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Editorial

Our year-end (and era-end) questions are not only what went wrong and how, but, as always, what is to be done? How do we understand the downfall of the socialist governments in Europe and the shattering of coherence in the world revolutionary movement? With our basic assumptions called into question, how do we reach an understanding of these events we did not predict in a way that will empower and not disable us? How do we maintain the connection between theory/ideology and revolutionary activity in this historical period? A dozen years ago, we pursued our ideological work and political activity in a world some forty percent of which was socialist (however flawed the model) or on some clearly noncapitalist path of development. It seems indisputable that, at least in the immediate future, we must now think and work and act in a far different context. Our choice is not whether to change, but how.

The subtitle, *A Journal of Dialectical and Historical Materialism*, chosen at this journal’s founding five years ago, designates a tradition that has always, at its best, seen change and development as inevitable and welcome. The urgency of our present need to analyze and evaluate dramatic and often catastrophic changes in the world and the need to imagine and construct a humane alternative to capitalist world domination require us to draw on this inherent strength of Marxism, reawakening it where it has become moribund. In every part of the world, revolutionary movements, workers’ parties, socialists, and left activists of all stripes are retooling for this task.

The need to build a united left political movement is widely felt, and few would wish to repeat patterns of the past in which such attempts have been weakened by dogmatism in theory and practice. It is therefore not surprising that any focus on Marxist methods and analysis may be regarded as an unwelcome diversion from the desired uniting of a broad socialist left. A search for profound change in forms of political struggle, however, cannot succeed in isolation from necessary theoretical study. The Marxist recognition of the dialectical linkage
between theory and social activity can play a positive role within a broad left of the future.

*Nature, Society, and Thought* is seeking a way to participate in this necessary process of change. We start with the affirmation of our vision of socialism, the need to redefine it, and the determination to work for it; with the promise of the fruitful use of our intellectual tradition disencumbered from dogmatism; with the recognition that interaction with other methods and traditions is to be sought and not feared.

To encourage this process of critical examination and projection of directions for further theoretical development, we are proposing a participatory Workshop on New Directions in Marxist Theory for Socialists to be held in October 1992. This Workshop will be a long working weekend, with every person attending a participant. Emphasis will be on interaction, learning from each other, generating new ideas, sharing experiences of those engaged in daily political activity. No formal papers or lectures will be presented, but planning and preparation of materials in advance should make it possible for discussions to be conducted at a thoughtful level and in depth. It is hoped that this Workshop will produce materials, to be published in *NST* and elsewhere, that will be useful to those committed to socialism in their teaching, research, and formulation of political activities. We hope also to contribute to the current process of theoretical development now ongoing internationally. We appeal to academics in all disciplines, and to trade unionists and others who give conscious priority to theory in their activity.

Those interested in participating are asked to submit suggestions as soon as possible; the Preparatory Committee will send all participants copies and (about 1 September) a tentative program with costs and a site (probably in the Northeast) chosen considering the preferences of participants. Specifics about submissions are on the Call to Participate that appears on the facing page.
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The Public/Private Distinction: Does It Promote Democracy or Serve the Ruling Class?

Thomas Kleven

Liberal ideology divides social life into a private sphere and a public sphere. The private is that area of life in which individuals and groups are largely autonomous, i.e., free from state intervention. The public is that area in which people collectively participate in governance and in which individuals and groups must sometimes subordinate their concerns to the good of the whole.¹

This essay offers a critique of liberal ideology from the vantage point of the public/private distinction I shall first discuss the legal and social consequences of the distinction;² second, analyze its philosophic underpinnings; and then examine in Marxist terms the extent to which the distinction promotes democracy, as liberal ideology contends, or furthers the domimative and exploitative interests of the ruling class. Finally, since private and public spheres would likely appear in any advanced society, I shall comment on how a democratic socialist order might treat their interrelationship. My basic point will be that the distinction is not fixed and immutable but rather highly manipulable; and consequently that it must be analyzed in historical context and incident to an evaluation of the entire social system of which it is a part.

Before proceeding with the argument, I should offer a few words about the concept of the ruling class. The notion of a ruling or dominant class is central to Marxian analysis (see, e.g., Domhoff 1983; Mills 1956). In using the phrase ruling class I do not mean to imply a monolithic, conspiratorial clique with a well-defined and agreed upon agenda. Nevertheless, power in liberal society is hierarchically and unevenly distributed; and there is a privileged class or segment of society which wields predominant political, economic, and social power.

and which uses this power to exploit and oppress the less powerful. There is much infighting among this ruling class; some are more powerful than others; and there is a degree of mobility both into and out of elite status. Nonetheless members of the ruling class do have a common interest, which they act on in ways both organized and spontaneous, in preserving the system and their privileged status within it. One such way, which is the theme of this essay, is through the manipulation of the public/private distinction.

The consequences of the public/private distinction

Liberal ideology justifies the public/private distinction as promoting democracy. Democracy implies self-determination. This in turn implies private decision making in areas which are exclusively or dominantly of individual or group concern and public decision making in areas of legitimate or dominant collective concern. This in turn explains liberal institutions. Public decision making is for the most part through legislatures or administrative agencies, with collective self-determination supposedly being assured through an electoral process which makes these bodies responsive and accountable to the people. Legislative and administrative bodies determine those actions which promote the public good. While they may also decide not to act and thus to leave certain matters to the private sphere, the risk that collective concerns will dominate legislative/administrative decision making necessitates special protection for important private concerns, as through a bill of rights enforced by a judiciary which is to some extent removed from day-to-day politics so as to enable it to safeguard private concerns in the face of demands for state intervention.

A starting point in criticizing the assertion that the public/private distinction promotes democracy is to recognize that no fixed boundary separates the public from the private, that the public and the private are not either-or alternatives but inhere simultaneously in every situation, and consequently that plausible arguments are possible on both sides of every public/private issue. This enables decision makers to manipulate the distinction to reach whatever results they want. The issues of sexual freedom and economic regulation are illustrative.

In a series of cases beginning with Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), which struck down a ban on the sale of contraceptives as applied to married people, and culminating in the overthrow of prohibitions against abortion in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), the Supreme Court placed people's sexual and reproductive lives largely beyond the purview of state regulation. These decisions enjoy widespread public support as fostering self-determination. Indeed, if
any area of life is private, one’s sexuality would have to be a prime candidate. Nevertheless, sexual privacy is under attack. The Supreme Court has already upheld criminal sanctions against homosexual activity in *Bowers v. Hardwick*, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), and it may not be long before Roe is overturned.

To justify these intrusions the public side of sexuality is emphasized—and there is an arguably public side. As to abortion, the argument is that the fetus is the moral equivalent of a human being, entitled to the same protections as every other human against invasions of its personhood. From this vantage point abortion is murder, the prevention of which is a well-recognized ground for state intervention. As to homosexuality, the argument is that people’s sexual mores cannot be kept private but unavoidably spill over into the public domain and impact upon society’s mores generally, both sexual and otherwise; and that society has a legitimate interest in protecting its mores against what it deems to be harmful influence. From this vantage point some view anything which undercuts traditional family life, as homosexuality is alleged to do, as socially disruptive and therefore of legitimate public concern.

In contrast to sexuality, it is commonly understood that nominally private economic activity is of public moment, in that it affects every one’s well-being, and is thus regulable by the state. Such has not always been so, however. Early in the twentieth century, as the struggle to establish the liberal welfare state unfolded, the Supreme Court in the so-called Lochner era struck down numerous economic regulations (see Strong 1973; Tribe 1988). While the Court used several legal doctrines to support its decisions, the primary underpinning was the claim that economic regulation invaded people’s private domains by interfering with their freedom of contract. That claim is now largely rejected, either on the ground that unequal bargaining power infects many contractual situations, thereby justifying state intervention to rectify the imbalance, or that so-called private contracts have public impacts, thereby justifying intervention to regulate those impacts. Yet even today liberal ideology contains a subtle antigovernment bias which favors the private over the public in economic matters. The presumption is that an activity should remain private unless there is good reason to publicize it; whereas in a socialist system, by contrast, the presumption might be that an economic activity remains public unless there is good reason to privatize it. Nor is it inconceivable that a laissez-faire oriented majority on the Supreme Court might again someday attempt to manipulate the public/private distinction so as to block state
Thus the public-private distinction is a two-edged sword. By focusing on the private, it can be used to cordon off areas of life from state intervention, e.g., sexuality, religion, speech, association, and thereby promote individual and group self-determination. On the other hand, by focusing on the public it can be used to justify state intervention in ways which undercut such self-determination. Or by focusing on the private, again, it can be used to justify the absence of or even to prevent state intervention to rectify injustice and oppression.

This last point is well illustrated today by the Supreme Court handling of racial segregation and affirmative action. It is, of course, settled law that the state may not discriminate against ethnic minorities through imposed segregation. Yet thirty-five years after *Brown v. Board of Education*, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), this is still a highly segregated society. In part, the explanation may be the difficulty of combating racism in the face of persistent racist attitudes. Another reason, though, is that the Supreme Court has relieved the state from responsibility for addressing segregation when it results not from state action but from ‘private’ action. So, while de jure segregated school districts have a continuing obligation to desegregate until desegregation is achieved, which has traditionally required some degree of integration as proof thereof (*Columbus Board of Education v. Penick*, 443 U.S. 449 [1979]; *Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman*, 443 U.S. 526 [1979]), a district which thereafter remains segregated in fact or becomes resegregated due to segregated housing patterns need not redo its desegregation plan to achieve greater integration (*Board of Education of Oklahoma City Public Schools v. Dowell*, 111 S.Ct. 630 [1991]; *Passadena Board of Education v. Spangler*, 427 U.S. 424 [1976]), nor must the outlying school districts to which whites, have fled to avoid integration participate in a desegregation plan (*Milliken v. Bradley*, 418 U.S. 717 [1974]). Moreover, there are limitations as to how far the state may go, even if it so chooses, to remedy racism. So, while race-based affirmative action is permissible to rectify past governmental discrimination (*Local 93, International Association of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland*, 478 U.S. 501 [1986]), the state may not set aside for minorities a percentage of government contracts when the lack of minority representation is the product not of state action but of generalized “societal [i.e., private] discrimination” (*City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co.*, 488 U.S. 469 [1989]). For to do so, according to the Court majority, would be to discriminate against innocent whites—thus standing the nondiscrimination principle on its head.
The Public/Private Distinction

Now, of course, the public/private distinction could easily be manipulated in just the opposite way, so as to make the state responsible for so-called private racism. The rationale could be that there is no substantive difference between racism as practiced by the state and as resulting from the mass collective action of individual whites; that the latter is every bit as public as the former; and that the state is in any event implicated in so-called private racism, and that the two go hand in-hand in that state-practiced racism has and still does contribute to so-called private racism by causing racist attitudes and in that the state has acquiesced and thus tacitly participated in so-called private racism. I feel sure most readers of this journal would favor such an approach, as would I. My point, though, has been that this is not a necessary interpretation of the public/private distinction and that it can readily be used, as it has by the Supreme Court, not to rectify injustice and promote self-determination but to help perpetuate institutional racism in life in the United States.  

Indeterminacy as endemic to liberal ideology

It is important to understand that the indeterminacy, and therefore the manipulability, of the public/private distinction is endemic to liberal ideology. Concepts such as due process, equal protection, free speech, and so on, are all subject to a variety of conflicting, indeed opposite, interpretations. To illustrate this point further, consider what is still the classic philosophical statement of the public/private distinction, that of John Stuart Mill in *On Liberty*

> As soon as any part of a person’s conduct affects prejudicially the interests of others, society has jurisdiction over it, and the question whether the general welfare will or not be promoted by interfering with it, becomes open to discussion. But there is no room for entertaining any such question when a person’s conduct affects the interests of no persons besides himself, or need not affect them unless they like. (Mill 1967, 1008)

Now, while it is obvious in reading *On Liberty* that Mill believed the scope of an individual’s private sphere to be wide indeed, it is possible to interpret his public/private distinction so as to make the private sphere quite narrow. The key is whether an individual’s actions affect the ‘interests’ of ‘others.’ These interests, according to Mill, are those concerns which ‘either by express legal provision or by tacit understanding ought to be considered as rights’ (Mill 1967, 1007). But this determination, which is a public one, is broad enough to encompass almost anything an individual might do. For example, abortion might
be deemed to violate another’s, i.e., the fetus’s, right to life. Or riding a motorcycle without a helmet, thereby increasing the risk of incapacitating injury, might by deemed prejudicial to the interests of others to whom one is financially obligated or to the interest of society at large that one not become a ward of the state. Or the freedom to choose one’s career, if unwisely exercised, might be deemed harmful to the interest of society, whose collective efforts make all careers possible, in maximizing goods and services.

There is simply no activity of an individual which cannot plausibly be claimed to affect the interests of others, unless some claimed interests are by fiat declared illegitimate. Mill attempts this move by asserting that the interests of others are not implicated when someone’s actions “need not affect them unless they like.” One way of reading this qualification is as putting purely mental effects off-limits, on the ground presumably that feeling bad is a matter of choice and thus somehow less real than physical effects. But mental anguish, as in the hurt caused by racial insults, is certainly a real harm arguably justifying their regulation either for that reason alone or because racial insults are interrelated with racist actions which cannot effectively be curbed without also regulating the former. Another narrower way of reading the qualification is as putting off-limits the mere disapproval of someone’s actions, as when one feels someone has made a bad decision or has acted otherwise than one would choose to oneself. Even here, however, it will always be possible to advance other justifications for deeming someone’s actions to adversely affect the interests of others.

Moreover, to the extent one believes in false consciousness, a substantial dose of paternalism might be thought justifiable. Mill asserted, and based his libertarianism on the notion, that the individual best knows her interests and is most likely to take those interests to heart; as against others whose own interests would likely impinge on their attempts to decide on behalf of the individual. To the extent, however, that the individual’s choices are influenced if not fully determined by the culture of which she is a member, and to the extent that that culture is dominated by a ruling class which has achieved ideological hegemony, then what an individual perceives as her own interests might actually serve the interests of the ruling class and contribute to her continued subordination.

One answer to this dilemma, with which Mill would have sympathized, is to combat ideas with ideas, to expose the lies of the existing order, so that armed with the truth the individual will be able to make intelligent decisions about her true interests. But this assumes equal
competition among ideas, whereas in a hierarchical society, even one which purports to value free speech, the ruling class will inevitably dominate debate though its control of and greater access to the means of communication. In addition, it overlooks the prevailing ideology’s hold on people’s hearts and minds, the presumption in favor of the status quo, the inertial power of the existing system, the desire on the part of most people for acceptance and conformity even when exposed to alternative ways of thinking. Consequently, belief in false consciousness could readily lead one, even one committed to a broad sphere of individual autonomy and self-determination, to believe in the necessity to revolutionize the existing order as a prerequisite to egalitarian discourse, and even to intervene in people’s lives in ways that would otherwise seem to violate individuality so as to break down the resistance of their false consciousness—all to the end of creating the conditions under which people can individually and collectively determine their true interests.

Now Mill would no doubt object strenuously to this line of reasoning. And its validity is certainly debatable. My point has simply been to demonstrate the inherent indeterminacy of liberal ideology as a way of emphasizing the importance of contextual and political analysis.

**The public/private distinction in context**

The argument so far has been that liberal principles can be manipulated to justify a wide, if not infinite, range of results to specific disputes, all of which results are consistent with some version of liberalism. Recognition of this manipulability of the public/private distinction, and of liberal ideology in general, leads one to focus less on abstract doctrine and more on who makes these decisions and whose interests they serve. The above discussion amply demonstrates that the promotion of democracy does not adequately account for the distinction in liberal society. For while it can be and has at times been used to advance both individual and collective self-determination, it has also been used to help perpetuate exploitation and oppression.

How then to explain the public/private distinction? Here Gramsci’s (1971) notion of hegemony is useful. As must any exploitative and oppressive system, liberal society must find some way to sustain and legitimize itself. Force of arms may help sustain a system, but because the oppressiveness of force is so obvious it may also delegitimize and thus destabilize. Thus the need for other means of legitimation. One which has so far worked quite well in the United States is to provide the populus as a whole with enough material well-being to distract
people’s attention from their own oppression and the imperialistic exploitation of others which contributes to their material well-being. Another, as Gramsci posits, is the use of ideology to foster ways of thinking which make the way of things seem normal or natural or morally justifiable. But oppression is oppressive, and no ideology can fool all the people all the time. So oppressive systems face continual demands for rectification, and unless all-powerful the ruling class will from time to time have to make some concessions. Here, again, ideology can be used both to rationalize the needed reforms and, more importantly for the ruling class, to contain those reforms within acceptable limits—i.e., so as to preserve the system and the dominance of the ruling class.

The ideological underpinnings of U.S. society are democracy, freedom, and equality, particularly equality of rights and of opportunity. And there is just enough actuality to these concepts, all of which respond to basic human needs and desires, to produce widespread support for the system, even though they are far from fully realized. Thus the political/legal process, inclusive of all branches of government, does to some extent provide people an avenue to express grievances and obtain relief. Indeed, a major purpose of the political/legal process is to resolve disputes and mediate grievances in less disruptive ways than would otherwise occur. But the ruling class still dominates the process, thereby ensuring, so far at least, that it will not be used to revolutionize the system entirely.

Enter the public/private distinction as a means both of granting demands for, and at the same time limiting, reform. In the area of economic regulation, the distinction now justifies state intervention on behalf of the public welfare; but it also helps sustain capitalism by asserting the primacy of the so-called private market, state intervention being justifiable only to correct the market’s inefficiencies or to provide goods the market is incapable of providing. As to women and ethnic minorities, the distinction has been used to undercut overt state discrimination somewhat, though not totally so; but by insulating the state from full responsibility for so-called private discrimination, it also helps perpetuate male domination, institutional racism, and the absence of genuine equality of opportunity. And more important than the settlements reached in specific situations, the use of the public/private distinction to grant modest reforms helps to channel disputes through the political/legal process, to legitimize the process as fair and neutral, and to delegitimize attempts to circumvent or attack the process. Even the terms ‘political’ and ‘legal’ are loaded, in that they imply that
reformist or revolutionary activities outside the electoral/legislative/judicial arenas are 'nonpolitical' and 'nonlegal' and therefore illegitimate.

The use of ideology to legitimize and pacify, along with the provision of material and social goods and the threat and use of force against the more rebellious, have so far proved quite successful in the United States in sustaining the capitalist system and the predominance of the ruling class. Socialism is not presently on the agenda in this country and has not been for some time—not since the New Deal, the Second World War, and U.S. imperialism helped overcome the ravages of the Great Depression. In fact, the great social reforms in the United States—the expansion of the franchise, the abolition of slavery, the civil and women's rights movements, the establishment of the welfare state—have for the most part not confronted capitalism directly and can even be seen as strengthening capitalism's hold.

The universalization of the franchise, for example, while a potential source of power for the oppressed, has in fact contributed to the dominance of monopoly capital (see Baran and Sweezy 1966; Galbraith 1973; Lindblom 1977). Monopoly capitalists require the active intervention of the state to promote their interests through such measures as economic stabilization, state purchase of their goods, and imperialistic ventures abroad. By creating a large middle class which is dependent on monopoly capital and consequently susceptible to liberal ideology, monopoly capitalists have been able to dominate the political process and use the state to their advantage. Meanwhile, those whom the system oppresses economically have been depoliticized—due to such factors as the lack of funds to organize and mount successful campaigns and an electoral system structured to favor a two-party system which submerges and silences nonmainstream views.

So, too, the abolition of slavery and the civil and women's rights reforms have been favorable to capitalism in several ways. While capitalists do benefit from the division of the working class along race and gender lines, monopoly capital, especially, depends on a large labor force which is most efficiently run when job assignments are based on skill and productivity. Race and sex discrimination, which social pressure may impel employers to practice, are thus artificial barriers to the achievement of efficiency. Moreover, they limit competition among workers for the better jobs and may thereby drive up labor costs. Since even absent discrimination the competition for jobs divides workers, it should not be surprising to find as much or more opposition to affirmative action from white male workers who benefit from race and sex
discrimination as from capitalists. Finally the amelioration of discrimi-
nation by moving the more activist of the oppressed groups, into the 
middle class, may both pacify them and convince others who identify 
with them that opportunities are increasing and redress is available 
within the system.

Likewise the welfare state, while in infringing somewhat on cap-
talist prerogatives, has on balance had a stabilizing effect. Take the 
regulation of employment. Limitations on working, hours, for example, 
may undercut management’s ability to exploit labor, but also benefit 
management by protecting labor against overwork. And the right to 
unionize may enhance labor’s bargaining power, but may also forestall 
more disruptive struggles while still preserving management’s author-
ity through limits on the scope of collective bargaining (see Klare 
1978). Or take state provision for the needs of those who cannot work 
or find cannot find work through security, unemployment compensa-
tion and other aid programs. Such programs, by reducing the reserve 
army of the unemployed, may strengthen the position of workers as 
a whole. But given the difficulty of providing for oneself outside the 
labor market under advanced capitalism, those without work will either 
remain destitute, and, thus be source of potential upheaval, or else must 
somehow be provided for. As between the alternatives of family and 
charitable provision on the one, band state provision on the other, 
the costs of which may fall on the same sectors of the society either 
way, the latter may well be more efficient and generate less conflict. 
But since undertaking welfare state measures alone would put individ-
ual capitalists at a competitive disadvantage, the stabilizing view of 
the welfare state sees state intervention, although in part a concession 
to class struggle, as a means by which capitalists collectively promote 
their interests as a class.

Nevertheless, despite the recent conservative drift in the United 
States, it seems premature to write off the potential for struggles to 
realize democratic socialism. Thus the view advanced here of the 
stabilizing impact of liberal reforms must be counterbalanced by the 
possibility that at the same time these reforms may represent incipient 
socialism emerging out of capitalism and that the current conservatism 
is a temporary hiatus in a long-term movement. History is retrospec-
tive. So long as capitalism dominant in this country, so will the stabiliz-
ing aspect of liberal reformism. But should future reforms bring about 
democratic socialism, the reforms of the past will then no doubt be 
seen as the first steps toward that end. Indeed, the ongoing; struggle to 
democratize the United States must inevitably and soon confront the
reality that genuine democracy, in the form of truly egalitarian self-determination, is not possible under capitalism. So long as capitalism remains, it will be difficult or impossible for oppressed ethnic groups and women ever to attain equality in this country, since in light of the great inequalities capitalism produces it serves the interests of whites, and men that people of color and women disproportionately bear these burdens.

How soon the reality becomes apparent, and whether when it does it will be possible to transcend today’s conservatism and move beyond liberal reformism to a more broadly based struggle for socialism, remain to be seen and depend on the circumstances. So long as this system produces enough well-being to pacify a large enough middle class to sustain the ruling class’s power hegemonically, and so long as rank-and-file inhabitants in the United States see competition from others of the rank-and-file rather than the working of capitalism itself as a threat to their well-being, then socialism seems unlikely. In the not so unlikely event, however, of a prolonged economic crisis, whose brewing may help explain current events in both the United States and throughout the world, the opportunity for genuine democratic socialism may well present itself. The risk, as evidenced by an increasing reactionary trend in the United States, is that in a crisis the movement will be in a more fascist direction. This is why we on the left must continue to advance the ideals of a fully socialized and democratized society.

The public/private distinction under democratic socialism

Supposing an egalitarian democratic socialism, would there still be a public/private distinction? In the first place, it is hard to imagine a society, especially an advanced society, where the concepts of public and private, and therefore a distinction between them, would not exist. Concepts arise out of material existence. Since human beings are largely social animals, a society in which humans live exclusively or dominantly “private” lives, with minimal interaction with others, is simply inconceivable. A dominantly communal existence with little that is strictly personal is perhaps somewhat more conceivable, but only for a relatively small and highly homogeneous group. Since in the modern context any such group, would be part of a larger society, the communalness of life would be internal to the group and society as a whole would still have to confront the question of the degree of autonomy, i.e., privacy, the group would be allowed within the larger society.

Though the public/private distinction exists, it comes becomes problematic
only in the face of conflict. If everyone agrees on the public and private aspects of life, and willingly conforms his or her actions thereto, then there is no conflict and no need for a method of conflict resolution. The manipulation of the public/private distinction arises in the course of conflict resolution and, due to the indeterminacy of the distinction, is an unavoidable aspect of it. This clearly appears in liberal society, which as illustrated by the issues discussed earlier in this paper is fraught with conflict. Conflict is managed in liberal society by the creation of rights such as the individual right to privacy or the right of the state to regulate in the public interest. Which side gets the right, when the issue is whether an aspect of life is public or private, depends in turn on the way in which the public/private distinction is manipulated.

As events in Eastern Europe and China demonstrate, conflict exists as well in state socialist societies. It would be instructive to examine and compare the extent to which conflict has been managed in these societies through the manipulation of a public/private distinction or its functional equivalent. I am not, however, prepared to do so now in the same detail as for liberal society. In general, liberal societies, especially the United States, seem to have emphasized more the private and socialist societies more the public. For example, the existence of widespread poverty in a country as affluent as the United States is attributable to the treatment of poverty as largely a private matter. While some public measures are undertaken, the state is not responsible for ensuring everyone access to such goods as employment, adequate housing, and medical care. By contrast, the state socialist societies, though economically less developed and highly inegalitarian, seem to have addressed more the needs of the least well off relative to their overall standards of living—although the current upheaval is causing severe economic hardship and the new openness may disclose that such problems as homelessness and unemployment have been more pervasive than previously acknowledged. At least it seems that these societies have treated these issues as more public than liberal societies on an ideological level, as evidenced by constitutional guarantees of employment, housing and medical care. The United States Constitution contains no such provisions.

On the other hand, the state socialist regimes have tended to suppress and regulate bureaucratically aspects of social life which liberal societies treat as private and view as integral to individual self determination; matters such as the choice of a career, individual entrepreneurship, geographic mobility, and freedom of expression. The absence of such rights and opportunities helps explain the current
turmoil in the socialist societies. Moreover, the absence of greater democracy in determining society’s direction has been a major contradiction under state socialism. It is hard to reconcile an ideology which views so much of life as of public moment with a hierarchical decision-making process lacking mass public participation. While these societies have not been totally devoid of democratic forms, and in many instances have been more democratic than liberal propaganda allows, they fall far short of truly democratic socialism. Their future direction remains to be seen. State socialism is certainly collapsing in most, and some are already moving down the capitalist road; yet, while anti-socialist sentiment seems widespread, it would be premature to write off the possibility for movement towards democratic socialism in at least some of the state socialist societies.11

Would egalitarian democratic socialism, if brought about either through the socialization of liberal society or the democratization of state socialist society, entail internal conflict? Likely so. While the inequalities in both societies clearly cause conflict, the elimination of inequality would not necessarily eliminate conflict since conflict may have other causes. Conflict might arise, for example, over access to resources or the question of whether equality is desirable. Even assuming consensus on this point, the process of eliminating inequality will be an extended if not endless one entailing debate over what equality means and whether it exists in practice. To some liberals equality means equal rights, to others equal opportunity or equal outcomes or equal responsiveness to people’s differences. To socialists equality might mean one thing in an advanced industrial society and another in a developing society, one thing in the early stages of transition and another under fully developed socialism. To Marx equality under communism entails a social structure in which each contributes according to one’s ability and receives according to one’s needs. But putting that principle into practice might also give rise to disputes over what constitutes contribution according to ability in particular situations and what distribution of the inevitably scarce goods of social life is appropriate when everyone’s needs cannot be fully met. A society without conflict, especially a modern mass society, is, in short, a utopian fantasy.

That conflict seems inevitable in any society with divergent wants and scarce resources, and if properly channeled is a necessary phase in the recognition of interdependence and the development of community, highlights the importance of the process of resolving conflict. The trouble in liberal society is that the inequality and oppression that produce conflict are built into the resolution process, as with the predominant
power of moneyed interests in the United States in both the political and judicial arenas. This helps perpetuate that very inequality and oppression, and is Marx’s meaning in calling “bourgeois right” a ‘right of inequality’ (Marx 1966, 9). Similarly, conflict resolution in state socialist societies has been skewed in favor of centralized bureaucracies which lack mass participation.

The task for democratic socialism, then, is to develop methods of dispute resolution which are truly democratic, so that the outcomes, rather than perpetuating inequality and oppression, promote an egalitarian society. This is the true meaning of the withering away of the state. The conundrum here is that a truly democratic decision making process, the particulars of which must themselves be democratically determined, is not possible in an inegalitarian society; and that democratic decision making, as a means of promoting substantive equality, demands substantive equality in order to be truly democratic. Thus social progress is a dialectical process in that equality and democracy, neither of which yet fully exists, are interdependent and must be created hand-in-hand at the same time that each is a prerequisite for the other. We must attempt to create them without being able to fully define them in advance and thus without being able to know we are there until we arrive.

Conclusion

Not wishing to be doctrinaire, and at the risk perhaps of sounding overly utopian, I have intentionally been vague about the particulars of democratic socialism, which might take a variety of forms in differing historical contexts and whose details will only be worked out through political struggle. Whatever its form, I feel confident in asserting that a society as inegalitarian, exploitative, and oppressive as the United States, both domestically and internationally, does not qualify. Nevertheless, democratic socialism might well include aspects of the liberal state. A bill of rights enforced by a relatively autonomous judiciary, for example, might have a place in an otherwise egalitarian democracy as a means of protecting people’s democratically determined private spheres; although it would surely go far beyond the U.S. Bill of Rights to include such rights as guaranteed employment and an equitable share of the social product.

As for the United States, any number of proposals could be advanced, many of which would entail a change in what is currently viewed as public and private, to move this society in a more democratic and egalitarian direction. Politically, proportional representation might
enhance the power of those whom the major parties do not represent, campaign reforms of various types might limit the influence of the moneyed elite, or strengthening local government might involve people more in governance. Economically, measures such as reregulation or nationalization of industry, workplace democracy, limitations on plant closures, full employment legislation, and many others, might undercut capitalist domination and exploitation.

I have refrained from advancing specific proposals, though, in order to emphasize the point that the key to a truly democratic and egalitarian society is the widespread and ongoing involvement of the people in creating that society. There is, to be sure, need for leadership and of a plan of action around which to mobilize people to take charge of society’s destiny. Historically, though, leadership has all too often been either self-interested or overly paternalistic, with the result that genuine mass self-determination has been stifled. Leadership, if it is to be progressive, must never lose sight of the fact that its programs are merely proposals designed to promote, and must be subject to revision in the course of, genuine self-determination. The relationship between the leadership and the people must be a reciprocal one in which the people ultimately control.

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NOTES

1. On liberal ideology and its antinomies, see Unger 1975.
2. For a fuller development of the public/private distinction, see Symposium 1982.
3. In Firefighters, a suit charging Cleveland with discriminatory employment practices, the Court upheld a consent decree containing a race-based promotion plan as a remedy.
4. Compare Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 476 U.S. 267 (1986), where the Court overthrew, in the absence of evidence of prior Board discrimination, a collective-bargaining agreement extending preferential protection against layoffs to minority teachers with less seniority than whites in order to maintain ethnic balance. On the other hand, perhaps in an effort to
accommodate both sides of the affirmative action dispute, the Court has allowed contract set-asides by the federal government, *Fullilove v. Klutznick*, 448 U.S. 448 (1980) and has allowed a public graduate school to take ethnicity into account in its admission process in the interest of diversity as long as it does not set aside slots for particular ethnic groups, *Regents of the University of California v. Bakke*, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).

5. A more through analysis of the public/private distinction than space allows here would have to account for the place of the Supreme Court in the ruling hierarchy and its interrelationship with other elements of the ruling class. What assurance is there, for example that this group of lifetime appointees will not use its power, either intentionally or unintentionally, to subvert the ruling hierarchy or the system itself? For an attempt at such an analysis and a more extensive discussion of the Supreme Court’s manipulation constitutional doctrine to mediate disputes and legitimize the system, see Kleven 1989.

6. Indeterminacy is not peculiar to liberal ideology, and may be endemic to attempt to articulate any philosophical principle and even to language itself. See, e.g., Wittgenstein 1958.

7. Contemporary liberal theories span a wide range, for example, from Nozick’s (1974) libertarianism to Rawles (1971) egalitarianism, which somewhat resemble, respectively, laissez-faire democratic capitalism and welfare-state social democracy. While none of the theories totally reflects the particulars of liberal society, support for most if not all aspects of liberal society can be found somewhere therein.

8. This bias in favor of the private helps explain the recent deregulation movements in the United States and other liberal societies. See, e.g., Grahl and Teague 1989 and Greer 1980.

9. Compare Marx’s (1967, 264–302, 470–503) characterization of the English Factory Acts as both a victory for the working class and as serving the interests of capital by deterring the premature spoliation of labor power.


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Cuba’s Role in International Mass Media

Sara Fletcher Luther

Restrictions on scholarship and information about Cuba keep U.S. citizens out of touch with important currents of history, including the role Cuba has played in Third World development. In the area of mass-media development, for example, and in the broad debate over international information policies, Cuba has made important contributions. However, the thirty-year war of ideas that the United States has waged against Cuba has precluded rational discussion of these contributions.

What follows is an attempt to fill in some of the background, especially as it relates to Cuba’s participation in the world information and communication controversy.

The history and interpretation of Cuban-U.S. relations are linked in significant ways to the rise of twentieth-century journalism and the refinement of newswriting for mass consumption (Black 1988). Cartoons, headlines, sensational reporting and editorializing, the role of public-relations professionals, competition between powerful owners of newspapers—all have been influential factors in the interpretation of events that marked the Cuban-U.S. connection. The attitudes that were created by these interpretations still hobble the formation of an informed public opinion (Thomas 1971, 313–14). In his account of the Spanish-American war and how it was influenced by the U.S. press, the historian Hugh Thomas quotes from William Randolph Hearst: “Under republican government, newspapers form and express public opinion. They suggest and control legislation. They declare wars. They punish criminals, especially the powerful. They reward with approving publicity the good deeds of citizens everywhere. The newspapers control the nation” (Thomas 1971, 313)

Of course the distortions that may be observed in present-day print
and electronic media are far more subtle than what was produced during the Hearst-Pulitzer journalism war of 1898. One would have to look hard to find anything as gross as Hearst’s 1898 New York-to-Havana telegram to his cartoonist Frederic Remington: “You furnish the pictures and I’ll furnish the war” (Thomas 1971, 340).

Today’s news biases may also have a far wider significance and effect than yesteryear’s, as the very life chances of people in the poorer countries become dependent on what they are allowed to communicate to us and what our information and mass-communications industries tell us about them.

A growing number of activists and scholars in the United States are calling attention to the role of the mass media in shaping and manipulating popular attitudes toward international amity and human development (Noam Chomsky, Edward S. Herman, Michael Parenti, and Herbert I. Schiller, among others). Other sources of information on the ideological uses of mass communication include the Institute for Media Analysis and its journal *Lies of Our Times*; the *CovertAction Information Bulletin*; FAIR (Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting), and its bulletin, *Extra!*; the Center for War, Peace, and the News Media, and its bulletin, *Deadline*; and the Media Alliance. Major international organizations are also paying attention to the problem, among others, UNESCO, and the International Association for Mass Communications Research.

The strongest voices have come from those closest to the scene of action, representatives and scholars of Third World countries. Working within the framework of the United Nations and the Non-Aligned Nations, they have devised two campaigns. The first aims at redressing the maldistribution of the world’s economic power and resources, and the second, at equalizing the imbalance in communicational and informational resources. The campaigns are designed to be interdependent, in the belief that the overcoming of global economic inequities requires global restructuring of news media.

The news publishing industry and press analysts in the United States oppose these trends. In various debates they have especially targeted the campaign known as the New International Information and Communication Order (NIICO), by which the poorer countries are seeking to change the emphases and distribution of world news and information resources. It is a controversy that goes back to the early days of UNESCO (Preston 1989). When the conflict erupted there in the late 1940s, spokespersons for the publishing industry in the United States opposed what they identified as dangerous trends toward the
“internationalizing” of culture and communication (Preston 1989, 59). During the present decade, the same hostility continues, emanating from what have now grown into vast transnational news agencies and media corporations. In 1984 it led to the U. S. withdrawal from UNESCO, in a major reversal of previous government support for the United Nations.

Still, the Third World’s campaign continues. The conditions that evoked the original call for a New International (or World) Information and Communication Order have not changed. In a paradoxical way, the accelerating tempo of information and communication technology has made matters even worse. People in the poorer countries know more now about their past contributions to, and their present tiny share in, the world’s wealth. They are becoming aware of the causes and effects of their poverty and national indebtedness. The severe disparities that exist—in technology, in education and training, in trading status, and in human subsistence standards—are not so well hidden as they once were. The struggle for access to mass-communication channels in order to bring these matters forward remains very much on the agenda. It intensifies existing world tensions and underlies the effort to strengthen conditions for peace and healthy human development.

The role that Cuba has played in world affairs during the years since its revolution has caused it to become a subject of scholarly curiosity, at the same time that it has continued as an object of attack by the United States. Its work in the area of mass-media development has perhaps been less noticed, although from the days of Herbert Matthews’s famous New York Times interviews with Fidel Castro (22–26 Feb. 1957), Cuban revolutionary leaders have showed keen interest in how the media can be used effectively to mobilize, educate, and politicize. There are many reports of how the rebels depended on mass media for the advancement of their cause—from the Moncada trial, to the mimeographed Sierra Maesta newsletter Cubano Libre, to the jungle broadcasts from Radio Bemba and Radio Rebelde (Judson 1984, 137, 164). Judson writes that Radio Rebelde provided honest treatment of the rebels’ problems, announcing their defeats or lack of supplies, along with their gains. Radio Rebelde “soon had the highest ratings of any of Cuba’s radio stations and Batista was jamming its broadcasts” (143).

As their social and economic conditions stabilized and their system of education developed, Cubans paid considerable attention to the formulation, analysis, promotion, and internationalization of the issues involved in the international mass-media conflict.
It is to be regretted that, in the present period of increasing acceptance of the rights of populations to choose their own paths of development, official U.S. policies continue to isolate and blockade Cuba and to prevent the Cuban story from reaching North Americans. To longstanding U.S. prohibitions on travel, scholarly exchange, diplomatic relations, and normal trade (including trade in the fields of information and telecommunication), are added the suspicion and rancor of powerful economic interests in the United States. Equally consequential is the presence in the U.S. of a large population of self-exiled Cubans, who exert their considerable influence in the political and academic climates, and more recently in the field of media, as in the case of Radio Marti and TV Marti, U.S.-sponsored agencies of external broadcast propaganda. The attitudes set in motion by these government, industry, and special-interest forces are mirrored in domestic electronic and print journalism and, accordingly, in U.S. public opinion.

Added to the overt modes of controlling the agenda on the matter of the Cuban revolution is the covert and almost immeasurable influence of the Central Intelligence Agency. I am referring particularly to its worldwide role as a creator and conduit for news and information; one former CIA operative has estimated that it is in fact the largest “news agency” in the world (Gervasi 1989), quite eclipsing the combined resources of the “big four”: Associated Press, United Press International, Reuters, and Agence France Presse.

Besides the aforementioned limitations on the availability of unbiased information about Cuba, there are some specific problems of mass communication theory that hinder understanding. For example, there is the unfinished debate about the ways in which journalism and its legitimate functions are perceived. By large majorities, international bodies like the United Nations and UNESCO have adopted resolutions, treaties, and guidelines that prohibit the use of journalism to incite racism or violence; they have urged journalists to contribute to the cause of peace by informing their readers and listeners about the roots of militarism and nuclear war, and about human-rights violations, including those violations that are associated with underdevelopment and poverty in vast areas of the world. It is a view of journalistic purpose that is not acceptable to textbook journalism in the United States, where the assumptions of rigorous neutrality are a sine qua non. A rare examination of the issue is found in a study of information technology in the Third World by William James Stover (1984). He comments that “most American journalists reject the notion that they have an obligation to promote any cause, no matter how noble.” They “believe their
professional values require them to be absolutely neutral. To condemn the arms race, for example, would require taking sides on an issue, and this would interfere with their professional objectivity.” Stover argues that “nuclear war is of such paramount importance that it should be condemned by all professions.” He adds, “Other vital issues such as human rights and world inequality demand similar subjective involvement and responsibility” (138).

Another unresolved aspect of the theory of mass communications is the relationship between reporters and the ownership structure of the media for which they work. In the United States this issue is perceived as one of “freedom of the press,” a tradition which holds that private ownership of the mass media in no way prejudices their content, and should be protected against any public regulatory legislation. A recent example is the declaration of the American Newspaper Publishers Association in opposition to any state laws which would mandate the use of recycled paper as a fixed percent of the total newsprint used by large circulation newspapers. “Regulating newsprint is regulating newspapers, and it is intolerable in a free society,” the publishers announced (New York Times, 22 Sept. 1989, B-20). In other parts of the world, the question of who owns the media—whether private corporations, the state, political parties, the church, or foreign interests—is recognized as being of critical importance to both the content and the perspectives of the news that is transmitted.

Another area of disagreement has been over the notion of free flow of information. As the argument has proceeded, the countries which were on the receiving end of the “free flow” have managed to alter the phrase by insisting on a “free and balanced flow” and, later, a “wider and better balanced flow of information” (Roach 1987). It is a recognition of the one-sidedness of the flow, which in fact has become a massive penetration of their cultures by Western-based mass communications, including the film, television, advertising, and publishing industries and the huge international news agencies. Much has been written to defetishize the mystical weapon of “free flow,” though, ironically, little of it flows past the ideological mentors of U.S. media (Preston 1989).3

Finally, we come up against some of the research methods and traditions that are common to much of Western sociology. These include the problem of funding and how a funding agency may influence a researcher’s choice and pursuit of a topic. In the case of research on Cuban media, few are the publishers, universities, or government agencies that will put up money, unless of course the research plan
reflects the anti-Cuban givens of current government policy (Zimbalist 1988). Certain aspects of social-science methodology are similarly restrictive, especially the self-imposed emphasis on empirical research, and the practice of dehistoricizing and decontextualizing the object under consideration. These latter approaches can cause grave distortions in a researcher’s findings about Cuba, especially in light of its long and complicated entanglement with the United States. It is a history in which each event is loaded with the ideological weight of previous actions. Thus the present controversy over access to mass media carries painful memories of precursor moments, such as the nineteenth-century warnings written by Cuba’s national hero and journalist José Marti, or the misinterpretations of the Platt Amendment betrayal, or the media disinformation about the Bay of Pigs and about the CIA assassination plans for Fidel Castro. Media research that detaches itself from time and space does not take us very far, though unfortunately the library shelves of U.S. colleges and universities are filled with it.

All these conditions—restrictions on the “free flow” of what we are able to read about Cuba; prevailing ideas of what is and is not “objective journalism,” “democracy,” “freedom,” “free speech,” and “free flow”; existing priorities for scholarship and research that emphasize empiricism and ahistoricism—combine to create a powerful hegemony. It sustains an ethnocentric single-mindedness about “our way of life as against theirs” that dominates almost the entire realm of U.S. opinion and attitudes.

Cuba and the international mass media

In talking with radio, television, and newspaper workers in Cuba, one is struck by their knowledge of U.S. folkways and mores and their familiarity with past and present history of United States-Cuba relations. In this respect they are not unlike their mentor Marti, whose skills and understanding were honed in encounters with the culture of the United States. Today’s Cuban journalists have learned their trade in the process of resisting the dominant position of their neighbor to the north and its influence in Latin American affairs. If called upon to explain and defend their concept of journalistic freedom, they will compare it to the kind of “unfreedom” that exists in U.S. urban ghettos. Or, as they discuss how the press law operates in Cuba, they are likely to place the issue in a context of U.S. international-law violations directed against them “during seven U.S. administrations.”

Among other violations, they are referring to the establishment in
1985 of a U.S. radio signal (Radio Marti) that transmits Spanish-language broadcasts with obvious intent of destabilizing Cuban society. The broadcast utilizes frequencies that are in use in Cuba, in violation of United States treaty commitments. They also cite the even more provocative action that is embodied in the United States effort to beam a television signal (Television Marti) into Cuban television channels. It is an abrogation of International Telecommunication Union conventions and of United Nations General Assembly guidelines adopted in 1982 (without concurrence of the United States) to protect nations from unwanted penetration by television signals directed against them from other countries.

Media workers in Cuba are broadly familiar with the journalism traditions and training in the United States and make use of them in shaping their own journalism education programs. They also incorporate values and techniques of other styles of journalism, including patterns developed in European socialist countries and in countries associated with the nonaligned movement. They have not forgotten the practices of prerevolutionary journalism in Cuba, when publishers' allegiance to Batista was bought and sold like a commodity, a fact acknowledged by various histories of Cuba (MacGaffey 1962, 47; Thomas 1971, 505, 507, 1136). Hugh Thomas writes that “one good source suggested that at the end of 1958 Batista was paying out to the press $450,000 a month for bribes.” Another historian, Louis A. Perez, Jr., says that “government bribes to the press were paid at the rate of $1 million monthly” (Perez 1988, 304).

Cuban journalists and media researchers also reject the U.S. pattern of mass-media ownership, asserting that it distorts news-stories in favor of the interests of owners. However, they warmly admire the kind of investigative journalism that occurred about the Watergate break-in, the arms sales to Iran, and the illegal funding of the Nicaraguan Contras. One journalism professor regularly shows his students the film *All The President’s Men*. Though Cuban media workers believe that certain outer limits are placed on such reporting in the United States, they are interested in achieving for themselves a more critical role in Cuban society. They want to go beyond their earlier stage of being “developmental journalists,” when they had to act as “transmitting agents” whose job it was to convey information on how best to fulfill the plan. They are increasingly concerned with the importance of the critical stance, the need to dig out and expose secrets and wrongdoing in Cuban society or government.

In short, during the years of U.S. covert warfare, economic
sabotage, and media interventionism against Cuba, and despite serious internal setbacks, Cuban professionals have accumulated skill and know-how in coping. They have taken some of the weapons that were deployed against them, remolded them, and turned them to new uses. An interesting example is the unanticipated effect of the decades-long effort of the CIA to destabilize and bring down the Cuban government. In 1986, I talked with a Cuban jurist who had been a CIA double agent for eight years, an experience that appeared to have deepened his commitment to Cuba’s goals. The following summer Cuban television and newspapers ran lengthy stories about twenty-six Cubans who had served the revolution over many years by pretending to work for the CIA; they were now “coming out” in order to denounce what they had observed about the methods of U.S. “democracy” (Ridenour 1989). The growing public record of the CIA’s use of journalism and journalists for intelligence and propaganda purposes (Marchetti 1974; Agee 1975 and 1987; Stockwell 1978; McGehee 1983) has had serious repercussions on how Cubans and other media workers around the world evaluate the neutrality claims of contemporary Western journalism.

The growth of journalism in Cuba has been occurring within a larger framework of social and economic development, as Cuban society has constructed comprehensive programs of health and medical care, universal education, and industrial and agricultural diversification. The result has led to a healthier, better informed, better educated, and totally literate citizenry, many of whom make up the growing corps of professional journalists, media researchers, and professors of journalism. These are the people who direct and staff the communications systems that have been put in place since the revolution, an infrastructure that included, as of 1989, fifty-two radio stations, two television channels, three national newspapers, Juventud Rebelde, Trabajadores, and Granma (the largest Spanish-language newspaper in the world, with a minimum daily run of 700,000), a number of provincial newspapers, close to a hundred specialized magazines, two schools of journalism, and a number of other agencies engaged in cultural, literary, and media-related activities.

Notice should be taken of the fact that since early 1990 Cuba has experienced acute shortages of printing and paper supplies, in part due to the continuing United States trade embargo and in part as a result of the profound political and economic changes in Eastern European countries that were its trading partners. This has forced large cutbacks in newspaper and magazine publications, with a social impact yet to be fully evaluated. For Cubans it means less access to home-reported news
about internal and foreign events. For United States information and propaganda agencies it may appear as an opportunity to intensify efforts to divide and weaken the present Cuban government.

The emphasis that the Cubans have put on mass communications, both domestically and internationally, arises directly from their revolutionary experience. They set out to transform the mechanisms and content of the existing media beginning almost from the day the new government was installed. Not unexpectedly, counterrevolutionaries were replaced with prorevolutionaries. Secret subsidies to individual journalists were exposed and eliminated. Cultural and educational programs were undertaken to protect the new state from hostile media attack. The long-standing pattern of the “colegio,” the professional association of journalists, was reinstated as the Journalists’ Union of Cuba (UPEC). The notion of free speech as once mandated by “pro-consuls” like Sumner Welles (Perez 1988, 261–63)—who seemed quite unmindful of the incongruity of demanding that Cuba have a ‘free press’ at the same time that he was trying to direct and control Cuban internal affairs—was reinterpreted to suit the new reality, which was that, so long as the revolution was under siege from the outside, no attacks from the inside would be countenanced. The historian Hugh Thomas provides an account of these changes from the point of view of those who were being displaced, mainly those who had owned and controlled the media during the U.S.-dominated Batista regime and its predecessors (Thomas 1971, 1261–63, 1463). Cubans working in television and radio tell the story differently, recalling the ending of decades of commercial exploitation, the reversing of long-standing neglect of rural listeners (because they had little purchasing power), and the breaking up of domestic and foreign advertising companies which had been controlling the structure and content of Cuban programming to suit their own interests (Urivazo 1985 and 1987).

In May, 1962, changes in the field of radio and television were formalized with the creation of the Cuban Broadcasting Institute, later renamed the Cuban Institute of Radio and Television (ICRT), which sought to construct a network that would make radio and television available island-wide. According to its spokespersons it continues to advance technically, despite difficulties resulting from the U.S.-imposed blockade. It hooked up to the Intersputnik satellite in 1974, introduced color television in 1975, and, after extended research, developed a system for converting Soviet-made television equipment from the SECAM (625 lines) to the NTSC standard (525 lines), which is what is used in Cuba, as it is in the United States. In 1979 it became an
INTELSAT subscriber. Today, among Third World nations, Cuba has one of the largest amounts of endogenous television production and is among those offering the most hours of television service.

If the internal press, radio, and TV transformations were in line with revolutionary traditions, what was not so predictable was how Cuba’s new media and its responses to the global communications controversies would change the international scene. Historians and media analysts from the capitalist countries have paid scant attention to either aspect of Cuban media development. For example, two recent collections on Latin American media, Atwood and McAnany’s *Communication and Latin American Society* and Fox’s *Media and Politics in Latin America: The Struggle for Democracy*, offer no discussion of Cuban media. On the international front, some of the Cuban initiatives have included the formation of the Casa de las Americas, which became noted for its promotion of Latin American literature; the Cuban Institute of Cinematographic Art and Industry (ICAIC), established in March 1959 (Chanan 1985); Radio Havana Cuba, which commenced its shortwave broadcasts at the time of the Bay of Pigs invasion in April 1961; Prensa Latina, founded 16 June 1959, one of the first international news services set up by a Third World nation; and the recently formed International Film Institute headed by Gabriel Garcia Marquez.

The year that the rebels took over in Cuba was a significant one in the life of nations. All over the world there was a growing recognition that colonialist domination was giving way to something new. In 1960, at its fifteenth session, the United Nations’ membership reached one hundred—it had started out at fifty-one. A year later Cuba was present in Belgrade for the formation of the Non-Aligned Movement, when twenty-five countries and thirty-five liberation movements joined to declare themselves for “independence for colonial peoples—opposition to military action against nonindependent countries and peoples, condemnation of the events in Angola and South Africa, and recognition of the rights of people to self-determination—as in the case of Cuba” (Stubbs 1989, 106).

As one of the first members of the Non-Aligned Movement (the only one from Latin America), Cuba joined in defining the grievances of the new countries and shaping demands for change. One of the early targets—in addition to the broad combat of apartheid, racism, and neocolonialism—was the problem of cultural and political interference, and the concentrated power of the transnational news agencies and other communications industries. The establishment of Prensa Latina had already demonstrated Cuba’s approach to the information controversy:
Prensa Latina was intended to become the “voice of the new Latin America,” a mechanism for breaking the “monopoly on information [that] existed in Latin America.” Its first director, Argentinian journalist Jorge Ricardo Masetti, explained: “Most reports about revolutions in Latin America are full of deliberately distorted information. Our duty is to put an end to this situation and help disseminate objective reports everywhere.” Objective did not mean indifferent: “We believe that indifference is a sign of cowardice because you cannot be indifferent when you are dealing with good and evil” (Formoso 1989, 8–9). Masetti’s remarks were made in 1959 and 1960, which, as it happened, was the same time that the CIA was starting up its anti-Cuba news manipulation campaigns in Latin America (Agee 1987).

Many other newly-independent countries followed the lead of Cuba in establishing national news agencies, although lack of money and trained personnel severely hindered their development. In 1975 the goal of a freer exchange of news between developing nations moved a little closer with the establishment of the Non-Aligned News Agencies Pool (NANAP). Its director described its goals as not “simply replacing the existing world-wide wire services or merely improving the balance in their news products,” but creating “a complete system, at the bilateral, regional, and multilateral levels, for enabling a multidimensional news flow” (Pero 1978, 160). The international edition of Granma, which is published in English, French, Spanish and Portuguese, regularly uses dispatches from some of the now more than eighty nonaligned countries’ press agencies. The power of the big four—Associated Press (AP), United Press International (UPI), Reuters, and Agence France Presse (AFP)—has arrayed itself against these new voices, seeking at best to co-opt them, and at worst, to undermine them by labeling them as “censored” or “government-controlled,” a charge that carries the questionable implication that in the United States there is an ideological distance between the press and the interests of the state. Paradoxically, there are a number of formal news-exchange agreements between the “big four” worldwide news agencies and various agencies of Third World and socialist countries. The Associated Press for example has had such a news-exchange agreement with Prensa Latina since 1979.

It was the deliberations of the leaders of the Non-Aligned Nations (NAN)—and their Ministers of Information—that led to the formal declaration of demands for a New International Information and Communication Order (NIICO) (Nordenstreng 1986), issued in August 1976 at the fifth NAN session in Colombo, Sri Lanka.

Another forum where the Cubans were active was UNESCO. There
the campaign against imbalances in information flows led, in 1978, to the unanimous adoption of the Mass Media Declaration. It underwent considerable amendment in order to win acceptance in the United States but opposition continued and, following a strong press campaign (conducted by the press on its own behalf) against the ideas embodied in the NIICO, the United States withdrew from UNESCO in 1984, hoping to bury the new world information order once and for all. However the Cubans have continued to work for change, recruiting support from other Third World countries, and using all their mass-media channels to keep saying the unsayable. For example, at the twenty-fifth anniversary of their shortwave broadcasting system, Radio Havana Cuba, in 1986, they brought together media specialists from several continents, including spokespersons for the many Latin American journalism groups in which they participate, including the Latin-American Federation of Journalists (FELAP), the Latin-American Association of Communications Researchers (ALAIC), the Latin-American Federation of Schools of Social Communication (FELAFACS), the Latin-American Association of Radiophonic Education (ALER), the Latin-American Agency for Special Information Services (ALASEI), the Latin-American Institute of Transnational Studies (ILET), the Institute for Latin America (IPAL), and the Higher Confederation of the University of Central America (CSUCA), to deliberate on the mass-media situation “on the threshold of the 21st century.” The result, not surprisingly, was a bold call for support of the NIICO as a way of achieving cultural identity and sovereignty, promoting new forms of communication between peoples, linking them up through exchange networks, and recovering Latin America’s cultural wealth. These are the kind of activities that Radio Havana Cuba itself pursues, broadcasting fifty-four hours daily in eight languages (Spanish, English, French, Portuguese, Arabic, Creole, Quechua, and Guarani). In line with NIICO goals, its programs are designed to build support for Cuba’s socioeconomic transformation and to counter what is perceived as a concerted media campaign against Cuba by United States newspapers and news agencies, and Latin American media that come under U.S. influence.

In what must have been a media first for a small (ten million population) and underdeveloped country, Cuba started in 1986 to transmit international television signals by satellite, beamed mainly toward Africa, for Cuban military then stationed there. Called Cubavision, and directed by the Institute of Radio and Television, the news and cultural program is broadcast in Spanish four days a week at 7:30 p.m. (Cuba time) via the Intersputnik system. While the signal can be picked up by
individual dish receivers along the east coast of North America it is not
deeded to be in violation of the International Telecommunications
Union rules, presumably because it is not specifically aimed to interfere
with North American frequencies. Nor is it perceived to be in violation
of the 1982 United Nations resolution on international direct television
broadcasting (DBS), which requires that a state that sets up a DBS
broadcasting service directed at another state must enter into consulta-
tion with any such state that so requests. In any case, perhaps for
obvious reasons, the United States has not requested such consultation.

In 1979 the Journalists’ Union of Cuba (UPEC) undertook the for-
mation of a Mass Media Study Center (CEMEDI-M-Centro de Estudios
de los Medios de Difusión Masiva) to conduct research in media the-
ory, methods, and practices. With large ambitions and little financing
its participants have published books and undertaken research. One
concentration has been on internal problems, including such topics as
media effectiveness, readership among youth, the training of journal-
ists, computer-science applications, the history of Cuban radio and
television, and the development of the labor press in Cuba. Even more
attention is focussed on hemispheric and international issues, including
many that underlie the NIICO debate, for example: the relationship of
the journalist to the arms race, or to government-sponsored campaigns
of destabilization directed at other countries; the role of disinformation
in U.S. foreign policy; the film industry in Latin America; the effects of
commercial advertising; the mass-media power structure in Latin
America; the management and supervision of Radio Marti; restrictions
on press freedom; the “old” information and communication order as
opposed to the “new”; and the training of Third World journalists
(including a critical evaluation of the work of Cuba’s José Marti Inter-
national Institute of Journalism, founded in 1983). Much of the
research is published in a small newsletter (printed in English, French,
and Spanish) which is intended for circulation among media research-

erers and policy makers in other countries.

During the eighties, as computer and satellite merged, a new
emphasis could be seen in the struggle over global informational
imbalance. Research and public statements by Cubans and others
called on governments of less developed countries to adopt national
communications policies. Such policies are perceived as a way of
responding to—without being overwhelmed by—the enormous increase
in the informatics technology of the transnational communications
industries. Cuba’s telecommunications may be studied as an example
of how a nation shapes such national policies: broad coordination of its
internal modes of mass communication, intensive development of international conduits for its message, direct participation in international telecommunications organizations, and a continuing emphasis on self-sufficiency, including, since the mid-eighties, the production and development of its own computers, with a goal of developing applications of computer science in Third World countries.

This paper has concentrated on Cuba’s role in the international controversy over global information flows in the belief that, like so much about Cuba, its media accomplishments have been widely ignored or distorted in the United States. What has not been taken up are some of the serious problems and shortcomings of the Cuban mass media, such as the inadequacies of professional training, the absence of genuinely critical commentary, and the sometimes boring, house-organ quality of what purports to be news but is more like an exhortation to work harder. A larger issue—of course given negative treatment by North American media analysts—is the close identification of the Cuban mass media with the goals and leadership of the Cuban Communist Party and the revolutionary government. In the United States the connection between the mass media and the government is less apparent, although when closely examined it may be seen to be very close, as is shown by Edward Herman’s analysis of how the major newspapers, newsmagazines and networks in the United States covered the NIICO controversy in 1984 (Preston 1989, 203–84).

It is clear that there is no space allowed in Cuba today for media voices that are counterrevolutionary. It is a degree of news control that is repugnant to the development of a free exchange of ideas between nations and peoples, although, as we know from our own history, it is not uncommon in nations which feel themselves threatened by outside forces. Perhaps, again drawing on our own history, we may assume that the limits which Cuba imposes on the exchange of ideas will diminish with the emergence of greater self-sufficiency and national security, and with the diminution of trade blockades, television wars, and covert actions directed against it.

While the New International Information and Communication Order is not a treaty proposal or a blueprint for international law, it does fall in the United Nations arena where international law is forged. It draws its inspiration from the UN Charter and the constitution of UNESCO. It has become part of the process of twentieth-century diplomacy, and must be understood in the context of the United Nations’ commitment to peaceful resolution of disputes, respect for national
sovereignty, unacceptability of racism or other violations of human rights, and the prohibition of war propaganda. These are relatively new concepts for the field of international relations and international law. They are still undergoing testing, review, and elaboration. Like them, the concepts embodied in NIICO can only become an international standard for behavior through continuing negotiation and practice.

During the years since NIICO was first formulated, its proponents have not lessened their support for it; they have in fact continued to define its characteristics, to argue its merits, and to implement procedures and structures by which it may be achieved. As noted, a number of NIICO goals have been forwarded by Cuba. Modest and under-financed as these efforts are, in comparison to their counterparts in the United States, their scope and impact cannot be denied. They have led to an increasingly hostile response on the part of the United States, but they have also added complexity and sophistication to the Latin American-North American relationship. One Cuban commentator sees the effect as the emergence in Latin America of a new stand “vis-à-vis the United States” in the form of a move away from “the ideological dogmatism of traditional Monroeism” (Hernandez, 1989, 397). Evidence of this may be seen in the widening cultural, trade, and information exchanges with Cuba that are being undertaken by other Latin American countries despite continuing pressure from the United States against such moves. At the broader, interhemispheric level Cuba’s support for liberation movements in Africa and its leadership in the ideological struggle to protect the cultural and informational sovereignty of nations has won it a place in Third World leadership. This too, has occurred in the face of untiring United States campaigns against it, notably in the OAS and in the United Nations Human Rights Committee. The struggle over access to, and control of, information and transborder data flows reflects a larger controversy, the conflict over the uneven distribution of the world’s material resources, technology, and knowledge. It is a crisis that will not be resolved by the kinds of policies being pursued by U.S. leadership—toward UNESCO, Cuba, or NIICO.

This paper was presented, in a somewhat different form, at the Canadian Latin American Studies Association conference on Cuba at St. Mary’s University, Halifax, Nova Scotia, 1–4 November 1989.

Poughkeepsie, New York
NOTES

1. Actually, conflict over control of news and information between nations goes back at least as far as the invention of telegraphy. A number of writers have commented on the parallel between the NIICO power struggle today and what happened in the nineteenth century, when emerging media and business interests in the United States sought to break down the British control of telegraphy and cable services (Luther 1988).

2. Original formulations by the nonaligned countries called for “a new international information order.” At the 20th UNESCO meeting in Paris, 1978, diplomats negotiated a wording more acceptable to the West, mainly to the United States, alluding to “[a new] more just and more effective world information and communication order.” Nordenstreng suggests that the new wording was aimed at distancing the issue from the New International Economic Order (NIEO—a goal promoted in the United Nations by Third World countries), and at evoking a more evolutionary reform. The substitution of “world” for “international” in his view implies “a theory of an ‘interdependent world’ which, like the McLuhanian ‘global village,’ undermines national sovereignty as well as class-based division between socialist and capitalist countries.” (Nordenstreng 1986, 19). The more recent and unexpected embrace of a “New World Order” by U.S. President Bush may be understood both as co-optation of these earlier Third World demands in the United Nations, and as an attempt to undermine concepts of national sovereignty that come into conflict with United States goals.

3. The book in question, Hope and Folly: The United States and UNESCO 1945–1985 by William Preston, Jr., Edward S. Herman, and Herbert I. Schiller (1989) almost did not get published. When U.S. publishing interests learned that UNESCO had commissioned its preparation by the Institute for Media Analysis, they issued sharp criticism. UNESCO leadership, seeking to accommodate the U.S. government, withdrew sponsorship of the study and the Institute had to find another publisher.

4. This commentary on Cuban media draws on interviews made in 1986 and 1989 with a number of Cuban journalists and media researchers; names of those interviewed are available from the author on request.

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Communism, Resistance, Postmodernism

Philip Goldstein

In a fundraising letter Colonel Oliver North presents himself not only as “one Marine infantry man who believes and still believes in freedom and democracy for the people of Central America and any other enslaved people” but also as a husband and father who condemns that “arrogant army of ultramilitant feminists opposed to traditional family values” (Bleifuss 1990, 4). It is not by chance that North brings together his anti-Communist crusade on behalf of “freedom and democracy” with this conservative attack on “ultramilitant feminists” and liberal family life. Such a complex of right-wing attitudes has long characterized U.S. views of communism. As Joel Kovel points out, not only does the culture treat communism as overwhelmingly evil, the culture assumes that this evil justifies massively brutal and cynical responses to liberal and radical feminists, trade unionists, African Americans, Indians, homosexuals, and Third World peoples (1988, 4–6).

I will show that this conservative depiction of a nightmarish communism has led historians, philosophers, and literary critics to assume that genuine intellectuals resist communism and oppose a complacent postmodernism. Before I do so, I should say that this conservative specter represents an excessively negative assessment, rather than a monstrous falsehood. Under Stalin and even after him, millions of Soviet people died unnecessarily and the Soviet economy and the society suffered terrible damage. Nonetheless, the conservative view is far too negative. In The Grand Failure, for example, Zbignew Brzezinski describes communism as nothing but waste, destruction, and terror. In fact, he says that before the Stalinist era no political movement had exacted “so much human sacrifice for relatively so little social benefit (1989, 21).


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This negative view dismisses the positive achievements of the Soviet Communists, who made the USSR an urban, industrial society, with a highly educated population. In *The Gorbachev Phenomenon*, Moshe Lewin shows that the Communists changed the USSR from a backward, agricultural society to a progressive, urban society, with many large cities and a public culture. More importantly, the Communists educated the population. As Lewin points out, in 1939 and even in 1959 more than ninety percent of the population had only four years of elementary school education; however, by 1984 those who had no more than an elementary school education were only 18.5% of the population (1988, 47). Moreover, this increasingly educated population helps explain the Soviet reforms. The new schools created technical specialists whose expertise mattered more than their loyalty to established doctrine. As Stephen Cohen points out, these specialists, brought into the party by Khrushchev, have consistently agitated for reform (Cohen 1985, 17–19). In East Germany, where the specialists were unable to exert any appreciable influence, the Communist regime collapsed readily enough, but in the USSR the agitation of the specialists brought significant and continuing change.

The conservative view also ignores the political differences of Communists. Rather than acknowledge the conflicts of Stalinist and liberal Marxists, the conservatives insist that communism is too rigid and dogmatic to allow opposition or change. For example, Brzezinski describes communism as a “grand oversimplification” in which “the abolition of private property would permit the attainment of true justice and of the perfection of human nature” (1–2). This “oversimplification” appeals to the semiliterate, who are moved to struggle against the ruling class, and to the intellectuals, who acquire a “readily understandable system of thought,” with a “unique insight into the future as well as the past” (2–3), but remains too dogmatic to permit reform. Its dogmas, especially its refusal to accept a multiparty system, are too rigid and too deeply entrenched to allow change. Brzezinski predicts that, rather than repudiate Leninist dogmas, the party leaders will allow the country to disintegrate, and “a coalition of disgruntled Great Russian officers, fearful central party bureaucrats, and outraged KGB officials” will undertake a coup and restore order (102).

As this mistaken prediction suggests, Brzezinski ignores the Communists’ liberal reformers, who, led by Bukharin, Khrushchev, and Gorbachev, defended democratic political structures, independent courts and judges, free artistic expression and intellectual exchange, and market-oriented economic policies. I grant that by the 1930s the
Stalinist variety had triumphed, but its triumph was due to the USSR’s peculiar conditions. As scholars have noted, to an extent, Stalinism won out because World War I, the revolution, the civil war, and the foreign invasion devastated Soviet industry and business. By the mid-1920s the country reverted to a primitive kind of agriculture, the triumphant alliance of peasants and workers broke down, and the Communist Party grew isolated and alienated. Stalin was able to exploit the paranoid fears resulting from this internal isolation as well from unceasing Western hostility. Not only did he successfully impose collective farming and liquidate the kulaks (rich peasants), he built up a secret police which exacted a strict political conformity and eliminated his opponents, including his Communist opposition. As Robert Tucker points out, his tyrannical regime came to approximate the equally tyrannical regimes of the nineteenth-century czars, who also built huge projects, forced the peasants into slave-labor camps, censored the work of artists and intellectuals, and organized an extensive secret police and a highly ritualized bureaucracy. Soviet oppression and tyranny resulted from overdetermined, historical conditions in which Stalin and his followers crushed their liberal opponents and imposed a despotic, neoczarist rule (Lukács 1973, 61–71; Cohen 1985, 38–70; Lewin 1988, 13–82), not from a monolithic communism.

The conservatives do not acknowledge these internal divisions between the liberals and the Stalinists. More importantly, the conservatives condemn anyone who opposes their negative, indiscriminate view of communism. Since the 1940s and the 1950s, when the Western world discovered the horrors perpetrated by Stalin and his supporters, any “fellow travellers” who defended communism simply convicted themselves of duplicity, blindness, or fanatic dogmatism. For example, in “Politics and the English Language,” a widely anthologized essay, George Orwell ridicules a professor who claims that Communist governments benefit their citizens. Orwell (1956, 353) says that the language of this professor epitomizes the dishonesty and the deception characteristic of political language. In an equally contemptuous way, David Caute defines a “fellow-traveller” as a person who, dreaming of rational “social engineering,” defends “the torments and upheavals inflicted on the Russian peasantry during collectivization” (1973, 3). Because the fellow traveller praises the USSR’s “planned social engineering” but refuses to join a Communist Party or move to the Soviet Union, Caute says that he or she betrays a “convenient schizophrenia” (5–6).

This “convenient schizophrenia” suggests the great extent to which
the conservatives made opposition to the evil communism the key feature of intellectual integrity. William Pietz points out that after World War II cold-war scholars defined totalitarianism as the “use of new communications and weapons technology to enforce a total control over language, the expression of ideas, and even, ideally over thought” (1988, 65). Moreover, resisting this “total control” characterizes the genuine intellectual, who opposes terrorist ideology and defends uncompromised truth (65). For instance, Norman Podhoretz praises the integrity and the bravery of Solzhenitsyn, who initially construed Marxism and Leninism as positive, enlightened doctrines betrayed by Stalin and his followers (1986, 186), but who quickly learned to reject this whitewashing distinction. Now Solzhenitsyn preaches against “the failure to realize that communism is irredeemable, that there exist no ‘better’ variants of communism; that it is incapable of growing ‘kinder,’ that it cannot survive as an ideology without using terror, and that, consequently, to coexist with Communism on the same planet is impossible” (Podhoretz 1986, 186).

Since at least the 1940s, the critical theorists of the Frankfurt School have also assumed that the genuine intellectual resists an oppressive and destructive communism. However, these theorists defend the subversive power of normative Hegelian thought. While they dismiss scientific Marxism as Stalinist and its defenders as dogmatists, they insist that Hegelian theory enables intellectuals to resist and to critique the empty conformity and the oppressive structures imposed by established institutions.

The trouble is that this Hegelian view preserves the conservative dismissal of communism. For example, in Beyond Glasnost, Jeffrey Goldfarb assumes that resistance comes from autonomous cultural practices, not from institutional changes (1989). He admits that in Gorbachev’s post-totalitarian society the rulers permitted more freedom of discussion and defense of human rights, but he insists that these reforms only solidified the tyrannical power of the government. They amounted to no more than variations of the totalitarian theme. Since totalitarian society rationalizes and controls every aspect of its institutions, resistance or reform can only come from outside, from what he, like Habermas, terms the autonomous cultural sphere. While Lewin (1988) and Cohen (1989) attribute Soviet reform to the USSR’s painfully acquired liberal and technical constituencies, Goldbarb describes Soviet reform as an “official imitation” of the Communist regimes’ former opponents, such as Lech Walesa, Andre Sakharov, Milan Kundera, or Aleksander Solzhenitsyn. As Goldbarb says, “These well-
known, along with not so well-known oppositionists, are the true authors of glasnost, the instigators of the post-totalitarian mind” (xvii).

This conservative emphasis on intellectual opposition and on an unchanging and unchangeable communism also permeates modern fiction. In spy and detective fiction, political dystopias, and modernist and postmodernist art, communism represents an evil of mythic proportions and the hero who opposes it thereby establishes his or her integrity. Consider, for example, Mickey Spillane’s One Lonely Night (1951). In this novel, Mike Hammer faces a Lee Deamer, a Communist adversary of the usual, mythic proportions. Not only does Deamer escape from an insane asylum, he kills and impersonates his sane twin brother, terrorizes various Communist Party functionaries, and tricks Mike’s ally Pat, the newspaper reporters, and even the whole U.S. public into trusting him. They foolishly believe that he alone, the last, honest conservative, can drive Communist infiltrators from the U.S. government. However, while One Lonely Night shows that this mythic communist evil justifies Mike’s resurgent chauvinism, this novel does not by any means restore our faith in the government’s bureaucracy. For example, a judge who condemns Mike’s relentless killing haunts him throughout the novel, undermining his faith in chauvinist brutality. Fortuitously enough Mike uncovers a brutal Communist ring, which, led by Soviet general Osilov and two Soviet spies, exploits democratic U.S. freedoms for undemocratic ends. This discovery restores his faith in his Rambo-like manhood but not in the U.S. courts or government. Indeed, to stop the wealthy and sexy Ethel Bright from raising funds for the Communists, Mike threatens to beat her; as he says, “Maybe I’ll see you stripped again. Soon. When I do, I’m going to take my belt off and lash your butt like it should have been lashed when you first broke into this game” (84). Posing as a punishing father and an aggressive lover, Mike reveals both the voyeur’s desire to see the lovely Ethel naked and the sadist’s desire to hurt her. Repeated in Spillane’s fiction, such desires encourage the domineering gaze which bonds male characters and male readers. Still, Mike ends up saving her from a Communist assassin and concealing her subversive activities from her father and the police.

To stop the Communist agents, Mike takes more brutal but equally chauvinist action, shooting and gutting them, but he carefully hides his killing and destruction from the police, including his ally Pat. Before he chokes Deamer to death, he brags about his brutality: “They were red sons-of-bitches who should have died long ago, and part of the gang who are going to be dying in the very near future. Pretty soon what’s left of Russia and the slime that breeds there won’t be worth
mentioning and I’m glad because I had a part of the killing” (171). Thanks to these “red sons-of-bitches,” Mike vindicates his role as a killing machine; they restore him and the reader to the chauvinist Rambohood threatened by the judge’s castrating morality. At the same time, by identifying the upright conservative Deamer with the ruthless Communists, Mike subverts any easy distinctions between conservatives and Communists. Moreover, by arranging the death of Deamer so that the police will blame the Communists, not him, Mike ironically betrays his intense distrust of the police, the courts, and the conservatives.

John Cawelti has recognized the voyeuristic sexuality, the sadistic violence, and the hysterical anti-Communism of Spillane’s fiction, but Cawelti treats these sentiments as standard features of formulaic, hard-boiled fiction and, more generally, of nineteenth-century didactic fiction (1976, 186–89). This generic analysis overlooks the fact that the harsh moral voice of a condemning judge torments Mike, forcing him to justify his brutality. Moreover, Mike’s justification is the new, cold war anti-Communism, including the notorious trial of the Rosenbergs and the McCarthyite persecution of Communists. One Lonely Night takes this barbarous persecution to reveal the conventional Communist menace from which Mike saves not only the confused Ethel and the devoted Velda but also the condemning judge and the innocent U.S. public. Such anti-Communist salvation silences the judge’s harsh voice but the salvation also subverts the novel’s formulaic distinction between upright conservatives and ruthless Communists and exposes the inadequacies of the police and of the government.

At an altogether different level, the realm of high art, the conservative view of communism emphasizes aesthetic-autonomy, rather than brutality and violence. This view of has certainly governed the reception of Solzhenitsyn, who earned critical praise for heroically defending the high modernist tradition of Dostoevsky even though the totalitarian rulers of the USSR sought to destroy it. Moreover, this view has influenced modernist and postmodernist art, which preserves the dystopian pessimism of the conservatives. To explain the modernist stance, some critics say that it describes the subconscious actions of the mind, rather than the empirical features of external realities. These critics suggest that, brought on by World War I, modernist art grows disillusioned with liberal ideals of progress and morality as well as the cliched language and public conventions of popular culture. Other critics consider modernist art a congenial opponent of liberal intellectuals and democratic writers whose Communist proclivities led to simplistic
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abstractions and stylistic ineptitude. For example, Lionel Trilling says that the “authenticity” of modernist art “is implicitly a polemical concept” (1972, 94). Moreover, these critics suggest that, while modernist art preserves the creativity and independence of the artist and the critic, the culture industry destroys the individuality, the thoughtfulness, and the resistance of the popular artist and the consumer, both of whom learn quickly enough that, if they resist or rebel, anyone could replace them.

While modernism repudiates popular culture and preserves the autonomy of the devoted artist, postmodernism subverts the conventions and assumptions of popular culture, especially detective and spy fiction. Both modernism and postmodernism express a dystopian pessimism, which may take the serious form of a deep, existential negativity or the comic form of absurdist situations and character types; postmodernist fiction forcefully parodies the empirical objectivity, chauvinist ideals, and mythic communist evil of the detective and spy story. William Spanos even suggests that this antidetective fiction subverts the totalitarian mythology elaborated by spy fiction. Critics complain that, unlike modernist art, postmodernist art does not resist totalitarian society in particular and modern society in general. For example, in several influential articles, Jameson complains that, an “aesthetic populism,” postmodernism, which effaces the “older (essentially high modernist) frontier between high culture and so-called mass or commercial culture” integrates culture into “commodity production generally” (1984, 54).

However, postmodernism does subvert the anticommunist mythologies of popular culture. Consider, for example, the differences between Ernest Hemingway’s *For Whom the Bell Tolls* and Thomas Pynchon’s *The Crying of Lot 49*. In *For Whom*, Hemingway has written a modernist adventure story which inverts the traditional virtues of heroism, faithfulness, and loyalty but which takes the intrigue and the adventure very seriously. Robert Jordan and his motley band of Spanish guerrillas lack the bravery and humanity of the great hero. Instead of gaining victory or triumph, they lose to the fascists and face destruction, if not suicide. Yet this modernist pessimism does not preclude the serious treatment of romance and war. For example, Jordan has a brief, intense, and moving affair with Maria, who blossoms even though she suffers from a fascist gang rape. Jordan devotes himself to Spanish partisans whose brutality and cowardice do not compromise his democratic ideals. Neither does the partisans’ alliance with the Communists compromise his ideals. Indeed, *For Whom* presents a surprisingly
ambiguous depiction of the Communists, who include both the Soviet journalist Karkov, a decadent but militant reformer, and the Communist Party leader Marti, a paranoid Stalinist ideologue.

By contrast, *The Crying of Lot 49*, Thomas Pynchon’s classic postmodern novel, both inverts traditional notions of life’s meaning and parodies the generic conventions of the detective story, including its specter of mythic communist evil or chauvinist violence. Appointed a trustee of Peirce Inverarity’s estate, Oedipa the detective/heroine undertakes to solve the mysteries of the huge estate. However, as she examines and pursues clue after clue, she gets less and less certain that she is finding a solution. The clues multiply, characters mysteriously die, disappear, or go crazy, yet Oedipa is less and less confident that her investigations have produced an answer or that she has escaped paranoia.

Not only does a definitive answer to the estate’s mysteries constantly elude her, her pursuit of this answer takes on a disturbing character. Her existential fear of a meaningless world precipitates a dystopian fall into uncertainty, if not insanity. When she first undertakes the investigation of the estate, she, like the lady of Shallott, leaves the safe, protected tower which has hitherto preserved her untested ideals. Thanks to Metzger, her cotrustee, she is unfaithful to Mucho Maas, her husband, and this infidelity precipitates another dystopian fall, but this one, which parodies the sexual exploits of the serious detective story, is comic. Putting on many, many clothes, Oedipa struggles to escape Metzger’s seduction, only to succumb all the more forcefully.

More importantly, her discovery of the mysterious Trystero parodies but does not repudiate the mythic communist evil of the detective story. With an underground postal service, a centuries-long history of conspiracy, and pervasive symbols and icons, the secret Trystero constantly extends its existence. In fact, the Trystero, which absorbs both the right-wing Peter Penguïnd Society and left-wing anarchistic revolutionaries, which may have fostered the French Revolution as well as a private, underground postal service, has an insurgent, totalitarian character. However, Oedipa cannot decide whether it really exists or Inverarity and his associates have simply made it up. As a result, Oedipa comes to suspect that her pursuit of a rational explanation of Inverarity’s will only reveals her paranoid fears. Like Dr. Hilarius, the psychoanalyst trained in the Buchenwald concentration camp, Oedipa fears that she too may suffer paranoid delusions.

In postmodern, antidetective fashion, the novel does not resolve this issue. The discovery of the Trystero makes her fear that she suffers
paranoia, but she cannot exclude the possibility that the Trystero has a
genuine function and true existence. However, posing this issue does
parody the cold-war ideology behind the novel’s military-industrial,
Southern California setting. Like the popular detective story, The
Crying invokes the specter of a hidden, subversive totalitarian force;
however, while the popular detective story treats communism as mythic
evil justifying chauvinist brutality, The Crying of Lot 49 suggests that
the totalitarian Trystero may amount to no more than a paranoid delu-
sion.

In sum, the opponents of a postmodern approach complain that it
deprives the subject of its traditional capacity to resist and to oppose
the ideological commitments of his or her culture. I grant that a subject
that is situated within its cultural practices cannot escape complicity
with their ideological commitments. Indeed, neither One Lonely Night
nor The Crying of Lot 49 decisively reject cold-war ideology. Nonethe-
less, unlike modernism, which dismisses the subversive force of works
like One Lonely Night and adopts the cold-war belief in a monolithic
communism, this novel does question that ideology and, by implica-
tion, the whole pessimistic, anticommunist mythology fostered by
conservative historians, political scientists, and literary theorists.

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NOTES

1. In One-Dimensional Man, for example, Marcuse argues that the instru-
mental rationality deriving from the Enlightenment imposes a narrow, irrational
conformity on both the United States and the Soviet Union. Marcuse admits
that the totalitarian dictatorship of the Soviet Communist Party seeks to free the
Soviet people to gain enlightenment and independence, but he still argues that
Soviet Marxism perpetuates what he calls “technical progress as the instrument
of domination” (1964, 41–42). However, he insists that, even though this
instrumental rationality has successfully dominated the working class and other
oppositional groups, the systematic, totalizing theory of Hegel and Lukács
retains its subversive force.

In The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, Habermas faults those tradi-
tional Marxist theories which emphasize scientific technology, productive
labor, and practical totalities (1987, 67–68). He says that, unlike theories which
accept the Hegelian concept of rational communication, these traditional
theories of production fail to clarify their “normative foundations.” Without
such clarity, such theories cannot successively oppose totalitarian practices,
what he calls the “instrumental reason of a purposive rationality puffed up into a social totality.”

2. For example, Joseph Frank calls Solzhenitsyn an “exemplary figure who, like Tolstoy, has successfully opposed the power of the pen against the might of a tyrannical and oppressive regime” (1990, 103). Similarly, Richard Freeborn says that Solzhenitsyn’s “confined, pressure-cooker worlds of prison camp and cancer ward highlight more powerfully than Dostoevsky’s record of his prison experiences the inexhaustible resilience of the human spirit and the never ending pressure towards freedom experienced by all men under restraint” (1976, 16). Robert Boyer also says that what we learn from Solzhenitsyn is that “the affirmation of the free individual may itself be a radical gesture having as little to do with petit bourgeois pieties as with Marxist imperatives” (1985, 93–94). See also Yuri Glazov says that Boris Pasternak, Andrei Sakharov, and Solzhenitsyn showed “enormous integrity” because they recognized that the “social world” was “able to kill them spiritually and intellectually, if they were to allow themselves to be coopted into it” (1985, 159). See also Harrison Salisbury’s description of Solzhenitsyn as “a second government in a land where ‘the black toad of villany’ is king” (1970, xiv).

3. See, for example, Edel 1964.

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A Woman’s Viewpoint on the Ethical Dimension of Leontyev’s Concept of Human Nature

Dorothee Roer

1. Introduction: How I arrived at this subject

I arrived at this subject through two of my principal interests: The first is German psychiatry in the fascist era. Anyone researching this field is obliged to confront continually the (ultimately murderous) consequences of integrating the late bourgeois, profoundly inhumane concept of human nature in this discipline (Roer and Henkel 1986).

My second principal interest is making use of Leontyev’s theory for a differential psychology of gender. Any attempt at such use is futile without an assurance that Marxism supplies the appropriate instruments. It is precisely this that is now being questioned by a number of feminists. They define the Marxist concept of human nature as a particularly male (bourgeois) concept, hostile to women and to humanity as a whole, suitable as an instrument for the legitimation of inhuman practices, and unsuitable for the foundation of humane practices.

In examining this accusation I shall first briefly outline the feminist critique of Marx and Leontyev, which I shall then follow with a critical reflection in which certain arguments will be discarded or relativized, and others adopted.

2. What feminists criticize in Marx and Leontyev

In my presentation of a feminist critique of Marx, I follow Christel Neusüss (1985), whose exemplary study is widely read in the Federal Republic of Germany, and which I consider to be of conclusive value.
for the feminist-Marxist dialogue in our country. Neusüss asks why Marx fails to pay tribute in his works to the special form and the enormous (even economic) value of typically female (i.e., reproductive) work. Her reply is that his male-chauvinist thinking had distorted his view of this factor, leading him to a narrow, and therefore false and dangerous, understanding of labor and personality.

Neusüss argues: Marx primarily follows the model of hand-and-brain-worker as a master-builder (Hand-Kopf-Baumeister-Modell). To Marx, labor is the planned and purposeful production of social values by acting on and changing objects. In a conscious interaction of intellect and hands, producers subjugate their objects of labor (which can also be people) to their wills and put themselves as subjects opposite to the objects they are working on (rulers of nature, society, and history).

Neusüss’s position is that in Marx’s view human beings are hand-and-brain-monsters, believers in science, progress, and technology; hybrid planning fetishists and amoral rationalists; exploiters who believe they can control everything and have not even noticed how destructive their actions are. In short: Marx’s human being is none other than the manically self-deluding bourgeois male. The only deviation from the classical bourgeois model is that Marx’s human is antiauthoritarian and, in theory at least, committed to the concept of equality.

As for Leontyev, how is he regarded from a feminist point of view? As far as I know, no written argumentation has been developed on this question. I therefore fall back upon my experience of discussions on this subject. The following objections are raised time and again:

a) Leontyev’s concept of human nature is also dominated by an ethos of planning and doing. Evidence: the choice of activity as the decisive psychological category: doing as constitutive of being human; the emphasis on the objectiveness of all activity, doing as working with objects; the description of activity by means of the terms appropriation and objectification, doing as a process of subjugation and re-creation of the objective world, the dominant activities—playing and learning—as merely transitory, as preliminary forms of the activity = labor = wage labor?

b) Here we also find the hybrid fantasy of the creation of humans through themselves. Evidence in addition to the above-mentioned understanding of activity: the definition of personality as the totality of the individual’s societal relations realized by the individuals themselves; the concept of need or motive; even the basic moving moments are not provided or given, but self-created; the neglect of the social dimension (see below).

c) Such an approach leaves no room for reflection on that which
cannot be planned, or which is beyond the scope of planning, such as spontaneity, or irrational and unconscious activity.

d) Leontyev’s concept of the human being is utterly asocial. Evidence: the lack of any approach toward a theory of societal relations; questions of gender, sexuality, etc., are not discussed; mother-child relationships, central to every child’s development, are merely hinted at.

If this feminist criticism were found to be correct, the concept of human nature projected by both Marx and Leontyev would be profoundly inhumane.

Such a concept would help permit a legitimation of the categorizing of humankind in two classes: humanity = white bourgeois males, and the subhuman rest = women, children, the people of the Third World, etc. The neglect of the idea of the oneness of humankind would have highly sensitive ethical consequences (e.g., in racism). An inadmissible generalization would promote the acceptance—and indeed glorification—of precisely those personality traits as “generally human” which have emerged in the historical process as the psychological correlates of class-specific and gender-specific power. Antisocial behavior, power and violence would thus be legitimized.

Finally, it would suggest a quantification of humanity measurable on the yardstick of productivity = achievement of the individual (the more productive, the more human; unproductive = unhuman) which could, in the end, lead to the justification of selecting the “unproductive” to the point of murdering them.

A theory which permits such ethical positions cannot and must not be the basis for or part of a discipline which has a humanistic commitment. It is therefore necessary to examine these accusations very carefully. Let us at first go back to Marx.

3. My Marx, or why his Paris Notebooks mean so much to me

The following reflections are not intended as a contribution to the debate on what Marx really said. I only mean to discuss here my Marx, and I hope that this way of reading and understanding is defensible and not un-Marxist. Without regarding them as contradictory to later works (concerning the question of the continuity in Marx’s work, I agree with Fromm 1961, 79), I wish to argue on the basis of the Paris Notebooks (Marx 1975a, 1975b) because I consider them particularly stimulating and important for the formulation of an ethically reflected, historical-materialistic psychology.

A major objection raised by feminists against Marx is that he
defines human nature in general in the form of the autonomous, omnipotent hand-and-brain-man who rules himself, nature, and society. In the Paris Notebooks, by contrast, there is an emphasis on appropriation in the process of becoming and being a human individual, appropriation in the sense of “actual direct association with other men,” which for Marx means “activity” and “confirmation” (Marx 1975a, 298–306, 336–37; Marx 1975b, 228). Marx calls the individual “needy” in this sense (being in need of the objects outside himself) and “suffering” thereby (e.g., Marx 1975a, 336).

It will be seen how [in Communism] in place of the wealth and poverty of political economy come the rich human being and the rich human need. The rich human being is simultaneously the human being in need of a totality of human manifestations of life—the man in whom his own realisation exists as as an inner necessity, as need. (Marx 1975a, 304)

Only in the appropriation of the essence of the human being (the objectified human potentialities of all who lived before us) do individuals act and confirm their existence as human beings.

This definition precludes the perception of the individual as an autonomous subject who makes the world the object of his or her aims and purposes. Marx expressly warns against “postulating ‘society’ again as an abstraction vis-à-vis the individual” (1975a, 299) and repeatedly emphasizes the fundamental interweaving of the person and the material world. “As soon as I have an object, this object has me for an object” (337).

This brings me to the second main objection of feminists against Marx; that he did not perceive the individual as a social being. I quote:

Let us suppose that we had carried out production as human beings. Each of us would have in two ways affirmed himself and the other person. 1) In my production I would have objectified my individuality, its specific character, and therefore enjoyed not only an individual manifestation of my life during the activity, but also when looking at the object I would have the individual pleasure of knowing my personality to be objective, visible to the senses and hence a power beyond all doubt. 2) In your enjoyment or use of my product I would have the direct enjoyment both of being conscious of having satisfied a human need by my work, that is, of having objectified man’s essential nature, and of having thus created an object corresponding to the need of another man’s essential nature. 3) I would have been for you the mediator between you and the species, and therefore
would become recognised and felt by yourself as a completion of your own essential nature and as a necessary part of yourself, and consequently would know myself to be confirmed both in your thought and your love. 4) In the individual expression of my life I would have directly created your expression of your life, and therefore in my individual activity I would have directly confirmed and realised my true nature, my human nature, my communal nature.

Our products would be so many mirrors in which we saw reflected our essential nature.

This relationship would moreover be reciprocal; what occurs on my side has also to occur on yours. (Marx 1975b, 227–28)

The development of human potential is therefore always necessarily achieved in the material (or objective) relationships and in the social relationships simultaneously. These are beyond all quantifying evaluations in the sense of “more or less significant.”

The appropriation of human reality, [the] orientation to the object is the manifestation of the human reality (for this reason it is just as highly varied as the determinations of human essence and activities); it is human activity and human suffering. (Marx 1975a, 300)

In the Paris Notebooks we thus find differentiated statements on the ethical dimension of an emancipatory psychology. They can be used both in replying to the question of how human interaction should be structured as well as in defining our relationship to nature. Concerning the second, the aim is “the genuine resolution of the conflict between man and nature and between man and man” (1975a, 296).

4. And Leontyev? Was he able to translate Marx’s comprehensive humanism into his theory?

Generally speaking, there can be no doubt that Leontyev was able to translate Marx’s comprehensive humanism into his theory in that he shares Marx’s central assumption of the process of becoming human by appropriating the essence of the human being. Whether he assumes a specific human psychological ability (= human nature) in this respect, as is supposed by Messmann and Rückriem (1978), or merely a biological precondition which creates the material prerequisites for this process, as I suspect (see Leontyev 1979, 174), is not the point here. In any case, for Leontyev, being human means needing-the-world and becoming human means putting-oneself-in-relation (or being able to do
so). This position, the assumption that the individual is principally bound up with the world, necessarily gives rise to such ethical maxims for human action as justice and solidarity, and respect for nature, humanity, and culture. These remain abstract, however, if they are not qualified more closely by a more precise description of the nature of such relationships. In the Paris Notebooks this was achieved through the concretization of the concept of work/activity by the dimension of Doing and Suffering.

Perhaps to a scientist living in a socialist society, and being a Marxist, such ideas seem too obvious to require formulating yet again. However, it could also be that this idea of Marx—which I consider significantly emancipatory—is absent because, like other concepts of its kind, it was lost in the Stalinist era. No matter why, I have not found this specification in Leontyev’s works.

Instead, I find several instances of a tendency to restrict his concept of activity to the praxis of the “hand-and-brain-worker as master-builder” model. For example:

Sensory practical activity in which people have practical contact with the objects of the environment, experience their inherent strength, manipulate them and at the same time subjugate themselves to their objective characteristics. (1979, 25–26)

Or:

Working with tools not only confronts the individual with the material objects, but also with the interdependencies, which he himself controls and reproduces. (1979, 42)

Or:

[The individual] masters [life] both in day-to-day matters and day-to-day interaction as well as in the individuals to whom he passes on a part of himself, both on the barricades of the class struggle and on the battlefields where he fights for his country, and from time to time he masters it consciously, even at the price of his physical existence. (Leontyev 1979, 213)

On this point, I tend to agree with the feminist critics: his concept of humanity cannot always be clearly distinguished from the above-mentioned bourgeois notion of human nature as male nature.

In Leontyev’s concept of personality, this occasionally has disturbing consequences. For example, the three parameters of personality (scope and quality of relations, degree of hierarchization of activities and motives, general type of personality structure [1979, 202–12])
could suggest the following equation: the greater the quantity and quality of activities, the more personality (therefore: the more human?)

Defining the concept of activity more precisely by means of the dimension of Doing and Suffering would create the necessary clarity, particularly with regard to the ethical foundation of Leontyev’s psychology. In addition to reflections on Marx, theology can also provide a useful contribution. For example, scholastics have developed a distinct theory of suffering. They argue:

Suffering is a kind of change experienced by the individual, it is a modus of Becoming. Becoming means Doing when it issues from an active person, and when it is absorbed by a recipient, it means Suffering.” (Sölle 1973, 124)

Every single activity thus necessarily contains both these elements. In that sense, suffering is always an active process, active and practical recognition of my own involvement in relationships. In this context, the Christian concept of the acceptance of suffering also takes on a significance for non-Christians: it expresses the acceptance of the totality of life, even sick, damaged weak life. Humanity is indivisible. This is in contrast with the separation of Doing and Suffering: One variation is the negation of the existence and necessity of suffering. History has shown that the dividing line between strategies for doing away with suffering and programs for doing away with the sufferers is not clearly defined and can easily be overstepped.

But let us return to Leontyev. I think that the oscillation of his concept of human nature, as already described, has something to do with a genuine theoretical deficit: the way in which he deals with the social question. In principle, he is also clear and Marxist on this point: for him, activity and development are only conceivable as socially determined (e.g., Leontyev 1979, 84, 85, 27). However, in his approach society remains something vague and abstract. Activity is not mentioned as a social category, as a process of interaction between people, until page 197 of his main work, and it is not really derived.

In his Paris Notebooks, Marx describes human action as irresolvably embracing material production with the development of (inter-) human relationships. This important idea gives reasons for the reciprocal responsibility of individuals toward each other and toward their world as the only reasonable point of reference for action. I believe that Leontyev has not included this in his work and has thereby missed the chance of founding his concept of human nature in an ethically comprehensive matter.

Critics of his theory have pointed to the sociopsychological
underdevelopment of the Leontyevian theory time and again (e.g., Raeithel 1981, Haselmann 1984). I doubt, however, that this deficiency can be overcome by adding to Leontyev’s objective-material category of activity a second one intended to describe the social, interactive activities, which is the case, for example, with Haselmann (1984), and is indeed contrary to her own intention of always regarding the social and the material as two dimensions of one homogeneously perceived activity. The fact that Leontyev did not develop activity as the unit of material (or objective) and social relations cannot be overlooked. In coming to the end of this discussion I wish to show how the two dimensions in his thinking even divide and appear occasionally as two different forms of activity (which is typical for bourgeois psychological thinking) in the course of Leontyev’s argumentation. This will be illustrated in discussing the concepts of the double mediatedness of activity and in the “knot”-reflection.

The concept of the double mediatedness of activity:

The child’s activity is realizing his/her relations to other people through things and the relations to the things through people. (Leontyev 1979, 197)

In regard to this statement, Leontyev is to be found completely in line with the tradition of the Paris Notebooks. Only a few sentences later, however, he specifies:

In the beginning the child’s relations to the world of objects and to the people in his/her surrounding melt into one another; after a while, they subdivide and form discernible, though interrelated, lines of development. (197)

According to this understanding, the interwoven character of objective and social aspects of activity results from the child’s still poorly differentiated psyche—and not from the very nature of activity. Principally, the two dimensions of relationships between human beings and the world are perceived as two qualities or two types of human activity. This becomes even more evident in the following thesis:

In the course of ontogenesis, transition between alternating phases can be discerned. Phases in which objective (i.e., practical and gnostic) activities are prevailing alternate with the predominant development of social relations. (198)

Not only are the objective and the social dimensions of human activity separated from each other, but they are also perceived as being of varying significance at different periods of life. As social activities are
interpreted as being of particular importance for the development in (early) childhood, should we not we conclude that objective (practical and gnostic) activities are conceived to be the developmental elixir of adulthood? And what about adults whose predominant activities (as in the case of housewives and mothers) are social in nature? It is interesting, in this context, that Leontyev associated the gnostic aspect with the objective and not with the social dimension of activity.

The above thesis leads to the “knot”-reflection:

The described transitions also characterize the changes of motives typical for the respective phase. That’s how the hierarchical combinations of motives develop, the “nodal points” of personality. (198)

This idea—which is really important, but needs further elaboration—is illustrated in the following: To Leontyev the social and the objective dimensions of human activity come to be interrelated only in the course of the development of the motivational “knots”—and they do not exist as aspects of a single motive or activity.

On the whole, it seems to me that Leontyev’s theory provides us with a framework within which we nevertheless have yet to develop the basic categories, so that they can be concretized toward an ethical foundation of psychology. The “human being of humanity” (Mensch der Menschheit) Leontyev (citing Gorky) seems to have in mind (1979, 210) as a model for such an ethic has until now been little more than a shadow.

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Emotion and Class Consciousness: The Reception of a Contemporary Proletarian Novel

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Introduction

Jan Kubicki’s novel about coal miners, Breaker Boys (1986), has received little critical attention either positive or negative, perhaps proving William Dean Howells correct in his suggestion that “if our writers were to begin telling us...of how mill hands, or miners, or farmers or iron puddlers really live, we should very soon let them know that we did not care to meet such vulgar and commonplace people” (quoted in Lott 1988, 19). Among favorable commentators, one reader was pleased to have discovered a book “not just about mining and unions, but also about love, passions, and various emotions that constitute life at the edge of survival (McCoy 1987, 92), but most reviewers were less ecstatic. Critics in the New York Times, Kirkus Review, and Publisher’s Weekly all cited the novel’s “documentary accuracy,” its “vivid reconstruction of the period,” its “thoroughly researched” details, but noted, too, the book’s more glaring literary shortcomings, such as its somewhat amateurish narrative voice and its occasional heavy-handedness. But what bothers these reviewers most is exactly what Keith McCoy enjoyed: the novel’s emotional appeal. The reviewer for Publisher’s Weekly, faintly praising the novel and offhandedly dismissing it, provides the best example:

The portrait presented with documentary accuracy in this vigorous novel is of a virtually feudal society. In such “social” novels, literary descendants of the “proletarian” novels and plays of the ’30s, the bosses and their henchmen and lackeys are
knaves and the workers are virtuous when they have not sold out—a stark contrast that makes good history but predictable melodrama. Any readers will be reminded of How Green Was My Valley and other novels that elicit an emotional response. ("Breaker Boys," Publisher’s Weekly, 1986, 61)

The reviewer’s notions that Kubicki entertainingly portrays a feudal class struggle (which makes “good history”) or that coal bosses are knaves are disturbing enough, but his mild spurning of the book as melodramatic—eliciting an emotional as opposed to an intellectual response—reveals even more disturbing criteria at the core of bourgeois literary criticism. By praising the novel’s historical accuracy while at the same time rejecting it as melodramatic, these reviewers suggest that the realistic setting and events are tainted by exaggeration, bias, and manipulation—that the pictures of daily life among the miners are precise in their detail but that the shocking horror of that life is purely a matter of style or rhetoric used by an opportunistic author to arouse fear or pity and to prove a point. In this reading, the details are accurate (miners do live in squalor, coal barons in luxury), but the struggle between them—the dramatic tension between oppressed and oppressor—is not so stark or so distinct (“black and white”) as the author implies, and his portrait of the struggle is shaded in favor of the “virtuous” miners. For these reviewers, “melodrama” seems to be a handy label for dismissing a novel that realistically portrays the class struggle.

If melodrama is an “appeal to emotions,” then Breaker Boys is a melodramatic novel, and it would be hard to argue that Kubicki’s technique does not sometimes heighten the natural sadness of, for example, a young coal miner’s death. But because he generally avoids the banalities and gross sentimentality most often associated with melodrama, and because his depictions of classes will strike some readers as hackneyed generalizations and others as authentic portraits, it would be useless to conduct an essentially subjective debate over whether or not the book is melodramatic, and more consequential to ask why modern literary criticism might disregard a novel because it elicits emotional responses of the sort evoked by realistic portraits of miners’ lives. Surely, had the book promoted a sense of despair or dread, a moment of angst, or even a rush of adrenaline and a chill down the spine, reviewers would have been less likely to pronounce it melodramatic and more likely to welcome the book as a penetrating psychological analysis of the individual’s failure to comprehend an absurd and chaotic universe, or something of that sort. But Kubicki’s novel asks us
to feel for coal miners—vulgar and commonplace as they are—and to respond to their lives with sympathy and passion.

Kubicki’s emotional appeals are inextricably linked to the book’s working-class themes and its status as a proletarian novel. His “melodrama”—the label that literary criticism invariably applies to the struggle between opposing forces—amounts not to an imposition on the content, but to an ideology formed by the inherent emotional qualities of the historical situation depicted. For Kubicki there simply is no other choice but to use language that most closely represents the horrific lives of mine workers shackled by necessity. It is the struggle itself that elicits an emotional response, and because our sympathies must lie, as must Kubicki’s, with the miners, he portrays the struggle with a touch of what might be called melodrama, letting collective, social emotion shape his language and choosing words most closely connected to the essential sadness, frustration, horror, violence, and injustice of what he describes. It is not an emotional appeal intended to tease readers out of thought or to immobilize them in fits of weeping. On the contrary, it is an attempt to incite action sparked by sympathy and fanned by anger. Furthermore, Breaker Boys appeals to the emotions because it is about the place of emotions in the class struggle and in the revolutionary resolution of that struggle. The reviewers’ distaste for melodrama is not actually a rejection of Kubicki’s novel, but a distortion of the value of emotion, which in a capitalistic culture could be a unifying and motivational force and the catalyst for revolution.

Language, consciousness, and emotion in the novel

Like Dickens’s Hard Times, the book opens in a schoolroom, this one in the mining town of Jeddoh, Pennsylvania, at the turn of the century. Euan Morgan is attempting to write the pledge of allegiance but has trouble distinguishing between “b’s” and “d’s” and keeps splattering the page with ink. He dreams of working in the mines and at age eleven quits school and enters the breaker, where his illusions about the glory of work quickly crumble and his consciousness is invaded by experiences he can understand only in familial or natural terms: “The rollers [in the breaker], the grinders, with their massive, interlocking teeth crushed the raw chunks of coal as easily as his mam broke apart a lump of sugar [Picking slate out of the coal chute was like] trying to catch bits of glass floating down a mountain stream” (Kubicki 1986, 35, 37). Ill-equipped mentally to comprehend these conditions, Euan concludes that this dehumanizing place, where a mate finds in the coal chute a “grown man’s finger, blasted off or torn off,” must be hell (45). “What am I doing here?” he cries in despair, and
decides simply to stop thinking: “He couldn’t think, didn’t want to think. Thinking didn’t shut pain out; it let it in, left room for it to come in, to sneak in between thoughts. It was better to blank it all out, all, all his thoughts, both good and bad. Better to be thick and dull, like the air he breathed” (44). Euan’s sporadic thoughts are interrupted by meaningless words that simply mimic Euan’s machine-like labor: “Pick slate #.#.#.#.pick slate #.#.#.#.pick #.#.#.#.pick #.#.#.#.pick” (44–45). Kubicki here reveals the co-opting of a young boy’s consciousness by the alienating labor he performs until he is reduced, in Marxian terms, “to the condition of a machine and from being a man becomes an abstract activity and a belly” (Marx 1964, 68). Euan, who does in fact often measure the time in the breaker as the hours until and since lunch, has in his first day at work become almost an emblem of the worker whose work is external, whose consciousness is divided between work and home, whose mother (“mam”) and mountain streams have become coal grinders and coal chutes, whose activity becomes suffering. He is the literary proletarian everyman: “Machine labor,” writes Marx, “is simplified in order to make a worker out of the human being still in the making, the completely immature human being, the child whilst the worker has become a neglected child” (Marx 1964, 149).

Ironically, Euan’s decision to stop thinking is itself a thought, which like the products of his physical labor, becomes a power that confronts him. His only reaction to self-estrangement is to detach himself consciously from his own mental activity, to accept the self-estrangement of labor and to become thick and dull. To think about his family or his own bloody fingers is torturous. So he will stop thinking.

But he cannot stop working. And he must work with boys as unconscious, mechanized, and individualized as he now is, and who are therefore entirely estranged from one another and completely unaware of their common lot or their interdependence, even though that interdependence is obvious from their actions. In one of the more striking scenes in the early part of the novel, Kubicki describes the method of receiving coal in the chutes:

The sound of the coal moving down through the breaker toward them grew louder and more ominous. The top boy on each chute pulled his cap down over his eyes, reached out, and locked hands with those next to him, then set his legs, knees together, squarely in the flat of the chute. All began a low yell that rose higher and higher as the coal approached, climaxing in a delirious scream as the coal crashed with startling velocity into the
front rank. Coal flew into the air, hitting boys in the face on the way up, on the head coming down. It was like an explosion, the force of which nearly knocked some top boys, like duckpins, onto the rows behind. Only the grip of their mates saved them.

(40)

Here are the seeds of the strike that these same boys—an inarticulate and unconscious group screaming in harmony and depending on one another for survival—will later mount against John Markham, the colliery owner. The revolution will be started not by a group of grown men who are rational and class-conscious, but by a group of boys who feel the injustice committed against them long before they can articulate it.

The men of Jeddoh, more rationally self-preserving than little boys, will not strike against Markham, though he exploits them in ways that make him, rather than a melodramatic stereotype or caricature, the epitome of the nineteenth-century mine operator described in chapter 10 of Friedrich Engels’s *The Condition of the Working Class in England*. He raises the weight of the long ton (forcing the miners to produce more coal for the same amount of money), bleeds his workers at the company “pluck me” store, and evicts them from their rented homes at the slightest suspicion of their disloyalty. And taking advantage of a condition unique to the “melting pot” of America, he induces and deepens a largely artificial animosity between the Polish and Welsh to counter the unifying force of the United Mine Workers’ Union. “I could hire one half of the working class to kill the other,” the owner brags (193).2

Eventually Mother Jones arrives in Jeddoh and tells a crowd gathered on the Fourth of July in Wilkes-Barre that she’s come “to educate the worker#.#.##and to stir up the oppressed” (141). Euan, as confused by her rhetoric as he has been by all attempts to educate him, asks his sister, “What’s ‘aprest?” Verbal language means little to Euan, who left school unable to print well or spell correctly and who often communicates with the other breaker boys in a sign language that, unlike speech, can overcome the noise of the breaker.

But Mother Jones, more through her rugged maternalism than her exhortation, allows Euan to unleash the sympathy he has been suppressing since his first day at work. Seeing one of the new breaker boys taunted by the older ones, Euan screams,

“STOP IT!”

And they did, astounded by his wrath and indignation. Even
Euan wondered from where in him the voice had come. His head felt light as he stood over the whimpering boy, swaying slightly, dizzily. (288)

Euan’s shout, rendered in capital letters to signal its volume and its difference from normal speech and to preserve its quality as an emotional outburst, is an action (shout) inspired by sympathy and anger; it is not the discourse of a rational, conscious boy. In fact, he begins to swoon immediately after he shouts.

After this semiconscious outburst, Euan begins to form his passion into class action by encouraging the boys to form a union, the SSBB, the Secret Society of Breaker Boys, “a band of rowdies,” as Kubicki describes them, “who barely had a common language between them” (296). They write a pledge modeled after the pledge of allegiance and compiled of Mother Jones’s slogans and recite it, though “most of them had no idea what the words meant” (295). Euan’s compassion flares again when he sees a boy tortured by the cracker boss, and he himself becomes the victim. When the boss tries to murder Euan, the breaker boys revolt in a moment undescribed by the narrator. It takes place while Euan is passed out—unconscious—and is revealed to him only when he awakes to find the boys sitting atop the boss winding “ropes around him in every conceivable manner” (345). The instinctual solidarity spreads in Jeddoh: outside the strikebound colliery a Polish woman meets a Welsh, Euan’s mother: “No words passed between them, but their eyes locked; their hearts locked, and they joined each other in the middle of Frog Street and clung to each other and wept with each other” (369).

Now surely there is a slight touch of sentimentality in Kubicki’s style, in his repetition of words and structures and in the slow, simple phrasing that plays like a cello over the image of these two women. And certainly Kubicki expects an emotional response from his reader; to feel a moment of joy is to share in the collective emotion that is Kubicki’s topic and to affirm the idea that emotion is a unifying force, here between reader and character. But the scene, not a simple manipulation of our feelings, has implications for the political struggle between workers and owners. Anyone familiar with the history of the mine patches of northeastern Pennsylvania in the nineteenth century and anyone closely following the novel might be shocked to see Polish and Welsh women embrace but overjoyed to see the colliery owner’s greatest defense against strikes begin to crumble. The working class could no longer so easily be hired to kill one another. “The union,” writes Kubicki with a lowercase “u,” “had finally come to Jeddoh”
Kubicki appears to have successfully illustrated revolution in two forms—one the surmounting of induced animosity through the recognition of class interests over personal ones, and the other a full scale proletarian uprising inspired by the wrath of a young boy. Euan, a descendant of Thomas Gradgrind’s children (Hard Times), is a cousin of the protagonists of the proletarian novels of the 1930s: Michael Gold’s Jews Without Money, Jack Conroy’s The Disinherited, and Henry Roth’s Call It Sleep, all of which present young children and adolescents not yet fully articulate or entirely conscious, but whose sense of injustice and instinctual compassion compel them to reject exploitation. Like them, Euan, whose language provides only a vague interpretation of his world (coal is sugar, chutes are streams) or serves to separate him from his fellow workers, who barely have a common language between them, cannot argue for a revolution. He acts, instead, on his feelings of wrath and indignation, relying on the physical, manual communion between him and his fellows (their grasp on the chutes, their sign language). Portraying an untutored but angry child who starts a revolution, Kubicki seems to stand with Blake: “The tygers of wrath are wiser than the horses of instruction” (Blake 1969, 152).

The role of emotion in the class struggle

Though Marx believed that the working class would develop an understanding of its interests before collective action started, he provided little indication of what he thought would eventually motivate the worker to action. Surely, will alone could not accomplish that objective, and Kubicki’s notion that an emotional or passionate impulse could spark the revolution, that blind rage or unbridled sympathy could propel the worker into a strike seems highly plausible. Certainly the capitalist knows this. Having ensured the dissolution of the workers’ capacity for free thought, making them thick and dull, weakening their will, and estranging them from themselves, the capitalist next strips people of their essence—their passions and emotions, which are, Marx claimed, not “merely anthropological phenomena but truly ontological affirmations of being (of nature), only really affirmed because their object exists for them as a sensual object” (Marx 1964, 165). Because feelings are ontological affirmations of being, people whose labor destroys their sense of love are not fully human. To shape
or destroy consciousness is not enough; dehumanization is most fully accomplished by removing from workers the means by which they affirm their feelings and thus affirm themselves—by alienating them from the object of their love (other human beings) and by replacing the nexus of love with something inhuman, selfish, and callous. Love can thrive only in a humane context: “Assume man to be man and his relationship to the world to be a human one: then you exchange love only for love, trust for trust, etc.” (Marx 1964, 169). The capitalist squelches the natural tendencies toward association and community by substituting gross individualism for one’s more natural condition as a species being. The best way to isolate and control individuals is to destroy their emotional capacity.

For Marx, the tendency toward association and the need to restore one’s own identity as an objective being—as a member of a species—will eventually and inevitably break free of and destroy the power of imposed individualism and alienation. The resulting society will have been created and will remain united by passion “the essential force of man energetically bent on its object” (Marx 1964, 182). The capitalist, of course, actually helps to quicken the establishment of a society built on emotion by creating an impoverished class. “Poverty,” Marx writes, “is the passive bond which causes the human being to experience the need for the greatest wealth—the other human being. The dominion of the objective being in me, the sensuous outburst of my life activity, is passion which thus becomes here the activity of my being” (Marx 1964, 144). People, in full possession of their faculties and free from the control of the owning class, affirm themselves in the object of their passions by working for the comfort and improvement of others or, in the case of Kubicki’s novel, by embracing them in the street. It is easy to see how the simple embrace of Pole and Welsh can be considered a kind of Marxist revolution, an expression of reciprocal love that signals the restoration of collective emotion: an affirmation of each in the object of the other and an affirmation of the self in a passionate, instinctive, wordless recognition of common humanity.

But can the larger revolution originate in the emotional cry of a dizzy, uneducated young boy? Must the proletariat first become conscious of their exploited condition? An answer can be found in Engels’s preface to the U.S. edition of *The Condition of the Working Class in England*. Despite the fact that most people in the United States believed that the United States had no “working class” and hence no class struggle, miners nonetheless mounted massive strikes in the coal fields of Pennsylvania in the mid-eighteen-eighties. About these strikes
Engels writes, “The spontaneous, instinctive movements of these vast masses of working people, over a vast extent of country, the simultaneous outburst of their common discontent made them conscious of the fact, that they had formed a new and distinct class of American society, proletarians. And with true American instinct this consciousness led them at once to take the next step towards their deliverance: the formation of a political workingman’s party” (Engels 1958, 284). For Engels, spontaneous, instinctual outburst precedes class-consciousness. He continues: “That the laboring masses should feel their community of grievances and of interests [and] their solidarity as a class in opposition to all other classes; that in order to give expression and effect to this feeling, they should set in motion the political machinery provided for that purpose in every free country—that is the first step only. The next step is to find the common remedy for these grievances” (Engels 1958, 284; emphasis mine).

Kubicki, it seems, has accurately embodied in his realistic portrait of miners, the emotional source of the movement toward collective action—from an angry, half-conscious shout to the Secret Society of Breaker Boys. But the reviewer intervenes to distort that emotion and to interpret the book in a critical language that prevents emotion from being shaped into radical political machinery, much in the way that literary criticism from the postromantic age through the present has favored decorum, reason, irony, self-control, ambiguity, and stream-of-consciousness and has rebuked emotional appeals, preferring intricate language puzzles and dazzling verbal effects. “Michael Gold can perform magic with words,” wrote a reviewer of Jews Without Money; “It is a pity that sometimes he falls into the bathos of Messianic prayers for deliverance by the dreamy road of romantic revolution” (Gannett 1930, 5).³

Jan Kubicki’s historically accurate and romantic novel elicits an emotional response because his characters, patterned after the actual Welsh and Polish miners in Jeddoh, Pennsylvania, in 1900, lead despairing lives. In responding emotionally to his characters, we affirm ourselves and them, create the conditions for a heightened awareness of exploitation and injustice in our own day, and restore the foundations of Marxism revealed in the Manuscripts of 1844—passion and sympathy, the impulses of the heart that can be directed toward class-consciousness, action, and change.

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NOTES

1. Further references to this novel are given with page numbers only.
2. For a historical analysis of ethnic hatred resulting from economic conditions and the machinations of operators, see Wallace 1984 and also Roberts 1970, especially 23–27. Roberts, writing in 1904, notes that “the great need of the hour in mining communities is the introduction of intellectual and moral forces which will counteract the tendency to retrogression from this mixture of races. The United Mine Workers’ Union is a beneficent and potent factor in obliterating racial suspicion and prejudice. If the organization is preserved and its usefulness enhanced, it will, more powerfully than aught else, lead the way to social progress and assimilation” (Roberts 1970, 27).
3. Interestingly, melodramatic theater first appeared in Europe in the age of romanticism following the French Revolution. As Marilyn Gaull points out, these dramas expressed “the terror, passion, idealism, and inflated rhetoric to which the newly liberated citizens of France were addicted” (Gaull 1988, 91). Further demonstrating the more proletarian and collective characteristics of melodrama, Gaull writes that in England “both pantomime and melodrama were collective rather than private expressions, drawing on common knowledge, reflecting the values of the audience more than any individual author. The writers had a special affinity with the expectations of this audience, with whom they had much in common, for they were craftsmen, overworked and underpaid, rather than artists, poor people who prided themselves on their speed and resourcefulness, writers who however prolific, are mostly forgotten” (934). For an interesting commentary on romanticism as a revolutionary attempt to “hurl the dynamite of passion in the face of the apparently well-ordered bourgeois world,” see Fischer 1959, especially 50–62. Fischer helps explain why emotion was so attractive to romantic revolutionaries and so repulsive to the inheritors of neoclassical and Enlightenment values.

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Anti-Racism in U.S. History: The First Two Hundred Years

Herbert Aptheker

Herbert Aptheker’s latest book, bearing the same title as this article, is scheduled for publication early in 1992 by Greenwood Press ($47.95, 264 pages). It is the first extensive study of anti-racism on this continent in the seventeenth through midnineteenth centuries. The opening section of the book, laying out the author’s challenge to the view that racism was universally accepted by European-Americans before the Civil War, appears below with the kind permission of both the author and the Greenwood Publishing Group (copyright ~ 1992 by Herbert Aptheker).

Introduction

In the early 1970s, after I had concluded a lecture on John Brown before African American youngsters, one among them came to me. He said: “Did I hear you right? Did you say that John Brown was white?” Since I had never been asked that question before, I was somewhat surprised. “Yes,” I replied, “John Brown was white.” “God,” the child exclaimed, “that blows my mind!” I decided, then, to undertake a study of anti-racism in U.S. history, concentrating on the appearance of this view among white people, though not ignoring the contributions made to the idea by Black people themselves both through their activity and their participation in the argument.1 I found that there does exist a fairly extensive literature by scholars that deals with anti-racism to one
degree or another; nevertheless, given the consequence of the subject, its treatment is insufficient. Furthermore, there is no single book devoted to the subject.

Anti-racism among white people in the United States (with influences from other lands) has been significant beginning in the colonial epoch and continuing through the twentieth century. The belief exists, however, that anti-racism has been rare and that racist thought has been well-nigh universal. A significant source of this view is prevailing historical literature which either omits or minimizes anti-racism or affirms racism’s unchallenged acceptance. The truth we repeat is otherwise.

In rectifying errors, one must be careful to avoid exaggeration. This is a danger in all historical revisionist effort; the danger is intensified when subjective considerations are weighed. It is certain—indeed painfully obvious—that racism has permeated United States history both as idea and practice. Nevertheless, it always has faced significant challenge.

Racism is not to be confused with ethnocentrism, nationalism, elitism, or male chauvinism. There are common ingredients in all and no doubt this has played a part in racism’s appearance, virulence, and persistence. But belief in the superiority of one’s particular culture or nation or class or sex is not the same as belief in the inherent, immutable, and significant inferiority of an entire physically characterized people, particularly in mental capacity, but also in emotional and ethical features. That is racism. It has been applied especially, but not exclusively, in connection with people of African origin. Racist notions have been applied to other people—American Indians, for example—and have been rejected (and this will be noticed in subsequent pages), but the central focus of racism in the United States has been upon African-derived people. This work will particularly deal with this focus of racism and its rejection.

My study has persuaded me that the following generalizations are valid: (1) anti-racism is more common among so-called “lower classes” than among the so-called “upper class”; (2) anti-racism especially appears among white people who have had significant experiences with people of African origin; (3) anti-racism seems to be more common among women than men.

The impact of the prophetic quality in religion upon the history of anti-racism has been profound; this is, perhaps, of greater consequence than any other single influence. This reality will appear throughout the body of this work so far as Christianity is concerned. The concept of human oneness and equality is a tenet of both Catholic and Protestant
teaching, especially of evangelical Catholicism, as Toby Terrar has called it; today it is called the theology of liberation. Similarly, the idea of the equality of humanity forms a central thread in Hebraic literature.

The break with feudalism (especially its assumption of demarked, permanent status), both in religious form (the Reformation and the rise of Protestantism) and the secular form culminating in the American, French, Haitian, and Latin American revolutions, was fundamental to the questioning of racism, as of other inhibiting and invidious outlooks. Related to this was the appearance of capitalism. Here a contradictory force appeared. On the one hand, capitalism supported concepts of elitism, of “rugged individualism,” of colonialism, and the “survival of the fittest.” It had an insatiable appetite for expansion and rested upon exploitation. In the absence within capitalism of the status-fixed features of feudalism, racism (and male supremacy) provided devices for defining place, thus helping to divide and therefore weaken those forced to labor. All this tended to help initiate, welcome, and intensify racism. On the other hand, necessities of mechanization, technical advance, market expansion, individual capacity, initiative, and motivation might conflict with racist requirements and help question racism itself. Another factor was capitalism’s rejection of feudalism’s static and hierarchical features. The various revolutions promulgated ideas—as expressed in the Declaration of Independence, the Preamble to the U.S. Constitution, and the Declaration of Human Rights—that served as very significant instruments in the questioning of racism.

Examining the literature convinces me that for many of the people of the sixteenth through the nineteenth centuries there was an inherent absurdity of racism. Thus the qualities of African-derived peoples—speech, sadness, joy, love, tenderness, ferocity, skill, arts, organization, attractiveness (both aesthetic and sexual), and the will and capacity of resistance—were evident in various degrees and at different times. Though all this tended to make racism absurd (especially in its more virulent forms), still racism’s function as a bulwark of the status quo made questioning it difficult. Yet the literature does convey the feeling that racism’s very absurdity was important in evoking the objection to it.

Recent scholarship has indicated that much of the pro-slavery propaganda was directed by the master class at persuading its own members and other white people within the slave system of the righteousness of slavery. I suggest that the intensity and pervasiveness of racist propaganda had a similar purpose, namely, to persuade white people that the basic rationalization for slavery—the slave’s inhumanity or, at
best, significant and indelible inferiority—was valid. As one slaveowner said to a visiting English author, Harriet Martineau, if this was not true, if they were enslaving people who were equal to them, then, of course, the game was up and emancipation was required.4

Of all invidious concepts, that of male chauvinism comes closest to racism. It involves the denigration of an entire people, this time on the basis of gender; justifications for this have included insistence on marked mental inferiority as well as decided temperamental inadequacies. Consequent persecution and deprivation also have been acute.

The idea reappears, also, that the poor are without merit as well as without wealth and that these absences are causally connected. Ideas of the inferiority of the peasant and even of different qualities of brains in rich and poor were not unknown. Eugenics, too, has made poverty a hallmark of innate incapacity. Roger-Henri Gaurrand, for example, wrote: “To the conquering bourgeois, the proletarian was a savage of the most dangerous variety, a member of an inferior race.”5 Roman Catholic teaching often attributed class differences—as between the nobility and commoners or between landlords and peasants—to an inherent superiority of the former compared with the latter, an elitism closely related to racism.6

Color distinction alone has not been present at all times where racism in fact exists. This is notably true in the approach of the English ruling class to the Irish people, whose subjugation and atrocious treatment were rationalized in terms that can only be called racial, though here religious differences also played a significant role. Still, color difference and racism normally do go together.

There is a common conception that racism is of very ancient vintage, if not coexistent with the human presence. Modern scholarly consensus, however, holds this to be false; ancient society generally seems to have been without racism.7 Further, its absence or, at least, insignificance seems to have marked medieval Europe and most Muslim civilizations. Racism, however, certainly has marked so-called Western civilizations from the sixteenth century to the present. Literature detailing its history is abundant. But, for the same period, rejection of and challenge to racism have been present and significant. The literature on this has been relatively sparse. Let us, then, attempt to correct this neglect.

1. Anti-Racism: Denial and Distortion

There is a marked diversity in the historical literature in its treatment of racism. Thus there has been a sharp, sometimes even
heated, disagreement as to the source of racism. But for the purposes of this work it is not necessary to enter this debate.

Several historians have made contributions to the history of anti-racism; almost always, however, this was done incidentally, as it were, in works that concentrated upon other subjects. The list of such authors is by now fairly lengthy; their contributions will be noted as this work progresses. Here, as in so many other cases, W. E. B. DuBois was among the first, if not the first, to suggest that among people not at the top of the social order, especially in the colonial era, something approaching and even reaching mutuality and equality existed. The work of James Hugo Johnston also merits special notice in this connection.

Historians who do note anti-racism among white people sometimes express sharp qualifications about it or even surprise at its existence. Some illustrations are in order.

James M. McPherson—whose writings have been of decisive consequence in depicting the struggle for equality—rather paradoxically accepted the view of U. B. Phillips and Allan Nevins that the determination to maintain white supremacy was fundamental to Southern and national history. Both Phillips and Nevins, in developing this position, presented racism as a universal attribute of white people in the United States. McPherson, on the other hand, knew that such universality did not exist, and much of his writing demonstrates this.

He wrote that the stridency of slaveowners’ propaganda in support of slavery indicated that “the South’s [that is, slaveowners’] conscience” was “troubled about slavery.” He quoted approvingly William R. Taylor’s 1961 book, Cavalier and Yankee, to this effect, as he did Charles G. Sellers’s work of the previous year. This view was persuasively set forth at some length by Ralph E. Morrow in an essay published in 1961. Apparently the idea did not occur to him (or others) that the even greater stridency—hysterical fury, often—with which African American inferiority was affirmed might also have reflected profound doubts. Certainly the data, as the bulk of this book will show, demonstrate very widespread questioning among white people in all sections of the nation and in all periods of its history of the myth of “Negro inferiority.” Yet the position of Phillips and Nevins on this question dominates the historical literature to this day and was reaffirmed even by McPherson.

Somewhat similarly, Winthrop D. Jordan in the preface to his White Over Black penned these words:

During the Revolutionary era Americans suddenly came to question not only the rightness of slavery but also to realize for
the first time that they had a racial problem on their hands, that
the institution which their ideology condemned was founded on
perceptions of physiological differences which they thought
they could do little or nothing about. 4

Much of the material in Jordan’s own book refutes the assertion that
Americans suddenly questioned slavery in the revolutionary era; by
that time, on the contrary, the institution had been seriously challenged
for decades. But the book itself is filled with insistence by many
Americans that the perceptions were at least dubious and probably erro-
neous, and therefore they urged a termination of the status rationalized
by those perceptions.

Eric Foner, in the midst of a book examining the ideology of the Civil
War era, the central theme of which was to question the notion of
racism’s unchallenged sway, nevertheless remarked, as if by rote: “In
the United States of the mid-nineteenth century, racial prejudice was all
but universal.”5 In a somewhat similar way, H. Shelton Smith, in a
book subtitled Racism in Southern Religion, wrote in its preface: “It is
the purpose of this volume to trace the growth of this anti-Negro move-
ment between 1780 and 1910 and to indicate its impact upon human
relations.”6 But the content of the book is filled with denials of “Negro
inferiority” and the insistence that holding such a view is blasphemous.
Some who denied inferiority did not draw from this a condemnation of
slavery, holding the latter to be a secular condition that might accord
with God’s will; but Smith showed that even where slavery was not
attacked, racism often was.

Occasionally one gets the feeling that authors are startled by their own
findings and therefore offer some qualifying comment quite out of
keeping with those findings. James B. Stewart, for example, whose
writings have been models of care and perception, quoted from ser-
mons in the 1820s that offered “direct espousals of black equality.”
Others insisted that to enslave “persons whom God had created equal to
whites in every temporal and spiritual way” was sinful indeed. Stewart
added that all his witnesses “would have failed if judged by modern
standards of racial equalitarianism.” What standards are higher than
“direct espousals of black equality” or insisting that African Americans
were “equal to whites in every temporal and spiritual way”? 7

Ira Berlin, in a powerful book effectively challenging conventional por-
trays of the pre–Civil War South and especially of the position of its
free Black population, offered a section on close Black-white relation-
ships, particularly among the poor, in seven Southern states from 1840
to 1860. Nevertheless, he concluded lamely and inexplicably:
“Although friendly, even equalitarian relations between whites and blacks continued to exist on the margins of Southern society, they never threatened white supremacy.” But the preceding pages had not indicated what was “marginal” about the events described in seven Southern states during the pre–Civil War generation. Berlin wrote that they did not “threaten” white supremacy, but they certainly were part of the pattern that caused the slaveowners of a white supremacist society to feel threatened and, by 1861, to act out this fear. The book itself sustains that conclusion.8

With some regularity in the literature one finds authors arguing the pervasiveness of racism from data that suggest—or at least might be read to suggest—the opposite. Thus, in an article throwing doubt on conventional views concerning “the status of Blacks in 17th century Virginia,” Warren Billings concluded: “Once white Virginians perceived free blacks and miscegenation as serious threats to the public weal and to their own private interests, they moved to circumscribe the African bondsmen’s approach to liberty.”9 Clearly Billings had in mind not “white Virginians” but rather those few white Virginians who held office and passed laws. Miscegenation requires, of course, white participation; therefore some “white Virginians” did not view their acts as “serious threats.” Further, it is difficult to understand how African bondsmen could be approaching liberty unless some “white Virginians” acquiesced in, if they did not encourage, such movement.

Indeed, the anti-miscegenation legislation of the seventeenth century suggests this kind of reading. In 1663 the Maryland legislature found it necessary to enact the following law:

And forasmuch as divers free born English women forgetful of their free condition and to the disgrace of our nation, do intermarry with Negro slaves, by which, also divers suits may arise, touching the issue of such women, and a great damage befall the master of such Negroes, for preservation whereof, [and] for deterring such free born women from such shameful matches, be it enacted, etc. that whatsoever free born woman shall intermarry with any slave, from and after the last day of the present assembly, shall serve the master of such slave during the life of her husband; and that all the issue of such free born women, so married, shall be slaves as their fathers were.10

Laws of this nature were repeated by Maryland in 1681, 1684, 1715, and 1717. Their passage confirms the racism of the rulers of Maryland. At the same time, both the existence and the repetition show
that for some white people, not of an exalted level, there was an absence of, or even a resistance against, racism.

Again, Roger Fischer, treating “Racial Segregation in Ante-Bellum New Orleans,” observed that laws in that city forbade Black people from “participating in white activities and using white facilities.” Fischer continued that the legislators found themselves “powerless to prevent whites who so desired from mixing freely with Negroes in colored taverns, bawdy houses and dance halls.” As a result, in the 1850s, regulations were passed in New Orleans outlawing all interracial activity. Those found guilty of violating such regulations faced fines—if they were slaves, lashes. Laws enacted in December 1856, January 1857, and March 1857 provided increasingly heavy penalties.

Fischer concluded that this showed that “white New Orleanians grew increasingly suspicious of all activities that brought whites and Negroes together.” Rather, the data showed that those whites in New Orleans who enacted laws were “increasingly suspicious,” that other white people chose to socialize with Black people, that this was mutual, and that such behavior was common enough so that those who ruled felt obliged to restrain such choice by heavy penalties against both whites and African Americans and to do this repeatedly.

As a final illustration of what I think is a misinterpretation of data, consider the abundant literature dealing with the racism of white voters who refused to enfranchise Black men in the North and West during the years just before, during, and after the Civil War. The emphasis upon the existence of such racism is the theme of books by V. Jacque Voegeli, Eugene H. Berwanger, James A. Rawley, and Phyllis Field. These volumes present the overwhelming impact of racism as ubiquitous, decisive, and basically self-generating. As Field wrote: “It was the stereotype of the black man rather than slavery itself that served most effectively to condemn him.”

Certain problems may be noticed on the basis of the data offered by these authors themselves. Thus, on the question of whether or not Black men should have the suffrage—the main content of the books—one finds that in Minnesota in 1865 and 1867 the “yes” vote was 45.2 percent and 48.8 percent, respectively; in Wisconsin in 1865 the “yes” vote was 46 percent; in Connecticut that year, 44.6 percent; in Ohio in 1867, 45.9 percent; in Missouri in 1868, 42.7 percent. In New York the affirmative vote in 1846 was 28 percent, in 1860, 36 percent, and in 1869, 47 percent. In Iowa and in Minnesota, in 1869, suffrage for Black men was approved by over 56 percent in each case.

These percentages are of white men who voted to enfranchise Black men. They demonstrate that in the important question of political
empowerment, a substantial percentage of white men favored an anti-racist position, exactly the opposite of the conclusions of the books mentioned. In later pages we shall return to this development.

Often the universality of racism is simply assumed; this occurs even at times when material is presented showing the absence of such universality. A typical example occurs in an essay by Alfred Kazin dealing with Abraham Lincoln. Alluding to the Lincoln-Douglas debates, Kazin remarked that “the ‘Negro’ was the issue of the time, but remained a symbol to everyone, never an individual human being.” He continued that, knowing this, Douglas, being “alert to the prejudices of the crowd,” referred “scathingly” to a recent episode when Frederick Douglass had ridden in a carriage “with white women.” One may suppose that a skillful politician like Stephen Douglas knew what he was doing; yet one must observe that Kazin, writing more than a century after Douglas’s demagogy, seems to have missed the fact that Frederick Douglass was accompanied by white women. This would seem to reflect a rejection of racism by those women.

Another more explicit affirmation of the universality of racism appears in a fairly recent book by John S. Haller, Jr. Dealing with attitudes among scientists, Haller wrote: “The subject of race inferiority was beyond critical reach in the late nineteenth century. Having accepted science and its exalted doctrinaires, American society betrayed no statement, popular or otherwise, that looked to a remodeling of its social or political habits of race.”

This unequivocal statement is false; it is erroneous for any period of U.S. history and especially so for the late nineteenth century. That period was indeed the “nadir” of racism, as the late Rayford W. Logan put it, but it was also a period marking a decisive turning away from that nadir, as the second volume of this study will show. Even within the time limit of this volume, the statement is exaggerated. It is the overwhelming weight of this kind of writing and the absence of any systematic critique thereof that led Robert Moats Miller, for example, to ask: “Can we not agree that it is the consensus of recent scholarship that racism was an article of faith with almost all modern Europeans and their descendants in North America” and that this alleged consensus prevailed “almost until our generation?”

Reality on the question of the history of challenge to or rejection of racism has also suffered because there are numerous instances wherein evidences of anti-racism have been turned into the opposite. Thomas Graham, for example, has pointed out that in the case of Harriet Beecher Stowe “the salient argument of her writings was for the full, equal brotherhood of all men.” Contrary to contemporary stereotype,
she felt that in “general intelligence” all peoples were essentially alike. Despite some lapses, this was the thrust of her thought, but—as illustrated in J. C. Furness’s *Goodbye to Uncle Tom* (1956)—her views are regularly misrepresented.

Perhaps even more grossly distorted have been the views of Horace Bushnell (1802–1876). Charles C. Cole, Jr., in 1950 made that distinguished minister a racist; this was copied by Barbara M. Cross in her biography of him (1958) and by George Fredrikson in his *The Black Image* (1971). The distortion of Bushnell occurred in making his references to gorillas and chimpanzees point to African Americans, when in fact Bushnell was insisting on the human character of all African-derived peoples; they were made by God in His image, and unless they were enfranchised another Civil War might be required. Indeed, Bushnell anticipated much of contemporary racial egalitarianism and even suggested that the future might well see Africa at the apex of world culture.17

During the revolutionary era a considerable literature appeared treating the pros and cons of slavery. Important in this connection was Benjamin Rush’s *Address upon Slave-Keeping* (1773) sharply attacking the practice. Shortly thereafter came Richard Nisbet’s attack upon Rush with *Slavery Not Forbidden by Scripture* (1773). Both these works will be examined hereafter, but here note is to be taken of the appearance later in 1773 of an anonymous pamphlet issued in Philadelphia entitled *Personal Slavery Established*. The latter has been widely accepted in historical literature as a defense of slavery, but as Lester B. Scherer demonstrated,18 it actually was a strong, if satirical, attack upon slavery specifically directed against Nisbet; further, this pamphlet contained a section entitled “Capacities of Africans” that ridiculed the idea of their inferiority.

At times, people whose central contribution was opposing racist practices are presented in a contrary guise or in strange company. Even in John Hope Franklin’s *Racial Equality in America*, where he pointed out that “the remarkable thing about the problem of racial equality is the way it has endured and remained topical,” he at times slipped into one-sidedness in presenting his argument. Thus, writing that “this sense of racial inequality [was] as pervasive as slavery itself” in the eighteenth century, he cited remarks at a Harvard commencement in 1773 where the speaker insisted that slavery accorded with the Blacks’ inferiority and was salutary for all. It was absurd for anyone “to interfere with the beneficent social order, just to pursue some mystical primeval equality.” The problem here, however, is that this Harvard student was participating in a debate on the propriety of slavery and that there was
an opponent whose views were contrary to those of the benighted one quoted. The fact that slavery and the nature of the slaves was a matter of debate in prerevolutionary Massachusetts is as consequential as the ideas of an advocate of a “beneficent social order.”

Further, in this same book, Franklin wrote that “the position of the Abolitionists themselves in the matter of racial equality was, at best ambivalent.” Had this read “at worst,” it would have been more accurate. Again, in noting that slaveholders “were not alone in insisting that blacks were not the equals of whites,” Franklin correctly called attention to figures like Louis Agassiz and Francis Lieber, but then added Lydia Maria Child to this list. But Child was as principled and courageous an anti-racist as white America can show, belonging not in the company of Agassiz and Lieber but rather in that of the Grimké sisters and of John Brown—the figure, next only to Jesus, most admired by her.

The endurance and devastating impact of racism in the United States certainly is a fact and one that merits the most profound attack. This basic thesis of John Hope Franklin’s book is true, and racism’s condemnation is vital. In condemning racism, however, it is not helpful to deny, minimize, or obscure evidence of the repudiation of this barbarism. Anti-racism has persisted in this nation’s history and is an important, though grossly neglected, aspect of that history.

2. Questioning Racism’s Pervasiveness

There have been historians whose findings have led them to suggest doubts about the prevailing concept of the largely unchallenged domination of racism in the thought of white people in the United States. Significant in this regard has been Jeffrey Brooke Allen. In one article Allen examined the question “Were Southern White Critics of Slavery Racists?” Here he limited himself to Kentucky and the upper South from 1791 to 1814. In another article he examined “The Racial Thoughts of White North Carolina Opponents of Slavery.” In the first article Allen stated that his purpose was to challenge “the generally accepted notion that the majority of white anti-slavery Southerners were racists.” In the second he concluded that “virtually all” of the North Carolina white opponents of slavery “denounced not only slavery but also the racist ideology which so frequently served as its justification.” While Allen’s work has considerable value and will be used in subsequent pages, it is possible, I think, that the findings reported by him do not fully sustain the somewhat sweeping language he has used.
Gary B. Mills, in a very careful study dealing with antebellum Alabama, summarized:

Wherever whites and free blacks met each other on a one-to-one basis, toleration and often friendship resulted. Nothing has emerged so far to support the theory that whites in Alabama hated or feared free blacks; they did not fear the widow next door who was a founding member of their church or hate the barber with whom they hunted. Instead, it was the vague and theoretical mass of black freedmen that troubled them—the one popularized by political demagogues who built careers by swaying the emotions of voters, the one condemned by social malcontents who habitually penned the hate-filled and anonymous “letters to the editor” that are quoted today as measures of public sentiment.

Mills’s concluding sentence is substantiated by his very important article: “In view of the degree to which this study suggests a reinterpretation of southern race relations, a similar re-evaluation of other southern states on an unprecedented, comprehensive, grassroots basis is also mandated.”

In a study, some of which moved past the time limits of this volume, Michael C. Coleman found an absence of racism among missionaries to American Indians. Coleman examined the correspondence of four hundred such missionaries writing to the Board of Foreign Missions of the Presbyterian church. He reported that the letters showed ethnocentrism but were not racist. Where failings seemed to be present among the missionaries’ charges, they were considered “the product of circumstances, not race.” These men felt that “racism was outrageously anti-scientific”; they believed that the “Indians were human beings of full spiritual, intellectual, and social potential.” Coleman found a “nearly total absence of explicit or even implicit racism in tens of thousands of pages of correspondence and published literature.”

Finally, I think it appropriate to call attention to the stimulating book by David Edwin Harrell, Jr., chairman of the history department at the University of Alabama, Birmingham, although it is entirely beyond the time scope of the present volume. This study of contemporary Southern religious sects showed that some, which may be described as right-wing fundamentalists, issue propaganda similar to that of the most rabid advocates of slavery. But Harrell emphasized that this is true only of the most publicized elements in Southern religious
sects. Much of the teaching of other such sects, however, insists upon human equality, specifically and strenuously denounces racism, and expresses admiration for Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. In many instances the sects in practice are integrated from top to bottom.

Harrell rightly lamented that “the social views of the churches of the poor have generally been ignored by scholars”; and not only their churches, one should add. The book must be studied by all who believe that racism is all-pervasive in the past and present of U.S. history and society. Harrell observed correctly that earlier sociologists, such as Leonard W. Doob, writing in 1937, and Mary Gardner, Allison Davis, and Burleigh B. Gardner in Deep South, published four years later, reported a notable absence of racism among many of the poorer whites. Indeed, James McBride Dabbs insisted over thirty years ago that racial violence in the South was attributable basically to the propertied, not the poor, and that the latter “have been charged with a degree of racial animosity they do not really feel.” As the twentieth century approaches its end, the time surely has come for the historical profession as a whole to take seriously the findings of keen sociologists fifty and sixty years ago and the observation of so knowledgeable a contemporary as Dabbs in the 1950s and to notice the racist-rejecting integration-practicing poor Southern white folks who have been living in Christian fellowship with their Black neighbors for generations.

Several historians have produced books that contribute significantly to a historiography of anti-racism in the United States. Outstanding in this regard, in addition to Du Bois’s Black Reconstruction and the entire commitment of Carter G. Woodson, was the remarkable work of James Hugo Johnston noted earlier. Though written with great, even extreme, restraint because of its period of creation and its subject matter, it is an extraordinary account not only of racist practice and belief but also of the rejection of both, a fact somewhat obscured in Winthrop D. Jordan’s brief foreword to the published version, which finally appeared in 1970. Confined to pre–Civil War years and largely to Virginia, Johnston’s work challenged the stereotype of a rigidly racist society. Certainly, those who ruled sought such a society, but just as certainly they did not succeed.

Johnston offered many examples of petitions to the Virginia legislature from owners seeking to manumit slaves. He showed that such petitions frequently offered reasons for the actions that affirmed admiration for the one to be benefitted in terms at least implying the denial of inferiority. Thus an owner requested such permission in Dinwiddie County in December 1810. He wished “to see liberated”
James, his miller for over seventeen years. During that period, stated the petitioner, “he has conducted himself with respect to honesty, sobriety, and every other virtue generally found in human nature with so much zeal, that he has obtained not only my most unlimited confidence, but so far as I can judge that of all others that are acquainted with him.” Another, writing in 1830, insisted that his slave “is as honest a man as ever lived in the state of Virginia,” and so he wanted that person to be free.

Johnston, citing the work of another African American pioneering historian, Luther P. Jackson, observed that the latter had shown, back in 1927, that “certain white men [in Virginia] made a practice of assisting Negroes to buy their freedom.” Others, as is well known, assisted slaves to flee. Johnston called special attention to one such, a James Allen, who “gave his life to make possible the escape of a slave” in Virginia in 1802. In this case, the slave, Charles, had made good his escape; suspicion fastened on Allen as one who had assisted the fugitive. Allen was lashed and told that the beating would stop when he revealed Charles’s whereabouts. Allen chose silence and was beaten to death.

The egalitarian beliefs and habits of eighteenth-century Methodists and Baptists are well documented, and reference will be made to this later. Here it is to be noted that Johnston called attention to a complaint to the governor of Virginia in 1789 denouncing these “disorderly People” who “under the cloak of religion” held meetings of Blacks and whites as often as three times a week and even resisted patrols ordering them to disperse. In particular, concern was expressed about the behavior of “Mr. Charles Neale,” who held such meetings in his home and physically evicted law-enforcement personnel who tried to prevent such subversion.

Johnston remarked: “Unfortunately little is known of the social attitude of poor white men in this period”—anticipating by almost forty hears a similar observation by Herbert Gutman. He continued, however, “There is evidence that among this class were to be found those whose hatred of the upper classes made them allies and aids to the Negro conspirators.” Johnston cited the slave conspiracy in Virginia in 1816 in which a white man, George Boxley, was jailed for being a participant and a sympathizer. He called attention also to a letter of 1821 to the governor accusing an unnamed white man of similar subversion.

Johnston’s work is vital, too, because it refers to many petitions to the legislature seeking an end to slavery. Some were very numerously signed and often conveyed rejection of the idea of Black inferiority. Thus one from an unspecified number of white men from Frederick and
Hampshire counties in 1786 stated that the signers were “fully persuaded that liberty is the birthright of all mankind, the right of every rational creature without exception that the body of negroes in this state have been robbed of that right and therefore ought in justice to have that right restored.” Indeed, these petitioners insisted—as did David Walker in 1829 and William Lloyd Garrison in 1831—that if the grievances producing the late Revolution justified that effort, then surely the same principle “doth plead with greater force for the emancipation of our slaves in proportion as the oppression exercised over them exceed” that which the colonists had formerly suffered.

Johnston called attention also to two petitions, one signed by 422 and the other by 115 citizens, both dated 1795. These Virginians united in calling slavery “an outrageous violation and an odious degradation of human nature.” This, said these hundreds of white Virginians, was all the more reprehensible at the time they were petitioning, for it was a time “when the living spirit of liberty seems to be diffusing itself through the world.” They continued that they knew that objection to emancipation flowed not only “from interested motives” but also from allegations of the “unfitness of individuals for freedom.” But one must, they insisted, be “sensible of the effect of custom and prejudice arising from a habit of looking upon the African race as an inferior species of mankind and regarding them only as property.” The petitioners rejected such “prejudice” and insisted that they were believers in the teaching of Jesus. Hence they urged the legislature to pass regulations that would “restrain the holders from inhuman treatment” of slaves. In addition, they called on the lawmakers to ensure that the children of those then enslaved would become free when “of proper ages” and would receive instruction so that they might become literate and to “invest them with suitable privileges as an incitement to become useful citizens.”

Johnston also suggested that in the colonial period, when indenture of white workers was common, the latter may well “have lacked much of the ‘natural race prejudice’ that is attributed to the governing aristocrat.” Considerable confirmatory evidence has since accumulated. in this connection, observe the remarkable book by Mechal Sobel, The World They Made Together: Black and White Values in Eighteenth-Century Virginia. Her main point was not, as one reviewer thought, that “blacks and whites in eighteenth century Virginia formed a common cultural world.” What she did mean to convey, as she emphasized to this writer, was that the African American and the white Virginian worker “shared values,” “shared experiences,” and “shared lives,” but that “their world views were not identical, although organically related to each other.” She continued, “Indeed, the sharing
was what I emphasized, and still want to, but the difference is I think significant.” A main contribution of this path-breaking book is its emphasis on African influences upon white people rather than the reverse; it demonstrated how great that influence was in outlook, habits, and, especially, worship.

For present purposes, the Sobel book makes the point—obvious enough once stated—that in colonial Virginia the laboring population, African and white, played, lived, labored, and worshipped together and that one result was the emergence of “a new culture—a mix of African and English values.” Sobel emphasized the ruling class’s effort at division through propaganda, social pressure, and legislation, for example, laws against miscegenation (1691, 1705), prohibiting Black testimony against whites (1705), and forbidding free Blacks to vote (1723). She wrote of “marked separation in the nineteenth century” but believed that “the attempt to separate the two races was not as successful as early as has been assumed.” Much of the body of her book showed that in personal behavior and in common labor, worship, and resistance such separation was hardly successful in the colonial period.13

Earlier, in an article to which not enough attention has been paid, T. H. Breen had concluded after studying the late seventeenth- and early eighteenth-century history of this colony: “But the story of Virginia’s labor force between 1660 and 1710 was more than a dreary narrative of suffering and oppression. For a few decades, it had been possible to overlook racial differences, a time when a common experience of desperate poverty and broken dreams brought some whites and blacks together.”14 It is my belief, for which the remainder of this book will seek to bring forward confirmatory evidence, that the separation of Black and white peoples and the acceptance of racism upon which that separation so heavily depended never were as successful as the bulk of the historical literature and the dominant belief pattern of the nation would suggest.

NOTES

Introduction

1. I published a suggestion, “Anti-Racism in U.S. History: An Introduction,” in Black Scholar (1975), 6:15–22. Another essay, with the same title, but more material, edited by Benjamin Bowser, is in Sage Race Relations Abstract
The decision to concentrate on anti-racism among white people owes much to a conversation some years ago with John Hope Franklin.

2. A doctoral dissertation being prepared by Toby Terrar in the history department of the University of California in Los Angeles treats this strand in Catholicism up to the seventeenth century. I appreciate his sharing his findings with me.


Chapter 1

2. The classical assault upon the racism dominating the history profession in the United States until World War II was W. E. B. Du Bois’s *Black Reconstruction* (New York, 1935). Carter G. Woodson devoted his life to countering racist historiography. James Hugo Johnston’s book—originally a dissertation at the University of Chicago in 1937—was finally published in 1970 at Amherst, Massachusetts, as *Race Relations in Virginia and Miscegenation in the South, 1776–1860*.


Chapter 2


9. This kind of evidence brought forward by Johnston in *Race Relations in Virginia* makes quite inappropriate Winthrop Jordan’s prefatory remarks that Johnston’s work suffers from downplaying “racial distinctions” (italics in original) and not observing that “virtually all whites then (and most now) were unwilling to have blacks in America and at the same time be free.” His views as to the past are shown to be dubious by the work he introduces; his parenthetic remarks about the feelings of “most” whites in the present are at best extraordinary.


12. In a letter dated Haifa, Israel, November 30, 1989, italics in original.


[Anti-Racism in U.S. History by Herbert Aptheker can be purchased at (203) 226-3571 through Customer Service or at Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc., P.O. Box 5007, Westport, CT 06881. Credit card or open account orders can be made through (800) 225-5800, ext. 12.]
REPLACES AD PAGE.
Commentaries

Freedom of Speech and the Working Class:
On Terrar’s “Colonial America’s Press Legacy”

Toby Terrar misrepresents my research and the career of free-speech campaigner Theodore Schroeder in his article on colonial America’s press legacy (Terrar 1989). More importantly, his arguments have very dangerous implications for working-class movements, and fail to consider in any concrete way the potential for accomplishing his objectives through means other than the coercive power of the state. My work demonstrates not that the labor movement and its press disappeared “when antilabor press freedom flourished,” as Terrar claims (61), but rather that “this early labor press depended upon the health of the labor movement it served for survival, virtually disappearing during periods when unions were under particularly severe attack#.#.##[becoming] firmly enough established to survive economic downturns and repression” only in the 1860s (Bekken 1988, 106).

The key factor in the labor press’s health was not criticism from the corporate press, which many labor newspapers survived unscathed, but the material conditions in which working-class newspapers were produced—the health of the economy (which affected workers’ ability to organize) and of labor organizations (which supported the press), the economic structure of the newspaper industry, and the level of state repression directed against the movement. Elsewhere, I have addressed particular aspects of this repression, ranging from exclusion from the mails to beatings and shootings of newsboys distributing socialist newspapers, as well as the implications of advertiser-financing for the ability of dissident working-class voices to be heard (Bekken 1991a; Bekken 1990; Bekken 1991b, 24–34). While attacks by the antilabor press often accompanied this repression, there is no reason to believe they were its cause—and no historical evidence to support such an unmaterialist theory.


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Nor do I claim the labor press and its freedom flourished between 1925 and 1940, with the “destruction of the antilabor commercial press” by boycotts, unionization, and the National Recovery Administration (Terrar 1989, 61). Newspapers forced out of business during the 1930s (as in earlier decades) were at least as likely to be sympathetic to labor as to be hostile, it was often the most overtly antilabor publications, such as the Chicago Tribune and the New York Times, which survived. While the number of weekly and monthly union organs listed in two directories published in those years increased, the number of socialist and foreign-language papers declined sharply—both in number and frequency—during the same period. In 1925 there were several daily working-class newspapers, published in major centers such as Chicago, Milwaukee, New York, and Seattle, but also in immigrant centers such as Duluth, Minnesota. Most, including all but two of the English-language labor dailies, had closed by 1940. In 1925, for example, six daily labor and socialist newspapers were published in Chicago: Spravedlnost, Prosveta, Naujienos, Dziennik Ludowy (though it closed that year), Russkii Vestnik, and the Chicago edition of Vorwaerts. Three ceased publication in the next ten years, and the Chicago-based working-class dailies that survived the 1940s did so only by either retreating from their socialist stance or transforming themselves from local or regional community publications to national organs firmly under the control of the organizations that subsidized them (Bekken 1988; Hoerder 1987).

The NRA hardly interfered in any substantive way with the operations of antilabor publishers—the newspaper codes were the weakest of any adopted, while the printing trades had long been organized (Leab 1970; Linder 1990). Indeed, in 1954 the International Typographical Union condemned New Deal labor legislation as “a mushroom of legal restraints” which invaded unionists’ existing “American rights” (Tomlins 1985, 312). Nor is there much support for the proposition that labor coverage improved with the formation of the Newspaper Guild. The period is instead striking for the final disappearance of that sector of the capitalist press inclined to be sympathetic towards labor concerns (Douglas 1947; Hardt 1990; Lee 1937; Lipset 1956).

Nor did this period see substantial expansion of press freedom. The 15 July 1930 edition of Revolutionary Age was barred from the mails because it called for the overthrow of capitalism. In 1932, the ACLU reported that seven radical papers had been denied second-class mailing rights the prior year. In 1936 and again in 1937 the courts upheld the Post Office’s prohibition of stickers criticizing Hearst’s papers from the
The Militant’s second-class mailing rights were revoked in 1942–43 on explicitly political grounds. Thus, repression against the labor press hardly ended during the 1930s (Bekken 1991a). Similarly questionable is the assertion that the People’s Daily World was “able to compete with the few capitalist newspapers that can manage a nationwide presence” — even before it suspended publication — or that contemporary union newspapers, taken as a whole, “carry on the revolutionary, class partisan First Amendment heritage” (Terrar 1989, 62). While there are more than 650 union publications issued today, too many are mere mouthpieces for incumbent administrations, closed both to revolutionary ideas and to their members (Cessnik 1982; Jacobs and Spring 1981; Witt 1978).

Indicative of Terrar’s cramped notion of press freedom is his cavalier dismissal of Theodore Schroeder’s Free Speech League as “a political arm of the pornographic commercial press” (65). While Schroeder devoted substantial attention to obscenity and indecency prosecutions, he consistently defended (editorially, financially, and with legal assistance) the rights of working-class newspapers, while commercial publishers cheered the censors on (Schroeder 1916; Schroeder 1944). Schroeder defended the free-speech rights of pornographers, atheists, feminists, socialists, and anarchists alike, arguing that governmental action to regulate speech was unconstitutional, offensive to human liberty, and an opening wedge that could (and, given the government’s record, inevitably would) be used to censor political speech (Kuhn 1953).

Obscenity laws were used against socialist papers including the New York Daily Call, Appeal to Reason, Il Martello, and many others. While they may have on occasion been employed to protect women against harassment, obscenity laws also have proven useful in harassing working-class, feminist, and free-thought publications. The editor of the Polish socialist free-thought weekly, Bicz Bozy, for example, was prosecuted on obscenity charges for mailing an issue containing a cartoon of a fully clothed priest carrying a fully clothed nun, over the caption, “The Abduction of the Sabines.” Schroeder criticized the short-sightedness of those who did not see “that the censorial authority whose rightful existence they admitted would come home to plague themselves” (Schroeder 1911). Similarly, four editors of the Daily Worker were prosecuted, in 1927, on indecency charges based upon a poem, “America.” Mention of birth control, nudism, gay rights, free love, etc., was barred under obscenity laws, while advocacy of revolution was barred from the mails as indecent matter (Bekken 1991a). More
recently, federal indecency and other charges have been brought against community radio broadcasters for broadcasting programs “overly critical of [the] government,” on AIDS, gay and lesbian issues, etc. (Crigler and Byrnes 1989, note 17). Thus, the “personal liberties” the ACLU originally chose not to involve itself in were often part and parcel of the broader struggle for human emancipation.

The dangerous implications of Terrar’s argument should be readily apparent. On occasion the state has intervened to prevent press attacks against the poor and disenfranchised, but this has been the exception rather than the rule. The capitalist state has not shown itself inclined, over the years, to tolerate revolutionary speech (or even reformist speech by the politically disenfranchised). Regulations, such as obscenity laws used to prevent discussion of sexual morality (as well as titillating material), are inevitably extended by prosecutors against labor and reform papers. Similarly, Terrar leaves little scope for ensuring the rights of competing working-class tendencies to be heard. In Nicaragua, for example, the Sandinista regime shut down the Marxist-Leninist daily *El Pueblo* six months after taking power on the grounds that its articles offended the church hierarchy and threatened economic stability (Vanguard fighters #1984). Leaders of Communist-dominated unions were imprisoned for opposing government austerity policies and a ban on strikes (Wetzel 1983, 38). The Sandinistas felt that such views were socially irresponsible and contrary to the interests of the people, and so they silenced them.

Later the Sandinistas turned their attention from their left flank to critics on the right, censoring the counterrevolutionary *La Prensa* and penalizing Catholic broadcasters. After one such incident several Czech human rights activists, who had joined in campaigning against aid to the Contras, wrote Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega: “The counterrevolutionary onslaught will either be defeated by the free supporters of the Revolution or the Revolution will perish. In such a case it does not seem to matter too much if its defeat will be caused by outside intervention or an internal development which negates all the Revolution’s ideals and which gradually sets up a bureaucratic dictatorship with empty slogans and full jails” (Dienstbier et al. 1986). Similarly, David Finkel argued that “political censorship creates a habit of bureaucratism that can spread like a cancer through the whole revolutionary process. Any damage *La Prensa* could do to the revolution was secondary to the damage the revolution could do to itself trying to stop it” (Finkel 1984, 13).

Socialists have historically favored freedom of the press, not only
from police but from capital as well. While some Marxists have argued that this freedom should extend—at least during the immediate post-revolutionary period—only to working-class tendencies, none has argued for the press’s total subordination to the party or the state, even if they have behaved somewhat differently in practice (Bettig 1989).

More than a century ago, the Chicagoer Arbeiter-Zeitung contended that “freedom of the press and speech are prime and main necessities of culture and liberty.” But the editors went on to note that “dust is being thrown in the eyes of the people with big words about press freedom, while the population becomes more and more enslaved.” Only a few were in a position to actually realize the benefits of press freedom, and the truth was crowded out by the “lies, errors and corruptions” of the capitalist press (Freedom of the Press 1888). But despite their understandable bitterness—the paper’s editor had been hanged ten months earlier—they never suggested government control of the press.

Instead, working-class movements have responded to capitalist propaganda by establishing their own organs of communication, through boycotts of the capitalist press, and, on occasion, by refusing to handle particularly pernicious material. When the Seattle Post-Intelligencer devoted its editorial page to a full-page advertisement (placed by the editor of Seattle’s business daily) calling upon “Real Americans” to hunt down and kill unionists and socialists, printing trades workers notified management “that no union man would touch type or press” unless the advertisement was removed from future editions. “We have upheld our agreements and produced your paper, even though in so doing we were braiding the rope with which you propose to hang us; day after day we have put in type, stereotyped, printed and mailed calumny after calumny, lie after lie.” But they would not tolerate appeals to violence against their fellow unionists (O’Connor 1981, 183–84).

Similarly, in the aftermath of World War II, Japanese editorial and production workers seized control of the daily Yomiuri after the paper’s owner persisted in his antidemocratic editorial stance. The paper was issued under workers’ self-management, giving voice to Japanese union militants, for several months until the U.S. occupation forces decided that this violated capitalist press freedom and forcibly returned control to Yomiuri’s owner (Moore 1983). Labor-movement decisions to start new newspapers and, more recently, television and radio programs are, of course, more frequent.

Such approaches are fundamentally different from the strategy of appealing to the state to silence reactionaries. Instead they rely upon the working class itself—and thus pose a genuinely popular communications
strategy—and focus not so much on suppressing objectionable perspectives as upon making the means of communication available to all.

As Terrar argues, freedom of the press under the present capitalist international regime is largely restricted to the rich and powerful. Genuine democracy requires extending not just the legal right to communicate, but the actual means to do so, to the entire population (Schiller 1984; Picard 1988). But this cannot be accomplished by replacing the censorship of the marketplace with the heavy hand of the state: when governments determine which voices may be heard they generally defer to the powerful. Government censorship is no more consistent with working-class emancipation than is the daily censorship practiced today by the organs of the employing class.

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The Politics of Biopolitics: A Review Essay


*Primate Politics* merits extended consideration because “biopolitics,” like other applications of ethology and sociobiology, buttresses right-wing ideologies in a time of international crisis. It proposes, for understanding human political behavior, a biology-based theory as an alternative to Marxism and all other previous theories.

The challenge by ethologists and sociobiologists to the value of Marxism precedes recent events in the socialist world, which will seem to many to validate that challenge. It is clear, even to those who value dialectical and historical materialism as a fundamental tool in the acquisition, organization, and societally beneficial transmission of human knowledge, that confronting this challenge is necessary. Examining such a challenge through the application of the principles of dialectical and historical materialism may be helpful in charting future efforts in the various disciplines of knowledge, and thus the current philosophical crisis may be a nodal point in the development of Marxist theory.

The crisis comes at a time of rapid increase in our knowledge of human beings on many levels—genetic; biochemical (immunological, neuroimunological); neurophysiological and neuroanatomical. It is also a time of increased onslaught by the forces of the multinational systems against the partial gains made by people of color, by women, and by the people who have achieved nominal national independence in all areas of the planet. It is not surprising, then, that some intellectuals who depend on those who initiate such onslaughts for the support of


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their activities in the laboratories and in academia attempt to integrate the new knowledge from other fields with the knowledge from their disciplines into “new” theories that might support the new waves of racism and sexism. The most influential and pervasive theory to be proposed as the solution to the many problems in all human societies today is sociobiology, as popularized by E. O. Wilson (1975, 1978) and his followers (e.g., Rushton 1988; Lumsden and Wilson 1981; see also Tobach 1988). The theory in its most well-known form today states that the behavior of all organisms, including human behavior (social, intellectual, artistic and ethical, as well as reproductive), is derived from the drive for the gene to perpetuate itself in succeeding generations; the individual is only the vehicle for the gene to carry out those processes necessary for it to survive. One of the corollaries of the theory is that populations, including human populations, can be categorized as (1) those that are in an unstable, resource-poor environment, with many offspring that become reproductively mature at an early age and are vulnerable to early morbidity (r selection), and (2) those that are in a stable, resource-rich environment, with few offspring that take a long time to mature to the reproductive stage and live for relatively long periods (K selection) (Wilson 1975). Rushton, a behavior geneticist, applies this concept to humans, saying that various racial and ethnic groups display these characteristics. He compares “Asian,” “European,” and Black people according to the r or K selection processes to “explain” such differences among them as intelligence and sexual/reproductive behavior, correlating such items as size of genitalia with intelligence.

In developing sociobiology as a theory for understanding human behavior, Wilson (1978) proposes that the human species has evolved the ability to engineer the genetic process to guarantee that people have the appropriate genes for the desired social behavior, at the same time evolving a sense of ethics that prevents people from carrying out the engineering project. When he wrote this, he predicted that that this ability would not be realized for another hundred years, and he was glad that he would not be around to face the ethical dilemma of making decisions about the engineering process.

It is interesting to note that approximately ten years later, Roger D. Masters, the political scientist, who coeds the book presently under review, and finds sociobiology significant for the development of political science, states, “The political process must sooner or later be fundamentally affected by the power to change not only the environment but also the behavior and genetic composition of humans.
themselves” (1989, xii). Although he recognizes that knowledge of the human genome does not ensure that “conscious manipulation of the gene pool would guarantee the survival of the species” (129), he also states that “our tendency to attribute primacy to the material and sensual universe of human experience#.#.##may be an illusion. The greatest significance of many events may be their selective input on our gene pool rather than their perceived consequences for individuals or societies” (130).

Masters and Schubert clearly identify themselves as scientists who, although they see value in sociobiology and ethology, wish to dissociate themselves from any racist and sexist implications of sociobiological theory, or its application to human behavior. In The Nature of Politics, Masters acknowledges that the diversity of the gene pool is necessary to take care of the contingencies of changing environmental and other factors; the species would not be as likely to cope with significant challenges to survival if the gene pool was uniform. This is a statement intended to disarm those who would accuse him of advocating exclusionary policies. However, humans must take this evolutionary prerogative into account in the management of their lives, in keeping with the sociobiological mode of thinking, as all human activities are ultimately derived from the genetic process and its drive to survive.

In the epilogue to his book, Masters calls for an appreciation of the usefulness of a biological basis for developing codes for ethical behavior and for confronting the genetic engineering knowledge that we now have. He concludes the book with the statement, “The biological sciences must come to the center of our attention if the Socratic injunction, ’know thyself,’ is to come alive” (249).

One could assess the usefulness of an ethical code based on the biological sciences (for this one might read “evolutionary biology,” “ethology,” “primatology,” or “sociobiology”) by examining Masters’s discussion of the issue of the equality of women and men. His position, like that of Schubert, is distinguishable from that of Wilson, who characterizes the differences between women and men on the basis of their supposed differential contributions to the success with which the genes are able to perpetuate themselves, supporting the double standard in sexual behavior on the grounds that a man is most efficient in this regard if he impregnates as many women as possible, while a woman is most efficient in selecting a male who will be able to care for her while she is reproducing offspring to carry her genes into the next generation. It is on this basis that Wilson concludes that it is not possible for women to change their status in society by activities designed to do so (1978).
Masters argues,

While some may use these differences [cultural variations in the status of women in society] as evidence of cultural relativism, they can readily be explained as responses to the social and physical environment. Since similar differences in gender roles are found in other species, a naturalistic approach explains why some cultures invest equally in males and females, whereas others treat the two sexes quite differently. To assume that there is a single logic of male and female social and political roles, without reference to time and place, is contrary to evolutionary biology. It is understandable enough that people describe their own customs as natural, but this label does not justify the imposition of universal ethical criteria on others living in very different circumstances. Such ethnocentrism is all the more suspect today because contemporary doctrines of equality are suited to a market economy and have been used to extend the power and wealth of capitalist societies at the expense of the Third World. (242)

The equation of exploitative excesses by multinational corporations with insensitivity to cultural values and traditions in the treatment of women and men is an example of the tortuous logic used to integrate sociobiological principles with a humanistic pose. The fact that cultural changes brought about by the actions of people to control their own lives and land inevitably change the relations of women and men would seem to support his view, as well as a dialectical materialist view, that the material circumstances of society are critical in the formulation of human relations. The difference is that in the view of those who are struggling for equity the decisive behavior is based on cognitive activity expressing historically based values, a concept of ethics applicable to all people, women and men alike—that is, the right to self-determination and freedom from exploitation. In the biologically based system that he proposes, such activity would start from the premise that the difference in roles, being biologically based, should be taken into account in the planning of social change.

He validates the call for letting nature formulate ethical codes by citing the work of Carol Gilligan to the effect that

a priori ethical doctrines tend to be enunciated by males. While formal definitions of rights and duties are appropriate in some areas, such as legislation that will be binding on an entire society across generations, they cannot be taken as the only
mode of ethical reasoning without imposing a style of judgment contrary to evolutionary principles and inconsistent with the practice of many humans. A naturalistic ethic must consider differences of time and place, and therefore provides an alternative to both religious and philosophic dogmatism. (243)

One of the consequences of this approach to formulating appropriate responses to the domination of people by economic power is worthwhile considering. If the exploited country accommodates its ethics to the time and place of being exploited, and if the exploiters need not be called to task on the basis of some “abstract,” “dogmatic” “a priori” ethic such as freedom from domination and exploitation, what might be the effect on the diversity of the gene pool of humanity? To date, failure to abide by the a priori ethic of the human right to freedom has been the implementation of genocidal policies both in the home country of the multinational power as well as abroad.

Both Schubert and Masters present their application of socio-biological theory to the management of human affairs as ultimately beneficial to human welfare. A review of Schubert’s discussion of women in the book that they both edited indicates how this application is accomplished. In his introduction, Schubert discusses the effect of the work of women primatologists on the field. He appropriately points out that their investigation of the behavior of female primates in relation to the entire group under observation has led to new insights and profound reformulation of theories of social behavior. He cites two men to provide evidence of the effect of the research findings and theoretical writings of these women (Wrangham 1981; de Waal 1987a). This tribute to the women is well deserved. It is important to understand the process whereby women began to affirm their expertise as scientists and to examine their scientific work in the light of the characteristics attributed to it. For example, Schubert writes:

The new feminist paradigms of primatology and paleoanthropology strongly support cooperative attitudes in several strands of contemporary thinking, in which nurturance, environmentalism, well-fare-ism, and the valuing and protection of life define female nature, while technocracy, militarism, and the desecration of the biosphere generally are the opposite attributes of male nature. (21)

While Schubert is correct in citing one group of feminists who hold this position, there are others who would challenge this formulation (Rosoff and Tobach, in Hunter 1991). It is possible that the impetus for women
to assert their interests and demonstrate their abilities to do primatological research was part of the general agenda of women academics and scholars. It should be pointed out that Goodall, Fossey, and Galdikas approached Leakey for support in doing the research. The stories of what other attempts they may have made in order to breach the bulwarks of primatology that had been closed to women is to be found in their writings and in Haraway’s books (1989, 1991). The gratuitous statements that Leakey and Washburn were not feminists and that Hinde became “much more so” attest also to the underlying attitude of Schubert, who refers to the three famous investigators as “the stable of young women” whom Leakey “recruited” and “anted” into the field, as does the statement that “all three agreed that women make good field observers of apes and monkeys” (p. 16).

It is in these examples of the application of biological theory to human behavior and to scientific behavior in general that one must probe the level of political understanding with which Schubert and Masters approach the complex process of political behavior.

Within the common understanding of most people, politics is a human activity. Both Schubert and Masters acknowledge that human behavior is distinctively different from that of any other animal. Their aim is to show that by understanding the similarities between people and other species we can gain insights into the possibility of adopting more appropriate social practices, that is, practices that would not violate the principles of evolutionary biology. This would alleviate some of the social and societal stresses that bedevil us today.

*Primate Politics* is an exemplar of the application of sociobiology to a social science. The title intends us to understand that primates other than people also engage in politics, and that there are similarities in the “political” behavior of apes and monkeys that generate a continuum of a behavioral pattern in evolution. Common understanding of political behavior usually encompasses humans involved in the organization of communities, cities, states, nations, and international bodies in which they carry out activities such as governance and formulation of policies affecting group relationships. The reader would expect that in this collection of papers there would be some discussion of primate behavior that resembles complex group organization approximating some aspects of human political behavior.

In the preface, we read about the history of the book, and we learn that the book is about “the progressive development of scholarship extending evolutionary perspectives to the study of human social life.” This emerging field, now often called “biopolitics,” links “evolutionary perspectives and the study of human social life” (xii–xiv). The
evolutionary perspective is clearly a primatology based on ethology and sociobiology (24–25; 232–34). The definition of political science is more convoluted. The conceptualization of “politics” in the different papers in the book covers a spectrum of behavior, primarily based on inferences made from the behavior of the organisms being discussed, including humans. As there is no consensual communication among nonhuman primates except in gesture and vocalization, formulations of “governance policies” can only be inferred by the human observer. The inferences of “political behavior” are based on complex social behavior such as instances of shrewd social scheming by individuals to achieve goals, hierarchical structure of groups, associative behavior, reproductive affiliations, and so forth. In other words, the behavior described is social rather than societal.

To clarify the difference between the behavior of humans in groups and other primates in groups, a distinction between “social” and “societal” processes derived from the concept of integrative levels is helpful. In the evolution of behavior, continua of behavioral categories are evident on every phyletic level. One such category is social behavior, that is, the spatial/temporal activity relationships of two or more organisms, usually of the same species. In these continua of categories, there are also discontinuities at every phyletic level, so that the social relationships between and among individuals in the earlier phyla such as worms, snails, and bees are different from those among wolves, monkeys, apes, and humans. At the human level, the discontinuity is sufficiently great in terms of process and quality to warrant using the term “societal” to describe the complex relationships seen in political, cultural, or class behavior. All living organisms, including humans, engage in some level of social behavior. But other animals engage only in social behavior. “Society” denotes and connotes a voluntary association at some stage of the development of human social behavior in which relationships among related and unrelated individuals become institutionalized on the basis of cognitive function, language and consciousness. These relationships are formulated in rules of governance, and in culturally transmitted practices, how individuals are expected to behave. These rules are taught through human socialization processes involving language. They are not reformulated anew with each individual’s experience. They are changed within the previously existing rules of conduct, which are taught to succeeding generations.

Political activity, one aspect of societal process, is inherently interconnected, interdependent, and interrelated with the linguistic and cognitive characteristics of the human. As the communicative and cognitive functions of humans are different from those of other animals, as
Schubert and Masters state, some process in some way similar to that of political activity would have to be shown to be an inherent process in the lives of nonhuman primates without concomitant language, and a level of cognitive function that can produce consensual activity qualitatively different from the social behavior shown by nonhuman primates. The social behavior of nonhuman primates is primarily a function of reproductive processes (Tobach and Schneirla 1968). Nonhuman primate “societal” behavior would have to be shown to be independent of reproductive function. Sociobiology deals with this issue by proposing that all human societal behavior is ultimately interdependent, interrelated, and interconnected with reproductive behavior, just as is nonhuman social behavior.

The editors purport to demonstrate that the similarities in the social behavior of the nonhuman and human primates provide evidence for the continuity between social and societal behavior. But the existence of a difference, that is, language, is only briefly mentioned. The significance of this difference, produced by, and producing other discontinuities, such as the difference between social and societal behavior is not considered. The result of not considering these issues is that social behavior becomes equivalent to societal behavior, and as political behavior is the hallmark of societal processes, social behavior becomes political behavior. It follows, then, that the evolutionary biological processes that are seen as responsible for social behavior are considered responsible for political behavior on the human level.

The book is organized to demonstrate this equivalence. The “evolutionary biology” of primate behavior is presented in the first two sections of the book dealing with primates. The chapters are by primatologists Thelma E. Rowell, who has studied a variety of nonhuman primates; Jane Goodall, whose research has focused on chimpanzees; Frans De Waal, who has observed a number of different species of primates; and Shirley S. Strum, who has worked primarily with baboons (writing with Bruno Latour, a sociologist). Schubert offers a review of the studies of nonhuman primates done by these authors, as well as others, as examples of researchers who “deem various aspects of the social behavior of the nonhuman primates whom they study to be political” (3). These patterns of social behavior are derived from the activities of two or more individuals, more or less genealogically related to each other. Groups are formed through activities relating to reproduction, feeding, responses to noxious stimuli presented by predators, responses to abiotic aspects of the environment, such as heat, cold or rain. (For the significance of phyletic differences among these types of associative behavior see Tobach and Schneirla 1968). These groups,
however, have no previous history beyond that provided by the experience of the oldest animals in the groups. They have no future history beyond that provided by the youngest members of the group, as long as they stay with the group. As a consequence of such age constraints, the “rules” are similarly contemporaneous.

The physiology of the nonhuman primate subsumes a plastic, complex nervous system as well as reproductive, metabolic, regulatory, and other systems. Primatologists and comparative psychologists have provided many demonstrations of problem solving of an advanced level, both in regard to social behavior (outwitting a stronger or faster animal so that the slower or weaker animal could “steal” food from the stronger) and in understanding aspects of the environment sufficiently to permit efficient foraging and solving problems to obtain food. Thus nonhuman primates have been observed to manipulate objects in the environment for obtaining food that is not readily accessible (modifying twigs to probe for termites or larvae), or integrating past experience so that visits to fruit trees are timed in relationship to the growth cycle of the trees. In a number of cases, the behavior of a group of individuals becomes organized on the basis of contemporary physiological states, as well as on the basis of past experience, so that activities are jointly carried out, thus groups of primates move together in foraging. But comparable behavior is seen in a variety of species, e.g., migrating ants, birds that mob a predator, wolves and other carnivores in harrying and hunting. The physiological basis for the similarities and differences in these patterns in these species depends on such factors as a narrow responsiveness only to contemporary sources of stimulation (as in the case of the ants), as contrasted with the possibility of integration of past social experience to organize the behavior of the individuals of the group (as in the case of the wolves). Thus, “collective” activity, suggestive of a possible relationship to the collectivity of political activity is first, not particular to the nonhuman primates, and second, what appears to be equivalent behavior may be derived from very different processes.

Schubert recognizes that there are significant differences among the social behavior patterns of different species, as well as between those of humans and of nonhuman primates. Despite these differences, Schubert and Masters believe that understanding primate politics will contribute to the theory of political science in an innovative and constructive manner. Information to support this view is presented in the third part of the book, introduced by Masters, which starts with an introduction labeled “human politics.” In this section, we read three articles. The first, by a human ethologist (Nicholas G. Blurton Jones)
proposes that studies of animal behavior by behavioral ecologists, ethologists and sociobiologists require that we reexamine the commonly held view that sharing in hunter-gatherer societies is altruistic (in the generally understood meaning of altruism, that is, doing something for another without expectation of benefit to oneself) that is, that such societies demonstrate a sharing ethic. Rather, there is an undercurrent of hostility associated with sharing, because of the inevitability of scroungers, the desire for affluence, and the difficulty of persuading hunter-gathers to hoard. He proposes that what is demonstrated in the hunter-gatherer societies is the concept of “tolerated theft.” Individuals tolerate theft to an extent dependent upon the abundance of food, the predictability of finding food, and the quality of the food in terms of its being suitable for sharing. This formulation is derived in terms of the fitness of the behavior, that is, whether the energy expended in preventing the theft is likely to leave the defender better off than if the food were not defended. In other words, the ultimate aim of the behavior is to permit the individual to survive, rather than to share. Thus, when there is plenty of food, some theft is tolerated, because the energy needed to prevent the theft or recover the stolen food would exceed the energy needed to get food otherwise. When there is a shortage of food or resources, the theft is not tolerated, and what appears to be sharing in times of plenty is no longer seen.

He states that tolerated theft is an expression of “reciprocal altruism.” The concept of reciprocal altruism states that altruistic acts take place in anticipation of reciprocity, not as acts carried out without any expectation of benefit to the altruist. Further, reciprocal altruism is dependent on the degree of kinship between the two participants in the activity. This concept is said to be applicable to humans and other animals: all species act on the basis of the ultimate selfishness of the genes: reciprocity of altruism is in a direct relationship with the degree to which the two individuals share genes in common, that is, how closely related they are. According to this concept, the development of social or societal consciousness is based on such relatedness in all societies, beginning with that of the hunter-gatherer.

This formulation is consonant with the position of Schubert that “the highest level of complexity in social organization and behavior for simians corresponds to the prepolitical band level among humans” (55). Many anthropologists believe that the earliest groupings of hominids were based on kinship (Lee 1990). In spite of this general agreement, it is informative to look at an approach to the development of political institutions and societies that, although based on the same belief about kinship, proposes quite a different process. Rather than a
static picture of predetermined processes derived from genetic functions, we are given a picture of a process of change in social relationships that produces the next level of human relationships: societal relationships.

In Richard B. Lee’s article on primitive communism and inequality, he discusses the evidence for the nature of primitive (early) human societies, in which “people lived for millennia in small-scale, kin-based social groups, in which the core institutions of economic life included collective or common ownership of land and resources, generalized reciprocity in the distribution of food, and relatively egalitarian political relations” (232).

The discussion by Lee indicates that in the earliest social, presocietal institutions, there were differences among individuals that could lead to contradictory relationships that would result in reorganization of the social group. These groups could include nonkin individuals (slaves, as indicated above). The development of these prestate societies, with weak political forms (that Lee calls “semmommunal”), are reminiscent of the mesolevels described by Novikoff (1945) in the discussion of the concept of levels of integration as they are seen in the social organization of different phyletic levels of organisms. The contradictions within the early communal forms of societies are based on the relationships among the members in regard to individual differences in characteristics that would lead to designation of leaders, but the basic egalitarian, sharing behavior of the group resulted in leaders who were not given more power or opportunity to arrogate personal wealth and property. As Lee points out, the concept of hospitality and sharing was fundamental in those societies, indeed it was a concept that was never to be violated. This could be seen as reciprocity, but it is a reciprocity that is not determined by kinship.

The process that Lee describes takes into account what is generally believed about early groupings being based on kinships; but he proposes a process that changes qualitatively with the quantitative changes in the numbers of individuals. These qualitative changes, productive of better chances for survival of individuals, may have been related to the accumulation of information about the environment and the changes that take place with seasonal changes (Marshack 1971) leading to changes in the operations that individuals carried out to change the environment (labor; the beginning of agriculture and sedentism). Lee’s approach projects a process that affects nonreciprocal sharing that does not rely on extrapolating from the behavior of animals (tolerated theft) to infer explanatory principles.

The first article in this section of the book on human behavior,
designed to show how biological science can contribute to our understanding of the political process, offers assumptions that need testing. Although the Lee scenario also needs validation by research, the data offered by observations of extant hunting-foraging peoples do not contradict the assumptions he makes, and it offers a more rigorous analysis than does Blurton Jones.

The other two papers in this section of the book are by a political scientist (James N. Schubert) who reports on the vocalizations of people in antagonistic political encounters; and the other is by Masters, who, together with his colleagues studied the relationship between facial displays and political leadership. In neither of these two papers are there any data offered as to the politics of the humans studied. One can imagine that Madison Avenue and corporate management teams colluding on an election campaign might try to apply the theory to better control the voting and political behavior of people. Masters and his colleagues state at the end of their paper in which they studied the facial displays of Reagan, “We have demonstrated the feasibility of experimental analysis of the complex interactions between expressive behavior [facial changes], the medium of communication, and prior attitudes, which can influence citizens’ dispositions to support a political leader” (205).

James N. Schubert studied decision making in a U.S. municipal council consisting of five people by recording physical, or “paralinguistic,” characteristics of the voices of the participants (pitch, intensity, pause rate, speech rate, etc.). Carefully stating the limits of possible generalizations because of the size of the group and other factors, and recognizing the need for further research and hypothesis testing, he nonetheless analyzes the behavior of the five people in terms of dominance and submission, reactions and competitive interaction, as they relate to the paralinguistic verbal behavior. He says that the small group is typical of many primate species and may have evolutionary significance.

Paralinguistic dimensions of verbal behavior are variables that appear to play an important role in collective political decision making and that are to require both ontogenetic and phylogenetic explanations. In short, this is an area in which biobehavioral and ethological approaches to behavioral analysis appear clearly relevant to the development of more comprehensive political behavior theory. (220)

It should be noted that nowhere in this study is there any content
analysis of what the issues were that were being decided, what the societal relationships among the people were, etc. We know that one was a woman, one was the mayor (are we to assume the mayor was a man?), and that their ages ranged from forty to sixty years.

In Masters’s concluding section of the third part of the book, in approximately three pages (222–25), he asks “what is politics?” He begins by stating that politics needs to be defined at a macrolevel; the individual’s functioning at levels of physiology (hormonal, brain) may influence politics but it is the macro level that needs definition. He then reviews how various writers (Aristotle, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Hegel, Marx, Locke, Rousseau, Socrates, Aquinas, the Bible) have dealt with society, power and influence (control over individuals), social conflict, law, state, regime or political system, and political history. He finds that in all this there is no scientific basis for a political science. Rather, he concludes:

Research like that in Part III [Blurton Jones, Schubert, Masters and colleagues described above] thus deepens our understanding of the complexity of political phenomena. In Parts I and II, we found that a reinterpretation of research on nonhuman primates shows the risks of assuming we know what other animals are doing; in studying human politics as well, understanding is distorted by projecting our own intentions on the behavior of others. Greater insights into the ‘proximate causes’ of individual and group differences in human social organization and behavior are likely to result from new work in primatology, cognitive neuroscience, developmental psychology and ecology. Deeper understanding of hominid phylogeny along with research in ethology and anthropology will illuminate the way factors in the physical environment, social organization, and cultural practices of a human population function as ultimate causes influencing the evolution of authority and power. It should be evident that the study of primate politics will be an invaluable means of furthering the age-old quest for a better understanding of human nature. (246–47)

It is clear that Schubert and Masters have dismissed the possible contributions of dialectical and historical materialism. They substitute for that philosophical approach the reductionist explanation of molecular biology (genetics), the idealist concept of behavior inherited to further the survival of the species (ethology), and the mechanical materialism (or scientific materialism as E. O. Wilson prefers to call it
(On Human Nature) of sociobiology. Based on these ideologies, the future of human behavior and societies is the playing out of the fate decreed by the gene.

It is necessary to state that there has been little attention paid by those interested in dialectical and historical materialism to the need for the development of theoretical and experimental approaches to the problems posed by ethology and sociobiology. There have been admirable criticisms, such as Kaye (1986) and Lerner (1992), among others. But these have been derived from philosophical sources other than Marxism. To date most of the effects of these ideologies have been seen in scientific disciplines somewhat removed from the scene of political activity. The promulgation of biopolitics as the answer to dialectical and historical materialism emphasizes the need for a vigorous application of this method itself to the challenges posed by ethologists and sociobiologists.

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