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In Memoriam
Philip S. Foner (1910–1994)

The death of Philip S. Foner has been mourned by all who knew of his trailblazing and uniquely prolific work in illuminating the U.S. past and making his findings available to several generations of readers. Beginning with his dissertation, *Business and Slavery* (1941), a distinguished study of the links between Southern planters and New York merchants, Professor Foner for more than half a century produced scores of monographs, documentary collections, essays, and reviews that focused on many of the central issues in U.S. history. Innumerable scholars, in the course of their researches, have found Foner’s publications of indispensable assistance, providing a vast storehouse of vital historical information. He was a leader among historians whose pioneering writings established the basis for contemporary research in U.S. labor history and African American history. He was a scholar of the U.S. Left who by example showed younger students that research and teaching were essential components of the struggle for social progress. His was a life of commitment and dedication to challenging the mystifications and distortions that uphold the status quo.

The range of his scholarly output was truly astounding. His 1945 publication, *The Life and Major Writings of Thomas Paine*, acquainted twentieth-century readers with Paine’s significance as a champion of national independence and democracy. His five-volume work, *The Life and Writings of Frederick Douglass*, is still the basic published source for those seeking material about this foremost leader of the antislavery movement who fought...
against all who would deny Black people the constitutional rights established by the Civil War. Foner’s work was of prime importance in making clear Douglass’s stature as a great hero of the democratic tradition. Other trailblazing works Foner authored include his History of Cuba and Its Relations with the United States; Organized Labor and the Black Worker; Women in the American Labor Movement; and American Labor Songs of the Nineteenth Century. In other works he dealt with, among others, such varied themes as the life of Helen Keller, the international response to the death of Karl Marx, the response of British workers to the U.S. Civil War and the Civil War era, and the struggle against streetcar segregation in Philadelphia.

Foner’s magnum opus, of course, was his multivolume History of the Labor Movement in the United States. His work here was a formidable challenge to the John R. Commons interpretation of labor history, which largely uncritically praised the role of leaders such as Samuel Gompers who accepted the premises of corporate capitalism. Foner set his account in the context of an U.S. society divided by class struggle, and criticized the AF of L’s failure to move toward political independence, its toleration of racism, and its domination by a narrow bureaucracy. Woven into the Foner study is the saga of workers’ struggles to build unions representing their interests and the militancy expressed in innumerable strikes and other forms of protest. Due attention is given to such radical labor organizations as the Industrial Workers of the World and to the struggle for industrial unionism that led to formation of the CIO. Contrary to the views of some critics, Foner’s studies of the labor movement were not simply institutional history but rather included considerable material about workers’ consciousness and their living and working conditions. Foner’s work in labor history continues to be of great value to all serious students of the labor movement.

Philip Foner always proudly acknowledged his commitment to the Marxist tradition. He recognized class conflict as the central element in historical development and he had a sense of the scientific, dialectical process that would lead ultimately to socialism overcoming the contradictions of capitalism. Marxism, for Foner, was no set of dogmas but rather a philosophy that can
only be verified by empirical evidence. Throughout his career he worked with enormous energy to accumulate and analyze the data in which, in the last analysis, the truth is to be found.

Integrated with the his scholarly work was Foner’s personal and political courage. He was not intimidated by blacklists and resolutely fought the infamous New York State legislative Rapp-Coudert Committee that sought to purge New York City’s municipal colleges of alleged Communists. In the 1950s he defied Joe McCarthy, who sought to pillory liberal and radical authors whose books were found in U.S. libraries abroad. For a time Foner worked as educational director of the International Fur & Leather Workers Union and later he became a book publisher. Only in 1967 was he able to return to academia when Lincoln University appointed him professor. But through all of these years, Foner continued indefatigably his work as author and lecturer, speaking often for unions and student audiences on many campuses. He lectured often in the Soviet Union and other socialist countries in Europe. He visited Cuba several times and was greatly honored by the Cubans for his studies of the interaction of the Cuban revolution with U.S. imperialism.

Philip Foner was unique; no one could match his energy and productivity, his ability to work effectively on several projects at the same time. He has left us a legacy, a treasure-house of books and articles that will spur the work of historians now and in the years to come.

Herbert Shapiro

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Another View on the Crisis in Marxism

Herb Gamberg

Much is being made of the necessity to rethink Marxism, and I am not always sure what is meant. The demand seems to suggest that Marxism is in such a profound crisis that nothing less than a reconsideration of its very fundamentals can save it from total extinction or irrelevance (which is the same thing). I do not think that the crisis is of this nature, given that Marxism remains a vital intellectual and political tradition with roots in many parts of the world. Yet new and often seemingly intractable problems have arisen that undermine much of an earlier and easily sanguine acceptance of the Marxist tradition. The most contemporaneous crisis certainly devolves from those problems connected to the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the open embracing of capitalism by the countries of Eastern Europe. While these events are of great historic significance, I do not consider them shocking, as do so many on the Left.

Part of the crisis in Marxism is the lack of clear-cut understanding of how and why revolutions fail to maintain themselves. The fact of their failure, however, has been with us for a while.

Those engaged in this rethinking lack clarity on how to define the problem. Little distinction is made among what is still true about Marxism, what continue to be problems unresolved from earlier times, and what is specifically new about current problems facing Marxism. For example, the original formulations of Marx and Engels had, it seems to me, problems completely rooted in nineteenth-century thought that have continued to plague much of Marxism into the modern era. Although Marx and Engels early recognized their debt to Hegel in the formulation of their underlying philosophy, their thought is far more deeply rooted in the almost completely taken-for-granted assumptions of nineteenth-century science. These assumptions

saw science discovering a law-like universe through the technical application of experimental method and the quantitative enumeration of a natural order. It was often remarked by both Marx and Engels that they intended to do for history and human society what science was already doing for nature. It is in the context of this assumption that Marx thought he was discovering the “laws of motion” of capitalist society. In saying this, it must be realized that this positivist impetus is only one part of the nineteenth-century legacy.* Other aspects in their work contradict this positivism, which is the reason that Marx and Engels’s writings can be built upon and reworked in new contexts and with new developments. The positivist element is there, however, and has been built upon in ways that could not possibly be foreseen by the originators.

What is significant about the consequences of Marx’s original thought is both the manner in which they occurred in the twentieth century and the manner by which they have been interpreted by contemporary critics. In recent years, for example, it has become the fashion in left academic circles to condemn the economic determinism, unilinear evolutionism, and reification of the base-superstructure imagery of much twentieth-century Marxism. That these latter emphases have been influential in the present century, that they have their roots in the thought of the founders, is, I think, an appropriate interpretation (that they were also critically evaluated in some of Engels’s later correspondence is also true). But the contemporary interpretation of the concrete historical manifestations of these problems is, to say the least, peculiar. Harking back to an earlier Marx in the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, contemporary thought often not only rejects the positivist implications of nineteenth-century Marxism but the scientific aspirations of Marxism as well. That is, this critique often turns Marxism into a humanist critique of capitalism rather than a disciplined engagement with its overthrow. At the present time, much of social criticism in postmodernism and aspects of feminism reject all attempts to build a social science. The view that nineteenth-century Marxism is, at best, one in a variety of critiques of capitalism leads to a spread of various forms of idealism.
More specifically, fashionable criticism has even more peculiar notions about twentieth-century Marxian positivism. The most common view sees twentieth-century Marxian positivism in its most virulent institutional form in almost all concrete attempts to build socialism. With little attention to the histories of twentieth-century revolutionary societies, the complicated and often tortuous histories of the Soviet, Chinese, and other revolutionary societies are uniformly rejected as examples of encrusted positivist dogma. This critique may perhaps be applied with some validity to Soviet history under Stalin and it may even be articulated as a general tendency of postrevolutionary societies. But as an across-the-board condemnation of all of Marxism in revolutionary societies, it leaves much to be desired.

The most salient feature of this almost taken-for-granted position about Marxism is its specific neglect of the place of Lenin’s thought in the evolution of Marxism. This neglect, it seems to me, is extremely deleterious to the Marxist viewpoint since it rejects the positive developments of Lenin’s thought and action while reenforcing those older positivist tendencies in nineteenth-century Marxism. Attacking Stalin’s Marxism for its easy evolutionism and economic determinism, contemporary critics are led by their neglect of Lenin to recapitulate much of the positivism of the past. The recent discovery of Gramsci, for example, while important in adding dimensions to the analysis of capitalist legitimacy, almost never mentions that Gramsci wrote in full agreement with Lenin’s view of the Marxist tradition.

To deal with Lenin’s critique of the Marxism of his day leads to a realization that his ideas most clearly articulate the dynamic and dialectical aspect of nineteenth-century Marxism while breaking with much of its positivist tendencies. (I emphasize the word much here since elements of positivism remain in some of Lenin’s thought, especially in his philosophic treatise *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism.* ) The dominant trend in European Marxism in Lenin’s day involved the solidification of Marxism as a positivist science of social reform. Openly manifested in the thought of Eduard Bernstein, who proclaimed that movement toward socialism is more important than the goal of socialism, it saw Marxist theory as the automatic unfolding of historical laws
and Marxist practice as the acquiescence to whatever social reform seemed probable and feasible. Even those Marxists who saw revolutionary transformation as a necessary end of the capitalist social process put it so far in the future that for them, the movement became everything as well. The evolution from Marxists, who see socialism as a probability on the far horizon, to present-day social democrats, who glorify reform alone, is firmly rooted in this overwhelmingly positivist demiurge of the early twentieth century.

The main contours of Lenin’s grappling with this positivist dominance in Marxism bear repeating. In *What is to be Done*, Lenin articulates a position on the movement of working-class consciousness that appears rather novel and daring, but at a stroke negates much that is positivist in the Marxism of late nineteenth-century Europe. He asserts unequivocally that the working class *left to itself* will not come to revolutionary consciousness. Although the objective tendencies of capital accumulation predictably lead to an increasing proletarianization of the workforce (and this highly predictive tendency is what gives Marxism its claim to be a science of the laws of motion of a capitalist system), this objective movement, says Lenin, does not automatically lead to subjective understanding and therefore to revolutionary action. In fact, he says, the usual and predictable result of this proletarianization is the growth of trade-union consciousness. The latter is the limit of working-class consciousness, again if left to itself. “The history of all countries shows that the working class, exclusively by its own efforts, is able to develop only trade union consciousness, i.e., it may itself realise the necessity for combining in unions, to fight against the employers and to strive to compel the government to pass necessary labour legislation etc.” (Lenin 1929, 32–33). Lenin’s position represented a frontal attack on what he called the theory of spontaneism found among the Mensheviks in his own social democratic party. Spontaneism saw the working class coming to revolutionary consciousness by the inner workings of the capitalist laws of motion. The larger the numbers of proletariat, the greater the increase and intensification of working-class consciousness.
In seeing the transition from capitalism to socialism as the operation of blind laws of history, Menshevism and much of European social democracy at the time were demonstrating the totally positivist side of the nineteenth-century tradition. It was Lenin’s bold stroke to revivify the dialectical and revolutionary side. In contemporary language, Lenin recognized that revolutionary social theory is a subtle and complicated blend of determined structure and determining agency. To overemphasize the former is to fall into positivism that was and remains a major obstacle to Marxist theory (to overemphasize the latter is to fall into ultraleftism or even anarchism, which is also a real problem in the history of the Left). Lenin, for stressing the fact that the working class is not an inexorably predetermined agent of revolutionary change but is in need of conscious, often outside, theoretical assistance (“The workers acquire class political consciousness only from without, that is, only outside of the economic struggle, outside of the sphere of relations between workers and employers” [1929, 76; emphasis in original]), was accused of elitism and of lacking trust in the inherent revolutionary capacities of the class. He was also accused of actually jettisoning Marxism by this presumed lack of faith in its determined revolutionary destiny. These criticisms, it seems to me, entirely miss the point. To Lenin’s Marxism, the major force for revolutionary change remains the working class, engendered by capitalist development; what he rejected was the idea that this change could result from the automatic unfolding of social forces that inevitably lead that class to socialism. At the level of practical politics, he saw such inevitablism as leading to passivity and acquiescence in piecemeal reform. If the movement toward socialism is inevitable, then the political part of such movement need do no more than accommodate to the immediate demands of workers for better pay and better working conditions. Thus, to Lenin, there was an intrinsic connection between positivism as a theoretical position and reformism as a political outlook.

Even more controversial than Lenin’s approach to Marxist theory was his application of that theory to the organizational demands of working-class transformation. Here I am speaking about his then novel idea that the political party of the working
class must be a professional body of dedicated revolutionaries. ("The working class revolutionist must also become a professional revolutionist" [1929, 123].) If, said Lenin, revolutionary consciousness is not automatically spawned by working-class life, then that consciousness must be generated not only external to that class but in a carefully constructed, self-recruiting, political organization. Moreover, since theoretical consciousness is more commonly the property of intellectuals, not usually of working-class origin, so the initial membership of this organization will come from more privileged classes—intellectuals who have rejected the ideology of privilege and embraced Marxist theory and practice. For the whole transition between capitalism and communism, this party was to retain its vanguard status as the organization representing the most progressive possibilities of the working class and all other oppressed groups. ("The spontaneous struggle of the proletariat will not become a genuine 'class struggle' until it is led by a strong organization of revolutionists" [1929, 126].)

It must be reiterated that Lenin’s conception of a revolutionary party arose as a critique of all preexisting parties, especially those parties that claimed to be Marxist and claimed to represent the working class. The social democrats of his time were increasingly espousing a Marxism that was pragmatic and reformist. Moreover, in fighting for the immediate needs of the working class, rejecting the demands of other groups, refusing to interject long-range goals into their political programs, they saw themselves as more firmly rooted in working-class life. And in permitting anyone into their parties who simply espoused allegiance to its principles, they also saw themselves as most democratic. To Lenin, the democracy of easy recruitment and easy allegiance made such parties no less bogus than ordinary bourgeois parties. Here Lenin’s analysis has completely hit the mark. The evolution of those political parties associated with the Second International demonstrates the clear connection of these organizations to the bourgeois order. From parties that originally proclaimed socialism, they have now become almost totally reform parties that hardly speak of socialism. Moreover, their organizational style is a virtual replica of the parties from which
they allegedly distinguish themselves. While it may be admitted that contemporary social democratic and labor parties often run more honest governments when in power (although they are not always free of corruption), that combination of sham democracy and backroom politics so characteristic of bourgeois parties is characteristic of these parties as well.

Significant for my present argument is that these social democratic parties are immured in positivist and pragmatic conceptions of social change, and that this fact is seldom mentioned in contemporary Marxism’s response to these parties. The major critique revolves instead around the ways the programs and policies of these parties are not socialist or not socialist enough (an easy critique, since these parties hardly maintain a claim to be socialist). Then again the focus of criticism against economic determinism is saved for some bogeyman called orthodox Marxism, either with little reference to concrete examples or with reference to later Leninist parties. In this way, the critique of social democracy becomes fraternal, i.e., how to save socialism in social democracy, while the implicit critique of Leninism is that it is hopeless from the start.

Lest I be misunderstood, I am not rethinking the importance of Lenin for Marxism in order to assert that all is rosy in this direction. It is obvious that those parties that accepted Lenin’s principles have themselves devolved into organizations quite different from his original intentions. Many of the worst prognostications made about Lenin’s party at the time of its inception have come true—that it would become the agent of a dictatorship over the working class rather than assisting the class to rule and develop in its own interests, that the central committee and then its chair would ultimately control everything, and that it would become a new seat of privilege and corruption. Most significantly, after taking power in a revolutionary way and instituting revolutionary programs, it could later become a harbinger for the counterrevolutionary restoration of capitalism (or its instigation in nations that had little capitalism beforehand).

The truth of these tragic events should not, it seems to me, lead to certain too easily accepted conclusions. One conclusion is to see the whole of twentieth-century revolutionary experience as
premature, as something that should never have happened. Har-
kening back to another position of Marx and Engels that revolu-
tionary change to socialism will probably occur only under
advanced industrial conditions, this outlook simply rejects the
most fundamental development of twentieth-century capitalist
experience. This is the development of monopoly capitalism, the
intensification of imperial expansion as a systemic feature of
monopoly, and the growth of greater revolutionary conscious-
ness and activity at the capitalist periphery rather than at the
center. Again it was Lenin who first articulated the theoretical
outlines of this development, outlines that validate the possibility
and actuality of revolutionary transformation in economically
backward countries. It is a mechanistic view of Marxism that
rejects such transformations in the name of some encrusted idea
of historical necessity. Of course the initiation of socialism in
such nations presents new and unforeseen difficulties, and these
must be analyzed and overcome; but the denial of such revolu-
tions becomes a denial of the most important features of
twentieth-century experience—the Russian and Chinese Revolu-
tions. These revolutions are the watersheds of our century,
highly successful in many ways and so important in their failures
that one of our real crises is our failure as Marxists to understand
what went wrong in these great revolutions.

It is this latter question that must be addressed when dealing
with the Leninist type of party. If these great revolutions are
accepted with both their successes and their tragedies, then it
must be recognized that their initial victories and initial indus-
trial takeoffs (under unbelievably adverse circumstances) could
probably not have occurred without the leadership of a party of
this type. Almost every successful socialist revolution has been
led by such a party (in the Cuban case somewhat belatedly and in
the Nicaraguan exception not at all). And the failure of such
revolutions cannot be seen as intrinsically connected to the
seemingly inexorable corruption of an originally revolutionary
party. Why this happened, what alternatives existed to change
course, and mistakes made by revolutionary leadership are all
fundamental questions for Marxism. The mechanical Marxism of
positivist critics does not ask such questions; instead it simply
denies Lenin, implicitly blaming him for the positivism of later developments and concealing their own positivism from themselves.

The main political predisposition of the fashionable Marxism now found in academic circles involves then an all-too-easy acquiescence in a positivist style of thought and an acceptance—whether uncritical or critical—of social democratic politics. In another guise, this political outlook embraces the view that various social movements will mysteriously aggregate into a new revolutionary synthesis some time in the future. This far from exhausts the variety of Marxist styles found in the insulated arenas of academic life (where Marxism is increasingly popular). Along with calls for parties of a new type—parties that are mass parties and “democratic”—are political styles that reject anything that smacks of what is considered old-style politics. A great variety of outlooks either consider themselves Marxist or highly sympathetic to the Marxist commitment to fundamentally transform capitalist society. While differing from each other in many ways, these outlooks have two features in common. In the first place they deny the centrality of social class in the analysis of contemporary capitalism and in any potential political program for its transformation. If such thinking is Marxism at all, it is a Marxism without the working class. Secondly, these outlooks, if they engage in political activity at all, deny or ignore the need for any direct attack on and transformation of state power.

In this nonclass critique of capitalism, the viewpoint with perhaps the longest pedigree is critical theory. It arose in Germany in the thirties, when the working class fell prey to Nazism, and remains the foremost attempt to reject capitalism without connection to an agent that might transform it. Beginning as the Frankfurt School, it has continued to proliferate in the modern era, leading at its extremes into the total relativism, negation of science, and subjective idealism of what is now called “postmodernism.” Some strands of contemporary feminism consider themselves postmodern, and are at the margins or even at the very center of critical theory. I would have to emphasize “strands” here, because feminism is such a vital, changing, and multifaceted theoretical current. Even when feminism links with
Marxism, which it often claims to do, it commonly shows more similarity to critical theory than to Marxism. In an attempt to demonstrate total respect for conditions of the women, some feminists conceive of women’s standpoint as the beginning of theory and political practice. Also, feminist attacks on what is considered male and elitist in science negates the idea that there can be objective knowledge external to any subject’s awareness of it. On this basis, some of feminism rejects the idea that there can be false consciousness of social conditions and that scientific theory can represent truer explanations. This viewpoint can logically lead into the conundrum that must accept the conservative viewpoints of women as equally valid with the more emancipatory ideas of feminism itself. In its healthy rejection of the scientific pretensions of positivism (whether mainstream or Marxist), feminism often goes to the other extreme of relativism and subjective idealism. In place of the spontaneism that leads to positivist determinism and political reformism, a spontaneism is substituted that leads to indeterminism and sometimes fanciful revolutionism (a viewpoint shared with anarchism). Thus it is not the nonclass position alone that demarcates much of feminism from Marxism. Even when class is brought back into the analysis, it is often done from a methodological position that does not formally integrate theory with practice.

In sum, this essay argues that much rethinking of Marxism being done now, in avoiding Lenin, is avoiding the central issues such reappraisal must face. The crisis in Marxism is basically a crisis in Leninism, but not in the way this is usually conceived. The blanket rejection of Lenin now occurring in the former Soviet Union is purely and simply (and often intentionally) a total rejection of the socialist project and a complete commitment to capitalist restoration. In our own context, the denial or rejection of Lenin has allowed a veritable proliferation of theoretical and political forms that have been found wanting in theory and historical experience. The often-quoted dictum that forgetting the past leads to a recapitulation of its errors has certainly proven true in contemporary Marxism. In this case the accumulated tragedy that is called social democracy is one of the most common examples of this recapitulation. Or counterposed
to renewed positivism is the antiscientific spirit of the romance with varying oppressed groups in all their everyday immediacy. In either case, central to almost all of contemporary Marxism is its extremely academic quality, its tendency to be insulated from the rest of society in the precious atmosphere of academic careerism.

The most salutary aspect of Lenin’s Marxism is the demand for a continuing integration of theory and practice. Done well such Marxism has led successful socialist revolutions and has begun the difficult process of industrializing backward societies. That all the parties that have led these revolutions have also devolved into privileged elites making a mockery of the socialism they espouse is, it seems to me, a problem of immense proportions. That Leninist sects arise here and there with little understanding of either Marxism or of the society in which they exist is a subproblem in this type of Marxism. Real revolutionary parties do not arise after a superficial reading of *What Is to Be Done*, although the seventies on this continent saw many little grouplets claiming themselves as revolutionary parties on little more than such superficiality.

To accept the importance of Lenin is, it seems to me, to face the real crisis in Marxism, that is, to understand more profoundly why Leninist parties failed. Why is there more centralism than democracy in the concrete history of these parties? How does privilege accrue in ways that lead to elitism and separation from the classes they are supposed to lead? Only a revitalized history of these parties demonstrating what could have been done to avoid these tragedies and to point the way for future revolutions (which are bound to happen in the Third World) can overcome the present crisis. Finally, what can we do in our own societies to build an active and successful revolutionary movement where all we have is failure and misdirected efforts? Ah, there’s the rub.

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NOTE

*The positivism referred to here is the philosophy of science which dominated nineteenth-century thought and was critically evaluated by Marx and Engels in the analysis of what they called mechanical materialism. It sees the accumulation of knowledge as resulting from a static and separated relationship between the scientist and an objectively predetermined world.

REFERENCE LIST

Three Worlds, or One, or Many? The Reconfiguration of Global Divisions under Contemporary Capitalism

Arif Dirlik

Recent changes in the world situation have called into question concepts such as nationalism, imperialism, and the Third World that have been central to the analysis of global relations since World War II. I discuss here the idea of the Third World, which has held a strategic place in this constellation of concepts. The question is, specifically: Why does the concept of the Third World persist in academic, journalistic, and political discourses when the conditions that produced it have disappeared, and an intellectual sea change in recent years has brought it under renewed criticism? We have long been aware of the internal incoherence of the concept, and its residual nature. But so long as global divisions were configured by an opposition between capitalism and communism (the First and the Second worlds), the concept seemed at least to have a referential meaning. With the disappearance of most of the socialist states, the structural conditions that endowed all these terms with meaning have also disappeared. There is at the very least a numerical absurdity in speaking of a Third World when there is no longer a Second World. Under the circumstances, can there be any reason other than failure to face up to a new world situation, intellectual habit or inertia, and even a nostalgia for past configurations of the world, to account for the persistence of the concept?


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I approach the question in two stages. I argue, first, that while existing critiques of the concept have revealed fundamental problems in its formulation, they themselves have not offered viable substitutes for it, and have sidestepped important changes in the global situation that have recast the implications of the concept. There are good analytical and political reasons to argue that it may be more problematic to discard the concept than to retain it. For better or worse, the term is still of some utility in invoking on a cognitive map of the globe locations that seem to share common conditions of existence—due not to any inherent identities but to forces that structure global relations. These forces, and the conditions they produce, arguably predated the appearance of the concept itself, and have survived the conditions that produced it. It may still make some historical sense to use the term Third World when there is no longer a Second World, which may be a reason that, once it had come into being, the concept Third World could acquire a life of its own, without reference to the conditions that produced it.

Recognition that the concept may represent something more than an ephemeral abstraction, I argue, secondly, permits a more radical critique of the concept, one that takes into account both recent transformations in global relations and the way we think about them. I am particularly interested here in the potential of societies encompassed within the Third World concept to serve as autonomous sources of alternative global visions, a question that is integral to the history of the concept, but is ignored in most current critiques. This question is daily forced to the surface of consciousness by a reconfigured global situation, if only in the erasure of the utopian projects once associated with the Third World. To recall the term is to recover memories of those utopian projects that are essential to imagining radical alternatives to the present. On the other hand, it is necessary also to disassociate those radical alternatives from the actual Third World which, in its present reconfiguration, may have become an obstacle to the imagination, let alone the realization, of any such radical alternatives.
The Third World in contemporary criticism

In his seminal critique of three worlds theory, published in 1981, Carl Pletsch offered the following analysis of what he described as its “deep-structure”:

The division of the planet into three worlds is based on a pair of very abstract and hardly precise binary distinctions. First the world has been divided into its “traditional” and “modern” parts. Then the modern portion has been subdivided into its “communist” or (“socialist”) and “free” parts. These four terms underlying the idea of three worlds may be thought of as an extremely general social semantics. They are terms which derive their meaning from their mutual opposition rather than from any inherent relationship to the things described. . . . The traditional world is more often the third world or the underdeveloped world, for example. But making explicit the concept of tradition that underlies these other terms permits us to tease out all the other implications contained in the idea of the third world and locate them in a structural relationship with the implications of the other worlds. The third world is the world of tradition, culture, religion, irrationality, underdevelopment, overpopulation, political chaos, and so on. The second world is modern, technologically sophisticated, rational to a degree, but authoritarian (or totalitarian) and repressive, and ultimately inefficient and impoverished by contamination with ideological preconceptions and burdened with an ideologically motivated socialist elite. The first world is purely modern, a haven of science and utilitarian decision-making, technological, efficient, democratic, free—in short, a natural society unfettered by religion or ideology. (573–74)

Pletsch’s was the most thoroughgoing critique of the Third World concept, which had come under increasing criticism in the seventies.1 His critique was valuable, among other reasons, for demonstrating the residual nature of the concept, as well as
locating its derivation in a conceptual structure informed by the juxtaposition of tradition and modernity, reconfigured by the Cold War opposition between capitalism and communism. Rather than a representation of an autonomous reality, the concept referred to an imaginary state in development that encompassed a heterogeneous world, identifiable only as a site for the struggle between capitalism and communism, and transitional to one or the other. The whole conceptual structure, finally, was informed by a hegemonic assumption of the ultimate “naturalness” of capitalism, which provided its teleology. This teleology, expressed in the paradigm of modernization, we may note, also suppressed the heterogeneity of the societies encompassed within the First and the Second Worlds.

The decline and fall of socialism in the 1980s appears on the surface to have fulfilled the prediction of the modernization paradigm where the Second World is concerned. Ironically, the much-touted victory of capitalism over communism, rather than confirming the teleology of modernization, has brought to the surface globally conjunctures and disjunctures that have ruptured global spatializations along systemic boundaries drawn according to earlier economic and political criteria, and has rendered the future even more problematic. Two criticisms of the Third World concept, informed by antithetical readings of the new world situation, are especially noteworthy.

One is that in postcolonial criticism, which has raised questions about all “foundational” histories. So-called “post-foundational history,” in its repudiation of essence and structure and its simultaneous affirmation of heterogeneity, also repudiates any fixing of the Third World subject and, therefore, of the Third World as a category. As one scholar puts it:

The rejection of those modes of thinking which configure the third world in such irreducible essences as religiosity, underdevelopment, poverty, nationhood, [and] non-Westernness . . . unsettle[s] the calm presence that the essentialist categories—east and west, first world and third world—inhabit in our thought. This disruption makes it possible to treat the third world as a variety of shifting positions which have been discursively articulated in
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history. Viewed in this manner, the Orientalist, nationalist, Marxist, and other historiographies become visible as discursive attempts to constitute their objects of knowledge, that is, the third world. As a result, rather than appearing as a fixed and essential object, the third world emerges as a series of historical positions, including those that enunciate essentialisms. (Prakash 1990, 384)

What is rejected here, it seems, is not the concept of Third World, but Third World as a fixed category, which also shifts attention from structures and structured conflicts to a politics of “location” and “difference.” The Third World as concept in turn appears as a discursive construct, constructed in different ways according to historical contexts and ideological dispositions.

A second criticism has been offered by Aijaz Ahmad in his critique of some of the seminal literature on the Third World. Ahmad advocates the abolition of the three worlds division on the grounds that

we live not in three worlds but one; that this world includes the experience of colonialism and imperialism on both sides of . . . [the] global divide . . . that societies in formations of backward capitalism are as much constituted by the division of classes as societies in the advanced capitalist countries; that socialism is not restricted to something called “the Second World” but is simply the name of a resistance that saturates the globe today, as capitalism itself does; that the different parts of the capitalist system are to be known not in terms of a binary opposition but as a contradictory unity—with differences, yes, but also with profound overlaps. (1992, 103)

Ahmad’s repudiation of the Third World stems from a reasoning that is the antithesis of that in postcolonial criticism: the assertion of capitalism as the foundational principle that shapes the globe, uniformly if not homogeneously.

In their range, these criticisms of the Third World concept suffice to illustrate the profound analytical and political problems the concept presents. To summarize: (a) The concept is a
discursive construct that bears no “inherent” relationship to the reality it represents, but is a product of an ideological structuring of the world into three parts. For Pletsch, the primary responsibility for the construct lies with Euro-American social science, with its hegemonic assumptions about the world that are rooted in the teleology of capitalism. In his 1976 essay, Abdel-Malek already had pointed to the complicity of Third World intellectuals in sustaining such hegemony when he wrote that “the ‘Third Worldists,’ . . . the Westernised sector of the intelligentsia and of the political class . . . take on, objectively, the role of ‘compradors’ on behalf of the different hegemonic powers . . . accepting the vision of themselves as the West’s ‘Third World’” (132–33). Recent criticism has been, if anything, even more insistent on questioning the instrumentality of the Third World concept in nationalism and nationalist historiography, in which Third World status privileges the nation and the national struggle as a means to overcome that status. (b) Represented in terms of a residual category, societies included in the Third World have no autonomous existence of their own, and are placed temporally in one or another of available transitions from a backward to an advanced status. (c) The Third World concept erases the heterogeneity of societies so depicted, as well as differences internal to societies. Pletsch’s critique is concerned primarily with the former, without any clear specification of where differences are to be located. Postcolonial criticism insists on heterogeneity at both the international and the national levels, bringing a postmodernist sensibility to the question of difference, which ultimately resides in the politics of “location” or “identity.” Ahmad’s criticism locates the fundamental difference at the level of classes that cut across national boundaries, ironically giving primacy to intranational over international differences.

There is little in these propositions that one could quarrel with, especially in our day when, with the structural constraints of the Cold War removed, the Third World would seem to be at war with itself, boundaries between the three worlds seem to be abolished daily with the globalization of capital, to be replaced by boundaries within individual societies, and ethnicity has come forward once again to challenge the domination of nation-states. Where class and gender conflicts are concerned, it is more
difficult than ever to distinguish the local, the national, and the international. Ahmad is certainly right to insist on the primary significance of classes, for with the globalization of capital, it may be possible for the first time to speak of classes that are not just national but global. On the other hand, judging by the localization of political struggles, the postcolonial critics are right to insist on the localization of all categories, and the politics of location. Perhaps most telling is the appearance of “First Worlds” in the capitals of the formerly Second and Third Worlds, and of “Third Worlds” in the capitals of the First.

Two problems immediately stand out, however, that disturb easy compliance in these propositions as they are stated. First, does the recognition of heterogeneity necessitate the repudiation of the existence of structuring forces globally? Conversely, does it suggest a flattening out of global relations, leaving us even less able to account for global phenomena? Secondly, if the Third World refers to little more than historically conditioned discursive constructs, are all constructs then equally valid? Do we not need to raise the question of the political implications of alternative constructs? For all its contradictions, Ella Shohat has written, “‘Third World’ usefully evokes structural commonalities of struggles. The invocation of the ‘Third World’ implies a belief that the shared history of neocolonialism and internal racism form sufficient common ground for alliances among . . . diverse peoples. If one does not believe or envision such commonalities, then indeed the term ‘Third World’ should be discarded” (1992, 111).

The argument based on difference (accompanied by a suspicion of metanarratives and foundational categories) is quite prevalent presently with the popularity of postcolonial criticism. Insistence on heterogeneity is motivated by a critical urge but, unaccompanied by a sense of structural context, culminates in a radical empiricism that undercuts its own call for critical understanding. Pletsch, for example, criticizes the three worlds theory because “Only if we can remember that ‘the other’ is never defined in intrinsic terms, but always in terms of its difference from the observer, will we have the differentiated understanding of the globe’s societies.” His essay does not offer an alternative analysis (or tell us at what level to understand the
term “society”), however, which leaves us with his introductory quotation from de Tocqueville that “the Deity does not regard the human race collectively,” but “surveys at one glance and severally all the beings of whom mankind is composed; and he discerns in each man the resemblances that assimilate him to all his fellows, and the differences that distinguish him from them” (Pletsch 1981, 590, 561). This is not very helpful, because, in its empiricism, it does not even tell us whether we can compare anything beyond the individual, or why we should even stop at the level of the individual human being. Why should the Deity not survey at one glance all the nations in which humankind is organized, and discern in each resemblances and differences that may place them in larger wholes, which is the question pertinent for the issue at hand?

Pletsch’s insistence on “intrinsic terms,” or the postcolonial preoccupation with “essentialism,” on the other hand, focuses too exclusively on some approaches to the question of the Third World to the exclusion of others. It is possible to observe that, rather than being inherent in the Third World concept, the association with the concept of some intrinsic or essential quality may have something to do with the scientistic and teleological aspirations of social science, including Marxist social science (in search of immanent qualities for the formulation of laws), or with the obliviousness to history of Orientalist and nationalist historiographies. Those approaches associated with what is described broadly as “world-system analysis,” for example, approach the question not in terms of essences but in terms of historically changing global relationships. While it may not be free of problems in other ways, world-system analysis could hardly be held accountable in this regard; unless, of course, we are prepared to deny capitalism and nationalism as forces structuring global relations, as is the case with some versions of postcolonial criticism.

Ironically, the insistence on heterogeneity understood without reference to structural context, as in postcolonial criticism, leads also to a homogenization of differences, as if all differences were equally different, in terms both of location and the distribution of power. Different heterogeneities (e.g., differences between
genders versus differences between classes), it is possible to suggest, are qualitatively different from one another, and may not be encompassed within the same “politics of difference.” Likewise, the recognition of subjectivity in ‘the Other’ does not in fact negate that the self and “the other” may be placed structurally in very different power positions, which is quite often ignored these days in the application to such situations of the terms of the market place, chief among them, “negotiation.”

Let me hasten to add here that the “flattening” of global relations by the insistence on heterogeneity without structure finds its counterpart in the insistence on structural unity without heterogeneity. This is the case with Ahmad’s insistence on a globe under capitalism, differentiated uniformly along class lines, without reference to other differences, be they national, local, ethnic, or gender. With reference to the question of the Third World, it is possible to state here that taken in terms of certain structural relationships (rather than essences), the concept used with a recognition of historicity has been enabling of one set among others of important boundary distinctions in global relations, which have been erased in these recent alternatives, however valid they may be in terms of the criticisms they have directed at the concept. To speak of a “Third World” within the First, with due recognition of context, for instance, is not to equate the Third World in Los Angeles or Farmville, Virginia, with Somalia; but it does carry a certain significance and is expressive of certain relations within global capitalism.

This brings me to the second problem above, the problem of the Third World as a discursive construct. Criticism of the concept, based on its origins in the Cold War conceptual construction of the world, too readily sweeps under the rug the complex history of the realities and the perceptions within the Third World itself that may have endowed it with much appeal and radical significance, as if the term was able to articulate sensibilities that had been long in the making. In these days, when it is common to speak of how the oppressed appropriate the tools of the oppressor, it is somewhat surprising that so little attention has been given to the appropriation of this Cold War term in the struggles against domination and hegemony. The Third World
may have been essentialized in terms of poverty, race, religion, whatever; but it also served for a while as a source of utopian longings for the unity of the oppressed, and the creation of alternative futures. The prominent African American writer Richard Wright, who in 1955 felt compelled to rush to Bandung as soon as he heard of the upcoming conference of nonaligned nations, wrote (almost in spite of himself, for he was also deeply skeptical of what he found):

As I watched the dark-faced delegates work at the conference, I saw a strange thing happen. Before Bandung, most of these men had been strangers, and on the first day they were constrained with one another, bristling with charge and countercharge against America and/or Russia. But, as the days passed, they slowly cooled off, and another and different mood set in. . . . As they came to know one another better, their fear and distrust evaporated. Living for centuries under Western rule, they had become filled with a deep sense of how greatly they differed from one another. But now, face to face, their ideological defenses dropped. Negative unity, bred by a feeling that they had to stand together against a rapacious West, turned into something that hinted of the positive . . . Day after day dun-colored Trotskyites consorted with dark Moslems, yellow Indo-Chinese hobnobbed with brown Indonesians, black Africans mingled with swarthy Arabs, tan Burmese associated with dark brown Hindus, dusty nationalists palled around with yellow Communists, and Socialists talked to Buddhists. But they all had the same background of colonial experience, of subjection, of color consciousness, and they found that ideology was not needed to define their relations. (1956, 175–76)

A utopian moment, to be sure, but one for which the longings persisted as long as the generation that had come of age during anticolonial struggles prevailed. It was a similar longing that underlay the term “Third World Strike” in ethnic student movements in the United States.
It is also arguable that while the term Third World was coined after World War II, once created, it resonated with longings for alternative development that had been around much longer. We sometimes forget that while as a term “Third World” was a product of the opposition between capitalism and communism, the First and the Second Worlds, the realities to which it referred preceded the existence of a “second” world. As early as the turn of the century Chinese radicals such as Sun Yat-sen, well aware of the rising conflict between capitalism and socialism, already envisioned an autonomous path, “a third way,” that would provide a national alternative to the other two available paths of development. Examples of a similar consciousness may be found elsewhere, from Turkey to India. Perhaps the most clear expression of a desire for a “third way” was expressed by Mao Zedong in 1940, in his advocacy of a Chinese version of socialism, that would serve in similarly placed societies (colonial or semicolonial) not as a model for emulation but as a model for inspiration; to find their own “third ways” (Mao 1965). It is arguable that the political consciousness which strove for alternative paths of development both underlay and informed the Third World appropriations of the term “Third World” once it had been coined.

The Third World in this radical appropriation may hardly be attributed, as Abdel-Malek does, to a “comprador” intelligentsia ready to be “third-worlded” as the West’s “other.” Rather than homogenize the societies so described, moreover, in this usage Third World referred to a common experience, while recognizing the diversity of the societies so described. The representation of the Third World concept (to be distinguished from the term) merely as a product of a world structured by the conflict between the First and the Second Worlds overlooks a complex history of the search for potential “Third Worlds” as developmental and utopian projects. It also overlooks how these alternatives were marginalized, if not suppressed, by a Cold War conceptualization of three worlds, which discounted such search for alternatives, reducing them into irrelevancies in societies that had to be headed toward either capitalism, or socialism as it existed.
Rather than dismiss the Third World concept, we need to consider if, with the fall of socialism, some of these alternatives have indeed made a comeback, albeit in a transformed vocabulary, reduced to nationalist alternatives rather than national-liberation alternatives conditioned by a sense of belonging in a Third World. Given the present situation, Third-Worldism might indeed play a positive role both internationally and nationally.

These reservations suggest the considerations that need to be included in a thoroughgoing critique of the Third World concept presently: (a) a distinction between the present and the past in order, first, to avoid projecting upon the past the discontents of the present, and, second, to enable a critical consideration of the sources of contemporary discourses on the Third World. The critiques of the Third World concept to which I have referred above do not specify differences between the present, when the concept may have become irrelevant, and past conceptualizations where the idea of a Third World, however problematic, may nevertheless have had something to say about global relations; even if the Third World may be little more than a historically limited discursive construct, it is necessary to spell out the implications of alternative constructs—to distinguish, for instance, discourses informed by a market paradigm from those, such as Ahmad’s, that are informed by a Marxist paradigm of class, (b) it follows that a distinction is also necessary concerning the structural contexts implied by different discourses on the Third World, and, (c) the same may be said with regard to the critical political agenda imbedded in the Third World concept. Though it may have been a product of a particular Cold War configuration of a global capitalism, the idea of the Third World also implied for some time a challenge to a conceptualization of the world in terms of the teleologies of capitalism or socialism. Is it possible presently to speak of alternative Third World visions of global structuring in any meaningful sense? To the extent that Marxism entered the formulation of such critical visions (distinct from its role in socialism), what does this say about Marxism?

The problem of historicity does not require much comment, and may be dealt with in a consideration of the latter two problems, which I will address briefly below.
Global capitalism and the question of the Third World

Whether we think of recent global changes as “restructuring” (“the new world order”) or “destructuring” (“the new world disorder”), there would appear to remain little room for what used to be called the Third World. The question is whether or not this means the disappearance of forces reconfiguring global relations in new ways, however unstable such configurations may be, now that they have been deprived of the political forms that earlier gave some coherence to global structures. Is it possible to identify political formations, striving to be born, that may empower new critical agendas that do not serve the new structures of power, if only implicitly, or fall back upon resistance strategies of a bygone day that are no longer relevant? These questions render necessary a reconsideration of both the structural assumptions of the Third World concept, and of the “nation-form,” which in the past has been linked inextricably with Third World liberation struggles.2

There is no space or need here to elaborate on my understanding of global capitalism, which I have described at length elsewhere (Dirlik 1994). How it may bear upon the question of the Third World is suggested by my contradictory validation of the two antithetical positions on the Third World represented by Ahmad and postcolonial criticism—the one insisting on the universality of class structures, the other eschewing any global structures in the name of local confrontations. This contradictory assessment reflects my sense that under conditions of global capitalism, the problem of structure presents itself at once as a global and as a local problem, due to the motions of capital, unrestricted by earlier political forms associated with capitalism and socialism. Capital, having achieved transnationality in all aspects, but especially in production (“the new international division of labor”), cuts across regional and national boundaries to create genuinely global classes, as Ahmad claims, that are articulated organizationally in transnational corporations most obviously without being restricted to them. The recent preoccupation with globalism, internationalism, etc. that is visible in all the national contexts with which I am familiar may be
viewed as one ideological expression of global capitalism, and what Leslie Sklair has described as a “transnational capitalist class,” which now serves as a paradigm for grasping other social groups, not excluding intellectuals (Sklair 1991, 52–84). A “deteritorialized” capital subjects earlier divisions in global relations (including nations) to disruptive forces from the outside, sort of creating productive and consumptive social formations empowered by forces that recognize no divisions: hence the possibility of finding First World formations in the formerly Second and Third Worlds, and Third World formations in the formerly First and Second Worlds.

To stop here, however, would be to overlook the localizing forces, at work at a number of levels, that have a multiplicity of origins, but are also promoted ironically by the same transnational capital in search of diverse markets, that in its very search for profits contributes to local diversification by working over existing differences, as in the so-called “micromapping” and “database marketing” of contemporary marketing strategists. As transnational organizations disrupt earlier boundaries from above, “database marketing” reworks local cultures into new localisms to undermine larger unities from below. Localities in competition with one another to place themselves on the pathways of a transnational capital in perpetual motion speak eloquently to the contradictory (but nevertheless comprehensible) forces at work at the present stage of capitalist development.

In other words, while both the universalizing thesis offered by Ahmad and the localizing orientation of postcolonial criticism may be valid, neither is sufficient without the other to offer a portrayal of the complex forces at work in the contemporary world economy. Recent preoccupation with the global and the local suggests the problematic nature of the relationship between the two and the necessity of accounting for the global in the local, as well as the localism of the global. The situation is further complicated by the fact that while the older boundaries imposed by political formations are under disruption, it would be naive to claim that they are gone. To suggest that there may be “Third Worlds” in the First World is not to suggest that these Third Worlds have the same status in the conditions of existence.
Likewise with the “nation-form.” Ahmad and postcolonial critics are at one in calling into question the “third-worldist” focus on the nation as the unit of analysis, which disguises the fact that the nation itself is a site of struggles among a multiplicity of forces. This may be more the case today than in the past, when localisms generated by global forces have emerged to challenge the “nation-form.” To say that the “nation-form” is undergoing a transformation, however, is not to say that the “nation-form” is, therefore, gone out of existence. Rather, globalization and localization work over existing boundaries, creating new consciousnesses, and new political formations, that present new dangers but also new opportunities for resistance.

“Third-Worldism,” which I take here to refer to Third World sites as sources of alternative social and political visions, also needs to be reconsidered in light of these global transformations. To recall Shohat’s statement above: Is it possible any longer to believe or envision possibilities of resistance that had their sources in the “structural commonalities” once evoked by the very term “Third World”?

Only as a memory, I would like to suggest here; and if such memory is important to keeping alive the possibility of resistance to structures of domination that seem more seamless than before, confounded with present realities, it may also blind us to new possibilities of resistance, and even serve to legitimize forms of domination that have their sources in what once seemed to be promises of liberation. I have in mind here the earlier national-liberation struggles of the Third World that took as their goals not just the achievement of national independence and sovereignty, but also linked the national struggle to the realization of goals of social and economic justice. So long as national liberation in this sense was a convincing proposition, there seemed to be little objectionable in the linking of Third World struggles to national struggles; it was even possible to rationalize oppressions within the nation on the road to the realization of alternative futures.

This promise is no longer sustainable as the former Third World nations become integrated into global capitalism and the visions of national liberation are transformed into visions of
creating not alternative social formations but alternative versions of capitalism, as expressed in the recent preoccupation with the “different cultures of capitalism.” National-liberation struggles earlier aimed at what Samir Amin has described as “delinking” from the capitalist world-system in order to achieve integrated national development that would bring benefits and justice to all within the nation, a goal that was deemed impossible to achieve if incorporated into capitalism. The goal of most so-called Third World states presently is to promote “export-oriented economies,” which may help national-development figures, but at the cost of marginalizing or opening to global exploitation significant portions of their populations, something that once was deemed undesirable. Interestingly, the “globalization” or “internationalization” of the national economies, as it undermines earlier notions of national economic sovereignty, or national integration, results in the reconstruction of national cultures in ways that may help counter the global forces that threaten to disrupt national existence as such. Having compromised national integration at the economic, political, and social levels, national elites now express themselves in the language of so-called “cultural nationalism,” which proclaims national or cultural essences of one kind or another to contain the profoundly disruptive forces of global capitalism.

Neither should it be very surprising to observe that, in many cases, these national essences are constructed to legitimize incorporation into global capitalism; in other words, to demonstrate that the national culture in essence is one that is consistent with, if not demanding of, participation in a capitalist economy. Discussions of cultural nationalism in recent years have been inextricably tied in with discussions of national cultures of capitalism. Such essentializations of national cultures in practice, when radical theory repudiates all essentialisms, may be an indication of the gap that separates radical theorizing in our day from the practices of mundane politics. More to the point here, Third-Worldism has abandoned its earlier goals of national liberation in the sense above and has turned into neofascist reifications of national cultures and, rather than provide alternatives to the capitalist structuring of the world, not only legitimizes capitalism but also contributes to a resurgence of fascism globally.
These trends may be illustrated briefly through the example of China. China is especially interesting because under the leadership of Mao Zedong, and well into the post-Mao years, Chinese leaders made claims to both socialist and Third World status. During revolutionary years, China was also paradigmatic of a national-development strategy premised on delinking from the capitalist world system.

Since the second “opening” of China beginning in the eighties, but especially the nearly reckless opening to capitalism in the early nineties, China has emerged as a, if not the, playground for global capital, with the consequence that national political boundaries have become severely problematic as the coastal areas have become economically linked to a variety of regional economies (Japanese, Korean, Taiwanese, etc.). The boundary problem has been complicated further by the intense involvement in the Chinese economy of “diasporic” Chinese, including those from other Chinese states of East and Southeast Asia, as well as Chinese overseas.

As the Chinese economy has been globalized, strong localizing forces have also appeared, as the new development strategy has called upon (or permitted) localities to take the initiative in attracting foreign capital. This has resulted not only in the uneven development of the economy, but also has transformed the relationship between the center and the localities (between the national and the local economies) to the point where the central government has repeatedly acknowledged its inability to exert control over localities.

The contradictions created by simultaneous globalization and localization are manifested in the realm of politics and culture in an emerging contest between the global (a society defined by its incorporation in a globalized economy and culture), national (a notion of Chineseness that differentiates Chinese everywhere from others), and local (differences of Chinese from one another, depending on location) cultures. The new localism shows itself in the reassertion of local identities within territorial China, most notably in the South but elsewhere as well, corresponding, it would seem, to economic success. It is also seen in the claims on Chineseness of diasporic Chinese, some of whom view themselves as guardians of traditional values that have been forgotten
in territorial China under Communist rule. As with the economy, national culture no longer is containable within the political boundaries of the nation, which are disrupted from both within and without, as is visible in the appearance of a new idea of a “Cultural China.” “Cultural China,” a product of the very difficulties of defining “Chineseness,” however, represents also a “strategy of containment,” the construction of an essentialized identity in terms of remote historical myths, or the ideologies of a bygone day, chief among them Confucianism. Given the Chinese success in capitalist development, these essentialized identities also serve, needless to say, as hallmarks of a Chinese “culture of capitalism.”

The Chinese situation shows the irrelevance of analysis based on the Third World concept. That this former promoter of national-liberation ideologies has now turned into a promoter of an essentialized national identity, which provides a new legitimation for capital globally, also is revealing of the irrelevance of any notion of the Third World as a source of utopian alternatives to the structuring of the world by capital. Neither implies that there are no longer forces structuring the world, but only that these forces structure societies globally in ways that are no longer containable within a three worlds framework.

“Reinventing revolution”

The awareness of a new structuring of the world has become increasingly apparent over the last decade in the interest, on the one hand, in questions of global capitalism and, on the other hand, in the redirection of attention to problems of the relationship between the local and the global. The global, conceived in terms of transnational corporations, commodity chains and flows, human diasporas, cultural flows, whatever, is the realm ultimately of capital, which in its motions sets in motion not just production but cultures and peoples as well. The local, as it appears now, is incomprehensible without reference to the structuring powers of capital; it may even be suggested that the production and marketing strategies of capital have played a major part in drawing attention to the local, if not in actually manufacturing it. This may also be a reason that the local, rather
than any Third World, has now emerged as the site of resistances, struggles, and the generation of alternative conceptualizations of development.9

In a recent study, *Reinventing Revolution: New Social Movements and the Socialist Tradition in India*, Gail Omvedt points to women’s, peasants’, tribal, and environmental movements, with women playing central roles in all, as the sources for new visions of development in India. While these movements have been particularly prominent in India, localized struggles for survival and resistance to capital are by no means restricted there, and cut across divisions of First, Second and Third Worlds.10 What the emphasis on the local as a site of struggle as well as a source of alternative visions seems to suggest is that, unlike in an earlier day, when socialist or national-liberation programs promised even development across national economies (even if they did not realize the promise), within the structure of global capitalism, such promises have been abandoned, and localities are left on their own to fend for their survival. They also have emerged as sites for the negotiation and resolution of inherited exploitations and oppressions along class, gender, and ethnic boundaries, as well as in the social relationship to the immediate natural environment. Hence their potential as sources of alternative visions that, unlike the reified visions of capital, socialist developmentalism, or national schemes of development, are premised on immediate social relationships or relationship to the immediate environmental context. This attention to the immediate social and ecological situation, I should add here, does not imply a localistic parochialism. Those involved in such movements are quite aware of the necessity of overcoming inherited oppressions locally, as well as the necessity of translocal alliances, without which local movements must remain at the mercy of global capital.

I would like to underline here one form of such local struggles, that of indigenous peoples (the so-called “Fourth World”), that I think may have a paradigmatic role to play within this new historical situation. Indigenous voices, as with the local, have become more audible in recent years, and indigenous struggles are now an inescapable element in global economic and
political landscapes. What makes indigenous struggles pertinent in the present context is the oppression that they have been subjected to, regardless of location in the three worlds of a bygone day. My intention in assigning a paradigmatic status to indigenous struggles here is not to erase the particular problems of indigenous peoples by writing them into a text of local struggles. Nor do I wish to imply that there is a single indigenous vision of the world. Finally, I have no desire to get embroiled in controversies over whether or not contemporary indigenous visions are products of invented or reconstructed traditions. That indigenous utopias may be based on reconstructed pasts makes them more relevant as utopian alternatives for the present, because the pasts thus reconstructed account for inherited inequalities and oppressions within indigenous societies. What makes indigenous visions compelling presently I can only summarize here, without excessive distortion or simplification, I hope: (a) The repudiation of developmentalism, in both its capitalist and socialist visions, along with a repudiation of abstract epistemologies (of Enlightenment derivation) that legitimize such developmentalism. As developmentalism is called into question, so are notions of advanced and backward, the intellectual products of the ideology of development. (b) The affirmation of the primacy of ties to the land, and to nature, as the source both of subsistence and of community identity. (c) The reenchantment of nature, against the alienation from it, as in Enlightenment epistemologies advocating the conquest of nature, or in the commodification of the human relationship to nature (and, therefore, to one another). (d) A vision of the world as a federation of communities.

This vision of the world, its relationship to the present and the past, is eloquently expressed in the following lines:

In our dreams we have seen another world. A true world, a world more just than the one we now walk in. We saw that in this new world armies were not necessary, and that peace, justice and liberty were not spoken of as distant ideals, but as common, everyday things, named as easily as the other good things of this world: bread, bird, air, water, and even, for some, book and voice. And in this
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world, government by the many was the will and the reality of the people, and those that commanded were thoughtful people who commanded by obeying. And this new, true world was not a dream from the past; it was not something that came from our ancestors. It came to us from the future; it was the next step that we had to take.

And so it was that we began our journey to have this dream sit at our table, light up our house, go among our corn, fill the hearts of our children, wipe the sweat from our brow, heal our history—and to win this dream for everyone.

Subcomandante Marcos (1994)

The dream here is of people constituting and reconstituting themselves against capital and the state. If the indigenous vision in most cases also involves a reification of constructed pasts (which is not the case with Subcomandante Marcos, who draws on the future), unlike in the cases of nations and ethnicities, such reification aims at the creation of communities about whose fragileness and, therefore, need for identity, there is little question; the reification here, as it seeks to account for inherited inequalities, aims at liberation from, rather than justification for, such inequalities and oppressions. It represents, in other words, pasts that have been worked over already by visions of “liberty, justice, and democracy” for all.

These dreams of indigenous communities, while they have concrete sources in indigenous histories, may be found in our day in many of the local struggles to which I referred above.13 Utopian or not, these struggles all take as their premise the need to overcome a fundamental problem of life under global capitalism. In his recent book, Brave Modern World: The Prospects for Survival, the distinguished French Marxist historian Jean Chesneaux takes Hong Kong as a paradigm of the new global capitalism to describe the current world economy as an “off-ground” economy, which then becomes a characteristic of life in general under global capitalism (Chesneaux 1992). The solution to this “off-ground” existence seems to be implicit in his metaphor: the economy and, with it, life in general must somehow be regrounded. It is from this urgent need that the
indigenous vision, and local visions in general, derive their contemporary significance. It may be for the same reason that we must remember the three worlds of yesterday, but also forget them.

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NOTES

1. For an early example by a “Third World” intellectual, see Abdel-Malek 1981.
2. For “nation-form,” see Balibar 1993.
3. For a recent example, see Clegg and Gordon 1990.
4. For examples of such discussions, see Clegg and Gordon 1990.
5. See Amin 1990 for an example. Needless to say, most world-system practitioners, including Immanuel Wallerstein, subscribe to this view.
6. See, for an example, the essays in Befu 1993.
7. For an illuminating discussion, see Chen 1993.
8. For a discussion of regional self-assertion, see Friedman 1994. This article illuminates the point I make here, but is otherwise quite different in premise and thrust from my argument. Friedman’s goal seems not to be the analysis of the impact of global capitalism on cultural formations, but to validate Southern Chinese capitalism against Maoist notions of the national economy. For the revival of pre-Communist ideologies, see Dirlik 1995a. The Communist state recently decided to call for “a renewal of Confucian values in an effort to fill a moral vacuum which, since the birth of economic reforms fifteen years ago, is being replaced by ‘money worship’” (Japan Economic Newswire, 9 September 1994). I am indebted to Rebecca Karl for bringing this item to my attention.
9. I discuss this problem at length in Dirlik 1995b. For another discussion that approaches the problem from the perspective of diasporas, see Appadurai 1991. I must note here that diasporas, too, have served as sources of new utopias as global networks that may promise alternative social and cultural formations; but in the dispersal of peoples that they imply, what kind of resistance they may generate is more problematic. For an example, see Hau’ofa 1993. The volume is a collection of responses to Hau’ofa. For a different view than mine on the problem, see the various essays in Gilroy 1993. Gilroy, too, insists on seeing diasporic cultures in their localizations, rather than in terms of a reified essence that homogenizes diasporic peoples.
10. For an example from the United States, see Kamel 1990. Kamel offers an account of efforts, based on localities, to unite labor in the United States, Mexico, and the Philippines.
11. For one such controversy, between anthropologist Jocelyn Linnekin and Hawaiian sovereignty leader, Haunani-Kay Trask, see Tobin 1994. Indigenous
visions differ not only because of differences among indigenous peoples and their historical experiences, but also because of different relationships to the present global situation. Against the localized nature of most indigenous visions, for instance, is the diasporic vision of Epeli Hau‘ofa.

12. The items I note here are derived from the following works by distinguished indigenous leaders and spokespeople: Trask 1993, Churchill 1982 and 1983, Anderson Valley Advertiser (Mendocino County, Calif., 3 August 1994), and works included in Moody 1993.

13. See, for example, the influential book by Shiva (1988).

REFERENCE LIST


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Patriarchalism in Historical Context: Milton and His Feminist Critics. Part One

Leonard Goldstein

Introduction

The patriarchalism of John Milton has led some feminist critics not only to charge him with male chauvinism and misogyny, but to suggest that retaining his works in the literary canon is a disservice to the modern feminist project. Milton has not lacked defenders who argue that a proper reading of Milton’s text refutes the charge of patriarchalism. They see in his late poems a way toward a feminist reading, since by raising “issues involving women’s importance and women’s rights, he was awkwardly and imperfectly breaking ground” (Webber 1980, 6).

Shullenberger states that “the subtext of *Paradise Lost* encourages and supports a feminist reading” (1986, 70). Belsey maintains that *Paradise Lost* is “two texts in one, an absolutist poem, which struggles to justify the ways of an authoritarian God, and a humanist narrative, which recounts how human beings became free subjects, knowing the difference between good and evil in a world of choice” (1988, 60).

The controversy is understandable. Born of a contradictory situation, the Miltonic text itself is contradictory: it is patriarchal, but it questions that patriarchalism. If one side of the contradiction is emphasized to the exclusion of the other, the living dialectical relation is destroyed. What is needed is a thorough analysis of the social contradictions that produce the contradictory texts, which are both patriarchal and liberating.
In the current Milton debate much of the discussion is insufficiently historical: although there are plenty of references to capitalism, patriarchy, exploitation, and the like, relatively little attempt is made to establish a firm relation between the historical situation and the Miltonic text. It is possible, for example, for Catherine Belsey in her short book on Milton (1988) to include a chapter on sovereignty without referring to the English Revolution and Milton’s active participation in it, to the controversies over political theories in which Milton played a significant role, or to seventeenth-century forms of patriarchy and the alternatives to it offered by the utopian religious sects.

To historicize Milton’s patriarchalism, one has to set it in the context of the economic, social, political, demographic, and ideological parameters of then-developing capitalism. In the transition from the feudal to the capitalist mode of production, women in the working and middle classes were placed differently as economic producers and mothers. The capitalist mode of production contradicted and slowly replaced the feudal; at the same time, it developed internal contradictions that manifested themselves not only in class conflict between the emerging capitalists and wage workers, but in the ideas developed to explain and legitimate the new property relations. Patriarchalism was one of these contradictions.

In Part One of this essay, I try to show how the property relations of both the feudal and capitalist modes of production subordinated women. I then consider some ideological consequences of the developing social relations of the period, and Milton’s attitudes toward patriarchal marriage. Throughout, in accordance with the Marxist method of dealing with social structures as wholes, the social and the ideological are not strictly separated. Part Two (to appear in *Nature, Society, and Thought*, vol. 7, no. 2) will explore the spiritualization of marriage, Milton’s view of sexuality in marriage, and some feminist critiques.

Recent Marxist demographic research on the family in the transition from feudalism to capitalism has shown that the position of women was determined to a considerable extent by
economic, social, demographic, and ideological forces.

Chris Middleton has shown that in feudalism the lord of manor required that the peasant holding, the cottage economy, be held intact, that sufficient children be raised to meet future demands for labor on demesnes and holdings, that no children be born that were not already provided with adequate means of support, and that heirs—preferably males—be created to smooth the process of transmission of the property (1981; see also Middleton 1979). The social reproduction of property relations inevitably involved the reproduction of the race, and however much women may have tried to have control over their own sexuality and fertility, they could not for long resist the needs of the cottage economy or the moral pressure controlling fertility. For if, as he argues, procreation was a woman’s main function, “the sheer physical experience of pregnancy, birth and lactation,” consuming most of her married life, would “impede her role in the direction of agricultural activity,” with the result that it was “possible for husbands to usurp administrative control of the holding” (1981, 148). The controlling of fertility underlay patriarchal oppression; Middleton remarks that while it is understandable that the lord should develop those objectives, it is harder to understand why the tenantry shared them. “In the eyes of both, the satisfactory management of the economy required the division of peasant women into two groups: there were those who married and produced children and those who, remaining single, must be kept chaste” (1981, 113).

At this point “the newly-revived Augustinian doctrine of the procreative purpose of intercourse became a dominant value of the ruling class.” Further, since procreation was made “the raison d’être of marriage, the developing sense of property demanded that no procreative activity take place outside the confines of marriage.” This doctrine thus required “an emphasis on monogamy and sexual regulation” (1981, 114). It was then also that the tenant’s wish for a virginal wife became important, and this need was generalized as a necessary moral value for women (151).

Women were so placed in the cottage economy that seigniorial control over it put their sexuality and fertility under patriarchal
power. A hegemonic theology and morality then developed to guarantee feudal property relations. The subordinate position of women can thus be seen to be determined not by some innate drive of men to dominate women, but by social forces organically structured within the dynamics of the mode of production.

When we turn to the period in which Milton was active, we find that the position of women and the ideology justifying that position are equally determined by social and ideological forces. And these are contradictory with respect not only to the relation between the feudal and capitalist modes of production but also to those within developing capitalism.

It will be convenient to start with an illustration of the kind of contradiction I have in mind. It is fundamental to capitalism, and can be seen, when it is apprehended as idea, reduplicating itself in various forms throughout the ideational superstructure—in art, music, prosody, philosophy, science, and patriarchalism.²

The revolution in which Milton took an active part was a bourgeois democratic one (Hill 1943; see also Manning 1991). The English Revolution was a critical point in a process of replacing one form of property and its legitimating political institutions with another, productive capital based on wage labor replacing feudal property. The claim of productive capital for equality and freedom was based on its nature as commodity producer. Producers own commodities which exchange on the market as equivalents of value. As owners of the commodities, therefore, they relate to each other also as equivalents, as political and juridical equals (Pashukanis 1951, 193–97). The concept of political equality is thus a necessary consequence of the exchange relation in commodity production and is specific to capitalism. The claim to equality is limited, however, by the fact that capitalist production is exploitative. While the exchange on the market is that of equivalents, the extraction of surplus value is not—that is, the value the worker produces is far more than the value of the expended labor power. This difference in value is the surplus value, and it belongs to the capitalist. The limits of bourgeois equality are set in the capitalist-worker relation: the worker is not equal in the wage relation, for in this equivalent exchange relation the capitalist gets richer while the worker gets
relatively poorer. Prior to fully developed liberal democracy of the twentieth century, the only way to guarantee the exploitation of free labor, apart from the use of force, was to limit the franchise.

We can see in the Putney debates of 1647 how the bourgeoisie deprived the worker of the right to vote. Even the Levellers, one of the most radical groups, excluded wage labor, servants, and alms-takers from the franchise (Macpherson 1977, 14–15). The army leadership, Cromwell and Ireton, stood squarely for a property qualification for the franchise; the agitators, Sexby, Rainborough, and Petty, championed the rights of the common man (Brailsford 1961, 274). Ireton clearly understood what was involved when he pointed out that the elected agents of the army were asking for a redistribution of seats according to population and not the rates paid. Did this mean, he asked, that “every man...is to have an equal voice in the election of representatives?” He saw that the army was asking for universal manhood suffrage. Edward Sexby, who claimed to speak for the rank and file of his regiment, saw that without property rights, the ordinary person was subject to those who had productive property. And this is exactly what Ireton meant (Brailsford 1961, 275). In short, those who were propertyless were subject to exploitation and to a law defined and enacted by those who had property. Over the enactment or repeal of this law the propertyless had no voice.

The concept of equality is thus both generated and negated by private property, and to see a contradictory relation between equality and property, equality and female subordination, or equality and wage labor is not fanciful analogizing. The same law which “placed” the propertyless wage earner in a subordinate position so also placed some of the wives. This type of hierarchy developed at the same time as the bourgeoisie fought for equality.

II

The unwillingness of the army Grandees to enfranchise the propertyless is thus the political side of the growth of productive capital on land and in the workshop, and the subordination of the
worker to it as wage laborer. How did productive capital affect the position of both middle-class and working-class women within the patriarchal family?

It has been argued that the development of the capitalist mode of production began with the transformation of the feudal cottage economy into what has variously been called the protoindustrial household, the cottage industry, or the Kaufsystem. From one point of view it was a process of proletarianization, the changing of the peasant and artisan into wage laborer (Middleton 1983; Tilly 1984, 1), a process which, as Wally Seccombe writes, “got under way on a mass scale in the sixteenth century and was by no means completed at the close of the nineteenth” (1992, 170), though its beginnings reach back at least to the fourteenth century. The process can be found not only for the cloth-making industry but also for a number of others, e.g., mining and ironmaking (Sharp 1980, 159, 7).

The protoindustrial household arose out of the cottage economy in areas where poor soil made subsistence farming bad (Seccombe 1983, 22). Seccombe writes that the protoindustrial economy “was characterized by the massing of production of a given commodity in a particular region, saturating its markets and forcing producer households to rely for their subsistence on long-distance trade and hence the merchants” (1992, 182). A cottage in this situation would have land around it allowing for the cultivation of edibles and a cow or two for milk, cheese, and butter for home use. Rights to the commons in addition, plus a field or two, still did not provide enough to live on, so the cottagers either sought wage labor outside the cottage or began producing textile, metal, or wood products for local sale; that is, they set up a cottage industry. For the delivery of products to areas they could not themselves reach, the producers used the merchant, who, by supplying the cottagers with raw materials and setting up quotas, came to dominate production. By the eve of the Industrial Revolution, the merchants owned the cottagers’ means of production. The end of this process was the Verlag, or putting-out, system, in which the producers became proletarians working for a piece-rate wage. The cottagers tolerated crushing poverty and resisted proletarianization for fear of losing their birthright.
The *Kaufsystem* changed work and family relationships. “As indoor work intensified and field work at a distance from the cottage declined, the traditional division of labour between spouses broke down. Freed from the patrilineal bias of the male-dominated guilds, women were able to play a far more instrumental role in rural cottages than they ever could in households of urban artisans” (Seccombe 1992, 183). As women achieved a bit more freedom, Seccombe notes:

Not surprisingly, one finds an entirely different fertility regime. The imperative of land integrity has been weakened, since the household’s livelihood was not primarily dependent on the land (and the size of the land parcel) any more. Farming increasingly came to resemble extensive gardening, as smaller plots sufficed. The means of independent production were now mobile, as they became increasingly detached from the land, and a new household could be set up in business by a merchant and a loan. Patriarchal control over one’s offspring was correspondingly weakened. The institutional constraints of the first level were thus dramatically eased, and age at first marriage dropped; moreover, the cost incentive structure was tilted heavily in favour of childbearing since the labour supply was now strictly familial. Servants and day-labourers were generally not prevalent as supplementary hands in these households. People were simply too poor to pay wages; domestic service dried up when the age at marriage dropped, and parents could no longer control its timing and mate selection. The loss of parental control over marriage was not a disincentive to childbearing; the children of cottage handicraft workers tended to remain productive members of their parents’ households longer than peasant offspring, establishing their own households immediately, usually via marriage, when they did leave. Furthermore, the collapse of the dowry system and other forms of pre-mortem inheritance removed an additional disincentive to prolific childbearing for poor couples. (1983, 41)
Where a living could now be made independently of inheritable arable acreage, families could be founded as productive units. This possibility reduced the parents’ control over the marital relations of the young, thus altering the structural connection between the generations, and increasing fertility.

The development of the *Kaufsystem* altered the lives of women in other ways. A pattern of late marriage, a large percentage of women who never married, and the low rate of childbirth out of wedlock “restricted fertility massively” (Seccombe 1992, 184). Fertility was regulated not only by means of marriage, but also, as we have seen, by long and vigorous nursing. Whether individual women sought to control pregnancies, in this and other ways, seems to be under dispute among demographers (Seccombe 1992, 185 n. 181). To be sure, women were under economic and ideological pressure to bear more children, but the literary evidence seems to indicate that they could and did attempt to adjust the weight of the burden. On this point Seccombe writes that “priests and ministers denounced preventive measures as interfering with God’s will. They were convinced that their parishioners frequently employed all manner of potions and techniques to suppress ovulation, intercept sperm, induce miscarriage and perform abortions” (185). In discussing the position of women in both the *Kaufsystem* and *Verlagssystem*, Seccombe writes:

In the face of this acceleration [of the rationalization of the cottage industry], cottagers broke with the traditional land-based division of spheres, where men worked in the fields and women in and around the house. As families lost their land and commons use rights, men came inside to work alongside their wives, transforming the “sexual geography” of daily life. Domestic industry forced family members to work together at close quarters, placing a premium on face-to-face teamwork. The need to combine industrial work with childcare at one site fostered a much greater flexibility in the allocation of tasks between spouses. When a wife went to do business with the contractor, her husband would take care of the home, mind the children, tend the garden and milk the cows. In these
circumstances, the sex-typing of skills and areas of responsibility, so pronounced in peasant households, was frequently blurred and sometimes inverted. It was not unusual to find women working as cutlers and nailmakers, and men as spinners and lacemakers. Middle-class observers were troubled that men in weaving villages “cook, sweep, and milk the cows in order never to disturb the good diligent wife in her work.” The shake-up of male and female work routines in the course of proto-industrialization undoubtedly had far-reaching subjective effects, but it could hardly have meant that cottagers became impervious to gender distinctions in daily work. (1992, 207)

Seccombe goes on to discuss the views of Hans Medick (1976) and Jean Quataert (1986), who seem to believe that the sharing of the work erased gender distinction, which is tantamount to claiming an equality of the sexes. Though Seccombe concedes that the cottage industry fostered “a very substantial redistribution of spousal power to women’s advantage,” he calls it “an exaggeration to place women on an equal footing in the cottage economy, particularly as it gets caught up in the putting out system.” He concludes that there were “major changes in the shape and form of patriarchal authority in the passage from inheritance-based peasant families to the modern nuclear families of urban wage-earners.” But these changes did not mean “the terminal demise of patriarchal authority so much as its intergenerational truncation and the reconstruction of spousal hierarchy in new material foundations” (1992, 243).

The argument is that although the work was shared and the contribution of the wife fully recognized, there was no equality between the spouses: the household was dominated by the male. It seems to me that the development of the cottage industry did alter the position of women for the better, as some demographers have argued, though Seccombe and Middleton tend to discount any notion that there was some sort of rough equality between the sexes. To argue that the condition of women became better does not mean to argue that they became equal. Where the contribution of the women to the economy of the household was
significant, the women surely developed what Edward Shorter has called “a growing sense of personal autonomy” (1973, 612) and would have had more to say than otherwise.

Middle-class women were subordinated similarly to those in cottage industry. Middle-class households were of various kinds, that of the urban craftsman, like a tanner, clearly different from that of the professional or well-to-do-merchant, like the earlier Ménagier de Paris or Luigi Guicciardini. For reasons of space I confine myself to the urban craftsman as representative. The artisan household was a productive unit combining workshop and household, larger or smaller depending on the nature of the craft. The wife managed the whole household, caring for her husband and children, as well as feeding, taking care of, and at times managing the journeymen and apprentices and such servants the craftsman could manage to pay for. She might also be required to contribute to family income by carrying on a by-industry. As widow she might carry on the business, having during her lifetime become acquainted with it. Often a woman would carry on a business as femme sole, a position which gave her more rights than women generally had under common law (Power 1929, 407). And evidence shows that many women were efficient and successful business people.

That women had fewer legal rights than the men does not mean that they had no legal rights at all. Young people could be married off at the discretion of their parents and have nothing to say in the matter. Excluded from the business of the family since her brothers were the favored heirs, the bride brought a dowry (far smaller than the shares of the male heirs), to her husband, who had full control over that money during his lifetime. But while she had no control over that money during the lifetime of her husband, the marriage contract would include provision for a jointure, an amount of money the husband had to leave to his wife on his death that could not be touched by his heirs. These and other rights were protected, in England at least, by courts of equity such as the Court of Chancery (Robert G. Thompson 1974, 163). Nevertheless, women were severely limited in their legal rights, having, for example, no right to determine the use to which the family property was put. Some women in Blackfriars
parish protested vigorously to their minister, William Gouge, who seemed to insist on their inferior position. It came as an unpleasant surprise to him that these women took “much exception... against the application of a Wives subiection to the restraining of her from the disposing the common goods of the Family without, or against her Husbands consent” (1626, A3–4).

Although contested (for example, Brown 1986, 223–24), the conclusions of Alice Clark (1992) still seem to be generally valid: namely, that with the growth of industrial capitalism middle-class women became idle and dependent, and that working-class women continued to work, but at jobs that were always less well paid, and almost always less satisfying. The entire feminist project is precisely here: sexual segregation of work and discrimination on the job have always meant lower pay and less satisfying work as well as a whole host of disadvantages for women that come with male superiority. Also, the division within the working class of male and female and the feminist emphasis on dichotomous gender categories have always worked to the advantage of the ruling class.

With the separation of the workshop from the household, the family becomes the nuclear family, consisting of husband, wife, and children. Cut off from production and business enterprise, the wife loses much of whatever power and authority she had in the family. As Christopher Hill writes:

It was only after the family ceased to be the real productive unit in society that wives of more successful householders began to ape the habits and attitudes of their social betters, to cultivate white hands and vapours: their men-folk meanwhile gave them a sentimentalized elevation to compensate for their effective demotion from the productive process. The inequality was more apparent than real so long as the wife was the helpmeet of her husband in the family firm: deference to the middle-class lady only conceals her powerlessness once she has been cut off from production. Eve was a gardener. (1977, 219)

My argument is that nothing inherent in male or female bodies or minds determines the subordination of women, but rather
social, economic, and demographic processes along with received ideologies of a theological, ethical, and institutional kind, all of which become integral parts of the developing capitalist mode of production. Changes in the form of property introduced changes in the form of the household and in the domination/subordination relationship of husband and wife (what Seccombe calls “spousal power” in the household): changes in the age at which the young could leave home and marry, a choice dependent on the availability of inheritable land or the need for labor in the household; changes in the “fertility regime”: the age of onset of childbearing, the control of the size of families through one or another form of contraception or the spacing of children through extended lactation that deferred pregnancy (McLaren 1985, 23), and the age of ending childbearing; changes in attitudes towards sexuality and changes in the frequency of bastardy. These and other parameters set not only women but men and whole families within a broader or narrower range of possibilities for personal choice. This does not mean that they had no rational and subjective choices for which they could fight. It means, rather, choice and the struggle for the realization of the choice could not be exercised intelligently or even intuitively without taking these objective limiting conditions into consideration. Nevertheless, the range of choices was very narrow. We will return to the women’s response to these changing conditions shortly. It is clear that men seized the opportunity to dominate and that women protested. What needs explanation is why the men became dominant.

III

We have seen that before and during Milton’s period, the developing mode of production altered the structure of the household and the position of women in it: for the working population a process of proletarianization of labor, for the middle class a process of separation of the shop from the household. The working-class woman was forced out of entrepreneurial activity into less satisfying work at a lower wage, and the middle-class woman was pushed out of productive labor altogether, changing her status, as Margaret George puts it, from “Goodwife” to
“Mistress” (1973). It remains now to discuss some of the ideological consequences of these major social changes on the middle-class women with whom Milton was primarily in contact. It was for these women that the domestic conduct book was written, to justify their subordination in God’s name, and to spell out in detail the duties that went with that subordinate status.

Deprived of a vital role in production, the middle-class woman became economically superfluous and easily subordinated to the male. Households were increasingly governed by the father, to whom all were subject. Indeed, as Keith Thomas argues with some exaggeration, the power of the father both inside and outside of the household was absolute. And within this regimen the women were subordinate to the men. The ideological reasoning for this objective subordination varied in logical power or theological rigor, but it is precisely this argumentation justifying the socially necessary subordination that constitutes the artistic, theological, legal, and moral superstructure found in Gouge and Milton, on the one hand, and the radical sects, on the other. On the position of women Thomas writes:

The place of women was determined in theory, and to a great extent in practice, by a universal belief in their inferior capacity and by reference to the specific commands for their subjection to be found in Genesis and the Epistles of St. Paul. Women’s destiny was marriage, preferably at an early age, and then the hazards of continual childbearing. She was allowed a voice in neither church nor state and it was expected that she should stay at home and busy herself with the (admittedly considerable) affairs of the household. As a married woman she could own no property, at least not by common law; her chief ornament was her silence, and her sole duty obedience to her husband under God. The Puritans, by their exalted conception of family life, their protests against wife-beating and the double standard of sexual morality, and their denunciation of the churching of women, with its origin in the primitive view of woman as shameful and unclean, had done something to raise women’s status, but not really very much. If the wife was a partner, she was still an inferior one. As for
the much-vaunted Puritan love, it should be remembered that it came after marriage, not before; and that, as a popular manual remarked, “we would that the man when he loveth should remember his superiority.” (1959, 42)

The essential point, however, is that the objective equality of the value relation expressed itself in the notion of the political and spiritual equality of all believers, but that this equality tended, at the same time, to be negated by the exploitative nature of the property relation; that is, the exploitative nature of the property relation was extended to the bourgeois woman who was now deprived of her property or had access to it only through her husband, and not given political rights, namely, the vote, a deprivation which she shared with the working class and servants, neither of whom had property. Wives were subsumed under their husbands who, as heads of households, represented them, while servants even amongst the radical Levellers were regarded as “included in their masters” (Macpherson 1962, 296). The patriarchal nuclear family became the immediate institutional means of subordinating women, but hid the subordination by giving them spiritual equality. But the nuclear family also concealed the subordination of workers, many of whom in this period still worked within the family, which in any case was becoming proletarianized. To put it differently: the family had developed to the point that as the patriarchal family it made a compelling defense of the bourgeois property relation. But capitalism, not the patriarchal family per se, denied women their rights and workers their freedom. In other words, exploitation developed along with bourgeois equality, and both women and workers were subject to exploitation. And at this stage in the development of capitalism there was as yet no compelling need to institutionalize full—if indeed formal—equality in the universal franchise.

While throughout the seventeenth century women in both the middle and working classes were subordinate to their husbands, they had a role in the process of production and in business and thus a claim in share in the disposition of family property. As Margaret George puts it, quoting Clark, “If the lines between male and female occupations and tasks were distinct, those
occupations and tasks were equivalent as necessary performances; the tradesman did not support his wife as a dependent, but rather, the two were ‘mutually dependent,’ in pursuing their trade as in the raising of their children.” George maintains that “evidence of middle-class female withdrawal from this rough equality in performance, from business and productive enterprise, begins to mount only from the end of the seventeenth century (1973, 157). From this rough equality with their husbands in business or productive enterprise, the women were pushed “by men to the private—privatized—concerns of the nuclear family” (170), the patriarchal family dominated by men in which the women had relatively little to say in the conduct of family affairs. The difficulty here is that the middle-class literature on the family and the position of women, the domestic conduct book, began roughly with the Reformation and was a considerable body of literature in England from, say, 1540. Subordination of women thus came at least one hundred years before George identifies its onset. Closer examination of domestic conduct books from around 1540 to 1670 might show changes in these books corresponding to social and ideological changes in the period.

Perhaps something further should be said at this point about patriarchalism itself. Discussing the development of patriarchalism in the working class in late nineteenth-century Britain, Wally Seccombe confines the term to the patriarchal family. Writing that patriarchalism “refers to systems of male headship in family households,” he outlines the prerogatives held by husbands and fathers over their wives and children. He then goes on to point out that these prerogatives of dominance “are normally accompanied by the patriarch’s obligations to his wife and children which reciprocate, and hence reinforce, their obligations to obey him. It is the conscientious discharge of the obligations to care for and protect one’s dependents that fully entitles the househead to subsume their interests beneath his own in representing the family as a group. Hence, what counts as a ‘good father and husband’ in a patriarchal context is a head who exercises his prerogatives with some demonstrable sense of responsibility for the well-being of his subordinate kin” (1986, 59). The hegemony established by
men, while seriously depriving women of a variety of rights and possibilities for the development of their own personalities, is paid for by the support he is obliged to give her. As E. P. Thompson has forcefully argued, patriarchalism dominates the peasant and working classes well into the eighteenth century, but at a price. Deference “could be seen from below as being one part necessary for self-preservation, one part a calculated extraction of whatever could be extracted. Seen in this way, the poor imposed upon the rich some of the duties and function of paternalism just as much as deference was in turn imposed upon them. Both parties to the equation were constrained within a common field-of-force” (1978, 163). The point is that in the middle-class form of patriarchal marriage the women lost much but retained some. The difference was the bone of contention, for the women lost more than they gained, and had in the end to fight for what they had lost. The implications of the argument here are far-reaching but cannot be pursued in the confines of this study.

IV

We can now turn to consider the manner in which a Puritan ideologue like Milton dealt with the manifest contradictions within patriarchal marriage.

The whole relation of the sexes was contradictory; accordingly, it comes as no surprise to learn that, as David Aers and Bob Hodge argue, there were contradictions in Milton’s attitude towards women and marriage, which, they show, “he never fully resolved” (1981, 124). Contradictions in the position of a middle-class wife inevitably registered in the dominant ideology. She was both of the class and not of it: a bourgeois but a woman, united to her husband by class, separated and subordinated by sex. She was exploited by her husband yet entrusted with the management of the household, servants, and children; she was perpetrator of the ideology and yet a victim of it. So the ideology had to present a basically exploitative relationship as a mutually beneficial one, while also reinforcing masculine consciousness that the right to rule was the male’s. “The husband must so unite Authority and Love, that neither of them of them may be omitted
or concealed, but both be exercised and maintained,” wrote Richard Baxter, one of the more humane of puritan divines, anxious that men should not “omit or conceal” the real differences in authority, the difference between ruler and ruled.

Aers and Hodge also point up the manner in which Milton wrestled with the contradictions. Milton did indeed have the habit, sometimes unfortunate in an ideologue insofar as his own group is concerned, of taking basic premises of an ideology seriously, so that its inherent contradictions began to obtrude, its moral bromides turning into calls for action. But his idiosyncratic development of the ideology had its roots in a state of mind that was probably typical of his class. He came at this ideology as its victim. Shocked by his traumatic experience of marriage into realizing the destructive nature of the conventional bourgeois sexual ethic, he struggled to find in marriage the complete solution to the psychic consequences of middle-class individualism: isolation, fragmentation of personality, crippling frustration, and hence despair.

Milton was not alone in finding that refuge from the psychic consequences of bourgeois individualism in companionable marriage could not always be found, all the less so once the household-cum-workshop lost its productive function and separated into workshop and household. The subservient, unequal, and oppressed wife often could not function for the competing male as the sexual solace, comforter, confidant, adviser, and supporter required by biblical and Puritan injunction. The contradictions were, to be sure, mitigated by what Aers and Hodge call Puritan “moral bromides” on love and marriage that obscured the exploitation of such subordination of the woman. It is only partially correct, however, to call the ethical values coming to surround the Puritan institution of marriage “moral bromides.” For the contradiction between the need both for companionship and the subordination of women is real and is lived, producing all the joys and miseries that we know go with bourgeois monogamous marriage. This lapse into rationalistic analysis tends to abort their highly suggestive analysis. A more theoretical approach is that of Robert Briffault, who analyzes the social function of monogamous marriage and the contradictory “family
sentiments” that go with it (1934, 374–75). He observes that the ascendancy of “the paternal family as a social group and institution coincides with the development of conditions which impart a value to private property and which bestow individual economic power upon males” (371).

Briffault discusses two different but related changes in family sentiments. The first is the change from a diffused sense of social solidarity, a social sentiment felt by all for all, to a passionate attachment of an individual to another individual; secondly, the change from an (undifferentiated) attachment of all mothers for all children to a particular emotional attachment to one’s own children in what was becoming the patriarchal family. With respect to the former Briffault writes that “relations between the sexes have not, in the lower social phases, the sentimental associations which are marked in patriarchal societies, so that, love, in the romantic sense, may rightly be said to be absent” (374). The solidarity of the primitive group is not riven by conflicts of economic interests. On the other hand, “A society composed of paternal families, each of which is an imperium in imperio, is a battlefield for the sake of contending interests. The paternal family is . . . but an avatar of the individual as an economic unit, since it is represented by its head as holder of individual rights and claims of property and authority.” Heads of families were in competition with rival interests, and with this lethal competition came a change in sentiments towards individuals. “The social sentiment with which all members of the social group were regarded showed no pronounced difference of attitude distinguishing particular individuals whether male or female, came to be canalized, in a competitive individualistic society, and individualized. . . . The individualization of friendship and affection in a competitive individualistic society has reference to a trust which with the savage is felt towards all members of the group.”

Briffault goes on to write that:

the individualization of affectionate sentiment and trust takes on a notable development as regards sexual companionship. The absence of romantic or passionate individual love in savage society is largely the effect of the diffused character of social sentiment. As Mary Kingsley well
expressed it, “affection, with the savage is not so deeply linked with sex.” The emotional intensity of affection in the member of an individualistic society is the release of painfully inhibited reactions, an eagerly desired liberation from the strain of self-defence, watchfulness, and mistrustful antagonism which social life among “strangers” imposes. (374–5)

In this view, love as an individual attachment of passionate intensity develops as a surrogate for feelings of social solidarity: a generalized feeling of solidarity for all is replaced by an attachment to individuals. And this attachment of individuals, which is at first purely social, becomes associated with the pleasures of sex, possibly, as Dorothy Dinnerstein argues (1976), through the infant’s association of bodily comfort, well-being, and pleasure with the warm and soft flesh of the mother, so that the spiritual attachment of the sexes becomes associated with the sexual in a satisfying but very often problematic relation, as Milton, among others, was well aware.

The individualization of sentiment now affects the maternal instincts. Briffault argues from the polygamous families of pastoral societies where in the more advanced stages of cultural development, i.e., the development of private property, “one of the wives brings economic advantage to the husband, generally in the form of a dowry of land or other wealth associated with aristocratic birth, the children born of the various wives are accounted as children of the noble, or chief, wife.” Where a particular wife brings economic advantages, polygamy gives way to monogamy “in those societies where land cultivation is combined with pastoral holdings.” Briffault then shows how this situation gives rise to maternal sentiments:

Under these conditions the individualised maternal sentiments become centered upon the mother’s own offspring. The children of other women, which in primitive societies equally stimulate the operation of maternal dispositions, come to arouse jealousy, more especially where they imperil in any way the economic prospects of the mother’s own offspring, and still more if they are the offspring of
the same father by another woman. The maternal sentiments assume a new possessive and individual character. They are conceived, by the assumption of a physiological law unknown to biology, to rest upon the fact of kinship. The sentiments of the mother towards her offspring are due, she supposes, to the fact that those are “her own flesh and blood.” Those maternal sentiments are particularly centred upon male offspring, daughters being often regarded as poor substitutes as objects of maternal affection. That preference has doubtless a sexual basis, but that is greatly reinforced by the importance of male offspring in the transmission of family property under patriarchal usage. (1934, 373)

On this basis a whole culture of motherhood developed, and along with it a code of morals and conduct the purpose of which was to protect “proprietary marital rights.” Bridal virginity acquired importance, and bodily modesty came to be accounted an innate female sentiment. “The submissiveness, helplessness, physical debility and fragility, delicacy, the mental torpor and incapacity for intellectual labour of women come as parts of the same ideal, to be accounted equally ‘innate’ sexual characters” (373–74). In the later stages of this process, the earlier purely economic base of these values was forgotten and they came to be regarded as natural.

As part of the same process the nuclear family became the refuge from the murderous rivalry attendant upon economic competition. Briffault writes:

Monogamic conditions arising from purely economic factors have given rise to monogamic sentiment, in which escape from strife, mistrust, and loneliness is sought in the affection of a trusted companion bound by ties of common economic interest. The sentimental ideal of connubial union between life-long companions, which is held up as the ideal of sexual union in the exaltation of the paternal family, is in part realized by the long sharing of economic interests and the common battle against individualistic
competition. The sentiment is, as in every other instance, the effect, and not, as has been represented, the cause of the economic relation. (375)

It is evident that in theory and in actual practice the functions of the bourgeois form of the patriarchal family are contradictory and that out of these contradictions difficulties great and small emerge. In this historical period the nuclear family became not only “the medium for the consolidation and transmission of private property” (375) through the male heir, but also the emotional refuge from the effects of the antagonistic competition for private property, with each person seeking to destroy the next. The subordinated wife as comforter and solace became the main defense for the husband against these effects of dread, anxiety, fear, isolation, and loneliness. The nuclear family became also the field of contestation in which the subordinated woman asserted her own equality since as bourgeoise she was the value equivalent of the man and also had the right of property of her own person, a right which by the seventeenth century, with Locke most clearly, became a law of nature (Macpherson 1962, 140).

If women are not prepared to accept the subordinate position assigned by property, serving as standby solace to husbands as well as producing children as required with assured provenance, the ideologues of the middle class work out a whole panoply of ethics, morals, attitudes, feelings (taking full advantage of the rich resources of the feudal and ecclesiastical past) that girls—and boys, too—have hammered into their heads, aimed at insuring the subordination of women as cheaply as possible. It is far cheaper to indoctrinate a woman with the idea that her hymen, her flower, is worth its weight in gold, and that its loss reduces her value to nothing, than to immure her in a harem guarded by specially equipped soldiers who will fend off even better equipped invasive males.

Patriarchal moral values insuring male possession of women and their obedience include, among other things, modesty, pre-marital and postmarital chastity, submissiveness, obedience, and
a firm conviction that the male is superior to the female, as God had ordained it. Opposition has been dealt with in a wide variety of ways: strong social disapproval of deviation from elaborated patriarchal values, wife-beating, and even execution of deviant women as witches. From this extraordinary contradictory situation an entirely new psychology and psychopathology of sex emerged. The bourgeois requirement for the virgin bride elaborated itself into the peculiar pasha-like desire to be the first to “have” the woman, the fetishization of the hymen and its deflowering—a peculiar metaphor in any case. Since marriage did not always lead to companionship and monogamous love, the historically developed relation between companionship and sex (in which by some elaboration of ideas, the physical sexual act had become the highest expression of the spiritual-intellectual relationship) was severed. This led to the search for spiritual-intellectual relationship through sex, then for sex without the relationship. One result was pornography (hard and soft), of which Shakespeare’s “Venus and Adonis” and “The Rape of Lucrece” are fine Elizabethan examples; another was psychosexual pathology, with Dr. Timothy Bright and Robert Burton as the first seriously to investigate the new disturbed mentality.

In the Renaissance, as Georgianna Ziegler has shown in connection with Shakespeare’s “Rape of Lucrece,” a range of space-gender metaphors were derived from architectural design aimed at providing gender-related private space, rooms or closets, for both men and women. Space defined and located women in terms of patriarchal moral values, such as female chastity defended by male honor—concepts so charged with emotion that resistance to them threatens bodily violence and even death (1990). Ziegler’s deconstructive method has the great merit of revealing the patriarchal roots of these powerful and destructive metaphors involving the human body and a building (for example, space being equated with the vagina—thus “invading Tarquin”), or honor defining male sexuality in such a way as to dominate and limit the expression of female sexuality. On the other hand, the social roots of patriarchy are left largely
unexamined, so that in the end we do not find ourselves discussing what is to be done to get rid of patriarchy, but rather deploiring an essentialist sexuality about which nothing can be done. Finally, if patriarchy is not seen as a function of existing property relations, it becomes merely a hegemonic psychological category (like sexuality), above history and not affected by it.

This way of proceeding neglects the analysis of the social relations of patriarchy, so that the efforts of the Puritan divines, from whom Milton acquired most of his patriarchal views on marriage, to solve what they felt to be a major problem in the social relations then developing, namely, the antagonism and consequent loneliness of the competition of free-market relations, are left unexplained. These efforts are regarded by many feminists as more of the patriarchal same. True, as I will attempt to show. But the alternatives were not acceptable for various reasons. The principled objections of some of the sects to marriage were not acceptable either because they involved attacks on property or because their spiritualized eroticism seemed to the Puritan to be sexual anarchy. Instead of merely exploiting the pursuit of sex as a solution to inadequate or delayed marriage, as among the aristocratic or bourgeois gallants, the Puritan divines sought a solution to the loneliness in a new type of marriage, one that could accommodate sexual passion within the property relation, a relation to be sure based on patriarchal principles, a kind of relationship sexual anarchy could not achieve. And in this they succeeded, but not without engendering new contradictions, one of which was that the bourgeois women (and eventually all women) suffered gender subordination in patriarchal marriage, though in entering patriarchal marriage, the bourgeois woman shared in the usufruct of extracted surplus value. This did not prevent her from objecting to the subordination; still, a free bourgeois woman remains a bourgeois.

In short, if the analysis of love and marriage is not sufficiently historicized, solutions cannot be found for the problems they create, and this inadequacy characterizes Ziegler’s analysis as well as those of scholars who are seriously concerned with Milton’s concepts of sexuality, such as Edward Le Comte (1978)
and James Grantham Turner. Turner asks “How did normal sexuality relate to divine love?” (1987, 40), but his pursuit of the question remains entirely in the realm of ideas.

Part Two of this essay, to appear in the next issue of Nature, Society, and Thought, will begin by examining the question of why the sex instinct became value laden, that is, spiritualized, in the first place. This discussion will clarify Milton’s concepts of sexuality in marriage.

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NOTES


2. I have attempted an analysis of the complex relation between social and mental structures in late medieval and Renaissance culture in The Social and Cultural Roots of Linear Perspective (1988).


4. Levine writes, “For every [peasant who developed into a well-to-do] yeoman farmer, there were a great many cottagers who were inexorably losing control over their land and entitlement to commons. When the losers lost their land they lost their birthright and had to sell their labour in order to make ends meet” (1984, 45). Levine gives a very good overview of the process of “the protracted nature of the transition from the independence of the cottager to the dependence of the proletarian” in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

5. Unless I have missed something important, I do not see how this statement agrees with the one made in his “Marxism and Demography” article to the effect that the proto-industrial household tends to give rise to large families (1983, 38).

6. Seccombe finds support for his views in those of Rose (1987) and Osterhus (1986). In a 1986 article in Social History, Seccombe gives the detailed argument for his view that in the late nineteenth century the family wage established a new form of patriarchalism in the working class.

7. I am generalizing very broadly here, but not I think distorting research on the position of women. See Alice Clark 1982; Eileen Power 1929; Sylvia L. Thrupp 1948; Margaret George 1973; Linda Woodbridge 1986. For Guicciardini, see Martines 1973.

8. Clark writes that
women of the tradesman class were sufficiently capable in business, and were as a rule so well acquainted with the details of their husbands’ concerns, that a man generally appointed his wife as executrix, while custom universally secured to her the possession of his stock, apprentices and goodwill in the event of his death. That she was often able to carry on his business with success, is shown by incidental references, and also by the frequency with which widows’ names occur in the lists of persons occupying various trades. (1982, 293)

9. For Alessandra Strozzi’s concern for the male heirs, see Martines (1973, 20–21).

10. A conclusion similar to that of Clark for the relationship of women and industry in Florence for this time can be found in Brown and Goodman (1980), who find that

as the artisan sector grew from the late sixteenth century on, men were bid away from textile into luxury trades. Women, on the other hand, entered almost exclusively into the wool and silk cloth industries which simultaneously shifted... from the production of luxury cloths to more simple ones whose production could easily be routinized. Thus a rough sexual division of labor took place, but not separating the sexes between market and non-market activities. Men now supplied the highly skilled artisan labor and women the more unskilled labor required for textiles.

11. Most recent research seems to indicate that where women did continue to work under capitalism they were paid less. For an interesting discussion on how gender expectation did much to shape the wage strategies of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, see Ava Baron 1991. Baron writes that Kessler-Harris ‘points to the political dangers for women for relying on dichotomous gender categories: even when feminist scholars define women’s differences from men positively, an emphasis on sexual difference can perpetuate women’s inequality by reinforcing definitions of a woman’s ‘proper place’’’ (226).

12. Thomas’s skeptical tone is no doubt sobering, but as it is a judgment that is trans-class it does not help much in understanding the underlying contradictions that legitimate the subjectivity; nor, more important, does it suggest how to overcome them. As against Thomas’s view of Puritan marriage, see, among others we have cited, Wallace Notestein, who writes:

The influence of Puritanism in ameliorating the position of women cannot be overlooked. We have noted the considerable role allowed women by the business classes in London and in the larger towns. Those classes had become largely Puritan before the end of Elizabeth’s reign and were in the next two reigns the backbone of the Puritan movement. It will be said at once that the Puritans looked to the Bible for their opinions and found in the Old Testament and in the Epistles full support for the subordination of the female. It might be added that the great Puritan poet, Milton, insisted in his prose writings upon that subordination. Yes. But the Puritans were inclined to lay stress on the
obligations of the husband to his wife. William Gouge in his *Domestical Duties* took a somewhat advanced and generous view as to those obligations.

The Puritans exalted family life and the association of men and women in the home. The Puritan biographers were always talking of the man’s wife and of her share in the service of God. They were not mentioning the equality of men and women but emphasizing their partnership. That partnership was to be seen in practice in many Puritan households. (1955, 104–5)

This was published in 1955. It does not seem to me that the recent controversy on Milton’s patriarchalism has gone basically much beyond this, which was published forty years ago. Neither then nor now have historians discussing the issue dealt with the family in its concrete historical situation.

13. In recent years a new look has been taken at the Pauline epistles, and some theologians and literary critics have concluded that St. Paul has to be understood differently than has hitherto been done. Veselin Kesich finds, after a careful etymological and historical analysis of the relevant Greek words, that Paul is more a liberator than misogynist (1977). The argument is not convincing.

14. Gordon J. Schochet argues against Macpherson, maintaining that it was not their lack of property that disqualified the workers from the vote but the fact that they were not heads of families (1969, 423). See also Thomas, who remarks, “As for matters outside the household, the master’s voice spoke for all. In the seventeenth century reference to ‘popular consent’ meant the consent of householders and this class was smaller than one might think” (1959, 42).

15. For the role of domestic service in shaping the patriarchal family, see Seccombe (1992, 197–200) and his references.

16. One might agree in general with Thompson that the lower classes got something for their deference, but surely not equal value. He also argues that the hegemony did not “envelop the lives of the poor and it did not prevent them from defending their own modes of work and and view of life.” For when occasion demanded, the poor carried on political struggle against that hegemony.

17. For an analysis of the exploitative nature of the housewife under capitalism, see Brenner and Ramas (1984), and Seccombe (1974), and the literature cited therein.

18. Not entirely, for Ziegler writes that after her rape, Lucrece “resorts to the image taken from religious literature of the whole mind or soul within the corrupt body. To Lucrece, however, her body was originally pure. Only now, tainted with rape, does it become a ‘house...sacked,’ a ‘mansion battered by the enemy,’ and finally, a ‘poisoned closet’ (1170, 1171, 1657). Only by making another violent entry into this house or closet and letting the soul go free can Lucrece conceive of redeeming her own honour and that of her husband (1184–90).” Having lost her chastity through rape, Lucrece, naturally, commits suicide, thus keeping safe her husband’s possessions.
REFERENCE LIST


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In October 1992 the People’s Progressive Party (PPP) of Guyana led a coalition to electoral victory and inaugurated as president the party’s leader, Cheddi Jagan. This was the first free election in Guyana since the country achieved its independence in 1966. Had it not been ousted by CIA machinations, the PPP would have headed the government during the transition from colonial rule to independence.

Guyana today is one of the poorest countries in the Western Hemisphere, encumbered with a foreign debt of approximately $2.5 billion. In a country where wages average about $50 a month, servicing the foreign debt of $3400 per person absorbs some eighty percent of the national revenue. The Marxist Forum section of this issue of *NST* presents an abridgement of the principal section of the report of the Central Committee to the Twenty-Fifth Congress of the PPP held in December 1994 in which the strategy for dealing with devastation left by thirty years of dictatorial rule is outlined. The historical background presented here will be helpful in understanding the nature of the problems and the strategy that has been adopted to deal with them.
Guyana, called British Guiana prior to its independence in 1966, extends over 83,000 square miles of land on the northeastern coast of South America, with Venezuela on the west, Suriname on the east, and Brazil to the south. Ninety percent of its population of 730,000 lives in the coastal plain, a region some ten miles wide constituting some five percent of the land area. Rain forests and savannas occupy the rest of the country.

Guyana was the first territory in the Western Hemisphere to be colonized by non-Iberians. After some unsuccessful attempts by the British to set up colonies, the Dutch established a trading post around 1616 for trading in dyes, hemp, sugar, and tobacco with the various indigenous Indian tribes, who are referred to today in Guyana as Amerindians. The trading post was followed by the establishment of Dutch colonies for the production of sugar, tobacco, citrus fruits, and other tropical products. When initial attempts to enslave the Amerindians failed to produce a numerically stable labor force, slaves were brought in from Africa, as had already been provided for in the charter of the Dutch West India Company. A limited number of Amerindians remained enslaved, but increasing numbers of African slaves were imported as the colonies multiplied and expanded.

What is today Guyana was formed from the three Dutch colonies of Essequibo, Demerara, and Berbice, named after three of the main rivers in the territory. Dutch immigration policies encouraged large numbers of British planters from Caribbean islands to move to Guyana with their slaves as the islands deteriorated from the rapacious agricultural techniques employed there. Possession of the territories alternated among the Netherlands, France, and Great Britain, final control passing over to Great Britain in 1814. In 1833 the three colonies were united to form British Guiana, with its administrative center at Georgetown (Singh 1988, 3).

The land suitable for extensive cultivation lies within the coastal region and extends mostly only about ten miles inland. The Dutch colonizers were skillful in organizing the efficient cultivation of this land, which required that it be poldered with an elaborate system of dams, dikes, drainage and irrigation ditches, and canals. This coastal zone, which includes the capital
city of Georgetown, lies about five feet below sea level at high tide.

Public agitation against slavery in Britain, particularly among the working class, further stimulated by the “rights of man” movement associated with the revolutions in the North American colonies and in France and by pamphleteers like Thomas Paine, finally forced Britain to ban the slave trade in 1808 (da Costa 1994, 4–6). Abolitionist agitation in Britain continued, while slave uprisings continued to break out in various parts of the West Indies. In Guyana, where the slave population was about ten times that of the colonists, there were numerous slave uprisings, the largest occurring in 1763 under the leadership of Cuffy. It took the Dutch eleven months to put down that rebellion, at the end of which European population was reduced by a third, while only half of the slaves remained in captivity (Rodway 1912, 99). Another major rebellion took place in 1823 under the leadership of Quamina.

In 1833, the British parliament finally decreed that slavery would be ended after an eight-year transition period, during which time the slaves would be forced to remain on the plantations and work as apprentice wage laborers. The slaveowners were determined to force the ex-slaves to remain tied to the plantations once the apprenticeship period was over by preventing them from setting aside money to buy parcels of poldered land singly or collectively for agricultural use. A common practice in Guyana under slavery was to allow the slaves to cultivate small ground plots and sell the produce to buy clothing and other items of personal use. To prevent the apprentices from acquiring money to buy land for themselves, the plantation owners often destroyed these ground plots. Fines were imposed on every possible occasion and deducted from wages (Simms 1966, 45). But the apprenticed laborers resisted attempts to force them to work under the same oppressive conditions that had existed under slavery, so that by 1838 it became clear that the apprenticeship conception would not work and all slaves in the British territories were declared free. The freed slaves began an exodus from the plantation slave dwellings and formed villages or moved into villages established earlier and demanded better wages for their
planted labor. In 1841, in the Demerara and Essequibo regions, the plantation owners combined to restrict wages and introduce a severe work code to which the sugar workers responded with a twelve- to thirteen-week strike (Rodney 1981, 32–33).

Claiming the need to keep labor costs low in order to compete with sugar produced by slave labor in Brazil and Cuba, the plantocracy lobbied London successfully for permission to bring in indentured labor. Between 1835 and the ending of the indenture system in 1917, some 31,645 Portuguese (principally from the Madeira Islands, the Azores, and Cape Verde), 14,189 Chinese, 13,355 Africans, and 42,343 West Indians had arrived in the colony. By far the greatest number of indentured laborers, 238,979, were imported from India (Jeffrey and Baber 1986, 13; Manley 1982, 2). The Portuguese and Chinese did not adjust well to the climate and intense plantation labor, and they gradually moved to the towns and eventually became tradespeople. The Portuguese generally dominated the merchant activities. Large numbers of Chinese eventually left the colony.

The indentured laborers were obligated to work for five years at fixed wages on whatever plantation they were sent to. They were generally moved into the former slave quarters under conditions barely different from under slavery. When the indenture period was over, the laborers could voluntarily reindenture themselves for another five years or leave the plantation. After ten years in the colony, the laborers could ask to be repatriated free of cost before 1885; subsequently they had to pay a quarter and then a half of the passage money (Simms 1066, 50). Some 75,000 did return to India (Manley 1982, 4).

The labor conditions were extremely arduous. The workers would usually spend fifteen hours at work or travel to work, and the working day could be extended from twenty to twenty-two hours during the grinding of the sugar cane. The planters would say that the indentured workers on the plantations had to be either at work, in the hospital, or in jail. British Guiana was the worst colony in regard to the use of the criminal courts to enforce the rights of the employers against the workers. In 1907,
twenty percent of the indentured workers were convicted for offenses under the labor laws (Rodney 1981, 41).

To induce the East Indian laborers not to return to India at the end of their period of indenture, the plantation owners and the colonial government began to offer them plots of land in exchange for the price of the return trips, thereby ensuring a continuing supply of labor. In this way the cultivation of rice became the second largest agricultural activity, eventually leading to the emergence of the East Indians as the numerically largest group of peasant farmers in the colony (Hintzen 1989, 25).

Some of the former slaves did manage to buy plantation land, but they did not have the capital to maintain the complex system of dams, dikes, and canals, so they generally had to join the others in small-scale farming, handicrafts, and trade. Increasingly, like the Portuguese and Chinese, the Afro-Guyanese moved into the towns as laborers, where eventually they became the numerically largest ethnic group.

The British colonists consciously exploited the ethnic divisions in the population to their advantage. The top level of the social hierarchy consisted of white Britains working as managers and skilled staff in the offices of British-owned agricultural and commercial enterprises. The white Britains also served as colonial administrators and higher civil servants. Below the British were the white Portuguese, largely involved in commercial activities. In the latter half of the nineteenth century a growing need arose for literate workers on the plantations and in the urban and semi-urban areas. A system of primary education was put in place by the British that gave the black population the opportunity to obtain access to skilled and unskilled occupations that required minimal reading and writing ability. The expansion of primary education, however, required more teachers than the white population could provide, so teachers had to be recruited from the black population. The postprimary education then served as a springboard for Afro-Guyanese to higher paying civil-service occupations and more lucrative commercial activities, thus laying the basis for an Afro-Guyanese middle class with a bureaucratic cadre to serve the colonial and commercial
interests. To ensure that the children of the East-Indian laborers remained available for plantation work, they were exempted by and large from compulsory education and thereby became non-competitive in the nonagricultural areas of the economy (Hintzen 1989, 25). By 1930, literacy among Afro-Guyanese approached 100%, while among Indo-Guyanese it was around 25%.

To effect reliable control over the predominantly East Indian indentured workers, the British recruited the colonial police forces largely from among the Afro-Guyanese population, who were now mostly not involved in plantation labor. The vast majority of the Afro-Guyanese remained, nevertheless, in the proletarianized labor force in towns and villages (Hintzen 1989, 20–24).

During the twentieth century, a significant number of Indo-Guyanese were able to use their accumulated savings from their peasant undertakings to engage in commercial activities to the point where they displaced the Portuguese-Guyanese as the largest urban commercial group (Hintzen 1989, 25). The Indo-Guyanese plantation workers were still the most important source of profit for British colonial investment, so that discrimination was directed more against them than other ethnic groups. As a result of the discriminatory hiring in the state and public service sectors, Indo-Guyanese who acquired secondary education and were able to afford university education abroad tended to go into professions such as law and medicine, where the opportunity for successful careers was greater because of the relative independence of these occupations.

The PPP was formed in 1950 with the goal of expelling colonialism from British Guiana. Its leading figures then included the present president of the country, Cheddi Jagan, a leader of the Sawmill Workers Union and an active supporter of the trade-union struggles of the sugar plantation workers and their union, the Guiana Industrial Workers Union (GIWU); Linden Forbes Burnham, a leader of the British Guiana Labor Union (BGLU) and party chair; and Janet Jagan, the party’s general secretary. The GIWU’s sugar plantation workers were largely of East Indian descent, while the BGLU was based in the urban Afro-Guyanese working class. Despite a long history of attempts by
the British colonial authorities to foment racial antagonism between the Guyanese of East Indian and African origin, the PPP successfully pursued a policy of racial unity. The party had not been formed as an explicitly Marxist party, but its leadership was in the main Marxist, and the party proclaimed its purpose as follows:

The People’s Progressive Party, recognizing that the final abolition of exploitation and oppression, of economic crises and unemployment and war will be achieved only by the Socialist reorganization of society, pledges itself to the task of winning a free and independent Guiana, of building a just socialist society, in which the industries of the country shall be socially and democratically owned and managed for the common good, a society in which security, plenty, peace, and freedom shall be the heritage of all.

(Spinner 1984, 30)

The party gradually became more explicitly Marxist. At its congress in 1968 it adopted a Marxist-Leninist orientation and in 1969 participated in the World Conference of Communist and Workers Parties in Moscow.

In April 1953, in the first general election held under British rule with universal adult suffrage, the PPP won eighteen out of the twenty-four seats in the House of Assembly. At this point, Burnham, although party chair, made an unsuccessful attempt to become the PPP leader in the Assembly, a responsibility that was given to Cheddi Jagan by the PPP executive, a position that carried the prestige of prime minister in the constitutional arrangement instituted by the British Colonial Office (Singh 1988, 22).

One hundred and thirty-three days after the opening of the legislature the Churchill government in Britain suspended the constitution and deposed the PPP-led government, justifying its action by the need to thwart a communist takeover of the Western Hemisphere. The real reason for dissolving the PPP-led legislature was that on the preceding day, the legislature passed a labor relations act that would have ended company unionism on the sugar plantations by giving workers the right to choose their
collective bargaining representation by secret ballot.

The colonial authorities jailed most of the PPP leaders associated with the more militant position of the Jagans, but were less severe with those around Burnham whom they considered to reflect social-democratic tendencies. In 1955, Burnham failed in a second attempt to secure control of the party and formed a new political grouping that continued to call itself the PPP. He was encouraged to take this action by the Robertson Commission, a royal commission sent from Britain in 1954 to deal with the consequences of the suspension of the constitution. The Robertson Commission suggested that there were two groups in the PPP, one they labeled as a communist group led by the Jagans and the other a socialist group led by Burnham. The commission in effect issued a challenge to Burnham by stating: “We doubt however if they had the wit to see the essential difference between themselves and their communist colleagues or the ability to avoid being outmaneuvered by them” (Singh 1998, 25).

The ethnic character of both the class divisions and stratification within the classes in Guyana played a significant role after the Burnham split-off from the initially multiracial PPP. According to Jagan, in the ethnic/racial categories used in 1953, the population was distributed as follows: 46% East Indian, 35% African, 11% mixed or colored, 2% Portuguese, 1% other European, 1% Chinese, and 4% Amerindian (1994, 14).

Under pressure in the Commonwealth to resume constitutional rule in Guyana and encouraged by the split in the PPP and the formation of two new parties, representing upper- and middle-class interests, the British set new elections for 1957, but only after considerable racial and class-based gerrymandering of the electoral districts. In preparing for the new elections that were scheduled for 1957, Burnham developed a strategy that came to be known as racial politics. Burnham’s strategy was to capitalize on the anticommunism that the British used to suspend the constitution in 1953, and he accused Jagan of being more interested in forming alliances with international communism than in working for the independence of Guyana from colonial rule. Allied with Burnham was J. P. Latchmansingh, the Indo-Guyanese leader of the Guyana Industrial Workers Union, which
had its base among the sugar workers. Burnham’s hope for success was based on the expectation that Latchmansingh would deliver the vote in six sugar-worker constituencies, largely populated by Indo-Guyanese, while he would concentrate on the five Georgetown constituencies largely populated by Afro-Guyanese. Burnham’s candidates received only 26% of the vote, winning only 3 of the 14 elective seats. The Jagan-led PPP won 9 seats out of the 14 seats in the Legislative Assembly.

In 1958, Burnham changed the name of his party to the People’s National Congress (PNC) and moved much further to the right, basing his strategy for the 1961 elections more fully on racial politics by merging with the United Democratic Party, which had received the overwhelming support of the black and colored middle-class in the 1957 elections (Hintzen 1989, 50). Although the scope of home rule was severely limited by the Colonial Office, the PPP government had adopted a number of measures directed toward integrating the nearly all-black public service. The educational system was expanded in directions that would free it from domination of the Christian churches, which had refused to hire Hindu teachers (Hintzen 1989, 50). Burnham used these measures to stimulate fears in the urban black and colored populations that they would be driven out of the jobs and schools by the Indo-Guyanese. In this connection, Jagan commented that “Burnham’s alliances with conservative and racist elements resulted in the class struggle appearing not as previously in the 1920s as Coloured (Indians, Negroes, mixed) against White, but as Indian against Negro and Mixed. Fears of one kind or another, whether real or imagined, were generated against the P.P.P. and expressed in racial and anti-communist terms” (1966, 345). To accommodate the petty bourgeoisie and yet not alienate his socialist-oriented working-class base, Burnham took the political-economic meaning out of socialism. At the 1961 annual meeting of the PNC he stated:

It must be remembered that the PNC is a Socialist Party; by that I mean that the PNC draws its strength from the working people of this country, that the PNC is dedicated to the establishment of a system of social justice where the
workers would get their just desserts, will get the rewards of their labor, and no longer will a few get the lion’s share while the many get the jackal’s pickings. (Pierce 1964, 78)

As the 1961 elections approached, a new bourgeois party, the United Force (UF), was formed by Peter d’Aguiar, a soft-drink, beer, and rum manufacturer of Portuguese descent, the most successful private businessperson in Guyana (Simms 1966, 149; Latin America Bureau 1984, 39). For his mass support he turned to the Portuguese minority, the black and colored middle class, the wealthy conservative Indo-Guyanese, and the Amerindians, the latter deeply under the influence of the Catholic church and other Christian missions. D’Aguiar had attempted to merge his forces with the PNC and provide financial assistance in exchange for majority control in the PNC executive, leaving Burnham, however, as chair. Burnham rejected the offer. Further negotiations were pursued, but led to no merger after d’Aguiar failed to demonstrate that he could make inroads into the constituencies in which the PPP was strong (Singh 1988, 27–28).

The British, despite another round of gerrymandering, again miscalculated. The PPP won 20 seats, the PNC 11 seats, and the UF 4 seats. Jagan again received the mandate to form a cabinet.

In October 1961, two months after the election, Jagan went to the United States to request $40 million dollars in developmental aid. According to Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., then an adviser to President John F. Kennedy, Jagan’s failure to criticize the Soviet Union when he appeared on Meet the Press and his remarks to Kennedy that he thought highly of the *Monthly Review* and the writings of Paul Sweezy, Leo Huberman, and Paul Baran convinced Kennedy to let Jagan return empty handed. Schlesinger noted the British felt that there was no alternative to getting along with the Jagan government since they considered Burnham “an opportunist, racist and demagogue intent only on personal power” (1965, 778). Nevertheless, the United States government subsequently decided to support Burnham and pressure the British to put Burnham in power by changing the electoral system from election by plurality to proportional representation (779). The U.S. government reasoned that a coalition between the PNC and the right-wing UF might be able to win a parliamentary
majority in the next elections, since in the 1961 elections the PPP had received 43% of the votes, while the PNC and the UF had received 41% and 16%, respectively (Singh 1988, 33). The U.S. strategy relied on the creation of political chaos in Guyana so that the British would have an excuse not to grant independence while the PPP government was in place. Using the chaos as an excuse, the British could then impose a change in the electoral system that would give the a Burnham-UF coalition a majority in the legislative assembly.

The CIA preparations for destabilizing the PPP government were based on using right-wing U.S. trade unions, the American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD), and the anticomunist International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICTFU) to organize strikes and riots. In his book *West on Trial*, Jagan notes that “the records show that there were far more visits of U.S. trade unionists to British Guiana in the 18 months following the 1961 general election than in the 18 years preceding that election” (1966, 298). Riots, strikes, destruction of buildings, and widespread arson were organized by the forces of Burnham and d’Aguiar in 1962 and 1963, accompanied by continual agitation from the Burnham-controlled Trades Union Council, an eighty-day strike by the Civil Service Association that continued with new demands whenever the Jagan government agreed to meet the demands raised previously, and frequent street violence directed against the Indo-Guyanese population. The eighty-day strike was particularly damaging. The U.S. columnist Drew Pearson, in his syndicated column on 22 March 1964, reported: "The strike was secretly organized by a combination of U.S. Central Intelligence Agency money and British intelligence" (cited in Jagan 1966, 304). The PPP government was actually more a government in form than in fact, since the British had the ultimate authority over the army and police and used this authority to weaken the ability of the PPP government to respond to the crises being generated. Toward the end of 1963, the British ordered the change in the electoral system that the U.S. had been insisting on. Elections were held in December 1994 with the PPP winning 24 seats, the PNC 22, and the UF 7. The PPP actually had increased its share of the vote in
comparison with 1961 from 43% to 45% and claimed that had it not been for fraud in these British-administered elections, it would have received an absolute majority.

In 1967, the CIA’s funneling of funds abroad through U.S. trade unions via bogus foundations was publicly disclosed. An article entitled “How the CIA got rid of Jagan” in the British Sunday Times (27 April 1967) commented, “As coups go, it was not expensive: over five years the CIA paid out over £250,000 [$US1 million]. For the colony, British Guiana, the result was about 170 dead, untold hundreds wounded, roughly £10 million-worth of damage to the economy and a legacy of racial bitterness” (cited in Latin America Bureau 1984, 40–42). An editorial in the 4 June 1990 issue of the Nation reported that at a seminar for its staff Schlesinger stated “I felt badly about my role thirty years ago...I think a great injustice was done to Cheddi Jagan.”

In the 1964 elections, as in the elections of 1961, the campaign workers of the PNC attempted to win the support of the largely black petty bourgeoisie and urban office workers by implying that after independence the PPP, if elected, would be displacing them with Indo-Guyanese. Burnham was limited, however, in how far to the right he could go because the radical origins of the PNC made it necessary for Burnham to continue with a radical rhetoric in order to hold the support of the Afro-Guyanese workers. The PNC speakers maintained that no coalition would be formed between the PNC and UF because the PNC was socialist and the UF was capitalist. Burnham repeated this emphatically only a few days before the election (Jagan 1966, 370).

Once the election was over, Burnham immediately formed a coalition with the UF. D’Aguiar was named minister of finance. The coalition government terminated the trade relations that the PPP administration had established with Cuba. Favorable conditions were established for foreign investment. Britain then granted its colony independence in 1966 (Jeffrey and Baber 1986, 30). After independence the United States was given the right to use the former U.S. air base in Guyana for seventeen years. Guyana voted against the People’s Republic of China

The PNC-UF coalition government’s attempt at economic development was a failure, in part because it was completely unrealistic and in part because of increasing corruption on the part of Burnham’s patronage appointees. D’Aguiar resigned in anger as minister of finance late in 1967 after the director of audits could not obtain proper documents to account for approximately $G20 million in government expenditures (Singh 1988, 40). The UF subsequently went into opposition, but Burnham was able to remain prime minister owing to defections in the legislative assembly from both the PPP and UF.

With Burnham now in full control, the PNC was able win the 1968 elections through what was essentially weakly disguised fraud sustained by a thoroughly corrupted urban trade-union bureaucracy and a public service increasingly dependent on PNC patronage appointments. To retain the support that he had among the urban working class and to placate the left wing of the PNC, he blamed the failure of the coalition government’s 1966–72 economic development plan on the need to compromise with the right-wing UF.

In 1970, the PNC changed the name of the country to the Cooperative Republic of Guyana and declared its intention to form the first really democratic socialist society based on cooperatives. In a speech in 1969 announcing this plan, Burnham said:

In the west, under a capitalist economic system, cooperatives own chain stores, oil fields, housing projects and millions of dollars worth of property, and yet, and this is the important point, the cooperative movement in those countries are only an appendage to the economic system. The economy is still owned and controlled by small powerful groups and the decisions are still made by these groups, . . .

In eastern Europe, cooperative movements are also to be found, but again their activities are only peripheral to the basic economic system. The basic system places economic power and control in the hands of those who run
the communist party and they are the government. The decisions which those few leaders make are made by them because, according to them, they know best and not as a result of consultation with the people. . . .

It is not our intention that, as in other countries the cooperative movement should remain a mere appendage to the economic life of the nation. (Burnham 1970, 158–59).

Burnham’s plan was to coordinate the development of the private, public, and cooperative sectors in a direction that would lead to the cooperative sector becoming the dominant economic sector through a strategy of import substitution and nationalization of foreign enterprises. A National Co-operative Bank was opened to give preference to cooperative undertakings and through which all state business was to be conducted. By 1976 some thirty-two companies were nationalized, including the foreign-owned enterprises that accounted for Guyana’s main exports, bauxite and sugar. By that year eighty percent of the economy was under PNC control. The mutually agreed-upon compensation to the foreign owners was sufficiently high so that not a single foreign company complained about its terms. The new companies together with those that were state enterprises before 1970 were controlled by the Guyana State Corporation with Burnham as the chairman. The nationalized enterprises and economically significant cooperatives were managed by senior PNC stalwarts without any meaningful worker or trade-union participation. Except for the cooperatives sponsored by the Afro-Guyanese left-wing cultural organization (with a somewhat black-nationalist orientation), the African Society for Cultural Relations with Independent Africa (ASCRIA), the cooperatives were usually run as private businesses for the enrichment of their managers (Latin America Bureau 1984, 48–52; Jeffrey and Baber, 129–30).

Despite increasingly inefficient and corrupt management, the gross domestic product grew and wages of workers in Burnham-controlled unions increased in this period, largely due to increases in the international prices for sugar, rice, and bauxite, as well as from increased foreign borrowing.
The patronage benefits from the expansion of the state sector were used by Burnham to build an even stronger base of support among the largely Afro-Guyanese public service workers and administrators. “The regime had provided them with an enormous hike in salary followed by a relief in income taxes and generous subsidies on major consumer items. Through the state they now enjoyed preferential access to rapidly increasing job opportunities which brought in their wake higher salaries, increased perquisites, and quick and easy promotion” (Hintzen 1989, 162).

The agricultural workers and poor farmers, who constituted the majority of the population did not obtain comparable benefit. The PPP-led sugar workers, members of the Guyana Agricultural Workers Union, had to strike repeatedly for wage increases and recognition of their union, recognition finally being received after a representation vote in 1975, in which the GAWU received 98.7 percent of the vote. By 1973, problems with the nation’s balance of payments arose as a result of the growing foreign debt and rising oil prices. These became increasingly severe and by 1976 the economy went into a steep decline.

New challenges to the PNC rule arose in the aftermath of the 1973 elections. His dictatorial methods were evoking a growing opposition. The PPP had continually expressed its opposition to Burnham’s use of fraudulent elections under the veil of a “cooperative republic” to disguise what in reality was state capitalism, whereby the public sector was being used to provide luxurious incomes for an elite of PNC managers and government officials. In 1974, a group of Marxist Afro- and Indian-Guyanese, largely urban-based intellectuals, who preferred to distance themselves from the PPP’s association with the international communist movement, organized the Working People’s Alliance to oppose Burnham’s increasing use of radical jargon to consolidate his personal power through electoral fraud and corrupt patronage practices. They were joined, and subsequently led, by the noted historian, Walter Rodney, whose appointment as head of the history department of the University of Guyana in 1974 had been vetoed by Burnham (Singh 1988, 54–55).

Burnham’s response to the mounting economic problems and increasing signs of erosion within his traditional political base
was to switch to what would appear outwardly to be an ultra-leftist political structure and use this structure to justify increasingly oppressive measures for dealing with his opposition. Thus in 1974, at a special PNC congress in the Georgetown suburb of Sophia, Burnham enunciated in what is known as the Declaration of Sophia the doctrine of the paramountcy of the party. In 1975, under this doctrine the PNC and the state were fused in the “Office of the General Secretary of the People’s National Congress and the Ministry of National Development.” Through this vehicle, state funds were officially channeled into PNC without any identifiable assignment in the national budget. The doctrine of paramountcy required civil servants, the military, and the police to pledge loyalty to the party rather than to the government or to the titular head of state (Latin America Bureau 1984, 53–58). In 1976 Burnham subsequently declared that “the People’s National Congress is seeking to lay the foundation for the establishment of a socialist society based on Marxism/Leninism” (Burnham 1976, 4).

It appears that Burnham hoped that this newly declared ideological identification would open the doors for economic aid from the socialist countries. He established diplomatic relations with Cuba, the Soviet Union, China, and several other socialist countries. The Burnham government played a progressive role in the nonaligned countries movement, supported the MPLA in Angola, broke diplomatic relations with Israel. The United States government was not pleased with this turn of events and relations between the two countries became tense, the United States recalling its ambassador in 1976 (Singh 1988, 122). In face of what it saw as a danger to Guyana from imperialism, the PPP changed its political line from “noncooperation” and “civil resistance” after the rigging of the 1973 election to “critical support” in August 1975. The PPP took the position that anti-imperialism is the gateway to socialism, that “in relation to imperialism the regime was then progressive; it was only in relation to socialism that it was reactionary. . . . In many countries regimes with more or less similar positions to the PNC had been overthrown, and fascist or semi-fascist dictatorships established. It was this possible danger that the PPP saw in the Guyana situation” (Guyana’s Road to Socialism 1979, 26). Jagan announced that
the PPP was “prepared regardless of ideological and tactical
differences to work with others if they are interested in building
socialism in Guyana, and that includes the PNC” (Singh 1988,
51–52).

Burnham welcomed the “critical support” of the PPP, but
refused to broaden the government. According to the PPP,

the PNC was prepared neither to consider a political
solution nor to create the favourable conditions for anti-
imperialist national unity. This is due to the fact that the
Party is rooted in rightist opportunism. Its leadership is
dominated by the reactionary petty-bourgeoisie, which has
become entrenched, is using the state for private accumu-
lation and expanding and developing as a class with
ambitions of becoming the big bourgeoisie. Nationalisa-
tion since 1971, though a progressive step, did not lead to
revolutionary transformation. It became a “peculiar mid-
wife to capitalist relations.” In the nationalised enterprises,
as in the state machine, the PNC bureaucrats and technoc-
crats were elevated to the top; simultaneously, transfers
took place horizontally from the state-administrative
sector to the newly nationalised enterprises. This
bureaucratic-technocratic elite replaced the Canadian,
American and British elite with the same salaries, allow-
ances and life-style.

. . . The Guyanese revolution must be democratic.
Democracy is essential for mass mobilization in defense
of independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity and
for building the foundations of socialism. As V. I. Lenin
pointed out: “Whoever wants to reach socialism by any
other path than that of political democracy, will inevitably
arrive at conclusions that are absurd and reactionary both
in the economic and political sense. (Guyana’s Road to
Socialism 1979, 28)

The PPP conducted talks with the PNC from late 1975 to the end
of 1976, but to no avail, since Burnham was unwilling to
relinquish any of his personal power. Burnham in the meantime
discovered he could not get aid from the socialist countries on
the scale he wanted and moderated his anti-imperialism and
again appealed to the United States for financial aid. The United States and IMF responded with considerable aid, as the PNC, with its corrupt practices unabated, drove the economy deeper into foreign debt and economic crisis. In 1981 the foreign debt reached US$636 million, the equivalent of 110% of the GDP (Hope 1985, 92). By 1990 it rose to US$2 billion—seven times the GDP. (In 1995 it stood at $US2.5 billion, or $US3300 per person.) In 1981 Guyana, unable to meet payments on its debts, had to withdraw from the IMF and World Bank programs (Latin America Bureau 1984, 70). Guyana had sunk from one of the more developed countries of the Caribbean in the 1960s to one of the poorest countries.

In 1978 Burnham conducted another fraudulent vote, this time, a special referendum, the results of which enabled him to change the constitution in 1980 to give him complete control over the country (Spinner 1984, 164–68). To retain power in face of mounting internal unrest, Burnham resorted increasingly to physical violence, murder, and terror, including the assassination of Walter Rodney in 1980.

Relations with the United States took a turn for the worse in 1983 when Guyana refused to participate in the U.S. invasion of Grenada and openly condemned it. Burnham died in August 1985 and was succeeded as PNC president by Desmond Hoyte, who had become prime minister when Burnham assumed the presidency under the constitution of 1980. Hoyte conducted the December 1985 elections with the same level of fraud. A joint statement by a number of civic groups that included the Guyana Bar Association, the Anglican Church, and the Catholic Church condemned “the familiar and sordid catalogue of widespread disenfranchisement, multiple voting, ejection of polling agents, violence and collusion by police and army personnel” (Singh 1988, 64). Hoyte moved considerably to the right, initiated a program of privatization, and moved Guyana closer to the United States. Economic performance, however, continued to decline.

International pressure began to mount in the late 1980s for terminating the pattern of fraudulent elections. After two visits to the United States by Cheddi Jagan, six U.S. congressmen and eight senators urged the State Department to condition aid to Guyana on the holding of free and fair elections there. The
Caribbean Council of Churches added pressure on Hoyte in Guyana and internationally. Economic pressure was applied through the donors to the United Nations Development Program. Hoyte, after several subterfuges, finally agreed to permit free elections, the arrangements for which were to supervised by an international council headed by Jimmy Carter: The Council of Freely Elected Heads of Governments’ Mission to Observe the Registration and Electoral Process in Guyana (Ryan 1992, 74). The free elections were finally held on 5 October 1992 and were won by the PPP/CIVIC alliance, an electoral alliance that included the PPP and the WPA, which ran candidates under their party labels, and several other democratic groups. The popular vote was PPP 53.4%, PNC 42.3%, WPA 2%, and UF 1.2%. A multi-racial cabinet composed of members of the PPP/CIVIC alliance was formed, with Cheddi Jagan as president and Sam Hinds as prime minister.

In December 1994, the Central Committee of the PPP reported to the 25th party congress on the way the PPP/CIVIC alliance government has dealt with the consequences of the economic devastation it inherited from the PNC regime. A portion of this report appears in the Marxist Forum section of this issue.

In March 1995 I visited Guyana to learn what we in the United States could do to assist the Guyanese people in their recovery from the devastating effects of the massive CIA subversion of the PPP government in the 1960s. High on the list of priorities is to induce the U.S. government to provide relief from debts to the U.S. government, banks, and international agencies. All public institutions in Guyana need personnel, since the servicing of the huge foreign debt does not allow the national budget to match the salaries paid in the private sector. Specialists of all types are welcome, especially teachers, accountants, and those experienced in drafting laws. Such workers may come for short or long stays in exchange for room, board, and a very small stipend. Anyone interested in such activities or other forms of support may write to NST. The editors of the journal will facilitate contact among those wishing to form a solidarity network.

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Report of the Central Committee to the 25th Congress of the People’s Progressive Party of Guyana, 3–4 December 1994 (Abridged)

Section III. Political and Socioeconomic Situation

*Democracy, freedom and human rights*

The long struggle for the restoration of democracy in Guyana finally won out on October 5, 1992, when free and fair elections were held for the first time in twenty-eight years.

Our struggle for independence and social justice began with the formation of our Party in 1950. The history of that period, including our historic electoral victory in 1953, the suspension of the Constitution, the suppression of our Party, the split in 1955, our second and third electoral victories in 1957 and 1961,
subversive foreign intervention between 1962 and 1964, the fiddled constitutional arrangement establishing proportional representation is well known. October 9, 1992, when the PPP/CIVIC alliance assumed the reins of office, was a memorable date. It was exactly the same date, thirty-nine years earlier, when the PPP had been forcibly removed from government.

The PPP has set about establishing a state of national democracy. It is neither a capitalist state propagating capitalism nor a workers’ state practising socialism. By this is meant a state that

- constantly upholds its political and economic independence;
- fights against militarism and military bases on its soil;
- resists new forms of colonialism and foreign domination, as in the colonial period when British Guiana was “Booker’s Guiana”;1
- rejects dictatorial anti-popular forms of government;
- ensures the people’s broad democratic rights, and enables their participation in shaping Government policy;
- embarks on radical socioeconomic changes including the promotion of cooperation in the countryside and the development of the public sector together with the provision of social services such as education and health.

The tasks of a national democratic character comprise:

- consolidation of national independence;
- carrying out of agrarian reforms and eliminate survivals of feudalism and exploitation;
- restriction of the development of foreign monopolies (two PPP governments were destabilised with the help and in the interest of foreign monopolies;
- securing substantial improvement in living standards for all the people;
- democratizing social life;
- pursuing an independent and peaceful foreign policy;
- promoting a national industry and enterprises belonging to its citizens.

An enduring foundation for our economic takeoff is democracy: democracy in all aspects—political, economic, social and cultural; representative, consultative and participatory. It is not
simply about voting and electing representatives, and the minority obeying the dictates of the majority.

Democracy entails the right of persons and communities to political self-determination. We have restored the supremacy of Parliament and abolished paramountcy.

Participation involves empowering the people to exercise control over resources and the decision-making processes which affect management of resources.

We see democracy and development as being interrelated and as key to achieving our goals of social and ecological justice.

The PPP/CIVIC government proposes to retrace the footsteps of the PPP government in the 1957–64 period when, under a national democracy, the country attained both economic growth (an average annual rate of ten per cent in rice, seven per cent in sugar and bauxite, and eight per cent in manufacturing) and human development (high levels of education and health, with special emphasis on women and children, guarantees of fundamental rights, a multi-party political system and periodic free and fair elections).

**Reconstruction: Obstacles**

Our victory at the polls was greeted with nation-wide rejoicing. The Guyanese people welcomed the breath of fresh democratised air of freedom and enthusiastically moved to support the new government’s drive to rebuild the country.

“We were making a new beginning,” Comrade Cheddi Jagan declared, when he was sworn in as President at State House. We were doing so with distinct advantages and disadvantages—advantages: tremendous local and foreign goodwill; no cold-war anti-communist hysteria as at the time of our earlier victories in the 1950’s and 1960’s—disadvantages: continuing stagnation and recession in the world economy; a politicised Public Service and a run-down infrastructure.

As we settled into office, we had to cope with missing files, typewriters, computers and vehicles. And we found out that the destruction of the country wrought by the PNC [People’s National Congress] regime was much more than was previously apparent. With a per capita income of US$330 and an external
debt per capita of US$2,260, Guyana remains one of the poorest countries in the Western Hemisphere. Nearly a half of the population is below the poverty line. This leads to a vicious circle of poverty and stifled development.

The consequences of poverty are: lowest nutritional intakes, lowest life expectancy, and highest infant and maternal mortality rates as compared with the other CARICOM countries; inadequate pre- and post-natal care; very high percentage of illegal abortions; homelessness; street children; primary school dropouts; poorest high school examination results as compared with the Caribbean; juvenile delinquency; crime; increasing prison population; production, use and export of marijuana; narco-trafficking; emigration, especially of skilled people.

Having inherited an economy in a prolonged decline of more than two decades, the PPP/CIVIC Government is faced with an unenviable task in its search for economic growth with social justice and eco-justice. The constraints are:

- huge debt burden, the servicing of which absorbs most of our foreign exchange and revenue;
- an extremely weak public sector management;
- a narrow revenue base;
- ruined physical and social infrastructure;
- low level of technology
- decline in the quality and level of education which has eroded our human resource base;
- inadequate remuneration of public sector employees;
- widespread demoralisation which has adversely affected motivation and moral standards.

Guyana has an unmanageable burden of debt, which is the greatest contributing factor to poverty and curtailed development. Consequently, finance is inadequate for payments of salaries and wages in the Public Service and to provide social services. Guyana’s foreign debt of over US$2 billion is perhaps the highest per capita in the world. Nearly 50 per cent of Guyana’s foreign commercial earnings is utilised to service the foreign debt, equivalent to nearly two times the average (23 per cent) for the 47 least developed countries in the world. When to this very high debt-service ratio is added 40 per cent for fuel
imports, Guyana’s balance of payments problem is compounded. Economic growth and human development cannot take place without foreign exchange for the import of capital goods, spares, services and essential consumer goods, especially when less than 10 per cent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of Guyana is from the industrial sector.

A minimum wage of less than US$2 per day and a maximum salary of less than US$800 per month in the Public Service do not facilitate the entry or retention of persons in the Public Service. Salaries in the private sector and in the Caribbean and North America are much greater, leading to a brain drain.

Consequently, it is impossible to maintain the administrative capacity for the implementation of projects. For example: US$170 million had been approved by the International Development Bank (IDB) for projects but they could not be implemented because of the lack of skilled/technical/ professional personnel.

Of current budgetary expenditure, the Social Services Sector was in 1992 allocated a totally-unacceptable eight per cent of revenue. This was a disastrous climb-down from the nearly 30 per cent allocation by the PPP Government in the 1957–64 period.

Significant progress has been made towards restoring external viability. The current account deficit of the balance of payments has been reduced from almost US$150 million in 1992 to a projected US$120 million in 1993. Over this period exports are projected to have grown by over 20%. At the same time, the deficit in the capital account of US$47 million in 1990 had been turned around to a surplus of US$78 million in 1993, largely on account of substantial new capital inflows.

Good governance and economic growth

Given this reality, and taking cognisance of the negative factors—bureaucratic/command type of government and management without popular participation, no coordinated development plan, political and racial discrimination, denial of freedoms and human rights, extravagance, bribery, corruption—which led to economic collapse, a huge debt burden, poverty, alienation, frustration, hopelessness and emigration, the PPP/CIVIC Government is proceeding very much conscious of the need for
strong policies and practices internally, to manage efficiently available resources. These include an entrenched democratic culture, good governance, transparency and honesty in public administration, prudent financial husbandry, integrity in public life, justice and equity. Corruption, extravagance and lack of accountability, vices which characterised the past, will not be tolerated by the PPP/CIVIC administration—a policy which has won the confidence of the people.

The previous administration had made the State indistinguishable from the ruling party, and subverted the state institutions, making them instruments of “party-paramountcy.”

The police, army, public service and judiciary are once again asserting their independence and professionalism, and ridding themselves of overt and covert political influences. The results of these bold policies have been a clean administration and increased revenues, especially at the Customs Department.

The PPP/CIVIC government respects fully the independence of the institutions which deal with employment. Employment and promotion will be carried out irrespective of political affiliation, race, ethnicity and religious persuasion. Qualification, merit and experience are the basis for employment and promotion. In this regard, and also to cope with fears of racial/ethnic insecurity, a Task Force on Race Relations has been set up under the leadership of the distinguished Bishop of Guyana, the Rt. Rev. Randolph George. A draft report is being circulated for broad discussion with the objective of enacting a Race Relations Act and establishing a Commission to deal comprehensively with all forms of discrimination and racist incitement.

The Government is committed to accelerated development of the Amerindian people. A Task Force has been set up to elaborate a comprehensive Development Plan for these communities.

The Guyana Airways Corporation (GAC) instituted in 1993 a scheduled air service to various parts of the Interior. This has proved to be a boon, particularly for the Amerindians.

Women play an important role in Guyanese society. They are well-represented in the National Assembly and two are Ministers of Government. It is proposed to enact legislation to guarantee equality of opportunity for women, to provide greater opportunities for their education and to embark on urban and rural projects
to enhance for gainful employment opportunities.

Young people have been affected seriously by the maladministration of the PNC regime. The decline in educational standards along with the absence of sports, cultural and leisure facilities contributed significantly to the demoralisation of Guyanese youth leading to migration, drug addiction and other social vices.

In the cultural field, Government is working to develop community centres throughout the country for cultural activities and to broaden training with more sports coaches and equipment. The provision of facilities in culture and sports will greatly assist in diverting the youths from alcohol and narcotics. It will also facilitate the improvement in educational standards and technical skills.

The expansion of operations in the fields of mining and forestry has raised concerns about effects on the environment. There is a serious shortage of trained personnel in the environmental sector. Government is in the process of establishing an Environmental Protection Agency.

An Environmental Protection Act will shortly be presented to Parliament and a National Environmental Action Plan is being prepared with the assistance of the World Bank.

The University of Guyana started in January 1994 a degree programme in Environmental Science run by an inter-faculty Environmental Studies Unit, assisted by the European Union.

Human resource development—an educated and healthy populace and work force—and a clean, pristine environment are essential for economic growth and human development.

The decline over the last two decades has resulted in an almost total collapse of the educational system with the most drastic effects in the area of natural sciences. Government is taking steps to increase significantly science education at the primary, secondary and tertiary levels.

The rights and freedoms of the Guyanese people have been strengthened by:

- establishing mechanisms and capabilities to achieve completely free and fair elections as attested to in the Permanent Council of the Organisation of American States for the recently-held neighbourhood and urban elections;
• removing the atmosphere of fear, intimidation and victimisation;
• ceasing government’s political interference in the functioning of the trade union movement and other organisations;
• opening up the state-owned media to all shades of opinion.

Despite the serious constraints, the PPP/CIVIC made remarkable progress. The Inter-American Development Bank in its 1993 annual report singled out Guyana for its “relatively successful stabilisation and adjustment programme” and credited it with Caribbean’s highest expansion rate, even as the sub-region experienced a growth rate of under one per cent in 1993.

Real GDP grew by 7.7 per cent and 8.3 per cent in 1992 and 1993, respectively, and is projected to grow by 8.5 per cent in 1994 and 6–7 per cent over the 1995–1996 period.

Many gains were achieved:
• The sugar industry is expected to reach 260,000 tons compared with 243,000 tons in 1993;
• Rice production will be the highest ever—250,000 tons as against 204,000 tons in 1993;
• Gold production is expected to be in excess of 400,000 ounces;
• Timber exports will reach record levels;
• Non-traditional exports, especially agricultural products, continue to leap forward;
• The furniture industry is showing definite signs of revival;
• The bauxite industry is the only productive sector which has done poorly. It is unable to dispose of its stocks of bauxite because the very low overseas prices are lower than the cost of production.
• The construction services and transportation sectors are showing good growth.
• Unemployment has dropped to 12 per cent.

There has been a constant pressure and chorus to turn everything over to the private sector. We maintain that there is a place for state ownership and well run state-owned enterprise.

There are many examples here in the Caribbean which prove
that good and effective management is the key to success for any type of enterprise.

In Trinidad, ISCOTT, the Government Steel Company was turned around dramatically after new management took over.

This happened also in Jamaica where the foreign owners in the oil distribution business gave up the Esso oil refinery and, after it was turned around, tried to re-capture it.

In Suriname, the Government took the chance in oil exploration where private companies were unwilling and succeeded in saving the country over 60% in oil imports. The PPP/CIVIC believes in good and effective management of the entities it controls and is confident that they can made a contribution to the national economy.

Citizens Committees will be established in every community for infrastructure projects. This will lead not only to the empowerment of the people at the grass-roots but also to sustainable development.

Cooperative and mutual aid activities will be fostered in the building of a self-reliant society.

In addition to physical capital (investment and aid) and natural capital (natural resources), social capital (human resources) must play a cardinal role in economic development. To this end, we propose to foster an extensive programme of education and training.

Human development

It is possible to have growth, without social justice and ecological justice, without human development. Dr Wilfred David, former economic adviser to the PNC government, just prior to his sudden resignation in 1971 declared: “We have had growth without development. The problem has been exemplified by the high level of unemployment and foreign dependency.”

A clear difference between the PPP/CIVIC and the PNC towards the working people can be observed in the fact that in the past two years with a cumulative inflation rise by less than 20 per cent, wages and salaries increased by over 70 per cent, as compared with a fall in real wages by nearly 50 per cent during the last ten years of the PNC administrative dictatorship.
The salaries of teachers increased by 50 to 120 per cent in 1994.

For personal income tax, the threshold for non-payment was increased, making an additional 30,500 low income earners exempt from taxation.

In 1994, old age pensions were increased by 50 per cent, and social assistance by 100 per cent.

Health expenditure increased from 8.5 per cent in 1992 to 13.7 per cent in 1994; education increased from 10.5 per cent in 1992 to 18.5 per cent in 1994. We propose to increase expenditure rapidly to the levels prevailing under the previous PPP government, when health and educational standards were among the highest in the Caribbean.

**Privatisation**

The PPP/CIVIC Government, in co-operation with the IMF and World Bank, tabled a State Paper on privatisation in the National Assembly in June 1993. It has also set up a Privatisation Unit which is now actively working to determine which state enterprises should be privatised and what form privatisation, including divestment should take.

The PPP/CIVIC Government’s position on privatisation is not dogmatic. It is based on the rich experience of state enterprises under three different governments—colonial, PPP and PNC.

The State-owned Rice Marketing Board did not serve the rice industry and the rice producers (private farmers and millers) under the colonial and PNC government; and abysmally under the PNC Government.

The privately-owned Guyana Electricity Company gave unsatisfactorily service. The state-owned Guyana Electricity Corporation performed well under the PPP Government, and abysmally under the PNC Government. The new Government is once again putting the GEC wreckage into shape and working order.

The state-owned Guyana Sugar Corporation (GUYSUCO) sank to the lowest depths in production and productivity under the PNC Government. Privatisation, through a Booker/Tate management contract, coupled with improved wages, salaries and
bonuses and proper collective bargaining arrangements with the unions, led to unprecedented growth of over 20% per year in 1991–92. Even with the rundown machinery, the new management achieved in 1992 what it had planned to achieve in 1995!3

On this issue of privatisation, the views of the PPP/CIVIC Government are reflected in the UNDP Human Development Report 1993, which observes:

Privatisation is no panacea, however. Hastily conceived or executed, it might achieve very little. Privatisation should thus be seen not as an end, but as a means to higher levels of human development.

National democratic reconstruction

Equally important as a correct strategy, programmes and policies for sustainable development is the question of political power and who controls the state. If the social contract of our national democracy is to attain the objective of economic growth with equity, with social justice and eco-justice, then the balance of power must be in the hands of the working class in alliance with the revolutionary democrats (the progressive sections of the middle strata).

In our national-democratic reconstruction, we have made clear that the private sector will play a significant role and that foreign capital would be welcome; that in safeguarding national interests, foreign private capital will be encouraged to enter into joint ventures with the local private sector and/or the state. And the working people’s interests would be protected and served not only by the class basis, programme and policies of the PPP/CIVIC government, but also by the empowerment of the people at the work place and in the communities through the grass roots Citizens Committees which we have established.

National unity

The PPP/CIVIC alliance, representing all classes and strata, creates the basis for a government of national unity. This is fortified by regular and meaningful consultations with the opposition political parties, inside and outside of parliament, the private sector organisations, the trade union movement and other
non-governmental groups, including the religious/cultural bodies, especially liberation theologians, within the context of parliamentary democracy and the supremacy of Parliament.

The basis for national unity developed by the PPP/CIVIC alliance can be further strengthened by a direct involvement of other political parties. We did propose an approach for the Georgetown Municipal Council to involve all parties in the administration. Unfortunately, this was not accepted.

We do not share the view that politics in Guyana is cast in rigid racial/ethnic compartments and that allegiances would never change.

It is this false assumption that led to the prediction that we would not have won a majority at the 1992 elections. Had race/ethnicity been the only factor, the PPP/CIVIC could not have polled 54 per cent of the votes (in actual fact, a larger percentage had there not been so many irregularities committed by the PNC). Nor would we have won an even greater percentage of votes at the near mid-term neighbourhood and town council elections when generally ruling incumbent parties lose support at mid-term elections.

Those who see only race/ethnicity in politics in Guyana, as others who see tribalism and religion in other countries, are not viewing reality comprehensively, objectively and scientifically.

In Guyana, because of the strong foreign monopoly domination by the sugar plantocracy, the class struggle was more intense. And although the two major racial/ethnic groups are culturally different, they are not uni-class and class-different as formerly in the colonial period in East Africa. Both groups are largely made up of working people. As such, the PPP/CIVIC, with its working class sympathy and policies oriented to material and cultural fulfillment, can lay the foundation for unity in diversity.

The restoration of democracy has impacted positively on human development by creating confidence in government and institutions and a conducive investment climate. The beauty of democracy is the political stability it tends to create, on which investors place a high priority. It also facilitates examination and correction of the mistakes of dictatorship. We shall therefore continue to stimulate the objective conditions for the
maintenance of a symbiotic relationship between the twin pillars of participatory democracy and sustainable development.

This can be done by the private sector having a lead role, strongly supported by state ownership in selected critical areas and a rebuilt cooperative sector. In this regard, it is necessary to restate our support for the cooperative sector which was sadly neglected in the past, notwithstanding all the sloganeering about cooperativism.

This vision of strong economic development can be achieved by focussing on five areas of economic activity, viz: agriculture, mining, manufacturing, forestry and services. This broad based economy is necessary to guard against over-reliance on one product or industry.

The Party

Since our last Congress, the Party machinery has had to function in several spheres of activity.

The first phase, from July 1991 to October 1992, required an intensification of the battle for the implementation of the many conditions for free and fair elections.

With victory on October 5th, a new era opened up for the country and new tasks emerged for Party members and all of its structures. The response of our Party at its different levels and in different parts of the country has varied greatly with several types of actions emerging.

A major change has occurred at the highest level. Most of the top functionaries of the Party within the Secretariat and Executive have become Ministers of Government or hold very important responsibility at the State level. This has severely disrupted the operations at Party headquarters and has greatly reduced the activities of the National Standing Committees of the Party. The Party Secretariat which formerly administered Party business has been unable to function. In place there is a Freedom House Management Committee.

At the other levels and especially in our Groups, members have taken on new roles in community development Councils and more recently in the municipal and neighbourhood democratic councils. A lot of time and effort are spent by our leading
activists to make improvements in their communities. As a result, there is less time and energy for work in our Groups and District and Regional Committees.

The result, in the shift in emphasis at the different levels is a reduction of certain activities which had become common, essential features of Party life. These include the regularity of group meetings, education and ideological work, literature sales, house to house campaigns, bottom house and public meetings and fund-raising activities.

The effects of changes in Party life which have emerged since our moving into government must be seriously analysed.

It is understandable that the end of PNC suppression of the will of the Guyanese people would lead to a massive release of people’s energies for the repairs to the damage created by the former government. It is also clear that the high level of that deterioration would require enormous efforts for any meaningful improvement to be attained.

The fullest involvement of Party leaders, activists, members and supporters in the effort to rebuild was and still is a vital necessity. But due recognition must also be paid to the need to maintain and strengthen the democratic process, to ensure the continuity of the Party in government and to dutifully guide the direction of national and community development.

The sum total of all these needs is the need to maintain at all times the strength and character of our great Party.

The strength of a party is dependent in the final analysis on the level of development of its members. The demands on our members have grown and our members must therefore grow in order to play their roles effectively.

Many of our long standing members have had varying extents of political and ideological training and have had significant experience in the political battles against PNC oppression.

There is a need to refresh and extend their political and ideological education and to introduce them to other studies important in the task of socio-economic reconstruction.

We also have many members, especially those who joined within recent years, who have not had any meaningful political and ideological education and training. There is an urgent need
to carry out an organised programme for their development. The Party School has a critical role to play in this drive. Emphasis has to be placed on political and ideological questions, as well as the practical skills needed for the task of governance.

All structures in the Party, the Progressive Youth Organization and the Women’s Progressive Organization have to work with the greatest efficiency. Our members have to work to continuously develop themselves. We have to spread ourselves among the masses of the Guyanese people. Our duty is to get them to understand our policies, to assist us in our efforts and to continue to support us as a party.

It is important for our members to have a clear understanding of the objectives of our Party and the principles which guide the PPP/CIVIC government. This is essential, for what is at stake under globalisation is national survival—survival of our dear land of Guyana and all our people.

The PPP has always rooted itself within the ranks of the broad masses of the Guyanese people. We are committed to a path of development based on social justice.

The world socialist system had been seen by the working people of the world as the great hope for the achievement of social justice through the instrument of workers states in individual countries, as an alternative to the capitalist state.

The collapse of the socialist states in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe has given rise to the widespread notion that these events have proven capitalism as the only path for the peoples of the world. One writer, Francis Fukuyama, in his book *End of History* observed that there is no viable alternative to the market-driven neo-liberal private-entrepreneurial democracy.

Such a view is very attractive in the light of what has taken place. However, the events in the most developed of capitalist states themselves show that there is a deep structural crisis of capitalism.

Dependent market-driven capitalism has replaced bureaucratic socialism in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, and a poverty curtain has replaced the iron curtain between East and West Europe. And in Russia, with growing problems, “economic reforms are being slowed, if not wholly abandoned,
while the idea of a liberal democratic Russia must now be seen for what it always has been—namely, an idea, not a reality.” The same applies to East Europe generally.

Armed with scientific principles, theory and practice of the development of society, it is necessary to undertake an in-depth study of the causes for the failure of communist rule in the East and capitalist rule in the industrially-developed West. Theoretical tools are now needed to understand global disorder, the newly-emerging, inter-connected structures of the global economy and international relations, and the multiple new sources of instability, integration and inequality that are developing.

For developing countries like Guyana, an alternative path of development is necessary. The PPP maintains that social justice must prevail in the relationship between states and also within the national state.

While we work towards a New Global Human Order, we will work at home for the protection of the broad masses of Guyanese through the development of a state of National Democracy.

The National Democratic State is neither a capitalist state nor a workers state. In establishing such a state, it is necessary for our party to develop an elastic balance between conformity and transformation. We are under pressure to conform from external and internal forces which have their own agendas and from internal factors, such as the wrecked economy, which pose for the PPP/CIVIC government constraints, necessitating a new IMF 3-year ESAF programme. At the same time, we have our own ideas and principles and, in and out of government international and national experiences about reconstruction and transformation. By dealing with our situation objectively and scientifically with facts and figures, we have succeeded not only in striking a good balance between conformity and transformation, but also in creating a good relationship with the IMF, World Bank, IDB, CDB, the European Union and our bilateral aid donors. And our proposals for a New Global Human Order is providing the basis for North/South partnership and cooperation for mutual benefits. The global strategy we propose is based on a well-thought out vision of a world order in which small developing states like Guyana will have a clearly defined place and role in the sun.
Our National Democratic State is based on the partnership of all classes and strata committed to political democracy and social justice. It unites the workers, peasants/farmers, businessmen, professionals and intelligentsia in a broad alliance which allows for the satisfaction of the interests of these various groups. It prevents the dominance of any class or strata and in turn protects each from being crushed.

The rebuilding of Guyana requires that all the human resources within the country be allowed to flourish and make their varied contributions.

Our policy of national democracy re-emphasises our party’s commitment to protect the working people and the broad masses of Guyanese. It allows for the healthy growth of the capitalist sector but aims to prevent an unbridled private sector development in which the interests and welfare of people in general and the local businessmen in particular are stifled by monopolistic sectors.

Our members must understand the working class foundations of our political ideology. They must be educated to translate this commitment into practical measures aimed at building the national democratic state.

Our task is to reach out to all classes and strata to develop their understanding of the objectives we are pursuing and the path we are taking.

We have a country to rebuild. For this, we must strive for national unity as the vehicle towards national democracy.

EDITOR’S NOTES:

1. Until its nationalization in 1976 Booker-McConnell Ltd. of London produced eighty percent of Guyana’s sugar. Apart from owning the bulk of the sugar lands and mills, the company was heavily involved in shipping, import-export, insurance, retail trade, printing and other commercial activities.

2. The PPP has introduced a bill in parliament to legalize abortions.

3. What has been “privatized” here is the management. GUYSUCO remains a state enterprise, despite strong pressures from the IMF and World Bank to privatize it.
The Marxist Forum is an autonomous network formed to make available discussions and programmatic materials of Marxist organizations in different countries. Materials from the Forum are distributed through the Marxist Educational Press. For more information about the Forum, write to Gerald Erickson, Marxist Forum, 9 Pleasant Street. S. E., Room 330, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN 55455. Additional materials and commentaries appropriate for distribution are most welcome.

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**Germany:** Draft of New Theses of the DKP (German Communist Party) prepared for the 1993 party convention (final theses as adopted are available in German). 10 pages. $1.00

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Eighth Congress Resolutions (1992), New Communist Party of Britain. 38 pages. $2.60

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Guyana: Report of the Central Committee to the 25th Congress of the People’s Progressive Party. 1994. 28 pages. $2.00


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**Philippines:** Stand for Socialism against Modern Revisionism, by Armando Liwanag, Chair of the Communist Party of the Philippines. 27 (double) pages. $2.00

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Cornel West was in his midtwenties when he wrote *The Ethical Dimensions of Marxist Thought* in the 1970s, more than a decade before *Race Matters*. Its youthful enthusiasm seems restless under the harness of an abstract analysis, and its technical argument demonstrates West’s skill as a scholar of Marxism.

The second book is concrete social criticism, blunt and mordant. It is accessible to any thoughtful reader who has followed current events: the Los Angeles “social rage” of 1992, the Clarence Thomas/Anita Hill hearings, Crown Heights. The author turns from the general theorizing of the first of these books, and in the second provides his unacknowledged answer to the early search for a “foundation” that “justifies” moral reason. The foundation of social life (and therefore of thought) is for West “our basic humanness,” our community of concern and mutual care—“a universal love ethic” carried out by local activists, multiracial coalitions, and state, regional, and national networks.

The young Marx worked with the tradition of philosophy that troubled itself with the nature and status of moral propositions. “Thou shalt not kill”; “To exploit persons is wrong”—are these moral expressions true or false? Are they supported by the necessity of reason? Do they imply a “universal obligation”? Can they be justified by “timeless criteria, necessary grounds, or universal foundations for ethics”? If not, do all moral practices and ethical...
concepts collapse into a relativism in which anything goes and social conflicts must be settled by the maxim of might-makes-right?

Examining Marx’s philosophy, West answers “no” to these questions. But he does so by discarding both traditional philosophy’s quest for moral foundations, “hard objectivism,” and its opposite number, moral relativism. West’s alternative is “radical historicism”: “different dynamic human agreements and disagreements and changing community-specific criteria constituting continuous and discontinuous traditions which are linked . . . to multiple human needs, interests, biases, aims, goals, and objectives.” The argument of his book is that this was Marx’s position, and he defends it as his own.

While Marx started out—and remained—convinced of the righteousness of the claims of the people against their oppressors, West contends, he agreed with the moral relativists that moral ideas and judgments reflect the interests of individuals and social groups like classes—hence the concept of “false ideology.” But did he mean, explicitly or not, that there are no grounds whatsoever for objectively deciding moral conflicts and that therefore such conflicts must be resolved—not rationally solved—by physical force, by the blind laws of motion? And whatever his position, was he correct?

To prove that Marx was a radical historicist, West traces the course of his “quest for certainty” from an early concern with objectivity in ethics through many stages we cannot reproduce here. Marx, he says, passed from a search for philosophic absolutes to a (scientific) description, analysis, and explanation of the relativities of political economies and history. Feuerbachian “essentialism” was overcome by the Hegelian dialectic of social life forever changing.

But West oversimplifies this evolution. Passing from the search for objective foundations to empirical and theoretical studies does not require in principle that one forsake the search for objective tendencies and regular laws in society independent of subjective bias. In his Theses on Feuerbach (1845) Marx declared that the human essence is the concrete “ensemble of social relations,” and in his later writings he adheres to the
notion of a definite “species-being”—an understanding of which requires one to “first deal with human nature in general, and then with human nature as modified in each historical epoch” (*Capital 1*, chap. 24). Moreover, the economic laws he derived from analysis of masses of data and formulated were not merely ink-on-paper statements eliciting agreement from others; they signified powerful forces of social history locked in opposition prior to and apart from human notice and description. West does not take account of this “causal efficacy” of physical matter, tools, machines, industrial materials and processes, social movements, and historical events.

For him the major Marxist thinkers dealing with ethics have failed to answer the charge of relativism. Engels, combining “moderate historicism” and objectivism, was wrong in assuming that the proletariat (most of the people), when free to choose, would choose their own human essence (“what we really are”). Kautsky’s argument—that human values are grounded in the natural facts (scientifically confirmable) of instinctive self-preservation and social interaction, community, the production of tools, and technical progress—is “plausible” but needlessly foundational. Lukács was mistaken to posit the dialectical method as the proletariat’s practice in history and the “objective necessity of history” that calls to the proletariat for class consciousness and guidance. Why? “‘Reality’ (be it conceived as dynamic or static) cannot serve as a last court of appeal for the choice of theories about reality; rather, it is always part of such theories people must choose in order to solve problems, insure survival, overcome unpleasant circumstances, etc.”

In company with postmodernism and its “textualization of reality,” West has here abandoned the search for a ground of our moral decisions in the objective world. One is impelled to ask whether, to insure the survival of people, the capitalist theories of Friedman in the United States and the International Monetary Fund in Russia ought to have their last court of appeal in the thought of the theorists or in the palpable hunger of millions. To interpret the world is to deal with a reality outside the interpreter’s head; it is the world that is the proper subject of interactive inquiry if human problems are to be solved.
In his attempt to save Marxism from foundationalism and its “positivistic, economic, and reductionist version” and to rebut antifoundational skeptics, pure descriptivists, moral and explanatory nihilism, and “the sense of political impotence and historical cynicism,” West defends the flank of relativism (historicism) but gives little heed to the other flank (objectivism, radicalism). For him Marxism is a valuable but not sufficient tool of objective social analysis and explanation, having insights into, but not an adequate understanding of, nationalism, racism, gender oppression, homophobia, and ecological devastation. Nor does it address the “existential meaning of death, suffering, love, and friendship.” He sees Marxism as one among many traditions at the communal table for consensus-building.

Like everyone, West reflects the limitations and strengths of his own relative position in history. He says little or nothing about the Russian and other twentieth-century revolutions guided by Marxism, the constructive role of the socialist countries in that history, the Great Depression, the long history of labor’s struggle against capital, the imperialist exploitation of the poor and colored peoples, and the wreckages that the Cold War has wrought on the people and environment of the planet. His book abounds with the heady optimism of youth of the mid-1970s and its ebullient self-confidence, messianism, and pluralism, briskly illustrated in the autobiographical introduction, “The Making of an American Democratic Socialist of African Descent.” As African American, he brings to the democratic dialogue the cry of the oppressed and marginalized, whose sufferings and wisdom the privileged class and race and gender cannot possibly know otherwise—a cry not only material but preeminently moral and spiritual. As Christian, he brings to the discussion the agonies of the estranged soul, where there is no balm in Gilead, but the hope of healing through empathy and compassion.

*Race Matters* is a passionate probe into our present-day U.S. dilemma—the “unemployment, hunger, homelessness, and sickness” of millions and “the collapse of the spiritual communities” of families, neighborhood bonds, schools, churches, synagogues, mosques, and “communication industries (television, radio, video, music).” For long these have been the matrix of
meaning, hope, and love” for our people. The bitter fruit of their blight is “despair, disease, and death”—meaninglessness, anger, and violence. So this work is about all of us—because the racial fault in our self-satisfied California world can widen and destroy our interdependent life and destiny as a people. This book is dark in diagnosis and hopeful in prescription. It is vitriol and vision. It combines deep moral feeling and incisive social analysis, denunciation and redemption, concrete observation and synoptic understanding. It is appreciative of our progressive heritage, Black and white, and attentive to our present crisis; conversant with the views of major Black leaders, it is constructively critical of their policies and characters. A powerful moral impulse has found rational form and compact expression. This “prophetic framework of moral reasoning” illuminates and inspires.

West is scornful of the liberal philosophy of government programs to secure “integration” of Black people into white society and the conservative solution that African Americans must be “well-behaved” to be “accepted.” Rather, Black people are constitutive of U.S. society as a whole, which we must grasp in its common history and common future. That requires us to give priority to economic productivity and our eroded infrastructure, creating a government “to ensure access to basic social goods—housing, food, health care, education, child care, and jobs.” But for this we must raise up new leadership.

All these material improvements and the leadership requisite to achieve them presuppose a spiritual transformation in our primary institutions of nurture and education. Liberal structuralists, calling for more government spending on the meeting of basic needs and the guaranteeing of economic and civil rights, overlook the deepest need of people for sound identity and self-worth. They wrongly believe people are principally motivated by rational self-interest. Conservative behaviorists are insensitive to economic and political structures. Neither can cope with the pervasive nihilism—“life without meaning, hope, and love,” life corroded by self-hatred, which in turn makes the victims easy prey for the profit-driven corporate market with its seductive Circes—“images of comfort, convenience, machismo, femininity, violence, and sexual stimulation.”
Starting with a “love ethic” at its center, the “politics of conversion” must advance from local institutions outward, raising up collective leadership responsible to grassroots democratic groups. Such a politics would work to alter interactively the structures of socioeconomic life and the souls of Black and white folk. But West’s accent—greatly needed now—is on the souls, giving secondary attention to the workplace, trade unions, new forms of economic organization like cooperatives, and modes of participatory planning. Yet the brief chapter, “Beyond Affirmative Action,” is a plea to preserve and augment affirmative action—a meager “concession” forced from big business—by “social democratic redistributive measures that [wipe] out black poverty” and by “the affirmation of black humanity.”

Taking the Thomas/Hill hearings as a case study, West lays bare “the pitfalls” of racial reasoning. Nominated in “an act of cynical tokenism,” Thomas was unqualified and, like Hill, a Reagan conservative, but few Black or white leaders had the courage to say so. “Closing ranks” for “survival,” most accepted Thomas’s spurious claim to “racial authenticity” and “victimization,” yielding as well to the Black nationalist sentiment or Black patriarchal power and the patriarchy and homophobia of Black conservatism. The notion of skin pigmentation triumphed over ethical principles.

West believes Black leaders today are creatures of “the new black middle class” that emerged in the 1960s. Many are Uncle Toms in business suits and academic robes (though the “robes” are “shabby”). They are “race-effacing managerial leaders,” like Thomas Bradley. At the other extreme are “race-identifying protest leaders” (Louis Farrakhan) who force the whites to appease them and thus to overlook the Black poor. The saving minority are the “race-transcending prophetic leaders” like Adam Clayton Powell, Jr., and Ronald Dellums, but their exemplars are absent from this generation. (Black scholars are similarly “race-distancing elitists, race-embracing rebels, and race-transcending prophets.”) Among Black intellectuals today, West considers Toni Morrison to be the sole person of the latter type. The solution to this crisis of Black leadership is to grasp the structural and institutional processes that have devastated Blacks and to
reconstruct “the resources for nurturing collective and critical consciousness, moral commitment, and courageous engagement.”

With the directness of Malcolm X, West lights up and makes clear the hidden nature of the subjects he touches: the new Black conservatism, Black-Jewish relations, the myths and taboos of Black sexuality (white sexuality, patriarchy, and homophobia at work), Malcolm X, Martin Luther King, Jr., and Jesse Jackson. From America’s past many great progressive figures pass in review here, evoking the rich heritage, Black and white, to which we are indebted. But we are in want of a sequel to connect Black history with working-class history (Black and white), as well as with the international liberation movement of the poor and colored peoples.

*Race Matters* is mainly a moral work from a member of a trampled minority addressing both that minority and a numerical majority already racist, already dominant both over the means of material production and distribution and over the institutions forming mentality. Under such double despotism, whence comes our help? From the despised and rejected, from the depths below, from the tattered and creative remnant. Who are these? They are the Black and white and other prophetic souls who dare to stand up and speak out and march forward for justice. And what is the “foundation” of their cause, the “ground” that can justify their project of liberation in the consciences of one another and of humanity? In the day of the industrial revolution, Marx found this ground in the very material powers of production, the tools and machinery, the iron bonds of labor and cooperation that bound the workers to one another and their families, to nature, and to those machines in a creative-and-destructive process, interlinked in struggle with the forces of nature and society, of classes and economies. Is this picture still true? More or less: West reports that in 1989, one percent of the people owned thirty percent of the wealth, and ten percent owned eighty-six percent of the wealth.

West’s indictment of capitalism has to do more with its psychic than its material exploitation: induced addictions to consumption, drugs, transient pleasures, and sex as new opiates
of the people, and the destruction of dignified identity. This moral sermon is authentic and right. But in the absence of a deep material critique, the danger is that liberals, moderates, and some conservatives will take over the morality of “love” and make it a national logo, conveniently forgetting the needy millions, the necessity of survival, and the nitty-gritty of the class struggle.

While West is a Christian and a socialist, he shuns here the terminology of these commitments. He rests his case on universal human needs and values and the requirement of “psychic conversion” in all of us. Moreover, he sees us as participants in the procession of “a great cloud of witnesses” in the freedom march from bondage in Egypt through the wilderness of estrangement to the promised land. His is a call to join that procession and to number ourselves among that noble army of martyrs and prophets and protesters—“to take our place,” in the words of the spiritual, “with those who loved and fought before.”

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English revolutionaries in the midseventeenth century claimed the right of the people to resist a tyrant, raised an army and fought a successful war to do so, beheaded that tyrant, eliminated the monarchy, and set up a government based on the concept of popular sovereignty. The revolution’s immediate practical success was short-lived, but it changed England
forever. Although the Commonwealth lasted only eleven years, the king who was restored to the throne in 1660 had sharply limited powers, and in 1688 England completed its bourgeois revolution by installing a constitutional monarch.

An important ideological role in these transformative events was played by that giant in English literary history, John Milton. Christopher Hill has noted that Milton was not only a fine writer, but “the greatest English revolutionary who is also a poet, the greatest English poet who is also a revolutionary” (*Milton and the English Revolution*. New York: Viking Press, 1977, 4). During the 1640s, Milton wrote many essays, issued as pamphlets, on social, religious, and specifically political issues. His tracts arguing for divorce by consent, and especially his *Areopagitica*, on freedom of expression, are still of broad interest. (*Paradise Lost* is among major poetic works written after his forced retirement from politics.)

While the trial of Charles I was going on, Milton wrote *The Tenure of Kings and Magistrates*, arguing, as its subtitle declares, that it is lawful for anyone who is able to do so, “to call to account a Tyrant, or wicked King, and after due conviction, to depose, and put him to death.” Within two weeks after the execution, the work was completed and published. Milton was promptly appointed Secretary for Foreign Tongues, to be in charge of diplomatic correspondence and propaganda. In this capacity he answered a long theoretical work, *Defensio Regia*, commissioned by royalist exiles to attack the revolutionaries and defend the divine right of kings to rule. Milton’s refutation (also in Latin) was first published in 1651 as *Pro Popula Anglicano Defensio* [*A Defence of the People of England*], and again, revised and enlarged, in 1658.

These two important prose works have been issued in a new scholarly edition by the Cambridge University Press. A thirty-eight-page introduction by Martin Dzelzainis puts them in the context of the political events of the time, and summarizes their arguments. Both are published complete: *The Tenure of Kings and Magistrates* with seventeenth-century spelling retained, *The Defence* in a new translation into very readable modern English by Claire Gruzelier. Footnotes explain events and people
mentioned in the texts, with more extended biographical sketches of important figures at the end; also included are a select bibliography, a chronology of Milton’s life and contemporary events, and indexes.

This volume is one of the “Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought.” With more than twenty published so far, from Aristotle to Thomas Paine, this series is a valuable contribution to scholarship.

Verso has brought out a much slimmer volume of seventeenth-century political writings by an obscure pamphleteer, which nonetheless make interesting reading alongside the somewhat ponderous prose of the towering Milton. In 1648 and 1649, at the height of the English Civil War, John Warr published three pamphlets setting forth a theory of “people’s rights” as the basis for a rational social order. He endorses the right of a people to overthrow a government that has become tyrannical, and argues that the interests of king and subjects are in complete opposition. “Anti-monarchicalness is no crime at all,” Warr declares, “but a difference in judgment about an external form of civil government” (p. 84).

In a brief but provocative foreword, Christopher Hill points out that the free discussion Milton praised in *Aereopagitica* was carried on in the 1640s largely in religious idiom, but Warr’s secularized vision recalls the Levellers, Diggers, and Ranters. The editors argue that Warr “during the heady days when (in Winstanley’s phrase) the old world was ‘running up like parchment in the fire,’ Warr began to articulate a modern philosophy of human rights” (p. 2).

A short anonymous answering pamphlet in defense of monarchy is included in the volume. This first complete edition of Warr’s known work has gone quickly out of print, but it will have found its way into some libraries. Even minor writings from this period of radical social change repay contemporary study.

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The “invented tradition” is a rope that stretches between the present and the past, but with the peculiarity that this connection is artificial (Hobsbawm 1992, 63).

The parenthetical citation is best placed just before a punctuation mark, preferably at the end of a sentence or clause. If the author’s name and/or the date of the work appear in the text, do not repeat in the citation.

These ghosts do not speak to protect us in our power, in McGrath’s phrase from the poem “The Restless Night,” in our “immortality which is only lifelong” (1988, 95).

Following a block quotation, the parenthetical citation follows the final period:

> No poem written by a thirty-year-old, surely, has ever so totally rejected so many of the beliefs of the society it was written in. No poem, certainly, has lived to see so many of its heresies so widely accepted before its author turned forty. (Hodgson 1976, 323)

Endnotes

When discussion is needed, endnotes (with superscript numbers in the text) may be used sparingly. Citations within these notes should be in the same author-date style as in the text.

1. Sidney Honan notes these exchanges but provides a different interpretation (1981, 163). See also Abel 1963 for an early metadramatic reading of *Hamlet*.

Reference list

Full bibliographic information on all sources cited in the text is given at the end of the article in a single list of references, arranged alphabetically by author's last name. (Several works by the same author are listed in chronological order.) Examples and detailed descriptions of entries appear in *CMS* 16.18–16.209. MEP uses authors’ full names (rather than initials), with dates immediately following, sentence capitalization (or “down” style) for all book and article titles, no quotation marks around article titles, and no abbreviated names of journals. Names of U.S. publishers should be abbreviated as in *Books in Print*, and *Univ.* may be used in names of university presses. When place of publication is not a generally known city, give country or, for U.S. publishers, name of state in abbreviated form (see list in *CMS* 14.17), but do not use two-letter postal codes (NY, CT, CA, etc.). Frequent types of Reference List entries follow; see *CMS* 16.35 and 16.104 for other examples.

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Citations from the classics of Marxism

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ABSTRACTS OF ARTICLES

Herb Gamberg, “Another View on the Crisis in Marxism”—A figure often maligned and neglected in contemporary Marxism is undoubtedly Lenin. It is argued here that this neglect lies at the heart of the crisis in Marxism. The major contribution of Lenin’s ideas—their deepening of the activist, antipositivist side of Marxism—is often denied in a plethora of supposedly new syntheses and formulations that recapitulate old errors. What is needed today is a deepening analysis of the dissolution of revolutionary society in Leninist terms. Without this analysis, the crisis has little hope of resolution.

Arif Dirlik, “Three Worlds, or One, or Many? The Reconfiguration of Global Divisions Under Contemporary Capitalism”—The tripartite division of the world in post–World War II social science has been criticized for its ideological weakness and for ignoring differences across the “three worlds.” The fall of socialist states and a new phase within capitalism add plausibility to such criticism. Such criticism, however, may destructure global relations and force analysis toward a relentless empiricism. It also ignores the ways in which the Third World concept empowered oppositional movements to create new political configurations as alternatives both to capitalism and actually existing socialism. What is required now is an account of the restructuring of global relations by a global capitalism and the new forces of opposition it generates. Local movements to contain the ravages of capital, a primary recent form of resistance, have much to learn from indigenous movements that question the very notion of development.

Leonard Goldstein, “Patriarchalism in Historical Context: Milton and his Feminist Critics. Part One.”—The controversy surrounding feminist critiques of Milton can best be understood by analyzing the social contradictions that produced the
contradictory Miltonic text, which is both patriarchal and liberating. This two-part article attempts to historicize Milton’s patriarchalism by placing it in the context of developing capitalism. The first part reviews recent Marxist demographic research on the family in the transition from feudalism to capitalism as a background for considering Milton’s concept of sexuality in marriage.

_Erwin Marquit, “Historical Background to Guyana’s Struggle for Freedom”—_A coalition led by the People’s Progressive Party of Guyana won a historic electoral victory in 1992. The article reviews the complex ethnic/political history of Guyana that led to this victory.

_“Report of the Central Committee to the 25th Congress of the People’s Progressive Party of Guyana, 3–4 December 1994 (Abridged)”—_Abridged excerpts are presented from the section of the report of the Central Committee to the 25th Congress of the People’s Progressive Party of Guyana that deals with the political and socioeconomic situation.

**ABREGES D’ARTICLES**

_Herb Gamberg, “Une autre vue de la crise du marxisme”—_Une figure souvent calomniée et négligée dans le marxisme contemporain c’est assurément Lénine. L’auteur constate que cette négligence est au fond du crise du marxisme. On nie souvent la contribution principale des idées de Lénine—leur approfondissement du côté activiste, antipositiviste du marxisme—toujours en multipliant des synthèses et formulations dites nouvelles qui récapitulent les erreurs anciennes. Si on veut vraiment faire face à Lénine, ce qu’il faut c’est une analyse approfondie de la dissolution de la société révolutionnaire en termes léninistes. Sans cette analyse, la crise a peu d’espoir de se résoudre.

_Arif Dirlik, “Trois mondes ou un ou beaucoup? La réconfiguration des divisions globales sous le capitalisme contemporain”—_On critique la division tripartite du monde par la science sociale après la deuxième guerre mondiale à cause de
ses bases idéologiques et d’avoir ignoré des différences à travers les «trois mondes.» La chute des états socialistes et une nouvelle phase du capitalisme donnent de la plausibilité à une telle critique. Cette critique pourtant peut déstructurer les rapports globaux et force l’analyse vers une empiricisme implacable. Elle ignore aussi comment le concept du Tiers Monde accorda pleins pouvoirs aux mouvements oppositionistes afin de créer de nouvelles configurations politiques qui offraient des alternatives et au capitalisme et au socialisme existant. Ce qu’il faut maintenant c’est un compte-rendu de la réstructuration des rapports globaux par un capitalisme global et les nouvelles forces de l’opposition qu’il engendre. Des mouvements locaux à contenir les ravages du capital, une forme de résistance récemment primaire, ont beaucoup à apprendre des mouvements indigènes qui contestent la notion même du développement.

Leonard Goldstein, «Le Patriarcalisme dans son contexte historique: Milton et ses critiques féministes. Partie une»—La controverse qui entoure les critiques féministes de Milton peut être mieux comprise en analysant les contradictions sociales qui produisent le texte contradictoire de Milton, à la fois patriarcal et libérateur. Cet article en deux parties essaie d’historiser le patriarcalisme de Milton en le plaçant dans le contexte du capitalisme en voie du développement. La première partie revoit la recherche marxiste démographique récente sur la famille en transition du feudalisme au capitalisme comme arrière-fond d’une considération du concept de Milton à propos de la sexualité dans le mariage.


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