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What Is Fundamentalism?

Domenico Losurdo

Fundamentalism and fundamentalisms

What is fundamentalism? One immediately thinks about the Middle East and Islam, but the term first appeared in U.S. Protestant circles, regarding a movement that developed prior to World War I whose followers occasionally referred to themselves as “fundamentalists” (Riesebrodt 1990, 49). Although this concept was developed in the heart of the Western world as a proud and positive self-definition, it is now being used to brand the “barbarians” who live outside of the Western world, and who prefer to call themselves “Islamists.”

The popular definition of fundamentalism is the claim to “derive political principles from a sacred text,” which serves to legitimize ancient secular norms and to judge their adherence to or deviation from the text on a case-by-case basis (Choueiri 1993, 29). In order to analyze the problem correctly, one must keep in mind that there are different kinds of fundamentalism. Jewish fundamentalism, for example, proclaims “the holiness of Eretz Israel” and the “supremacy of a higher law”; such movements possess a growing and worrisome vitality. They pit the “holiness of Halacha” (Eisenstadt 1993, 275) against existing political institutions, while Islamic fundamentalism upholds the sanctity of Sharia; in both instances, human societal norms have to be justified in the eyes of unimpeachable divine law.

We can find the same dichotomy in Catholic doctrine. For this reason, the renowned jurist Stefano Rodota saw a “move toward fundamentalism” in the sharp polemic against legislation on pregnancy termination in Pope John Paul II’s encyclical letter Evangelium Vitae. Just as there is no lack of books that draw a close parallel between the American Protestants of the early twentieth century and today’s Iranian Shiites, many polemics have discovered similarities between John Paul II and the leaders of radical Islamism. The former states: “Authority derives from God and is postulated by the moral order. If laws . . . contradict this order and the will of God, they cannot overpower individual conscience . . . in this case authority loses its claim and turns into abuse.” The second text proclaims: “The definite and essential point is that he who renounces the divine law in favour of another law, created by himself or other people, is practicing idolatry and tyranny, and is moving away from the truth, and he who governs on the basis of such law is an usurper.” The latter statement is by Maududi of Pakistan, considered to be one of the main leaders of today’s radical Islamism. According to Ayatollah Khomeini, the leader of the Iranian Shiite revolution, every political regime must acknowledge the supremacy of divine law; it must not be absolute but bound by constitution, or in other words political power and human “rule” must be clear, as the Pope puts it, that it is not “absolute but acting on behalf of God” (Spataro 1996, 27–32). Finally, the influential Rabbi Eliezer Waldman resolutely opposes any Israeli withdrawal from Hebron by stating the citizens and “military must not follow any orders that violate any commandment of the Torah” (Lewis 1996).

Is the tendency to fundamentalism restricted to religion? A “laicism” arguing in this way would prove to be especially dogmatic. On a philosophical level, dogmatism means the inability to apply the same criticism to one’s own theories as to those of one’s opponents. If one subscribes to the definition of fundamentalism given earlier, one should also include the “holy writ” of human rights that is invoked to supersede domestic laws in some countries. This becomes even more obvious when those campaigns include explicit religious overtones: “There is sin and evil in the
world, and the Holy Book as well as the Lord Jesus Christ forces us to oppose them with all our might.” Those are the words of U. S. President Ronald Reagan on 8 March 1983, when he was trying to prop up the Cold War by turning it into a holy war (Draper 1994, 33). This concept of “holy war,” usually considered to be a feature of Islamic fundamentalism, played an important role in U.S. foreign policy of the last century, especially with Woodrow Wilson (Losurdo 1993, 166). Critical analysis of fundamentalism emphasizes its rejection of the principle of national sovereignty (Guolo 1994, 79–81). In the same way, the U.S.-led campaign for “human rights” insists on the right, even the duty, to intervene without regard for such superstitious beliefs as respect for states and national borders.

Maududi talks about an “international revolutionary party” (Choueiri 1993, 175); significant American political circles claim to support “liberal-democratic internationalism” (Draper 1994, 31–34). Since the collapse of communist internationalism, the only opposing sides left are apparently the internationalism based on “human rights” and the one that refers to the Koran. Islamic fundamentalism insists “on the interminable counterpositions of the ‘universal’ interests of the Western world and the equally ‘universal’ interests of Islam” (Guolo 1994, 81). The same view, with reverse value judgment, denotes the West’s “human rights” crusade.

Sometimes the Vatican joins this crusade. In the same way that a politician such as Ronald Reagan had no qualms about posing as a prophet, Pope John Paul II can easily appear as a jurist or theoretician of natural law when he demands an “international criminal law” that would be able to advance higher “moral values” even against political rights of individual states. But quis judicabit? [Who will judge?] The Pope seems to realize the dangers of an internationalist approach when he warns against the “law of the stronger, richer, and bigger” (Accattoli 1997). Catholic internationalism, with its delegitimization of existing law, is perhaps a little more restrained than “liberal-democratic internationalism,” even though the latter often denounces the former as a form of fundamentalism.
Fundamentalism, the modern world, and culture clash

The usual trite “enlightened” interpretation of fundamentalism criticizes its obscurantist rebellion against the modern Western world. But even a moderate sociological analysis shows that these movements have their mass basis mostly in the cities. At least in Egypt, “it is rare that they are able to secure mass support in the rural population, which is largely semi-illiterate” (Lawrence 1993, 176). As a “result of mass schooling,” the “Islamic activists” are mostly “youth under the age of thirty, generally well educated, with diplomas in their pockets but very poor employment prospects” (Spataro 1996, 72). In the area of Sunni fundamentalism “the typical activist . . . is a student at a modern, nonreligious institution with emphasis on applied sciences.” Often these activists include “agronomists, electronics technicians, doctors, engineers.” A leading role in the Shiite revolution was played by “Islamic student elites, who received an excellent education in the Iranian system, but were frustrated in their attempts at social advancement.” Largely with “U.S. diplomas,” achieved thanks to Iranian stipends, the “leadership and technocrats of the Islamic Republic” also have considerable international experience (Kepel 1991, 46, 42).

Islamic fundamentalism assumes “a hostile attitude toward traditionalism as well as the official religious institutions. . . . From both an intellectual and political point of view, it introduces a creative interpretation of the sacred texts” (Choueiri 1993, 31). This interpretation is revolutionary, not only because of the content, but also because it confronts the traditional Sunni clergy, the Ulemas, with a new group of intellectuals. In the Western world the loss, through the Reformation, of the clerical monopoly in the interpretation of the Bible was an important step in the rise of the modern world. A similar breakup is happening in the Middle East under pressure from fundamentalism.

The assumption of the role of “religious intellectual,” which makes every activist an Ulema, gives the Islamic movement an extr clerical character, which often turns into anticlericalism in the more radical groups. As part
of the first generation that through their schooling gained access to religious sources without expert interpretation, these “warriors of God” have an extremely revolutionary view of the Koran and the Sunna. (Guolo 1994, 137)

With this new intellectual segment, radical Islamism is in practical terms introducing a kind of modern political party into a mostly static society. It is a party that, according to its theoreticians, assumes a “vanguard” function, and whose spread depends among other factors on its ability to create a minimal welfare state with “organisations for mutual support” to help the poorest classes gain access to education and the “modern world.” Even in Great Britain, the spread of fundamentalism among Moslems was made possible by its ability to fill the vacuum created by the “policies of extreme economic liberalism of Mrs. Thatcher” (Kepel 1991, 39, 53).

In the relation of the sexes, reactionary aspects are obvious, but even there a closer look shows the matter is more complicated than one might think. First of all, it needs to be established that male-dominated morality is primarily a sociological and not an ideological phenomenon: especially the women of the “lower classes” provide “support” for the Shiite Iranian “regime” (Riesebrodt 1990, 180), and as we learn from Adam Smith, these classes tend especially in sexual matters to express a “strict,” not at all “liberal” morality (1981, 794). Fundamentalist organizations in Egypt operate in this way: “They provide transportation for female students, who would otherwise have to travel in the ‘promiscuity’ of overfilled buses, where they would be constantly harassed; the only condition is that women on the ‘Islamic buses’ wear the veil. They establish entrances to the lecture halls separated by sex which allows women, who usually lose out on getting seats in overcrowded auditoriums, to have reasonable access” (Guolo 1994, 129).

Radical Islamism sharply rejects the tradition of the marriage contract and insists on “absolute freedom of the woman to choose her partner”; it condemns the “systematic polygamy” of the harem and tries to limit and even discourage polygamy. Wearing the veil is not always or everywhere based on coercion. The girls respond to their conservative backgrounds. “The veil, worn even against their parents’ opposition, is a symbol for Islamic radicalism”
This attitude means agreement with masculinist strict morals, opposition to the Western world, and a demand for cultural and political identity; a further aspect may be seen as reminiscent of Western feminist criticism about the marketing of the female body.

To emphasize the fallacy of explaining fundamentalism through the simple dichotomy of premodern vs. modern, one must remember that in only one country in the Middle East has fundamentalism been successful—Iran, the most modern country both on the socioeconomic and political level. Iran experienced the revolution at the turn of the last century as well as the democratic attempts of Mossadegh that were cut short by the CIA and Western intrigue in 1953. Finally, it should be mentioned that both early twentieth-century Protestant fundamentalism and contemporary Jewish fundamentalism refer to the country that has become the symbol of the modern world. Incidentally, the two are both distinguished by a “return” to the Bible.

The interpretation of fundamentalism as rejection of the modern world or as aggressive traditionalism does not fit with the equally widespread analysis that warns against the new totalitarian danger. In any case, it is worth mentioning that this accusation is only leveled against one of the many fundamentalisms that move today’s world. To avert totalitarian danger, the West is calling for a new crusade against militant Islam, which for its part is denouncing totalitarianism as a ruinous Western import (Spataro 1996, 25).

This second interpretation is no more convincing than the first. One should try a fresh attempt. Looking first at Islamic fundamentalism, we need to find out how it defines its enemies. In the view of Sayyid Qutb (the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood who was put in a concentration camp and later executed under Nasser), they are “human demons, crusaders, Zionists, idolaters, and communists, who differ from each other but are united in their opposition to Islam with all their might, to destroy the vanguard of the movements for the rebirth of Islam” (Guolo 1994, 75). Noteworthy are the arbitrary reduction of the enemy camp and the description of the conflict as a religious clash. The Manichaeism of this
interpretation is obvious, but it alone is not enough to characterize fundamentalism. Manichaeism is also found—only to mention the heroes of liberal-democratic internationalism—in the already quoted Reagan or Eisenhower, who described the international situation of 1953 in these words: “This is a war of light against darkness, freedom against slavery” (Lott 1994, 304). Those were the years when John Foster Dulles, who claimed to have an excellent knowledge of the Bible, advocated drawing political inspiration from it: “I am convinced that our political ideas and actions must as closely as possible reflect the religious faith according to which man has his origin and fate in God” (Kissinger 1994, 534). As secretary of state under President Eisenhower, Dulles condemned any attempt at neutrality as deeply immoral.

Let us return to further examination of the phenomenon of fundamentalism. How does Qutb identify his friends? We read: “An Islamic activist belongs to an ancient and noble tribe. He is part of an illustrious procession led by many exalted leaders: Noah, Abraham, Ishmael, Isaac, Jacob, Josef, Moses, Jesus, and the seal of the prophet, Mohammed” (Spataro 1996, 71). We are dealing with the claim to an unbroken historical continuity of hundreds of years, to permanence. The current conflict is being projected back into a distant past, and into exactly this distant past leads the identity of friend and foe, especially since Qutb attributes the enemies with an “innate” drive to aggression (Guolo 1994, 101). The world of Islam is called upon to overcome the current decadence and crisis by a return to the situation prior to the military, ideological, and political Western aggression, and this means a return to one’s self and to origins that have undergone a mythic transfiguration. The point is to protect the Islamic identity from contamination and interference. The point is to put an end to centuries of ruinous religious subversion. This is a protection, a kind of “cultural cleansing,” against all Western political tendencies without differentiation, from liberalism to communism. The essential and decisive element is the fight not against the “modern world,” but against the West. Ideas and institutions that are considered unacceptable or dangerous are condemned as having no connection with Islamic identity. Operation “cultural cleansing”
includes a variety of expressions of culture, fashion, language: in Algiers there is a spreading fight against the French language, which is seen in a negative light as the “language of the colonial masters,” as opposed to the “language of Koran” (Kepel 1991, 60).

The wished-for purity is only imaginary. Surely the theory of an “international revolutionary party” as a “vanguard” is not of autochthonous origin. In reality, Islamic activists draw a number of elements from their enemies: critique of modern Western civilization is borrowed from European cultural critique. Qutb quotes Alexis Carrel favorably and at length, but dilutes this source acknowledgment by relaying the ideas of this man of “great knowledge, extreme sensitivity, great honesty and liberal mentality” back to the Koran (Choueiri 1993, 179–81). Islamic activists like to consider themselves as occupying the political and ideological center, but they claim this modern classification did not originate with the French Revolution but with a verse of the Koran that is rather freely interpreted and even manipulated.

Fundamentalism is characterized by the tendency to create an inflexible identity by ignoring the relations and mutual influences of different cultures. If a cultural tradition is being presented as compact, exclusive, and antagonistic toward all others, it is in danger of adopting an ethnic configuration. Fundamentalism is a cultural tradition that tends to become nature, a nature that is incompatible with other cultural traditions, which are also represented as being stuck in inflexible intransigence. Ideas and institutions are first and foremost judged by their real or imaginary ethnic origin. Criticism of Western rule turns into criticism of the West in general, and finally criticism of “Western man”: his leadership role, proclaims Qutb, is in an inevitable decline (Choueiri 1993, 161). The transition from the historical to the anthropological level corroborates the tendency to understand the conflict in a naturalistic way.

**Fundamentalism and the awakening of the colonial peoples**

Any culture can be susceptible to fundamentalism. But it is not good enough simply to switch from singular to plural to define this phenomenon. Fundamentalism is not the way of life of one or more
distinct cultures; it is a reaction to the encounter, or rather the clash, of two different cultures, a reaction characterized by entrenchment and the construction of a jealously guarded and exclusive identity. One could say that fundamentalism is the rejection of one culture by another and the tendency to regard both as natural phenomena. Such a tendency increases with the size of the gap between the cultures and the violence of the clash. This is quite compelling in the relations of the West with other parts of the world. The awakening of oppressed peoples and their subjugated and silenced cultures is also characterized by rejections. In this sense, fundamentalism is neither a new phenomenon nor one restricted to the peoples of the Middle East. Consider, for example, the 1857 Sepoy rebellion in India. One could simply view it as a reaction by the old caste system, as a rejection of the modern ways introduced by English rule. That is certainly one aspect. The rebellion did not target the modern world as such, however, but those modern elements that were imposed selectively (depending on British interests) in the wake of colonial expansion and went hand in hand with oppression of a nation and a culture that had after all produced the Mogul Empire. Disraeli was already perfectly clear what a significant role had been played by the national question in this case (Stokes 1986, 4).

In the colonial and semicolonial countries, rejection of Western culture and rule often followed experiences of naïve trust and bitter disappointment. The example of China is useful: the Taiping rebellion in the mid-nineteenth century was irreconcilably hostile toward the pro-Western ruling dynasty. The rebels were extremely critical of Confucianism (Esherick 1987, 323, 325) and oriented themselves toward Christianity, from which they drew monotheism as well as the messianic idea of the “peaceable heavenly kingdom.” Far from being xenophobic, this movement was “intolerant toward traditional culture.” This aspect restricted its basis and led to its defeat (Suzuki and Feuerwerker 1995, 125), especially since Great Britain did not intervene on the side of the innovators but on the side of the obsolete ruling dynasty, in opposition to the hopes and desires of the rebels. In 1900, a very different movement developed; the Boxer rebellion was directed not only against the invaders and their “accomplices,” but against
Western ideas and even technical achievements, while fanatically defending religious traditions and autochthonous politics. Neither the telegraph and railroad nor Christianity could escape the fury of the Boxers. These advances went hand in hand in China with the technological and ideological expansion of the West and the ensuing national humiliation of the country. "All modern inventions and innovations" were branded as "foreign," and Christianity was a "foreign religion." Anything alien to authentic Chinese tradition and the happy (or in retrospect seen as happy) years prior to China's clash with the great powers became subject of merciless condemnation (Purcell 1963, 267; Esherick 1987, 68). So at last we are dealing with a fundamentalist rebellion.

At about the time of the Taiping rebellion, Egypt also experienced an attempt at Western modernization. Those were the years when the London Times praised the country as an "extraordinary example of progress," and the Egyptian leadership went so far as to declare that "the nation no longer belongs to Africa but is a part of Europe" (Mansfield 1993, 98). As in China, however, this declaration of faith was not enough to curb the great powers. Constantly growing English expansionism was followed by the Mahdi rebellion in Sudan toward the end of the nineteenth century, possibly the first manifestation of true Islamic fundamentalism. In an ironic twist, its most famous victim became General Gordon, who had distinguished himself in the suppression of the Taiping rebellion. This succession of pro-Western and fundamentalist movements still continues today. The West has responded to attempts at modernization and emancipation in the Muslim world (Mossadegh, Nasser, Arafat, Afghanistan) not only by diplomatic or military means, but often by evoking and supporting religious traditionalism, which, in turn, frequently undergoes a developmental process forcing it to assume fundamentalist militancy. Before Islamic fundamentalism could expand through the Middle East, it had to get rid of Marxist and communist-oriented movements, which it was able to do with the help of the Occident (Kepel 1991, 27–30).

Integration and separatism: Zionism and "Nation of Islam"

The dialectic of acceptance and rejection of hegemonic culture appears in the case of Jews and African Americans as a dialectic
of integration and separatism. It is clear from the words of one of its most prominent spokespeople that the Zionist movement did not only originate from a real, sometimes dramatic, need for security. Theodor Herzl was especially concerned about the process of assimilation on the horizon:

Pressure and persecution cannot eradicate us. . . . Strong Jews return stubbornly to their tribe when persecution erupts. This was clear during the time immediately following the emancipation of Jews. Those Jews with more education or material goods were completely bereft of the feeling of togetherness. (Herzl 1940, 48)

Max Nordau expressed the same or similar fears:

Before the emancipation the Jew was without rights, a stranger among the peoples, but he would not have dreamed of rebelling against this situation. He considered himself the member of a special tribe, who had nothing in common with his countrymen. . . . The anthropological psychologist and recorder of customs realizes: whatever the intent of other people may have been, the Jews of the past thought of the ghetto not as a jail but a place of refuge. . . . In the ghetto the Jew found his own world, it was his secure home with the moral and spiritual meaning of a homeland. [After emancipation the situation changed radically, in a negative sense] . . . The Jew was in a kind of frenzy to burn all bridges behind him. He now had a new home, he did not need the ghetto. He now had new friends; he did not need to huddle with his fellow Jews. . . . Life-saving differences were replaced by opportunistic mimicry. (Nordau 1909, 47–50)

Nordau stated clearly that the desire to return to the land of the fathers was more than a response to new threats against Jews. “It is incorrect to say that Zionism is simply defiant or desperate gestures against anti-Semitism. . . . For most Zionists, anti-Semitism raised the necessity to think about their relations with other people, and those considerations have led to results that will remain their spiritual and emotional property even if anti-Semitism were
to disappear forever” (Nordau 1913, 5). It is becoming clearer why those Jews who oppose Zionism see in it a return to the ghetto, even though the “Palestine-ghetto” is larger and more comfortable than the traditional one (Luxemburg 1968, 143).

So Zionism is first and foremost interested in returning to its roots, by connecting with a glorious past on the other side of the gulf of hundreds and thousands of years of oppression and humiliation. According to Nordau, the new “political Zionism” enables Jews to become conscious again of the “ability of their race” that allows them to maintain the “ambition” to “preserve the ancient tribe for the distant future and to add new heroic deeds of the descendants to the heroic deeds of the ancestors” (1913, 4). Herzl says even more clearly: “That is why I believe a new generation of wonderful Jews will spring up from the earth. The Maccabees will rise again” (1920, 132).

The goal was to rebuild and uphold the Jewish identity by repressing all memory of thousands of years of Diaspora that, although painful and tragic, also meant the fruitful blending of different cultures, in order to return to a mythically transfigured beginning. The return to the origins went hand-in-hand with expulsion from Jewry of all those who oppose Zionism.

Those who can, want to, and must perish may perish. But the collective character of the Jews cannot, will not, and must not perish. . . . Whole branches of Judaism may die and drop off, but the tree must live. If some French Jews are complaining about this concept because they are already assimilated, my answer is simple: it is none of their business. They are Israelite Frenchmen, perfect! But this is internal Jewish business. (Herzl 1920, 51)

In excluding or threatening to exclude those who have assimilated, and who have after all shared centuries or millennia of history with the Zionists, Herzl connected directly with the Maccabees of the second century BCE: while they were the protagonists of a glorious national liberation struggle, their main characteristic was xenophobia, especially against the Greek-speaking community, and they indignantly refused any contact with Greek culture.

Exactly because Zionism does not mainly respond to a need
for security, the fear and dilemma that characterized its beginning
remain, in spite of the foundation of a powerful Jewish state that
has close ties with the only remaining superpower. As far back as
the seventies, one can observe the development of different funda-
mentalistic movements that “break with the temptations of secular
society and base their existence solely on rules and prohibitions
based on sacred Jewish texts. Such a break requires a clear distinc-
tion between Jews and gentiles, to combat assimilation, the great-
est danger for the Chosen People” (Kepel 1991, 167). Palestinians
and Arabs occupy a special but not exclusive place among these
goyim. The voters that brought Netanyahu to power in 1996 did not
only look at the Middle East conflict. Orthodox Jews were driven
by another fear: the peace process envisioned by Perez would have
led to “integration” and the appearance of “a new, Westernized
Israeli society”; it would have endangered the “true identity of
Israel as the Jewish state, with the result that Israel would have
assimilated with the rest of the world just as the American Jews
have assimilated in American society.” In this sense, the election
amounted to a choice between “ghetto and global village,” with
the ghetto winning the day (Friedman 1996).

A comparison with Blacks in America might be of interest. As
long as they lived under slavery, the Blacks did not and could not
perceive the problem of a confrontation between their culture and
that of their white masters. Problems arose following emancipation.
An initial hopeful phase of attempted integration was followed by
disappointment, the painful experience of continued discrimina-
tion. The deep, seemingly indelible roots of racism brought about
disappointment, despair, and separatist ideas and movements.
Those movements were accused of taking up the segregationist
slogans of the white racists, just as the Zionists were confronted
with similar accusations in their time. Even Herzl was compelled
to reject the “objection” that he was “helping the anti-Semites” by
“preventing or compromising the assimilation of the Jews” (1920,
51). Of course, the victims of racism and anti-Semitism have very
unlike histories and are on very different levels of homogeneity
and internal unity. In order to emphasize their alienation from a
society that has deported and oppressed them for centuries, and
continues to discriminate against them even today, some descendants of Black slaves seek to redefine their identity as the “Nation of Islam.” In this way, they are falling back upon a religion that, although it is not that of their ancestors, stands apart from white society (Christians and Jews) and refers to movements that are engaged in struggle against the West. At the end of the day, the Nation of Islam demands the right to set up a kind of Black Israel.

Incidentally, there are parallels in the histories of Israel and Liberia. The first African state to gain independence in 1847 had experienced a wave of settlement by freed Black slaves from the United States, but after their arrival in Africa they experienced conflict with the indigenous population (Moffa 1996, 47–49). The return to the land of their fathers was in the first place due to initiatives by former slaveholders, who were now against slavery but had in no way accepted racial equality. (Even Lincoln had held this point of view for a time.) Originally cultivated by whites, the separatist project is being pursued today by African Americans who want to claim their identity.

A similar transition is happening to Zionism. For a long time anti-Jewish and anti-Semitic circles wanted to replace the old ghetto with emigration or deportation of its inhabitants to a far-away colony (even Hitler appeared to be in favor of such a scheme for a while). The same dialectic characterizes the emergence of fundamentalist tendencies in Jewish or African American communities that have settled in a different cultural area from their origin, and it is always this dialectic that operates in different ways in Arab or Turkish communities in Europe.

**Fundamentalism and Western national liberation movements**

Fundamentalist reactions can also occur when two Western European cultures clash. This was the case, for example, in the post-Thermidorian and Napoleonic expansion in the relationship between France and such countries as Spain and Germany. France was unquestionably more secular, because it went through the Age of Enlightenment and de-Christianization of the great revolution, and because the towns and urban culture dominated the countryside.
At the same time, it had a more developed political structure. Not only was Germany lacking in national unity, it was also exposed to decades of French expansionism from the other side of the Rhine river. And yet French cultural hegemony was able to spread without much resistance: The Prussian king Frederick II not only spoke French and associated with French promoters of Enlightenment, he also made no secret of his disdain for German culture and language, which he only used for talking to servants. At the beginning of the French Revolution, no country was more in love with the idea of an intellectual (and political) alliance with France. For this reason, the crisis brought about by Thermidorian and Napoleonic expansionism appeared even more dramatic: at this point an essentially fundamentalist rejection took place. This concept should not be seen as exaggerated or absurd. Let us look at the ideology of anti-Napoleonic struggle. It was characterized not only by the desire to get rid of French military and political domination, but also by the rejection of any and all ideas pointing toward the hated “archenemies” of Germany; uncritical francomania was replaced by undifferentiated francophobia and teutomania. At this point, according to Heine, the Declaration of the Rights of Man began to be presented as “something alien, something French and American, something un-German.”

The search for German identity involved all aspects of cultural and social life and included first-rate intellectuals and philosophers. The transformation of Fichte is of special significance. Although he was an admirer of Rousseau, the French Revolution, and the Grande Nation that had spawned it after the defeat at Jena, he did whatever he could to praise the German nation, its customs, and its language. He ascribed to it an originality and authenticity that other nations could not even try to achieve. And that was not all; in the Speeches to the German Nation, Fichte pronounced and celebrated the emergence of an authentic “German statesmanship” as opposed to foreign and especially French models. Fichte was not alone in his thinking. Other anti-French exponents went even further: in opposition to French liberal sexual practices they presented “German morals,” “German fidelity,” even “German costume” that supposedly
promoted the necessary female modesty; these are obvious parallels to today’s Islamic fundamentalism. Not even religion was free of the nationalization of culture. Certain patriots seemed to view “our German God” as subject of culture. Were they referring to the Christian God of Martin Luther, or, going back much further, the pagan Germanic God? This was not the main point for the adherents of teutomania; the important thing was disconnection from French religion.

The identity, created to oppose the enemy invaders, was being built up to a return to mythically transfigured origins. French intellectuals were subjected to hatred and contempt; the ordinary German people were being hailed as examples of original German-ness, especially regarding ancient origins that were being explored and worshipped. For this reason, the older terms Teutschland and teutsch were sometimes preferred over the newer terms Deutschland and deutsch. This was also the beginning of the glorification of the old, pure, and incorruptible Teutons (as described by Tacitus). Their customs and practices fulfilled the role that is today being ascribed to either the Sharia or Halacha by Islamic or Jewish fundamentalists respectively. This was the place to find the solution to Germany’s political problems, not in constitutions or institutions that were alien to the authentic German soul. In the eyes of the followers of teutomania, the German people had forever been struggling against Roman invaders and oppressors, whether they came in the shape of the legions of Varus and Augustus, or the Roman papal clerics, or the troops of Richelieu, Louis XIV, or Napoleon. The French army was seen as the new Romans. Obviously, in this interpretation, cultural and political traditions of both countries were being presented as natural phenomena; permanent antagonism was considered the only form of intercourse between those two antagonistic identities. The deep influence on German culture and philosophy of such writers as Voltaire, Descartes, and Rousseau was forgotten. The characterization of Roman-French perpetual invaders led to the suppression of whole chapters of history, such as the chapter of the Duke of Brunswick, who headed the “crusade to extinguish” revolutionary France in 1789.
A similar development took place in Spain. The Napoleonic invasion eliminated the old feudal relationship of production and marked the start of the modern age, but at the same time it oppressed and humiliated national and religious identity. The Spanish people responded with a rebellion that was supposed to get rid of Napoleon’s army as well as French cultural tradition as a whole and especially ideas of Enlightenment and revolution.

The Italian Risorgimento also constitutes a conflict between cultures. Italy had to reconstruct its national identity apart from the country that invaded and occupied it, in order to demand its independence on the political field as well. There was a strong trend to build up an essentially natural identity apart from and outside of history. This explains certain tendencies in Gioberti’s philosophy: he praised “Italian primacy in morals and civilization”; he referred to a mythical indigenous population (the Pelasgians); he proposed the foundation of a “catholic, moderate, anti-French, anti-German, truly Italian” school of philosophy that “may use its influence to destroy the evil built up over three centuries.” In this context, one can also fit some aspects of the national anthem by Mamelis that praise “Scipio’s helmet” and the courage of the ancient Romans.

Of course, national liberation movements are capable of more mature expressions. In his polemic against those who demanded the patriotic expulsion of German philosophy from Italy, because the writings were in the hated language of the Austrian occupiers, Bertrando Spaventa presented this thesis of exchange of ideologies: German philosophy could not have arisen without the Italian Renaissance, therefore it was not treason to refer to it; one cannot compare national stereotypes that have no relation to each other. This thesis was based on the teachings of Hegel, who in his day fought against teutomania by discovering the origin of French revolutionary ideas in the teachings of Luther. The elimination of French ideas is consequently pointless for the German philosopher, since the French proponents of Enlightenment and revolutionaries are following the trail of Luther’s Reformation, giving secular substance to a movement that Luther saw basically as an internal affair.
Fundamentalism and conflict among the Great Powers

The resistance against Napoleon in Germany and Spain, and the Italian Risorgimento, were wars of national liberation. But fundamentalist tendencies can also emerge through imperialist contradictions between great Western powers.

Especially during total wars, there is also a clash of ideologies, which is often presented as “philosophical crusade,” to use Boutrox’s term. World War I was seen and understood by the opposing camps as a clash of cultures that had no relation to each other and were rigorously antagonistic. Their identity apparently was not influenced by historical developments, but instead had an anthropological and in the last instance ethnic basis. Cultural life, in all its aspects, came to be seen as ethnic in origin. A well-respected German philosopher praised “German faith,” “German ethos,” and even “German knowledge” and “German art”; the “German people” were supposed to have “their own particular intellectual freedom in religion, morals, knowledge, and art” (Eucken 1919, 20, 4); this characteristic had to be protected from any foreign contamination. There is also no lack of reference to mythical or mythically transfigured origins. According to Eucken, German ambitions from the time of Luther can be summarized thus: “free, Christian, German” (1919, 14). Other writers went back even further, comparing the war against Napoleon with Hermann’s fight against the Romans. Although the origins are defined differently on a case-by-case basis, the tenor is the same: close the ranks and repel every foreign element. On the other side, Maurras was calling upon his fellow citizens even before 1914 to reject “the intellectual and moral imports” or at least be “very suspicious” toward anything that carried a “foreign label” and a “non-French brand name”; this would be the only way that France could again become cognizant of its “unique history” and “reconquer its intellectual and physical household gods” (Girardet 1983, 211).

Fundamentalist tendencies also emerged on the other side of the Atlantic. In the United States, a witch hunt started against anything that appeared German. Many schools abolished German language lessons, and it became dangerous to play German music; families
and even towns with German names hurried to Americanize them to avoid incidents or to emphasize their patriotism. While Germany attempted to rid itself of everything that did not fully comply with Teutonic authenticity, a similar “cultural cleansing” took place in America to praise and defend Americanism. Wilson became the spokesperson for the “American spirit,” “American principles,” “true Americanism.” This climate became even stronger after the war, largely as a response to the challenge of the October Revolution. During the 1936 elections, the Republican platform accused the incumbent president of betraying the “American system,” while the Democratic platform declared it would reinstate the “American way of life” and “authentic Americanism.” The urgent insistence on an authenticity untouched by any foreign element went so far that Roosevelt not only praised “our American system,” but criticized Jefferson because he had been influenced too much by the “theories of the French revolutionaries.” In any case, fellow citizens were called upon to resist not only communism but “any other foreign -ism.” Of course, it would be absurd to put such different personalities and political-cultural circles on the same level, but the fact remains that the common references to “Americanism” made it possible to “ideologically expel” unacceptable ideologies and their adherents as being alien to the spirit and soul of America (Losurdo 1993, 167–70).

**Fundamentalism and nativism**

Encounters and clashes of different cultures are caused not only by war but also by massive waves of migration. Let us return to the movement that coined the term “fundamentalism.” The turning point was World War I, which not only gave clear political boundaries to the movement but also served to radicalize its positions. After 1914, or 1917 (the time of U.S. intervention), this movement did not differ much from the other fundamentalisms that had been evoked by the massive clash; all were attempting to explain their cultures in nationalistic and ethnic terms, to present their own national traditions as natural and at odds with those of the enemy country. But Protestant fundamentalism, which arose prior to World War I and continued after its conclusion,
represented something new; the characteristics of this movement are worth considering.

After the Civil War, a massive process of industrialization and urbanization took place in the United States, with a substantial influx of Irish Catholics, Eastern-European Jews, and others. Added to this was the expansion of African American churches made possible by the abolition of slavery and stemming from the desire of former slaves to find sanctuary from white persecution. The new wave of immigration not only brought other religions or faiths, but promoted the spread of new ideas such as socialism and anarchism. On the cultural level, the ruling morals and values were being challenged by the spread of secularization, especially the spread of Darwin’s theory of evolution that questioned the biblical creation story. Other crisis points were the new sexual morals arising from the uprooting of large numbers of immigrants, the process of urbanization, and the ensuing weakening of social controls, and the rise of women’s emancipation. On the socioeconomic level, the new European mass immigration led to sharper competition in the labor market, since the safety valve of the Far West was gone by that time. The sociopolitical conflict was associated with a serious identity crisis.

American fundamentalism was trying to find solutions to all these problems. The first task was to settle on the enemy. The new immigrants were the vector for the spread of political, social, and ideological disorder, as were all those who, although they were American citizens, had turned their backs on “pure Americanism” under the ruinous influence of foreign elements and doctrines (MacLean 1994, 22). The encounter with nativist movements and especially the Ku Klux Klan is therefore understandable. The antidote to the infections, deviations, and distortions was supposedly the return to “old-time, old-fashioned Gospel,” which, freed from the demands and decrepitude of rationalist historical criticism, had regained its original and literal meaning, the return to “old-style religion” or “old-time religion” seen as the “true basis of our incomparable civilization” (MacLean 1994, 92). This is the context of the ban on the spread of Darwin’s theory of evolution, which had been enacted in some states under fundamentalist pressure.
The reclaimed religion merged with the nation state in this way: “The Constitution of the United States is based on the Bible and Christian beliefs; an attack on one is an attack on the other.” Every school must have “a flag and a bible,” in order for America to overcome the crisis and regain its original identity as a Christian nation and civilization (MacLean 1994, 92, 11; Riesebrodt 1990, 57).

Morals were not free from the process of ethnicization. A proclamation of “Anglo-Saxon morality” was sharply critical of increasing excesses and lack of restraint (MacLean 1994, 126). Dance, jazz, and unseemly female clothing were visible symptoms of decline (Riesebrodt 1990, 62). Some state legislatures were proposing laws to fine or arrest girls and women whose dress was deemed too provocative (MacLean 1994, 31). It was no coincidence that fundamentalists played a decisive role in passing prohibition laws (Riesebrodt 1990, 13). Again this fundamentalism is characterized by the tendency to stereotype different cultural traditions and present them as natural phenomena. A researcher describes this Protestant fundamentalist view of Germany:

The essence and pernicious influence of German culture manifests itself on one hand in German rationalism in the form of a historic-philological critique of the Bible that was trying to undermine the basis of faith, on the other hand in the evolutionist (social-Darwinist) philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche that attacked Christianity from the outside. The barbaric WW I, triggered by the Germans, is a direct result of those tendencies. Furthermore German beer serves to undermine the basis of Christian morality. (Riesebrodt 1990, 64)

There is no mention of the contribution of Spinoza to rationalist exegesis of the Bible, or of the decisive role played by Darwin and Galton in developing the theory of evolution, to name only two examples. The German adversary gains rigidity without any nuances; his definition gradually moves from the field of history into that of anthropology (and nature).

On the other side, according to the American fundamentalists, there is a clear-cut continuity from original Christianity and Paul of Tarsus to the Pilgrims, who established the American colonies,
and the Founding Fathers. This history is sacred on both the historical and religious level: the content of the Bible and the American Constitution are seen as identical (Riesebrodt 1990, 73).

This fundamentalism is comparable to the current phenomenon of the Lega Nord in Italy. Massive migration from southern Italy and the clash of two different cultures did not pose a problem during the years of economic prosperity, but things have changed. On one hand, the Wirtschaftswunder [economic miracle] is over, and competition for jobs has sharpened; on the other hand, the process of secularization and the crisis of Marxism have weakened the very ideologies that used to promote integration. At this point, a nativist, fundamentalist movement emerges. The different historic and cultural context serves to explain the differences between the movements. The Lega Nord clearly has to invent its “old-time religion”—which explains its vacillations. On one hand, it exerts pressure on the Vatican (and attempts to orient Catholicism toward nativism); on the other hand, there is the temptation to develop a neopagan religion based on the cult of the river Po and the gods of Padania,2 free from the contagious influence of cultures and groups alien to the authentic northern Italian spirit. The point is clearly to build up a mythical identity with its own peculiar values, which are incomprehensible and forever unachievable by southern Italians, the sudici.3 The elaboration of the nativist point of view goes so far as to postulate a Padanist and Celtic tribe of Padania, which has been called upon to rediscover itself and its authentic origins by ridding itself from the alien, irritating, and contagious elements.

*The West from Manichaeism to fundamentalism*

As we have seen, fundamentalist tendencies emerge also in the course of wars that take place in the West. But when we look at conflicts between the West as a whole, and militant movements in the colonies or the Third World, do we find fundamentalism exclusively with the latter? One should consider the warning of renowned sinologist Joseph Needham: “It is necessary to look at Europe from the outside, its failures and successes must be seen
through the eyes of the large part of humanity that consists of the peoples of Asia and Africa” (Abdel-Malek 1981, 73). This warning, which is much appreciated by Third World writers, provides a synthetic description of the methodological starting point of many of the great writings of European culture.

Is this tradition still alive? Especially since 1989, Western confidence does not seem to suffer from any doubts or contradictions, and it ascribes fundamentalism exclusively to its enemies or to everything that differs from the sacred and exclusive realm of civilization. But it is exactly this Manichaean attitude that is one of the prerequisites of fundamentalism. Manichaeism shows up clearly when conflicts sharpen. While in the fall of 1995 there was increased agitation by the Nation of Islam under the leadership of Farrakhan, there were assassinations in France that were ascribed to Algerian fundamentalism. A renowned columnist in a leading Italian paper paints a picture worthy of a closer look, since it is characteristic for mainstream ruling ideology. According to Barbara Spinelli, we are dealing with a planetary crash, whose camps have been clearly defined for centuries, or perhaps forever: on one side the “Jews and Christian civilization,” or “the Jewish and Western soul,” on the other side the “consciously anti-West, anti-European, and anti-Judeo-Christian” terrorists. The “anti-West hatred” that is raging in Israel is now unleashed in Europe: “today France is Europe’s Israel”; and Farrakhan, who has the audacity to strive for “a separate Islamic nation,” belongs mainly to “Islamic fanaticism” (Spinelli 1995b). There is such a lack of any attempt to understand the other side and to apply common norms and criteria to different cultures that the Stampa columnist does not even recognize an elementary problem: how to combine uncritical praise of Israel with demonizing Afro-American activists who are aspiring to a kind of Black Israel? One can (and should) criticize as unrealistic the ambition of the Nation of Islam to form an autonomous national state, but one must also consider the reasons for this demand. Instead of attempting a comparative analysis of the tendencies toward separatism in the Jewish communities of the late nineteenth century and contemporary tendencies toward separatism among African Americans, Spinelli simply
identifies the former with civilization and the latter with barbarism. For this reason, she always talks about fanaticism and fundamentalism in the singular form. Not a word about Palestinian victims of Jewish fundamentalism, although some settlers in Palestine worship Baruch Goldstein, the protagonist of the Hebron massacre, as a hero.

And is France really that innocent? In reality, the Paris assassination of 17 October 1995 marked a horrific anniversary. Thirty-four years previously there had been a kind of “Bartholomew night” in the French capital, to the detriment of Arabs and Maghrebians. “Dozens of bodies were thrown into the Seine... beaten, shot, drowned among the indifference of a ‘white city’ that permitted the flies to carry out an hours-long manhunt and murder in the great boulevards” (Benedetto 1995). “There were Parisians in the Flore who were amused by the spectacle and greeted the horrible scenes with applause” (Munzi 1995). The Stampa columnist, who in another article reconstructs the French-Algerian relations of the sixties (Spinelli 1995a), points to this and other episodes from the French occupation of Algiers. After all, the Algiers of the past evokes the Algiers of today: from the horrors of colonial oppression to the horrors of today’s civil war. In this case again, one must ask the question: is fundamentalism always and only found on the other side? From the many testimonials, let us choose one that has the advantage of having been published in the same paper where Spinelli so clearly draws the line between barbarism and civilization:

Let’s look at some of the stories collected by Amnesty International in the great silence of the Algerian bloodbath, for example the voice of a girl who had been kidnapped by the ruthless Sons of Allah. They went to her father to recite the first Sure of the Koran, which is spoken during the marriage ceremony. They had chosen her as ‘temporary bride’ for the enjoyment of the fighters. The father refused. They abducted the girl and raped her. When she returned home and the soldiers of antiterrorism arrived, they blew up the house claiming everybody was a “terrorist sympathizer.”

Another nameless mother tells this story: It was an evening like any other. Men in civilian clothing, masked
and armed like the praetorians of antiterrorism, knocked on
the door. They took the four sons out into the street, forced
them to lie down and executed them with a bullet to the
head. When the father started to scream they shot him too.
As they left, they told me: “An eye for an eye.” The police
forced the mother to sign a preprinted document stating that
her sons had been killed by terrorists. (Quirico 1996)

The complex character of the Algerian tragedy rooted in the
anti-Islamic coup of 1992, the contradictory dialectics that have
brought the masses of Algerians who used to support the FLN
(which was in many aspects influenced by Western culture) to sup-
porting fundamentalism, the ongoing frustrations that led African
Americans from Martin Luther King Jr.’s dream of racial integra-
tion first to the revolutionary project of Malcolm X (influenced by
Marxism and therefore Western culture) and then to the separat-
ism of the Nation of Islam, the disappointment and despair of the
Palestinian people subject not only to the temptations of Islamic
fundamentalism but the threats of Jewish fundamentalism—all
this is being suppressed and obliterated to make room for a war
of civilizations or religions that has been going on for hundreds if
not thousands of years.

In the course of the anti-Islamic crusade, further elements
that signify fundamentalism appeared, besides Manichaeism.
Especially informative is the praise afforded to the “Jewish and
Western soul.” Although it is not the same as race, the soul is not
exactly the same as culture either. Because of the theological tra-
dition, the soul seems to refer to a realm that has something to do
with eternity. For that reason, Rosenberg, the theoretician of the
Third Reich, emphasizes in his tribute to the Germanic-Western
soul that the “soul” is “the race seen from within” and the race is
“the exterior of the soul” (Losurdo 1995, 75). With the “occidental
soul,” journalism from Spengler to the Third Reich also glorifies
“occidental man” (Losurdo 1995, 58, 100–104), thereby moving
from theological to anthropological (in any case not historical)
terrain. The acknowledgement of “occidental man” continues to
play a significant role with Hayek (1960, 5, 19). The point is not to
put such different positions on equal footing. Of interest, however,
is the more or less pronounced tendency to describe the conflict not in a historical (and sociopolitical) context but to portray it in categories that emphasize at least permanency, if not exactly eternity.

Yet another aspect of this argument points toward fundamentalism: the tendency to create antagonistic, stereotypical cultural traditions without any “exchange of ideas” among them. To better clarify this point, let us return to World War I. In an important phase of his development, Giovanni Gentile mocks the “pseudo-concepts” of the war ideologists, who were praising in Germany the “German loyalty,” the “German desire,” the “German morality,” and so on. The ideologues of the opposite camps acted in similar fashion: they all wanted to claim for themselves “the highest virtue and greatest human talents” by stating those belonged to one nation or one culture. The countries of the Entente especially valued one of those virtues, claiming for themselves respect for individuality. So the war was viewed as the clash of “two mentalities: Romanic and Anglo-Saxon (pluralistic) vs. Alemannic (monistic and pantheistic).” Gentile protests against this interpretation and asks: “Are the Germans Leibniz, Herbart, and Lotze monists? And on the other side is all of Romanic philosophy . . . pluralistic? Are Descartes and Malebranche pluralists? Is Bruno a pluralist?” And “who doesn’t know that Goethe’s pantheism was of exotic origin, and can be traced back to Spinoza, who was not German, and our very own Bruno?” (Losurdo 1997a, chap. 5).

The Italian philosopher, who at that time was a true Hegelian, clearly shows the two tendencies of the ideological climate of those years that we would consider fundamentalist: the nationalistic view of morals and culture, and the stereotypical contrast of two cultural traditions that are being considered natural, as is shown by the use of the concept of “mentality.” In his polemic against these tendencies, Gentile points to history and to Spaventa’s thesis of the circulation of ideas through Europe.

Two questions come to mind: do pseudoconcepts become valid if one replaces the adjectives “German” or “French” or “Romanic” or “Germanic” with the adjectives “European” or “Western”? And is an opinion no longer stereotypical if it does not contrast German
monism with Romanic and Anglo-Saxon pluralism, but instead holds up oriental monism (holism) against Western pluralism (individualism)? In the same way that Germany was described by its Western enemies, the Orient is being described by an Occident that now includes Germany.

If one understands individualism as the acknowledgement of every individual as possessing inalienable rights, regardless of class, gender, or race, then this result cannot in all honesty be attributed only to occidental history. Some of its most distinguished philosophers (Grotius and Locke, for example) had no problems justifying slavery in the colonies. The two countries that are usually seen as perfect examples of Western individualism are particularly tainted in this regard. One of the first acts of foreign policy of liberal England following the Glorious Revolution was the snatching of asiento, the monopoly of the slave trade, from Spain. Blacks were transported mostly across the Atlantic to the English colonies in America and later the United States, where slavery continued to exist, unhampered, until the Civil War. The generalization of human rights, today considered to be a characteristic of the Occident, has been promoted mostly by people living at the fringes of the Occident. Let us look at a few significant historical conflicts. Who expressed individualism better: the black Jacobin Toussaint-Louverture, who in the name of the Declaration of the Rights of Man demanded the abolition of slavery (“nobody, be he white, black, or red, can be the property of another”) or the liberal (French, English, and American) circles who were horrified by this extreme demand that was “incompatible with the entire system of European colonization,” as the London Times proclaimed? Who expressed individualism better: Mills and his followers in England and France, who preached “absolute obedience” of the “immature races,” or Lenin, who appealed to the “slaves in the colonies” to break their chains (Losurdo 1997c)?

The thesis of the exchange of ideas must be applied internationally and for the negative as well as the positive elements. There is widespread condemnation of Islam as the religion of “holy war” (along with fanaticism and intolerance), yet Mohammed adopted
this concept from the Old Testament, where it appears in a much more natural form. The motif of holy war and crusade is by no means a stranger to the Occident, where it plays an important role even in U.S. twentieth-century politics, from Wilson to Reagan.

“Judeo-Christian-Greco-Western” tradition vs. Islam?

In Manichaean contrast with other cultures, the transfigured occidental identity is seen as part of a continuity that reaches far back into a distant and mythical past. Let us look again at the concept of the “Jewish and Western soul.” Even overlooking the disturbing noun, we see that the two juxtaposed adjectives combine complex and contradictory historical processes into seamless unity.

First of all, they suppress an obvious fact: Hitler and Nazism took advantage of a long-standing occidental tragedy when they unleashed the extermination crusade against the Jews, who came originally from the Middle East and were therefore labeled as “Orientals.” In this way, they had already been subjected to anti-Semitic mistrust and condemnation. At the same time, this concept has been developed by overlooking centuries of persecution of Jews and harsh confrontations between the two cultures, confrontations that, as we know, have not ended with the dissolving of the ghettos. The aftereffects are noticeable even today, at least according to a Jewish critic of Jewish fundamentalism. He reports that on 23 March 1980, “in Jerusalem hundreds of copies of the New Testament were publicly and ceremonially burned in Jerusalem under the auspices of Yad Le’akhim, a Jewish religious organization subsidized by the Israeli Ministry of Religions,” who took literally the urging of the Talmud to burn all copies of the New Testament wherever possible (Abraham 1993, 264). On the other hand, the counterposition of the Jewish-Western world vs. Islam does not take into consideration that throughout the centuries of Christian persecution the situation for Jews was much more favorable in the Islamic world and the Middle East, which is borne out by, among other things, the great Jewish culture in the Arabic language.

Even the Christian-Western tradition (to avoid speaking of the “soul”) shows problematic features, and not only because of the
geographic origin of Christianity. In the eyes of Nietzsche, mono-
theism itself has definite oriental characteristics, as it promotes
the cult of an omnipotent and perfect God whose infinite distance
minimizes or annuls individual differences in people. The idea of
equality, which has triumphed in the West, of which the West is so
proud that it presents it as the basis for its primacy and its mission,
is rooted in oriental religion with the demand for universal subju-
gation of man under an absolute lord at its center. The spread of
Judaism and Christianity in the Greek and Roman world, the victo-
ry of Christianity over polytheism and over a world that considered
slavery and inequality as normal and natural— all this is viewed by
Nietzsche as the victory of the Orient over the Occident.

The “Unzeitgemäße Betrachtungen” (IV:4) characterizes
Christianity disdainfully as a simple piece of “oriental antiquity”
(Nietzsche 1967). The God of Judeo-Christian tradition, who con-
demns every sin or slight infraction of the norms he imposed as
lèse-majesté, is “too oriental” (Die fröhliche Wissenschaft, apho-
risms 141, 135). Other indications that point to the Orient are the
linear understanding of time and the more or less messianic expec-
tation of renewal, which gained a foothold in antiquity among ser-
vants, slaves, and dropouts of all kinds, and later exerted its peril-
ous influence in the revolutionary tradition. One could paraphrase
a famous thought and grasp this idea of Nietzsche in the following
synthesized form: Judea capta Roman cepit [the captured Judea
conquers Rome]. The cultural defeat of Rome is the defeat of the
pagan, polytheistic, and aristocratic Occident.

Nietzsche contrasts the Judeo-Christian ascendancy with the
Greco-Roman ascendancy of the Occident. Today those two gene-
alogies or genealogical myths are being juxtaposed without con-
cern, thanks to another colossal suppression of centuries of fighting
between Christianity and the antique world. This process has a long
history. Europe in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries consid-
ered its struggle against the Ottoman empire as one against orient-
al despotism, and applied the same interpretation to the fighting
between Greeks and Persians (and between Rome and the barbar-
ians). This ideology fails to remember Greek and Roman slavery,
and the slave trade that was fully controlled by Spain and England,
in order for Europe and the Occident to glorify themselves as the exclusive island of freedom. This island assumes the heritage of the Greco-Roman world as well as the *res publica christiana* to continue the struggle against the incurably despotic Orient, which reaches from the Greco-Persian wars to the European and Christian war against Islam. The construction of the occidental identity, or the “Judeo-Christian-Greco-Western” tradition or soul, shows elements similar to any other fundamentalist mythology.

Although this genealogical myth in its diverse and contradictory configurations is problematic on the historical level, it is quite important for the understanding of Western self-assurance. Toynbee describes the American fundamentalism of the early twentieth century as follows:

> Among English-speaking Protestants there are several fundamentalists who consider themselves the Chosen People, in the literal sense as the expression is used in the Old Testament. This British Israel is confident its ancestry can be found in the ten lost tribes. (1934, 215)

But does not the West as a whole act in the same way? The great English historian points to the fact that in the course of colonial expansion, from the discovery-conquest of America on, the West and especially the Puritans have identified with the Chosen People of the Old Testament while comparing the Indians (and the other colonial peoples) with the Canaanites, who are doomed to being eradicated to make room for the Chosen People, who are the carriers of Western civilization, inspired by God. The “Western race feeling” condemned by Toynbee is based on this conviction, but in our time this expression is inaccurate (Toynbee 1934, 211 and note 1). Not “race” but the “soul” and “Western man” are objects of veneration. We are returning to a concept that we have previously encountered in a leading theoretician of Islamic fundamentalism, albeit with reverse value judgment. Regarding Western fundamentalism, it is significant that the historian who cautions against this tendency is one who attempts to sketch a complete picture of universal development of civilization, and who is therefore more immune to the false ideology of subliminal and smug fundamentalism.
For a concrete analysis of concrete fundamentalism

The previously cited German researcher who compares American Protestant fundamentalism with Iranian Shiite fundamentalism defines fundamentalism as “religious nativism with claims to universal validity” (Riesebrodt 1990, 222). Although this definition grasps the essence of Western fundamentalism, it contains two errors or inaccuracies. The phenomenon does not necessarily have explicit religious form or universalistic ambitions. Those ambitions are missing in the Boxer rebellion and the teutomanic movement that developed during the course of the Napoleonic wars, while they are certainly present not only in Islamic but also in Protestant fundamentalism and the “Christian-Western” or “Jewish-Western” fundamentalism. The Lega Nord is a special case. It is a kind of subfundamentalism that fits into a fundamentalism with universalist ambitions: in adopting the concept of the West as the only source of civilization, the Lega Nord assumes within this sacred realm a mythical Celtic and Padanic identity and demands on this basis the secession from the southern barbarians, who stand apart from authentic northern and Western civilization.

One cannot ignore the complex and diverse phenomenology of fundamentalisms. This means they are not all the same in regard to the typology and concrete historical and political significance in any given case. One should consider how much they portray a certain culture and the conflict between cultures as something natural.

When the natural explanation reaches its culmination, fundamentalism turns into actual racism, and cultural cleansing turns or may turn into ethnic cleansing. Historical and political functions of fundamentalist movements also vary according to the sacred texts, or texts surrounded by a sacred aura to which they refer and to which they claim to return. Significant differences can occur even within the same religious and cultural tradition: one can refer to the Judaism of the prophets after the Babylonian exile or to the Pentateuch and those parts that legitimate the dehumanization and even eradication of the inhabitants of Canaan. Within Jewish fundamentalism, there are
segments that continue to insist on the essential qualitative difference between Jews and Gentiles (Abraham 1993, 266–67; Kepel 1991, 213, 230) and that have the tendency to dehumanize especially the Palestinian people. For this reason, the respected Israeli writer Yesayahu Leibovitz condemns them as followers of a “Judeo-Nazi” movement (Spataro 1996, 22–23). With declared racism, we find ourselves outside of the field of fundamentalism in its own sense.

When talking about today’s fundamentalism, unfortunately we usually refer to Islam and about movements that try, albeit in confusing and sometimes barbaric ways, to promote national independence or an identity that has been oppressed for centuries. How should they be judged historically and politically? Let us return to the struggles against Napoleon that developed in Germany and Spain. Although Hegel sharply criticizes all francophobia and teutomania (and with this any fundamentalist trend), he acknowledges the inevitable and progressive character of the anti-French uprising. Marx points out that in the Napoleonic era “all wars of independence waged against France bear in common the stamp of regeneration, mixed up with reaction” (1980, 403). Because these movements must regain national independence in the fight against the country of Enlightenment and revolution, they tend to see the culture of Enlightenment and revolution as a method of denationalization and assimilation, an instrument in the service of an expansionist policy and national oppression; i.e., they tend to identify the struggle against the invaders with the struggle against Enlightenment and the French Revolution. In this way, regeneration (the real process of liberation from the foreign occupation) combines with reaction (the confused and dismal ideology that accompanies this process and is the harbinger of further involution and regression).

Engels goes a step further when he sees in the anti-Napoleonic wars of the German people the beginning of the bourgeois-democratic revolutions. Interestingly, Lenin compares at the time of the peace of Brest-Litovsk the struggle of the young Soviet country against German imperialist aggression with the struggle led by Prussia against the Napoleonic invasion and occupation;
he characterizes Napoleon as “the same kind of robber as now the Hohenzollerns” (Losurdo 1983, 189–92).

Hegel, Marx, Engels, and Lenin strongly reject the fundamentalist ideology that led the anti-Napoleonic struggles, but see no reason to liquidate movements that express the demand for national liberation. The robust sense of historical focus is underscored by their vigorous support for the nationalist movements in Ireland and Poland, even though their ideological platforms were regressive in their significant reference to Catholicism (the ideology of restoration and reaction at least in the first part of the nineteenth century) and the immediate identification of national and religious consciousness, which is a typical fundamentalist trend. Should we take a different approach toward Islamic fundamentalism and similar movements? One thing is to be considered: even though the West dismisses the revolts of the Sepoys, the Mahdis, the Boxers as simple expressions of xenophobia and rejection of modern thought, in the countries themselves they are seen as nationalist revolutions or at least as their first crude expressions. For example, Mao Zedong characterized the Boxer rebellion as a “just war” against imperialism (Mao Tse-tung 1969, 182). Lenin also refused to interpret this rebellion in the framework of the Western crusaders as a simple expression of the silliness of “Chinese barbarism,” “hostility of the yellow race towards the white race,” or “Chinese hatred for European culture and civilisation” (Lenin 1960, 372–73). Should we view the Russian revolutionary as a spokesman of anti-Western fundamentalism? A reader of Hegel and Marx, Lenin had nothing in common with the Slavophiles. He argued against and mocked those who wanted to hold the “light” of the “mystical religious East” against the “materialist, decayed West.”

The sharp condemnation of capitalist exploitation, aggression, and genocide in no way constitutes the veneration of a precapitalist world untouched by modern Western thought. Far from a summary liquidation of European cultural tradition, Lenin condemned colonialist and imperialist thought on behalf of “European spirit” and “European culture” that had invaded the colonies that were beginning to rebel against their oppressors. In this view, there is no room for a stereotypical counterposition of static identities
without “exchange of ideas.” After taking power, Lenin called upon the Western revolutionaries to learn the lessons of October and to assimilate them creatively, but he also challenged the Russian revolutionaries and the Russian people to utilize the “best Western European models” on the state-political level, and then to transform and overcome them (Losurdo 1997a, 69–74). Sharp criticism of every form of fundamentalism does not mean dismissal or neglect of the legitimate ambitions that are in certain cases expressed in distorted form through fundamentalism, and it does not mean to reject a concrete analysis of concrete fundamentalism. Not even the leading crusaders against Islam refuse this concrete analysis; at least it can be said that the United States has observed the rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan with a sympathetic eye, an obscurantist movement but one that tends to accept American and Western hegemony.

Let us assess the history of the Arab world over the last few decades. The process of colonial subjugation begins in the years following World War I, the same years that see the beginning of the worldwide process of decolonization, sparked by the October Revolution. This unfortunate chronological juxtaposition has likely increased the feelings of national humiliation on the part of the Arabs, especially considering that after World War II they saw a new state spring up in their midst that quickly became predominant, sees itself as a significant element of the Occident, and is a close ally of the country that personifies global Western hegemony. Although the fundamentalist answer appears distorted, dismal, and even barbaric, it is more rational than it seems at first glance. As early as the late nineteenth century, on 12 September 1881, the London Times summarized the situation in Egypt (and the Middle East) in this way: “We must remind you that the only domestic institution under Egyptian control at this time is the army. All others have been taken over, controlled or modified by French and English representatives” (Mansfield 1993, 102). The British daily forgot to add religion, which especially in those years with the Mahdi gave buoyancy to a strong national liberation movement. The history of the Middle East after World War II is one of resistance, which vacillated between calling upon the army (sometimes influenced by
The response to Islamic fundamentalism can certainly not be a crusade in the name of the supposed “Jewish-Christian-Western soul.” Such a crusade would only fan the flames and fully legitimize Islamic fundamentalism. The task is to come up with a position that combines criticism of the West with acknowledgment of its achievements. The weakening or dissolution of such a position is the reason that contemporary resistance movements against Western imperialism assume more and more the form of a religious or cultural war. Once the balance between criticism of the West and takeover of its achievements has been destroyed, there is only the holy war of the West against the holy war of Islam.

Epilogue: Suicide bombings, holy war, and fundamentalism

This essay, first published in Italian in 1997, underlines the danger of using the concept of fundamentalism in a dogmatic and trite way by applying it always to the enemies of the West and especially against Islam. Two years after publication, the war against Yugoslavia was unleashed. The attempts to justify or even praise this war were interesting. There was acknowledgment that the bombing of a sovereign state that had not committed any acts of aggression was contrary to international law, the constitution of the UN, and even that of NATO. But this was considered less important than asserting respect for human rights and the sacred moral norms. We need not go into the specifics of the accusations against Belgrade. It is more interesting to analyze the logical structure of the Western ideology of war. Positive legal norms were clearly differentiated from sacred and inviolable moral norms; in case of conflict between the two sets, the laws formulated by society are irrelevant. This priority of the sacred over the secular is solemnly emphasized in proclamations by the president of the United States, ending inevitably with the ritual intonation: God bless America! Here we find ideology and behaviors usually ascribed to Islamic fundamentalism; the difference is that in this case the ayatollah of Washington instead of Teheran decides unilaterally who the villains are. Current tragic events are more
enlightening. On at least one point, Bush and Bin Laden agree completely: this is a war of good against evil, and God, by definition, must be on the side of good. This is a holy war!

I have pointed out in this essay how important this motif is for Western political tradition. In view of recent developments, a few additional points need to be made. Let us look not at the crusades, but at contemporary and modern history, beginning with Bacon. In seventeenth-century England (not yet liberal, but proud of its exclusive “English or Anglican freedom”), Bacon wrote a dialogue of holy war (sacrum bellum) against heathens and savages, who are ultimately no better than wild beasts and deserve to be eliminated. The motif of holy war, conducted by the chosen people, plays a significant role in the history of Western colonial expansion. Let us give the floor to a great English historian, Arnold Toynbee:

The biblical Christian of European race and origin, who had settled overseas among non-European peoples, identified inevitably with Israel in obeying the will of Jehovah by taking possession of the Promised Land; on the other hand he identified the non-Europeans, whom he encountered during his progress, with the Canaanites who were given into the hand of the Lord’s Chosen People, to be destroyed or subjugated. With this belief the English Protestant settlers in the New World are exterminating the North American Indians in the same way as the bison, from one coast to the other. (1934, 211–12)

The motif of holy war accompanies especially (in explicit religious or superficially secularized form) the rise of the United States to its status as the world’s only superpower. In 1898 Washington began its war against Spain with the accusation that Spain had unjustly robbed Cuba of its freedom and independence, and on an island “that is so close to our borders” had acted in ways that were despised by “the morality of the people of the United States” and that are a “disgrace for Christian civilization.” This extraordinary document closely combines indirect invocation of the Monroe Doctrine with a call for a crusade in the name of democracy, religion, and morality in order to excommunicate an arch-Catholic country such as Spain and bestow the consecration of a holy war on a conflict that was the launch of the United States as an imperialist power.
A good decade and a half later, leading U.S. politicians celebrated the intervention of the United States in World War I as a regular crusade, although the action was determined by substantial material interests. A large part of the population went along with this official line. Wilson declared in soulful and solemn tones, “The time is ripe, destiny has spoken. We have not come to this point thanks to a plan devised by us, but by the will of God who has led us into this war.” And: “When people take up arms to free other people the fight takes on a sacred dimension.” At times one seems to be reading the sermons that accompanied medieval crusades: “The sword will sparkle, as if its blade reflects the light of God”; in any case, there was no doubt that the American soldiers were fighting as “crusaders” of a “transcendental undertaking” (Losurdo 1993, 166–67). Reagan used a similar ideology for his victorious crusade against the “evil empire.” “Holy” is by definition the war that is waged by the Chosen People. To put it as George W. Bush did: “Our nation has been chosen by God and has the historical mission to be a model for the whole world.”

As outlined in this essay, one of the characteristics of fundamentalism is the attempt to construct stereotypical traditions that are compared without any relation to each other. Islam is accused of not being able to differentiate between politics and religion in the international realm, as if the Koran had not taken over the concept of holy war from the Old Testament, the same sacred text that continues to play such an important role in Western history.

Western fundamentalism manifests itself in the campaign that tries to inflame holy war against Islam with another argument: the claim that suicide bombings are only found in Islamic cultural and religious tradition; this supposedly proves Islam’s innate disregard for human life and the dignity of the individual. This statement is obviously based on a lack of historical knowledge. Everybody should be familiar, at least through the movies, with the kamikaze fliers, those Japanese pilots who crashed their planes on the U.S. navy in the end phase of World War II. For another example from the Far East, let us jump back to nineteenth-century China: when the Taiping rebellion was crushed, hundreds of thousands preferred suicide to surrender (Chesneaux 1974, 2:127). Is the West immune to such behaviors? Both Israel and Jewish tradition as a
whole are seen today as integral elements of the West. For this reason two especially tragic chapters of Jewish history deserve our attention. After they had destroyed Jerusalem in 74 CE, the Roman legions were able after a long siege to conquer Masada, the last remnant of the Jewish state. During this siege, the Zealots at first fought determinedly against an overwhelming force and finally killed themselves rather than surrender. Over a thousand years later, the first crusade took place. It not only brought death and destruction to the Muslim world (which conceived on this occasion the concept of suicide assassins), but also attacked German cities that harbored Jewish communities. This led not only to suicide on a massive scale, but also to the killing of children of tender ages, who were in this way spared from the forced “conversion” to Christianity that was attempted by the crusaders (Chazan 1996).

Judaism is no stranger even to suicide assassinations. In 1944 Hannah Arendt argued vigorously against Zionist groups who were flirting with the idea of creating “suicide battalions” to speed up the creation of the Jewish state (Arendt 1989, 213). This should not come as a surprise. The Old Testament honors the figure of Samson, who manages to break the columns of the temple with many Philistines inside. “Judges” reports the hero’s last words: “O Lord God, remember me, I pray thee, and strengthen me. . . . Let me die with the Philistines” (Judges 16:23–31). This event took place in the same region that is experiencing today suicide bombings by radical Islamic groups; the difference is that Samson was involved in a national liberation struggle against the Philistines, while today the Palestinians wage their war of national liberation against Israel.

Finally, such practices and behaviors arise in struggles that are characterized by despair and feelings of powerlessness. They are especially used by ethnic and social groups that have experienced cruel and lengthy oppression. In the case of the kamikaze pilots, they were certainly part of a great imperialist power that committed horrific crimes, but one should not forget that they only appeared toward the end of the war (after the battle of the Gulf of Leyte on 25 October 1944); Japan was already on the ropes and, since its air and naval forces were practically paralyzed, had to watch helplessly the destruction of its cities by the Americans, culminating in the
annihilation of Hiroshima and Nagasaki less than a year later. The assertion that suicide bombings are an Islamic invention is simply a Western fundamentalist fairy tale. It is hard to find a people more desperate than the Palestinians, whose tragedy has been unfolding for decades with almost total indifference from the “international community.” In examining specific practices and behaviors, one cannot of course neglect the role of cultural and religious traditions, but first of all one must look at the objective circumstances.

We have seen that the statements by Bush and Bin Laden are as similar as two peas in a pod. Of course, Bin Laden is not a head of state, but merely leads a “private” organization. Anyone analyzing the contemporary international situation objectively must conclude that the United States is the only state that refers in its international dealings to the ideology of holy war. Like quite a few of his predecessors, Bush explicitly speaks about the “crusade” against “evil.” Without being aware of it, he even returns to the language of the medieval crusaders. According to St. Bernard of Clairvaux, a crusader who killed a Moslem was not *homicida* but *malicida*; he did not kill a person but a vulgar incarnation of “evil” (Bernardus 1862, col. 924). Any analysis of fundamentalism that in any way promotes the crusade by the “secular” and “civilized” Western world against “barbaric” and “clerical” Islam is nonsensical in both the historical and logical sense, and a political catastrophe!

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Except for the references to Lenin 1960 and Marx 1980, all quotations have been translated from the German by the translator of this article.

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NOTES

1. Regarding the interpretation of the anti-Napoleon wars, see Losurdo 1983, 189–216; Losurdo 1989, chap. 1, par. 2, and chap. 14, par. 1; regarding the different trends in the Italian Risorgimento, see Losurdo 1997a, chap. 5.

2. An area that the Lega Nord claims includes all of Northern Italy, beyond the actual Po plain (pianura padana).

3. Sudici can mean southerners as opposed to nordici (northerners) but it can also mean dirty, smutty, etc.

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Analogies between Aristotle’s Ontology and Biological Ideologies of Human Nature

Christos D. Georgiou

Aristotle was perhaps the most plethoric philosopher human-kind has ever known. He was the first to value the importance of logical causation exclusively used in science. He was convinced that it is possible to reach an understanding of nature by applying logical methodology. His contribution to logic, biology, physics, philosophy, and the humanities was immense. He created a philosophical system representing a comprehensive rationalization of the experience and attitude of a reasonable well-to-do citizen, which was actually a rationalization of the prescientific and social influences of his era. Aristotle tried to give some account of every interesting aspect of nature—intelligible and sensible—and of human society in his time. His ideas on the hierarchical gradation and structure of the natural world, of animals, and, in particular, of human society, contain important elements analogous to those on which certain deterministic philosophical extensions of modern biology to society are based. These analogous elements are most importantly those sociobiological extensions that portray a biologically predetermined essence of human nature shaping an unchanged hierarchical structure of society.

Aristotle’s realism

In the natural world of Aristotle, matter “is unknowable, qua infinite; for the matter has no form” (Physics 3.6.207a25). On the other
hand, he believed that nature is real, having potential materialistic characteristics, which are transformable and actual through their internal finality. Manifestation of this changeable actuality of nature is its movement, since “nature is a principle of motion and change, and it is the subject of our inquiry. We must therefore see that we understand what motion is; for it it were unknown, nature too would be unknown” (Physics 3.1.200b12–14). Moreover, Aristotle believed that there is an internal character in motion (energy) in nature, related teleologically to the final cause through a prime mover: “The first mover, then, of necessity exists; and in so far as it is necessary, it is good, and in this sense a first principle” for it produces movement (Metaphysics 12.7.1072b10–11, 1073a7), for purpose directs the moving causes that act upon material, not the reverse (Physics 2.9.200a32–36). The prime mover is responsible for the unity and purposefulness of nature. Furthermore, Aristotle believed that there is a causal order in nature, with the cause being the intrinsic element of which a thing is made (Physics 195a16–20).

Aristotle’s nature can be visualized as a scale lying between two extremes, with form without matter on one end, and matter without form on the other. The passage of matter into form must be shown in its various stages in the world of nature, and this is the object of Aristotle’s physics, or philosophy of nature. The passage from form to matter within nature is a movement toward ends or purposes. Everything in nature has its end and function, and nothing is without its purpose. Nature always seeks the end, and consequently evolution is teleological, with the final stage being the perfect form. Everywhere we find evidence of design and rational plan. No doctrine of physics can ignore the fundamental notions of motion, space, and time. Motion is the passage of matter into form, and it is of four energetic kinds: (1) motion which affects the substance of a thing, particularly its beginning and its ending; (2) motion which brings about changes in quality; (3) motion which brings about changes in quantity by increasing it and decreasing it; and (4) motion which brings about locomotion, or change of place.

Aristotle naturalizes teleology. He studies organic beings as moving toward ends and goals without attributing self-consciousness to them (Preus 1975, 105–7). In On the Soul, he explicitly
states in relation to final cause: “That for the sake of which has two senses, viz. the end to achieve which, and the being in whose interest, anything is or is done (2.4.415b21–22). By accepting teleology as perfectly natural, the anatomist enables his eyes to focus upon it wherever it may interact with necessity. Aristotle’s reference to the downward growth of roots appears to be a reply to Empedocles. In On the Soul, Aristotle criticizes Empedocles’ claim that roots grow down because they contain earth while stems grow upward because they have fire, as failing to explain why the parts of organisms would not then simply fly apart. The fact that parts with such different elements are held together in a whole indicates the presence of what Aristotle calls the soul (2.4.416a1–9). In order to help define what he means by soul, Aristotle coins the term entelechy (having a telos inside; from which the word teleology comes) (2.1.412a27; Cosans 1998, 311–39). Aristotle’s entelechy is not restricted to organic beings; it is a dynamic and teleological correspondence of the internal potentialities of matter (Physics 3.1.200b12–16). Movement is the entelechy of the mobile as it is mobile. Motion is the entelechy of something potentially mobile, becoming actually mobile (Bitsakis et al. 2000, 185–200). However, while defining entelechy as both dynamical and teleological, Aristotle distinguished form from matter: “And since nature is twofold, the matter and the form, of which the latter is the end, and since all the rest is for the sake of the end, the form must be the cause in the sense of that for the sake of which” (Physics 2.8.199a34–35).

Aristotle’s conception of biology

Aristotle’s ideas on entelechy, final cause, and form profoundly influenced his perception of the biological world (Gotthelf and Lennox 1987; Loeck 1991, 3–32), and have had a stupefying effect in modern biology. Living creatures and their parts provide far richer evidence of form, and of final cause in the sense of design for a particular purpose, than do inanimate objects. All that it demanded was a guess at the purpose of an organ or organism. Here, the success depends on whether organisms contain the suitable entelechy to cope with the challenges imposed on them by the environment. This led him to classify organisms in a graded behavioral and intellectual scale from inferior to superior, with
humans at the top, based on their individual inherent entelechy. This idea looks plausible when it is seen within the simplistic modern biological framework as an expression of the successful adaptation of organisms to the environment. As will be argued later, the Aristotelian notion of entelechy is analogous to the genetic potentialities presumed by sociobiology’s “program” to lie exclusively in the genes of the human genome.

One leading principle of Aristotelian biology is that in order of time, “the material and the generative process must necessarily be anterior; but in logical order the substance and form of each being precedes the material” \(\text{\textit{Parts of Animals} 2.1.646b1–2}\). As the formation of the animal proceeds, the predetermined substantial form drives the animal’s matter to take on one arrangement after another as the embryo advances from an undifferentiated mass to a fully articulated adult (Preus 1975, 95–98). The final adult form is so complex that it must develop gradually as initial parts work to impart the proper form to the matter of later parts. From this perspective, matter exists within a hierarchy of organization in which each part exists as material for the sake of its whole. Some flesh exists for the sake of its muscle, which in turn exists for the sake of its limb, etc.

Although each individual is subject to birth and death, generation and corruption, the form (nature in humans) remains unchanged. That is to say, the potential to grow and to acquire a certain form preexists in every living being. The limits of the form that organisms finally attain are predetermined. Form constitutes an organic entity in terms of expressing its potentially existing, an idea that contradicts Plato’s theory of ideas as the archetypes of things. Aristotle’s potentially existing is of biological nature because it expresses the lower and upper limits of what an individual of a species can reach. In the first case it just manages to exist; in the second it is exhibiting its full powers.

For the biologist Aristotle, everything knows its place and, for the most part, keeps it; the earth, water, and air are peopled with living things, each one in its proper place and with predetermined form; it is in the nature of a bird to fly in the air, of a fish to swim in the water \(\text{\textit{History of Animals; Generation of Animals}}\). Everyone and everything has a purpose (telos, aim,
goal, end). Everything has an entelechy as its internal, motion-driven potentiality. For example, he thought that rocks always fall to the ground because their entelechy compelled them to fall to the center of the earth. Human entelechy is a rational activity in pursuit of good (*Nicomachean Ethics* 1.1.1094a).

Aristotle proposed a fixed set of natural kinds (“species”), each reproducing true to type. An exception occurs, Aristotle thought, when some “very low” worms and flies come from rotting fruit or manure by “spontaneous generation.” The typical life cycles are epicycles: the same pattern repeats, but through a linear succession of individuals. These processes are therefore intermediate between the changeless circles of the heavens and the simple linear movements of the terrestrial elements. Aristotle imprinted this idea in a *scale of nature*, with minerals at the bottom, then vegetables, then more and more perfect animals, and finally humans at the top (Lovejoy 1936). The species form a scale from simple (worms and flies at the bottom) to complex (human beings at the top). As he writes,

> Nature proceeds little by little from things lifeless to animal life in such a way that it is impossible to determine the exact line of demarcation, nor on which side thereof an intermediate form should lie. Thus, next after lifeless things comes the plant, and of plants one will differ from another as to its amount of apparent vitality; and, in a word, the whole genus of plants, whilst it is devoid of life as compared with an animal, is endowed with life as compared with other corporeal entities. Indeed, as we just remarked, there is observed in plants a continuous scale of ascent towards the animal. (*History of Animals* 8.1.588b4–12)

Such a scale might be thought to imply evolution, but Aristotle was sure that nothing really changed in the world, and that species must be eternal and fixed signposts to a scale from imperfection to perfection. He believed that everything is created with the utmost perfection possible, a perfection existing in nature in different degrees. The form of an organism represents a purpose of not always reached perfection, that is a purpose to attain the highest predetermined degree of perfection through a transition
from potentially to actually existing. As he explains, “For what each thing is when fully developed, we call its nature, whether we are speaking of a man, a horse, or a family. Besides, the final cause and end of a thing is the best, and to be self-sufficing is the end and the best” (Politics 1.2.1252b32–1253a2). What Aristotle explicitly means here is that human nature is predetermined, an idea that was adopted by the bourgeois ideology of sociobiology as a genetically (by the “genes”) predetermined human nature.

Aristotle’s perfection is always conceived as higher and unchangeable, with its highest manifestation being God. According to this conception of perfection, living beings are sensible and corruptible. Higher than them come heavenly bodies, sensible and incorruptible. Higher still is the rational soul, insensible and incorruptible. Highest of all is God, the most changeless of all substances and hence the most actual, the most fully realizing its potentiality. The crown of Aristotle’s work, though, was its extension to humans as social animals, zoon politikon (political animal) (Politics, 2.2.1253a3–4), and beyond them to God. Following Philolaus’ doctrine, Aristotle believed that the human being contains in itself three souls or spirits of biological nature. They correspond with the stages of biological development: the vegetable soul of plants, the sensitive soul of animals, and the rational soul (or nous). The last belongs to humans alone and adds to all the powers of the “lower” souls the ability to reason theoretically. The purpose of each soul, which is its motive power, is to strive for its own perfection; the vegetative soul, for growth; the animal soul, for movement; and the rational soul, for contemplation (On the Soul 2.1.412a, 414a,b, 415b; Ethics 1.1102a9–11).

The perfection of the rational soul was to strive for something even more perfect, which could only be God, the unmoved mover of the whole universe (Metaphysics, 12.7.1072b14–31). Aristotle describes the soul as the first actuality (entelechy) of a natural body that has life potentiality, and as the cause and the first principle of the living body. The soul is at the same time the efficient cause (it initiates change and movement), the final cause (as the body’s goal), and the formal cause (as the organizing principle) (On the Soul 2.1.412a, 414a,b, 415b). Therefore, the human soul
is a reward based on the sum total of our biological nature and our unique capacities as humans to think and feel.

Aristotle’s ethics is also biological in nature (White 1994, 17–43), since it can be traced in the analogies he made between animals and people. Indeed, he tended far more to see a beast as an imperfect human and a fish as an imperfect beast than the other way around. He considered slaves and women more perfect than animals but less perfect than a master. This gradation was also applied to aspiration and love. For example, virtuous man is not obliged to give an equal love in return to those below him, which implies that the Aristotelian concept of love is elitist or perfectionist: “In all friendships implying inequality the love also should be proportional, i.e. the better should be more loved than he loves” (Nicomachean Ethics 8.7.1158b24–26). Therefore, love can only be upward; as slave’s love for his master, woman’s for her husband, and man’s for God. Love down the scale is not called for (Bernal 1979). Moral values are graduated as well. People share them in different form and degree. For instance, a slave’s association with values is meaningful only when they serve his master. A slave requires “only so much excellence as will prevent him from failing in his function through cowardice or lack of self-control (Politics 1.13.1260a35–39; see also Garlan 1982). Aristotle notes that a slave cannot be happy, no matter how comfortable a life he or she has, and does not have the opportunity to exercise what is most human in him/herself (Nicomachean Ethics 10.6.1177a7–10). So does even the laborer: “No man can practice excellence who is living the life of a mechanic or labourer” (Politics 3.5.1278a20–21). Woman’s virtues in relation to man were viewed in an analogous manner because their nature was inferior to man. As Aristotle writes:

The fact is, the nature of man is the most rounded off and complete, and consequently in man the qualities above referred to are found most clearly. Hence woman is more compassionate than man, more easily moved to tears, at the same time is more jealous, more querulous, more apt to scold and to strike. She is, furthermore, more prone to despondency and less hopeful than the man, more void of
shame, more false of speech, more deceptive, and of more retentive memory. She is also more wakeful, more shrinking, more difficult to rouse to action, and requires a smaller quantity of nutriment. (*History of Animals* 9.1.608b6–13)

Aristotle was so biased on the superiority of man that he even claimed that women had fewer teeth (*History of Animals* 2.3.501b20). This may not be an innocent miscalculation of Aristotle, since he was such a keen observer, recognizing even the hardly distinguishable differences in the sexual organs between male and female hyena (Gould 1984). Such bias against women persisted even in nineteenth-century medical studies on skull differences (Fee 1979, 415–33) and, as we shall see, in the modern biological ideology of human nature, sociobiology.

Aristotle’s idea of different grades of perfection in humans led him to advocate that there is no need for changing the state, which he believed is a predetermined form of social organization. Interestingly enough, in his political philosophy, Aristotle himself links biology with politics. He argues both that “the state is a creation of nature, and that man is by nature a political animal” (*Politics* 1.2.1253a2–3). All he thought as necessary was for people to adopt a moderate (nonradical) course in their lives within the naturally occurring state. This notion of passive human political behavior, as we will see, is in accordance with the basic premises of sociobiology.

**Biological determinism and reductionism**

Aristotle’s ideas on the biological world are prescientific, philosophical notions, not scientific theories. Aristotelian biological science is basically philosophic intuition. On the other hand, genetics and its modern molecular counterpart are sciences that generate sociobiological ideologies with common analogies to the main ideas of the Aristotelian biological ontology. His teleological views on the predetermined form (nature) of the human being and all organisms, and their classification in a scale of graded perfection, correspond to the socioeconomic classification in modern physiocratic theories. Even more, these scientifically unfounded theories of genetically determined intellect variation of human
nature show correspondence with his gradation of people by their ability to think (to possess *vouleftikon*). These ideologies are biological determinism and sociobiology, as well as biological reductivism (their wider theoretical basis). How did these theories arise, what are their basic claims, and to what extent have they been influenced by Aristotle?

Western societies emerged, at least politically, from the bourgeois revolutions of the seventeenth century in Britain and of the eighteenth century in France and America. These revolutions overthrew the old establishment, which drew its authority from the aristocratic status quo and from fairly well-consolidated powerful families. Bourgeois revolutions created and legitimized an ideology of freedom, equality, and brotherhood for all people, who were born equal. Nevertheless, this was true only for men, but not for all. For instance, slavery in French colonies continued until the first half of the nineteenth century; the United States Constitution counted Blacks as three-fifths of a person; during most of the period of English parliamentary democracy, only wealthy men had voting rights. Within this unequal social framework, it was natural for the ideology of equality to languish, since these revolutions brought about even greater economic and political inequality, not only among people but also among nations and races.

The contradiction in the coexistence of inequality with the premise that societies were founded on the principle of equality was resolved by the redefinition of the meaning of equality at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Instead of equality in apportionment of the products of social activities, what was meant by equality was equal chance in capitalizing life’s opportunities. According to this notion of equality, life is viewed as an endless fight for predominance and survival. Whereas for the aristocracies, the finish line was actually the starting line while everyone else remained at the starting line, the competition rules of the new society seemingly positioned everyone at the starting line with equal chance to arrive first at the finish line.

Such a notion of equality did not pose any threat to the social establishment of that time. On the contrary, it helped maintain it in
power since it actually implied that if somebody is powerless, poor, etc., this is the inevitable outcome of personal innate weaknesses. Therefore, nothing can be done to change it. Thus, the new society actually introduced a political process of establishing a new type of social classification analogous in essence to that of Aristotle; a scale of political and economic status gradation. By this process, legitimization of social power and wealth transfer from parent to child came to be based upon the idea that innate abilities are biologically carried on from generation to generation. Thus, a biological theory for viewing human nature within this social framework was developed for averting and neutralizing tensions created by social inequalities: the ideology of biological determinism (Ann Arbor Science for the People Collective 1977). This ideology was founded upon the following main points: (1) differences among individuals in attitudes, potentials, abilities, inclinations, etc., are innate; (2) these differences are coded in genes, so they are genetically inherited; (3) it is in human nature for societies to be hierarchically structured, and thus unchangeable. Therefore, a society based on equal distribution of wealth and political power is, supposedly, biologically impossible (Lewontin 1992). The new immutable social scale is of Aristotelian type, with the individuals having their own internal potentially existing (entelechy) and a fixed form (actually existing).

Such an ideology, though adequate in explaining personal differences, does not suffice in also explaining and legitimizing the hierarchical structure of the emerging bourgeois society, that is, why groups of individuals share “universal” behavioral characteristics and are “endowed” with more social and political power than others. This necessitated the appearance of the ideology of sociobiology, complementary to biological determinism (Ann Arbor Science for the People Collective, 1977). The ideologies of biological determinism and sociobiology are based on determinism and reductionism. Determinism posits that phenomena are determined by their causes in a specific way. The different forms of determinism express the modalities under which this determination is realized. A law is the formal expression of the relations between cause (or causes) and effect (Bitsakis et al. 2002, 228–55).
Reductionism splits the world in self-contained, nonintershaped, and unrelated external and internal segments that are then broken down into smaller parts, each with its own properties. These, in turn, are combined to form larger entities treated as causes that are internal and external and not interdependent (Lewontin, 1992). Biological reductionism is the extension of this theory to living beings. Sociobiological reductionism may be defined here as a specific form of biological reductionism with application to human society. This reductionism goes beyond the mechanistic approach of biological reductionism and reaches Aristotelian teleology (Gotthelf and Lennox 1987; Sedley 1991, 179–95). Here, the final cause for shaping human nature lies in the genes of each individual, the causation source of society’s constituent universal characteristics.

The ideology of sociobiology and its analogies to Aristotle’s biological ontology

The biological revolution of the twentieth century uncovered the decisive role of DNA (genome) in formulating the differences in function and form that characterize the various biological species. Moreover, the biological breakthroughs showed that even different species share common parts (genes) in their genome, and, more importantly, that the individual genomes among people of the same and different races show insignificant variation (less than 1%). In spite of these biological facts, the ideology of sociobiology was centered on the hypothesized existence of behavioral genes in the human genome. These were based on oversimplified analogies between human behavior and the instinctive (genetically determined) behavioral characteristics of other much simpler organisms (e.g., bees). This pseudoscientific notion is a transposition of past and present social divisions into an ideology for the legitimation of the hierarchical structure of modern societies, in much the same way as Aristotle theorized his society.

The most modern physiocratic ideology of human nature is sociobiology (Wilson 1975a, 1975b; Wilson 1978, Lumsden and Wilson 1981). It appeared twenty-eight years ago, and since then it became the leading ideology for legitimizing the idea of an immutable society as we know it today (Lewontin et al. 1984).
It basically claims that there is an unchangeable universal human nature encoded in the genes of our genome. That is, Darwinian natural selection supposedly resulted—through differential survival and reproduction processes of various species—in the predominance of certain human characteristics, which additively are responsible for the main structural constituents of human societies. What our societies are today is the inevitable outcome of three billion years of evolution and, therefore, it is fixed, and any attempt to change it is futile.

At the philosophical core of sociobiology lies the meaning that it gives to the genes, which in many respects corresponds to the meaning of Aristotelian entelechy. Sociobiology claims that genes are the materialistic substrate of a fixed genetic “program” that determines the structural characteristics (phenotype) as well as the intellectual and behavioral faculties (the form) of each human being (Lewontin 1992; Lewontin et al. 1984; Wilson 1978). The genome of each human is a bunch of gene-pages which contain hierarchically detailed information and instructions that make us what we are; they compose the “great book of life.” Aristotle, on the other hand, sees a relationship between matter and form not in reference to one another but as a necessary binding connection of their mutual states. This bonding is not imposed from the outside but constitutes a necessity for matter-form coexistence, with form (“species”) being the substance of every living being (Metaphysics 6.7.1032b1). This ontological notion implies a qualitative element that differentiates every individual (human beings as well): “the soul of animals (for this is the substance of a living being) is their substance according to the formula, i.e. the form and the essence of a body of a certain kind”; and using Socrates as example, Aristotle explains: “but when we come to the individual, Socrates is composed of ultimate individual matter” (Metaphysics 7.10.1035b30–31). This qualitative element corresponds to an integrated program (“formula”) that directs each individual’s full development (physical and mental). Such a program must contain at the start the nucleus of its finalization and the course (entelechy) that the individual is predestined to follow: “the potential is in process to fulfilment [entelechy]” (Physics 8.5, 257b7). The
potentially existing presupposes the pre-existence of entelechy from which it derives: “that which is potentially is brought about by that which is in actuality [entelechy]” (Generation of Animals 2.1.734a30–35). Entelechy constitutes each being’s internal bonding throughout its existence, and beyond it; ensures its cohesion and contains its form, the material constitution of which has been selected to serve it. Therefore, entelechy is both the structure and the program (final cause) of the individual inasmuch as the genes are for sociobiology. The genes for sociobiology are deterministic and teleological entities. On the other hand, entelechy is teleological as well but is also dynamic since it introduces new elements of reality and qualitative transformation. Entelechy and the genes of sociobiology are analogous. It should be pointed out that in the works of Edward Wilson there is not any causative relationship between entelechy and sociobiology.

Modern neurobiochemists and molecular geneticists do not accept the sociobiological premise that the mystery of life (behavioral and intellectual characteristics of each individual) is hidden in the DNA of the genes, nor that genes compose some kind of a “program” or constitute the so-called “great book of life.” The unscientific basis of the genetic determinism of sociobiology has been shown by many biological facts, some of which are quite revealing. It has been known that genes do not exist as individual entities in the linear DNA genome: each one is intercepted by different pieces of DNA (introns), which are not structural parts of it. In other words, each gene exists in different unconnected pieces (exons) of DNA. The amazing thing is that the cell can stitch together different combinations of exons from the same gene, which carry different genetic information and result in different products (proteins); that is, the gene does not contain single pieces of information. Moreover, it is well known to geneticists that a single gene can be involved in different biological processes, and that all genes of the genome constitute a genetic construction that neutralizes/substitutes malfunction of other structurally altered (mutated) genes. For example, it was found that occipital areas of the brain that normally participate in the processing of optical information are used to process information from touch in
blind people. This example of functional substitution cannot be explained in terms of genes, especially when their functional and structural definition is obscure (Morange 1998). If it is impossible to define the meaning of the gene, then there cannot be “genes for” intelligence, homosexuality, etc., as sociobiology claims.

DNA is certainly the molecule that plays an important role in the creation of the structural characteristics that make one species different from another, but this role is not dominant (Atlan 1999; Morange 1998). DNA genomes together with the rest of the cytoplasmic molecules inside and outside of the cells formulate, under the influence of external factors, (a) the structural (phenotypic) differences within humans as well as among nonhuman species, and (b) the mostly instinctive behavioral differences among the various nonhuman species; the behavioral differences of the latter result from the interplay between genetic and sociomimetic factors (offsprings copy behavioral patterns from parents, etc.). What makes humans different from other species is mainly the fact that the intellectual and social capacities of their brains are developed mostly after birth under the influence of external factors due to the extremely high brain plasticity in developing the neuronal circuits.

The topography of the brain’s parts is established genetically and biochemically before birth; it is the same in every human (having followed a nonpathological fetal development), and the brain’s intelligence-determining crucial interconnections are developed after birth mainly under the influence of socioenvironmental factors (Changeux 1997; Changeux and Ricoeur 1998; Edelman 1992). This functionality is supported by the fact that although humans and chimpanzees (our genetically closest relative) share more than 99 percent of their genes, their behavioral and intellectual differences are too immense to be accounted for by such minute genetic differences. These established scientific data show that genes are not responsible for the qualitative differences observed among humans, as sociobiology proposes. Instead, our social nature is determined by two main factors: (1) by the socially influenced molecular chance and developmental “noise” (e.g., the crucial impact of industrially produced toxic chemicals—accumulated in the mother’s blood and milk—on fetal brain development is well
established); (2) by the social micro- and macroenvironments that shape the individual's intelligence and behavior.

Sociobiology can be viewed also as a combination of two basic elements: (1) the Darwinian evolutionary process that led human society from a metazoan (postanimalistic) to its present and allegedly fixed form (Samuelson 1975), and (2) the view about unchangeable hierarchical social stratification, which is analogous to the Aristotelian view. In Aristotle's society, intellect or deliberative faculty (vouleftikon) is the main criterion for social classification of individuals and social groups. He claimed that free man has the potential to contemplate—he possesses vouleftikon—and, thus, he is a master and ruler by nature (Politics 1.2.1252a,b); the free woman possesses vouleftikon, but is without authority, and the child has, but it is immature”; “the slave has no deliberative faculty (vouleftikon) at all,” but he participates in logic only to the extent that he can sense it; down the scale, animals respond only to sensory stimuli (Politics 1.13.1260a12–13; Garlan 1982). Sociobiological social stratification is essentially Aristotelian. Here, universal social characteristics additively emanate from gene-encoded intellectual, behavioral inclinations, tendencies, etc., of the individual. Despite its name, sociobiology is actually a theory based on individualistic rather than social causation. For example, from the sociobiological perspective, nations engage in wars because individuals are innately aggressive; men govern societies because men innately dominate over women; whites dominate over blacks because they carry an innate dislike for them.

Sociobiology claims that human nature is constituted of universal characteristics (shared by certain groups of people) and of personal characteristics (that vary among individuals)—both coded by corresponding genes. All these and other universal and personal sociobehavioral genes do not stand the scrutiny of biological and historical confirmation (Kamin 1974; Lewontin et al. 1984; Reynolds 1976; Sahlins 1976). These genes, the “selfish genes” (Dawkins 1976), exist in pairs of opposing quality (normal/mutated or perfect/imperfect). Examples of universal elements of human nature rooted in genes for social characteristics are religious faith, male superiority, female inferiority, eroticism, xenophobia, etc., and
genes that explain conflicts between sexes, parents and children, etc. (Caplan 1978; Jensen 1976; Lewontin 1992; Lewontin et al. 1984; Tiger 1978). Even conservatism and liberalism are viewed as being rather genetically predetermined (Hirschleifer 1977, 1–52). Qualitatively opposing genes have been invented, too, for explaining elements of individual behavior, intellect, and actions such as ability/inability in entrepreneurship, lawfulness/criminality, intellectual superiority/inferiority, meekness/irritability, gullibility/incredulity, introversion/extroversion, homosexuality/heterosexuality, domination/submission, euphoria/depression, etc. These views are not much different from Aristotle’s views of the roots of human action (behavior): “action must proceed from a firm and unchangeable character” (Nicomachean Ethics 2.4.1105a31–b1; 4.3.1123–25). Moreover, such ideas have contributed to the creation of a “DNA mysticism” (Nelkin and Lindee 1995) in the public, further cultivated by ideologically biased molecular geneticists who flood it every day with illusionary “genes for” controlling the chemical keys of our identity, every pathological malfunction and, even more, our mental and behavioral “traits.” The notions that support the existence of a potentially fixed genetic disposition in our mental and behavioral differences have been strongly rejected by the famous molecular geneticist Bertrand Jordan, and prompted him to characterize the scientists who adopt them as “imposters of genetics” (2000).

These two qualitative elements of our genes are considered by sociobiology as the new fixed markers that quantitate the maximum degree in perfecting every individual’s social adaptability, classified in a sociobiological scale of graded intelligence (voulefikon). In such a scale, the sum of the perfect (normal) genes contained in each individual determines the highest degree of perfection that can be reached by its genetically predetermined human nature—some individuals possess a greater number of perfect genes than others. Absolute genetic perfection can be identified with the unmovable mover, Aristotle’s God. The available perfect genes predetermine the limits of the potentially existing in human nature. That is, individuals are differentiated from others by having qualitatively different inherent entelechy, manifested through
the unique expression of their genes as final cause. Moreover, the social environment (external world) imposes on the individual certain adaptation problems. The individual supposedly does not create these problems, but is subjected to them as a mere object. Sociobiology’s behavioral genes confront these problems without surpassing the sociohierarchical boundaries of the society. They array against them their genetically programmed information (entelechy) so as to achieve the highest limit (actually existing) of the individual’s potentially existing required to attain its final place in the hierarchical society: man over woman, well-to-do citizen over the poor—those with fewer “intelligence genes” (lower vouleftikon), the modern analogy to slaves in Aristotle’s society.

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**Welfare State and Democracy in Marx’s Theory of Revolution**

**Uri Zilbersheid**

**Introduction**

Marx’s theory of revolution is one of the most contentious socialist theories. Marxists of all stripes, both scholars and politicians, are deeply divided regarding the real meaning and messages of this theory. Not only the remote goal of the revolution, according to this theory, but also the theory’s blueprint for the immediate future have always been a source of contention. What is the real nature of the highest phase of socialism in Marx’s teachings? How should society be shaped by socialist forces in the interim period? Should socialist forces collaborate with other political and economic forces in shaping society in the immediate future? These and other questions concerning Marx’s theory of revolution have never found unanimous answers.

Millions of people and certain regimes that believe, at least officially, in socialism—in the possibility of building a free, productive, and creative society on the basis of social equality—view Marx’s theory of revolution as their prime source of inspiration. It is necessary, therefore, to make new efforts to elucidate different aspects of this theory, with the aim of building a better human society.

Marx distinguishes between the first phase of the revolution, which consists of enacting different economic, social, and
political measures when the socialist parties come to power, and the second phase of the revolution, which he defines as communism. Communism itself is divided into the lower and the “higher stage of communism.” The latter is the full abolition of all forms of alienation. The aim of the first phase is to create the preconditions for the development of the second phase, a nonalienated society. The socialist movement—including Marx’s Communist League—cannot, and should not, strive to bring about a nonalienated society as an immediate aim. Such a society can only develop when certain intellectual, economic, and technological conditions have been achieved. Immediate revolutionary activity should aim at creating these conditions, which are prerequisite to the development of nonalienated society. The creation and development of these prerequisite conditions—that is, of a new social and political order instead of the old, feudal, or purely capitalistic regime (or a mixture of both)—can be a long process.

At the core of the nonalienated society is the abolition of alienated production, termed by Marx the “abolition of labour” (Aufhebung der Arbeit), the “abolition of industry” (Abschaffung der Industrie), and the “liberation from industry” (Befreiung von der Industrie), in works such as The German Ideology (Marx and Engels 1976b, 52, 80, 205), “Draft of an Article on Friedrich List’s Book Das nationale System der politischen Oekonomie” (Marx 1975a, 279, 283), and in the Grundrisse (Marx 1986, 167; 1987a, 97). It should be emphasized that these terms denote not abolishing production as such, but rather turning it into creative, noninstrumental activity. This society also consists of the abolition of exploitation (often defined as the abolition of private property), of the division of labor, of the state (that is, of the relationship of political domination), and of the family (the alliance of man and woman as an economic unit). The abolition of these alienated social relations derives from the abolition of labor. If alienated, namely instrumental, production is not abolished, alienated social relations and formations (exploitation, the state, etc.) cannot be abolished. It should be noted that this society, which presupposes a transformation of human nature, cannot be realized in the near future. As this society cannot be a realistic goal
in the immediate future, only its principles should be outlined, and no detailed scheme concerning this society should be con-
strued. Marx therefore turns much of his attention to the creation of the preconditions for this society, namely to the first phase of the socialist revolution.

His revolutionary theory deals much more with the creation of the immediate new social order, which he considered a precondition for the liberation from all kinds of alienation, rather than with this liberation itself. His long and thorough study of capitalism, which encompasses many economic works and which reaches its peak in his masterpiece, *Capital*, is intrinsically connected with the creation of the preconditions for the development of communist society. Anyone who suggests a new social order must have knowledge of the structure, trends, and social and political forces of the existing society. Such knowledge will enable one to suggest a realistic blueprint for the immediate future.

Marx and Engels’s blueprint for the social order that should be constituted and developed in the near future is presented primarily in the *Communist Manifesto* (1976c) and the “Demands of the Communist Party in Germany” (1977). Other works, among them numerous newspaper articles, are also connected with the first phase of the revolution, although not always directly. The *Manifesto*, being a broad presentation of the revolutionary policy in the immediate future, that is, in the first phase of the revolution, and of the arguments for this policy, should be seen as a pillar of the theory of the first phase of the revolution.

The *Manifesto of the Communist Party*, known worldwide as the *Communist Manifesto*, was officially written by Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, who had been asked by their tiny party, the League of the Communists, to write its political program. Engels was involved in the preliminary work, but the *Manifesto* itself was mainly composed by Marx. Engels undoubtedly shared the views expressed in the *Manifesto* and it should be seen as the formulation of their common goals and policy. The *Manifesto* was published in February 1848, just before the outbreak of the revolution of 1848–49. Its principles remained the basis of Marx’s theory of revolution during his entire life. Some modifications were
suggested, or hinted at, in later developments of his theory, as I shall discuss later.

The “Demands of the Communist Party in Germany,” which was composed by Marx and Engels shortly after the publication of the *Manifesto*, and published in several “democratic” newspapers at the end of March 1848, should be seen as a completion of the *Manifesto*. It defines more accurately, elaborates on, and even corrects some of the measures enumerated in the *Manifesto*.

The *Manifesto* and the “Demands of the Communist Party in Germany” are not a blueprint for the immediate establishment of a communist society. Some features of communist society—the abolition of private ownership of the means of production, the abolition of the family, and the abolition of the state—are dealt with in the *Manifesto*, sometimes, as in the case of private property, in some detail. Another major feature of this society—that is, the abolition of the division of labor—is not discussed at all. The abolition of alienated production (“abolition of labour” or “abolition of industry”), which should be seen as the pivot of the new, classless society, is so vaguely mentioned that only experts in Marx’s teachings can detect it, as for example in the sentence: “In Communist society, accumulated labour is but a means to widen, to enrich, to promote the existence of the labourer” (1976c, 499). It is not due to negligence that Marx fails in the *Manifesto* to elaborate on some very important features of communist society. The main purpose of the *Manifesto* is to discuss the immediate revolutionary measures, ones that are not aimed at establishing a communist society. Their aim is to create the preconditions for the development of communist society—not this society itself.

Any realistic socialist revolutionary activity must first concentrate on bringing about and developing the new social order, out of which nonalienated society may develop. In the *Communist Manifesto*, the “Demands of the Communist Party,” and other works, Marx presents the principles of the new social order that will prevail in the first phase of the revolution.

I shall argue here that these principles are by no means a blueprint for a centralized, command economy, based on a total
nationalization of the economy, but rather for a mixed economy, and for establishing equal and comprehensive social services. Such a socioeconomic system may be termed today a welfare state. I prefer this term to other terms, such as socialist capitalism or market socialism, because the latter terms denote mainly the structure of the economy and do not relate to the nature of the social services. I shall also try to show that Marx and Engels attempted to reshape the concept of democracy, which then had primarily a sociopolitical meaning. It denoted at that time the political movement of the lower classes and their socioeconomic programs, not, as nowadays, a formal system of government. Marx and Engels suggested—and were active in that direction, believing that the meaning of political concepts is also determined by deliberate publicist and political activity—that the concept democracy should denote the alliance of all progressive—namely productive—forces, including capitalist ones, and the program for the welfare state they envisaged.

The economic and social plan of the first phase of the revolution

In the Communist Manifesto, Marx and Engels present a ten-point economic and social program to be executed when the proletariat comes to power. These points are included in what appears to be a revolutionary process whose time frame and nature is somewhat vague:

The proletariat will use its political supremacy to wrest, by degrees [“gradually” (nach und nach)]\(^2\), all capital from the bourgeoisie, to centralise all instruments of production in the hands of the State, i.e., of the proletariat organised as the ruling class; and to increase the total of productive forces as rapidly as possible.

Of course, in the beginning, this cannot be effected except by means of despotic inroads on the rights of property, and on the conditions of bourgeois production; by means of measures, therefore, which appear economically insufficient and untenable, but which, in the course of the movement, outstrip themselves, necessitate further inroads
upon the old social order, and are *unavoidable* as a means of entirely revolutionising the mode of production.

These measures will of course be different in different countries.

Nevertheless in most advanced countries, the following will be pretty generally applicable:

1. Abolition of property in land and application of all rents of land to public purposes.
2. A heavy progressive or graduated income tax.
3. Abolition of all right of inheritance.
4. Confiscation of the property of all emigrants and rebels.
5. Centralisation of credit in the banks of the State, by means of a national bank with State capital and an exclusive monopoly.
6. Centralisation of the means of communication and transport in the hands of the State.
7. Extension of factories and instruments of production owned by the State [*“Extension of national factories and instruments of production” (Vermehrung der Nationalfabriken, Produktionsinstrumente)*/]; the bringing into cultivation of waste-lands, and the improvement of the soil generally in accordance with a common plan.
8. Equal liability of all to labour. Establishment of industrial armies, especially for agriculture.
9. Combination of agriculture with manufacturing industries; gradual abolition the distinction between town and country, by a more equitable distribution of the population over the country.
10. Free education for all children in public schools. Abolition of children’s factory labour in its present form. Combination of education with industrial production, &c., &c. (1976c, 504–5; emphasis added)

In the opening lines of this passage, Marx and Engels say that all the economic means would *gradually*—that is, not immediately—be concentrated in the hands of the state (see note 2). We
do not learn how long this gradual process would last. We do learn that these ten points form the principles of the immediate new social order that the first phase of the socialist revolution should establish. This new social order, which is by no means a total nationalization of the economy, is a necessary stage in a process that, if initiated, would lead to the transformation—described as an “entire revolution”—of the mode of production. Such transformation is by no means replacing partial nationalization by total nationalization, but rather creating a new mode of production, defined in the early writings and in the *Grundrisse* as the “abolition of labour” and the “abolition of industry” and “liberation from industry,” of which the other dimensions are the abolition of the division of labor, the abolition of the state, and the abolition of private property. The term *gradually* enables Marx and Engels to avoid an immediate total nationalization of the economy and to establish another system, summarized in ten points and defined as “unavoidable.”

As we see, total nationalization is somehow set aside. Marx and Engels apparently never intended to turn the state into an exclusive owner of the means of production and exclusive initiator of economic activity. Thus, Marx later supported the encouragement of the development of cooperatives within the first stage of the revolution, and it is unreasonable that he would let the state take over these cooperatives and essentially abolish them. I would suggest that Marx mentioned a total nationalization as a concession to radical members, often prominent leaders, in the socialist movement and in his own party who believed in the feasibility of an immediate socialist revolution (Felix 1983, 69, 97–98). In actual fact, Marx never said how a total state ownership of the economic means or an absolutely state-controlled economy would operate. However, he did say several things about managing the economy under social ownership of the means of production, which was for him clearly distinct from state ownership of these means (thus, he emphasized the democratic nature of this management, and in the early writings, contrary to the late writings, he underlined its nature as planning noninstrumental production) (1976b, 46; 1989, 86–88; 1996, 88–90; 1998, 807, 838).
As we can see by a careful study, the ten-point program of the Manifesto is by no means a blueprint for total nationalization and for establishing a centralized economy (command administrative economic system) characterized by total planning, which was later to become the essence of what might be termed “Soviet socialism.”

According to the program, certain kinds of capital would be nationalized, while other kinds of capital and economic activities would be exempted from nationalization. Thus land, either in its form as feudal property or in its form as capitalist property, financial capital (namely banks), and the means of transportation would be nationalized, while industrial and commercial capital, and small businesses of all kinds, including peasantry, would not be nationalized (Wagner and Strauss 1963, 76–77). An industrial public sector—defined somewhat vaguely as “national factories,” and not unequivocally as state-owned industry—would be created, but not by the expropriation of private industry. Such measures would not be a total, but rather a partial abolition of capitalism, which should be understood as integration of socialist elements into the economic system, or as the establishment of a mixed economic system.

According to the first measure enumerated in the Manifesto, all land would be nationalized and become state property. According to the sixth, seventh, and ninth paragraphs of the “Demands,” this measure would first abolish “all feudal dues, exactions, corvées, tithes, etc.”—that is, feudal ownership of land. It would also transfer the “tenant system” (Pachtwesen) into the hands of the state, so that the “land rent” would “be paid to the state as a tax.” The tenant system developed where feudal owners of land either were replaced by bourgeois owners in a social revolution or transformed themselves into bourgeois owners—that is, owners who view land as a means, among other means, for making money. This tenant system should be seen in its essence as a bourgeois form of land ownership. Turning the rent into a state tax means abolishing this form of ownership. However, while private ownership of land would be abolished, all kinds of agricultural activity, of peasants and of small and big farmers, would remain private. Farmers and
peasants would pay rent to the state, but the other means of production, such as machines, livestock, and seeds, and the crops would be their private property, and they would be able to manage their farms as independent entrepreneurs. Forms of independent collective ownership, such as independent cooperatives, do not contradict such arrangements, as we know from Marx’s later writings, among them Capital and Critique of the Gotha Programme. Marx, it should be noted, always opposed state-controlled cooperatives.

According to the fifth measure suggested in the Manifesto, the system of credit would be nationalized and managed, in the form of a public central bank (“national bank”), as a state monopoly. The tenth point in the “Demands of the Communist Party in Germany” clarifies this point:

10. A state bank, whose paper issues are legal tender, shall replace all private banks.

This measure will make it possible to regulate the credit system in the interest of the people as a whole, and will thus undermine the domination of big financial magnates. (1977, 4)

As to the financial policy that Marx and Engels’s Communist League will pursue when it comes to power—either alone or by sharing power with progressive bourgeois parties, which may also participate in the political revolution—it should first be noticed that private bank accounts, big and small, would not be confiscated or abolished. “State capital” as a basis of the operations of the nationalized banking system does not contradict holding private accounts as another financial source.

In many works, Marx and Engels deal with the rivalry between financial capital (denoting here all forms of “money capital”) and industrial capital—that is, between two factions of the bourgeois class. At first, financial capital was part of the conservative camp, which was led by the landed aristocracy; however, with political and economic advance, it has become the skeleton of this camp. Discussing this development in England, Engels defines the “manufacturers” as “the advanced fraction of the English middle classes” (1976a, 217–18; see also Engels 1978, 151; Marx 1998,
In the Manifesto, Marx and Engels say very little about this point. While describing the endless drive of the “bourgeoisie”—practically identified with “modern industry,” with the industrial bourgeoisie, that is, with industrial capital—to develop the means of production and to turn the world into a large and developed market, Marx and Engels write:

The bourgeoisie finds itself involved in a constant battle. At first with the aristocracy; later on, with those portions of the bourgeoisie itself, whose interests have become antagonistic to the progress of industry. (1976c, 493; emphasis added)

In Capital, mainly in the third volume, and in other works, Marx usually regards financial capital as a conservative form of capital, as a kind of capital that tries to contain or even curtail industrial and technological development. Continuous economic development increases first the profits of industrial capital, thus reducing industrial capital’s dependence on the credit system. Continuous economic development also increases the relative power of industrial capital within the economy, enabling it to determine credit terms and to shape the economy according to its interests—that is, according to entrepreneurial drive and vision. Financial capital, as Marx shows in volume three of Capital, may bring about, or take action to deepen, economic crises, thus curtailing industry and enlarging the volume of credit provided through harsh terms. In the struggle between industrial capital and financial capital over the price of credit, economic crises may create periods of expensive credit:

In times of crisis the demand for loan capital, and therefore the rate of interest, reaches its maximum; the rate of profit; and with it the demand for industrial capital [for capital that can be invested in industrial production—U.Z.], has to all intents and purposes disappeared. During such times, everyone borrows only for the purpose of paying, in order to settle previously contracted obligations. (1998, 310)

In a passage that can be seen as a summary of this point, the importance of which for his theory of revolution has often been overlooked or underestimated, Marx says:
The credit system, which has its center in the so-called national banks and the big money lenders and usurers surrounding them, constitutes enormous centralisation, and gives to this class of parasites a fabulous power, not only to periodically despoil the industrial capitalists, but also to interfere in actual production in a most dangerous manner—and this gang knows nothing about production and has nothing to do with it. The Acts of 1844 and 1845 are proof of the growing power of these bandits, who are joined by the financiers and stockjobbers. (541–42)

Nationalization of the banking system would convert this kind of capital from an independent economic sector, which often dominates the economy, into a tool of the productive sector, which includes industrial capitalists, artisans, farmers and peasants, and public-sector industry. National governments would be able to use this tool, with other measures, for encouraging growth among all producers, private and public. This entails a certain amount of planning and regulation of economic activity, but is not tantamount to a command administrative economy that neither recognizes nor allows an independent entrepreneurial spirit.

The third major form of nationalization involves means of transport. While the Manifesto does not go beyond a general declaration in this regard, the “Demands” furnishes some details as to the nature of this nationalization.

11. All the means of transport, railroads, canals, steamships, roads, the posts, etc. shall be taken over by the state. They shall become the property of the state and shall be placed free at the disposal of the impecunious classes. (Marx and Engels, 1977, 4)

The means of transport, including railroads, and ships and other large-scale means of conveyances would be nationalized. Small-sized mobile means of transport, such as boats of all kinds, and carriages (which can be compared with motorized vehicles of today) would not be nationalized.
But why should the main means of transport be nationalized? Railroads, trains, canals, etc., provide a vital public service that is used for all kinds of purposes, economic and noneconomic. By transferring this service into public hands, the state would be able to grant its use without cost or at subsidized rates, thus encouraging its use for multisided purposes. In this way, the state can support all kinds of productive (agricultural and industrial) activity—that is, private and public productive enterprises, and those commercial activities that are intrinsically connected to them. But it also promotes in this way the freedom of movement, one of the fundamental human liberties, a subject to which I shall return later.

The seventh measure enumerated in the Manifesto has been often misunderstood and mistranslated into other languages. The measure, which relates directly to the industrial policy of the Communist League and its bourgeois allies, does not speak in any way of nationalizing private industry. Neither the term nationalization nor expropriation nor any other formulation such as “concentration of industry in the hands of the State” or “replacement of private industrial concerns by State industry” is utilized in the Manifesto. Marx and Engels speak of “extension” (Vermehrung) “of national factories and instruments of production” stating in effect that a productive public sector would be established alongside the private sector (see note 3).

In the Manifesto, Marx and Engels say nothing as to the nature of public industry. In the “Demands,” they say that mines and pits would be taken over by the state” (1977, 3), but Marx never developed a clear policy of nationalizing the raw-material industry as another means of promoting economic productivity. This policy was developed by Lenin, who, following Marx, never advocated total nationalization and the establishment of a command administrative economy. In the sixteenth point of the “Demands,” Marx and Engels say that “national workshops” would be built and that the state would guarantee “a livelihood to all workers” and would provide for those who have become “incapacitated for work” (4). This formulation suggests that a portion of the national factories would have a social-welfare character, and not necessarily operate as genuine industrial enterprises.
In tandem with the enactment of these economic measures of partial nationalization aimed at streamlining growth, other steps may be taken. These additional measures are “social” in character; their main aim is to reduce, yet not abolish, social gaps.

The first social measure enumerated in the Manifesto refers to the introduction of a heavily progressive income tax. It practically declares that economic classes would not be abolished and that the wealthier classes would be heavily taxed, paying a much higher percentage of their income as tax. Progressive taxation can only be based on income tax. Indirect taxes, that is, taxes levied on products and consumption, are inherently regressive, since they embody a system wherein each person pays tax at an equal rate irrespective of the real size of his or her income. Progressive taxation of income is a much more efficient means of reducing social gaps than indirect taxes. The fifteenth point of the “Demands” spells out and completes the second measure enumerated in the Manifesto, calling for both the “introduction of steeply graduated taxes” and the “abolition of taxes on articles of consumption” (4). Progressive income tax is one of the pillars of the universal system of social services, which has become the symbol of the modern welfare state. I shall discuss it later.

Another measure aimed at substantially reducing social gaps challenges the right of inheritance. While the Manifesto calls for an absolute abolition of the right of inheritance, the “Demands” are much softer on this matter. They call for “the right of inheritance to be curtailed” (4). Why did Marx and Engels change their mind concerning the problem of inheritance? It seems that the radical formulation in this connection does not actually belong to the socioeconomic program of the Manifesto, which is a blueprint for a mixed system that would serve as the precondition for the highest phase of the socialist revolution. The radical formulation, it appears, either gives expression to the militant thinking of Marx and Engels’s comrades in the Communist League, or it belongs to the highest phase of the socialist revolution, envisioned by Marx in works such as The German Ideology and Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844. This phase presupposes the transformation of human nature—that is, the creation of a new,
nongoistic (noninstrumental) attitude toward other people, and
toward natural and artificial objects. In such a high phase, the
right of inheritance would become irrelevant and cease to exist,
as would private property. Like the introduction of a heavily pro-
gressive income tax, the moderate formulation of the “Demands”
evokes a campaign to reduce social gaps, but not to abolish classes
altogether.

Both the Manifesto and the “Demands” call for introducing
free education for all children in public schools; children from all
socioeconomic classes would attend school without any mecha-
nism to compel children from wealthy families to pay tuition fees.
The education system, as well as other governmental economic
and social activities, would be financed by a progressive income
tax. Granting free—equal and comprehensive—social services by
the state, managed either by the central government or by regional
and municipal authorities or other public statutory bodies and
financed by progressive taxation, is what we term today the “prin-
ciple of universality,” which has become the symbol of the mod-
ern welfare state. In the “Demands,” Marx and Engels went so far
as to call for the application of the universal principle to the legal
system: “Legal services shall be free of charge” (1977, 3). They
did not suggest that the right to free legal service should be limited
by a means test. As it can be understood, the legal system would
be financed by the same “highly progressive taxes” that would
form the bulk of the state’s revenue.

Marx hesitated to develop and apply the universal principle
in broad terms. Thus, he never suggested that academic education
should be free for all; nor, in his comments regarding the first stage
of the revolution, did he evoke a scheme for a free comprehensive
health service based on progressive income or health tax, although
he says that in the second stage of the revolution health services
would be maintained and developed by society (1989, 85). In the
Critique of the Gotha Programme, he even seems to limit univer-
sal free education to the primary school level, quarreling with his
socialist comrades who wished to widen the scope of universal
education: “If in some states of the latter country [United States]
‘upper’ educational institutions are also ‘free’, that only means in
fact defraying the cost of the education of the upper classes from the general tax receipts” (1989, 97). He also seems to have had second thoughts about applying the principle of universality to the legal system, saying that civil justice, being mainly concerned with conflicts over property, “affects almost exclusively the possessing classes,” and therefore should not be financed by the state: the propertied classes should not be able to litigate “at the expense of the national coffers” (97).

Marx, in sum, did not always perceive the advantages of the universal principle, especially when he suspected (without a firm mathematical basis for doing so) that the propertied classes might financially gain from the state more than they would contribute to it. The principle of universality, which combines progressive taxation and free, equal, and comprehensive social services for all citizens, is in its essence a more equalitarian redistribution of wealth.

**Democracy in the first phase of the revolution**

The term democracy has developed historically, its meaning changing in the course of history. In ancient Greece, the concept denoted the political and economic rule of the lower classes. They were usually the “people” and not all the citizens. Sometimes the middle classes were also counted as part of the people. The landed aristocracy was usually not considered part of the “people.” For Plato and Aristotle, democracy had socioeconomic meaning: it was a regime managed according to the material interests of the lower classes. Democracy in Greece had other aspects, such as broad personal liberties and the participation of the citizens in the political process—in the election of government officials and in legislation. However, these aspects were perceived as components of a sociopolitical order conducive to the well-being of the lower classes. The Greeks could not imagine political and civil rights divorced from socioeconomic rights.

When the term democracy reappeared in modern times, starting with political philosophy, its meaning was similar. For Montesquieu, for example, democracy was mainly the social drive to establish material equality: “The love of democracy is the love of equality” (Montesquieu 1872, 38). Or: “It is not sufficient in a
well-regulated democracy that the divisions of land be equal; they ought also to be small” (42). Montesquieu never called his ideal regime, whose pillar is the separation of powers, “democracy,” since he believed that a socioeconomic hierarchy is natural and that any attempt to rebuild society without such a hierarchy would be foolhardy.

In the last two or three decades of the eighteenth century, the word democracy became increasingly associated with political movements pursued by lower classes in Europe and North America. During the French Revolution, democrats was the name given to popular social forces, to the movement of small-scale proprietors—artisans, shopkeepers, and peasants—and the wage laborers, who owned no means of subsistence and whose numbers grew gradually with the rise of industrial capitalism. This movement at first joined forces with the bourgeoisie, seeking to end feudalism; later, it struggled against the bourgeoisie to influence the nature of the evolving socioeconomic regime. In the early history of the United States of America, the members of the party founded in the late eighteenth century as the political organization of the popular, mostly agrarian, classes, were actually often named “Democrats” or “Democratic-Republicans.”

In the first half of the nineteenth century, democracy was firmly established as the name of the movement of the lower classes, that is, of the petty bourgeoisie, peasants, and wage laborers, who opposed the rise of capitalism. Alexis de Tocqueville, one of the prominent political philosophers of the first half of the nineteenth century, wrote about it: “Can it be believed that democracy, which has destroyed the feudal system and vanquished the kings, will retreat before the bourgeois and the rich?” (1961–84, 1). Another example: in 1849, Otto von Bismarck, the leader of the Prussian landed aristocracy, the Junkers, blamed the Democrats for inciting social unrest in the countryside by propagating the distribution of land among agricultural wage laborers and peasants: “The large class of daily wage laborers was urged during last year in eastern regions, namely Prussia and Pomerania, to posit such demands [for having land—U.Z.] by the promises of Democrats” (1969, 168; (emphasis added). “Socialists” and “Communists” did not
form a separate movement, but were an integral part, though more radical in its nature, of the large democratic movement.

When Marx and Engels began their political activity in the mid-1840s, they considered themselves part of the large democratic movement, that is, of the movement of the lower classes. Thus, in June 1846, they wrote a letter to the Chartist leader, Feargus O’Connor, in England, in the name of a political German-speaking group living in Brussels, presenting themselves as “German Democratic Communists of Brussels.” In the letter, they praised O’Connor for having succeeded in underscoring “the contrast between working-class democracy and middle-class liberalism” (1976a, 5–60). In the autumn of 1847, Engels met in Paris with the prominent democratic socialist Louis Blanc. He told him: “You can regard Mr. Marx as the head of our party [the Communist League—U.Z.], (i.e. of the most advanced section of German democracy, which I was representing vis-à-vis him)” (1982, 134). In an article published in the *Northern Star*, a journal of the Chartist movement, in January 1848, shortly before the publication of the *Communist Manifesto*, Engels wrote that “the acknowledged tendency of modern Democrats in all countries is to make political power pass from the middle classes to the working classes” (1976c, 440).

Thus, for Marx and Engels “democracy” was no mere formal construct. It had a fundamental socioeconomic meaning—unlike senses evoked by contemporary perceptions of democracy, they did not refer to universal voting rights, separation of powers, etc., without considering the socioeconomic tendencies and preferences innate in the system. Democracy meant for them a regime that worked to benefit the lower classes, abolishing their poverty, and raising their level of material welfare and intellectual development.

While the word mainly denoted the socioeconomic and political movement of the lower classes, or the political and socioeconomic rule of these classes as well, Marx and Engels broadened its meaning. In their work, the term came to signify as well the progressive bourgeois classes, or their political parties, and their opposition to the conservative classes.
Thus, they were ready, or even eager, to endorse political developments involving the progressive bourgeoisie, starting as early as 1847. In that year, a bourgeois party (defined by Marx in *The Class Struggles in France: 1848 to 1850* as “republican bourgeoisie”) that was formed around the French journal *Le National* took a historic step, and named itself “Democratic.” It branded the original Democrats “Ultra-Democrats.” The leader of the party was the chief editor of *Le National*, Armand Marras, and its most prominent ally was the poet, historian and statesman Lamartin. Party protagonists viewed themselves as representatives of a reasonable and orderly democracy, and they opposed any infringement upon private property. They advocated universal suffrage and moderate social reforms, such as introducing universal free education.

The original Democrats in Europe resented this bold step of the “National” party, and the Democratic circles around the rival Journal, *La Réforme*, even demanded that formal arbitration resolve the dispute as to which of the parties genuinely pursued democratic policies and would be entitled to be named “Democratic” (Rosenberg 1962, 41–45; Engels 1976c, 441). Marx and Engels did not share this resentment, although they rejected the generally aggressive attitude of the “National” circles toward the revolutionary Democrats, and naturally took exception to the perception of private property as sacred. They believed that the immediate revolution should not eradicate all bourgeois classes; instead, it should leave room for the progressive bourgeois classes, namely industrial capital and commercial capital, whose interests concur with industrial growth. Genuine material and intellectual progress can only be achieved if both the lower classes and the progressive bourgeois classes form a mixed socioeconomic system, a “welfare state.” *Democracy* should denote this order and the forces participating in building and shaping it.

Thus, cautiously and rather inconspicuously, they began to legitimize the circles around *Le National* and to recognize their democratic nature. It was not democracy as perceived within these circles themselves, but rather democracy as envisioned by Marx and Engels: an alliance of the popular classes with progressive
bourgeoisie elements formed for the struggle against the conservative rulers of society. In the article “The Prussian Constitution,” published in the *Northern Star* in March 1847, Engels discussed a new Prussian constitution that reestablished a national assembly and regional assemblies based on a feudal system of four estates, which were to be represented in the assemblies. Saying that this constitution was “offered to the Prussian people to cheat them of the rights promised by the late king,” he added that “the democratic papers of all countries—in France particularly *Le National* and *La Réforme*, nay, the ministerial *Journal de Débats,*—agree in this opinion” (1976b, 64). The latter (whose full name was *Journal des Débats politiques et littéraires*) was, though an official governmental organ, opposed to the dominant ruling class. The monarchy of Louis-Philippe was ruled by a financial elite of big bankers and bourse magnates, and therefore alienated industrial capitalists. *Journal de Débats* did not hesitate to criticize the policy of the prime minister, François Guizot, which furthered the interests of financial capital. *Journal des Débats* gave Saint-Simonites, among them Adolphe Guérout, Isaac Péraire, and Michel Chevalier, a forum to express their opinion. The Saint-Simonites criticized lack of economic productivity and parasitism and advocated industrial modernization, a managed economy—state involvement in the economy for furthering economic growth—and a policy of full employment. By calling *Le National* and *Journal des Débats* “democratic,” Engels undoubtedly made a bold step, which was supported by Marx.

In the *Manifesto*, both meanings of the term *democracy* appear: the movement and political rule of the lower classes, on the one hand, and the alliance of the lower classes and bourgeois progressive classes or parties, on the other hand. This contradiction results from the need of the authors to consider the wishes and understanding of their comrades in the Communist League and the democratic movement, and also from their own willingness to promote a new policy of collaboration with certain bourgeois groups. In famous lines in the *Manifesto*, Marx and Engels write:

> We have seen above, that the first step in the revolution by the working class is to raise the proletariat to the position
of ruling class, to win the battle of democracy. (1976, 504; emphasis added)

Reading these lines, one might conclude that democracy is tantamount to the political rule of the lower classes, especially of the proletariat, and that the *Manifesto* does not practically depart from the dominant meaning of democracy at that time. One might also conclude that the proletariat would not share political power with those other classes that would benefit from the socioeconomic system that ought to be established according to the *Manifesto* and the “Demands”—a system we call the “welfare state.”

In the later section of the *Manifesto*, however, we learn that the proletariat, or its parties, such as the Communist League, seeks to cooperate with other progressive classes or parties. The section entitled “Position of the Communists in Relation to the Various Existing Opposition Parties” does not lack contradictions, as Marx and Engels had to make concessions, not only to the radical line in their own party but also to the French Democratic Socialists who quarreled at that time with the “National” party, *inter alia* over the right of the latter to be named “Democratic.” Thus we read: “In Germany they [the Communists] fight [together] with the bourgeoisie whenever it acts in a revolutionary way, against the absolute monarchy, the feudal squirearchy, and the petty bourgeoisie” (1976c, 519). So the progressive bourgeoisie was courted by Marx and Engels as an ally (I shall not deal here with the inconsistent and ambivalent attitude of Marx and Engels toward the “petty bourgeoisie,” which traditionally was part of the democratic movement). Thus they endorsed an alliance of the Communists with the Swiss Radicals, a party which itself was an alliance “partly of Democratic Socialists, in the French sense, partly of radical bourgeoisie” (518).

During the revolution of 1848–49, Marx and Engels, who chose Cologne as the center of their activity, issued a newspaper entitled *Neue Rheinische Zeitung—Organ der Demokratie*, which was for them a continuation of the old *Rheinische Zeitung* (Marx had worked as the chief editor of the latter journal for several months, until his resignation in March 1843). Acting also as chief editor of the newspaper in its new form, Marx continued the
line he had pursued in the old version of the newspaper, that is, of expressing both the demands of the liberal, progressive bourgeoisie and the woes of the petty peasantry and other poor classes. By calling the new journal “Organ of Democracy,” Marx undoubtedly wanted to broaden the meaning of the concept democracy, so that it should also denote the progressive bourgeoisie—that is, its socioeconomic movement and its political parties—and a future government that would be formed by both the traditional democratic movement of the lower classes and the progressive bourgeoisie.

Many articles contributed to the newspaper by Marx and Engels are contradictory, not only because the authors had to articulate the wishes of radical socialist circles, with which they were connected, but also on account of the failure to form a durable alliance between the popular movement and the progressive bourgeoisie—a failure that led in France to violent bloodshed, whose victim was the Parisian proletariat. Hence, in the paper we find calls for the “overthrow of the political rule of the bourgeoisie” (Engels 1977b, 444; emphasis in the original). But the main line of the paper is unmistakable: Wishing to redeem his vision by forming a broad democratic alliance, Marx writes that “the bourgeoisie cannot achieve domination without previously gaining the support of the people as whole, and hence without acting more or less democratically” (Marx or Engels 1977, 262). In other words, the progressive bourgeoisie ought to become part of the democratic movement. In another article, published at the beginning of July 1848 (first in Neue Rheinische Zeitung and several days later in the Northern Star), Engels cites a long passage from the English paper the London Telegraph, an organ of the liberal industrialists Richard Cobden and John Bright, which spoke sympathetically of “that struggle which pervades all Europe, more or less, for a fairer distribution of the annual produce of labour” (Engels 1977a, 151). For Marx and Engels, such opinions held by leading figures from the industrial sectors of the bourgeoisie exemplified the feasibility of the alliance between this part of the bourgeoisie and the lower classes.

Although the attempts to form a coalition of the lower classes and the progressive wing of the bourgeoisie failed during the
revolution of 1848–49, Marx did not abandon in later years the idea of forming such a coalition. In the 1872 preface to a new German addition of the *Manifesto*, Marx and Engels write that “the remarks [in the *Manifesto*] on the relation of the Communists to the various opposition parties” are “in principle still correct,” although they have to be adapted to the new political situation, as the greater portion of the parties mentioned in the *Manifesto* had ceased to exist (1988, 175). In the preface to the English edition of 1888, Engels cites fully the second paragraph of the preface of 1872, which includes the sentence on the relevance of such an alliance (1990, 518).

The term “dictatorship of the proletariat” does not appear in the *Manifesto*. Marx applies this term in later works such as *The Class Struggles in France 1848 to 1850*, written and published in 1850, and the *Critique of the Gotha Programme*, written in 1875, and in the letter of 5 March 1852 (1983b, 62–65) to his friend Joseph Weydemeyer. Does the political concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat contradict the unfaltering will to form an alliance with the progressive bourgeoisie, that is, with that part of the bourgeoisie whose interests could concur with a welfare state? The famous concept has two meanings, neither of which contradicts such an alliance: first, the central, leading role of the proletariat, or its political parties, in the new political rule that should replace feudal or conservative bourgeois rule; second, the “despotic inroads on the rights of property, and on the conditions of bourgeois production” (emphasis added), according to the *Manifesto* (1975, 504)—that is, nationalizing, or confiscating, certain forms of capital without respecting the property rights of the owners. We can view the second aspect of the meaning as an economic aspect of the notorious “despotism of the majority” that worried prominent thinkers such as Alexis de Tocqueville and J. S. Mill. The progressive or industrial, wing of the bourgeoisie might be interested in such aggressive encroachment on the property rights of the feudal landlords and conservative bourgeoisie without ideologically admitting it.

While composing the *Manifesto*, and throughout the first stage of the revolution of 1848–49, Marx did not rule out a leading
role that might be played by the progressive bourgeoisie, and he therefore refrained from saying “dictatorship of the proletariat.” In the course of that revolution, and shortly after it, he concluded that this wing of the bourgeoisie would never lead such an alliance because of its “fear of revolutionarily attacking any kind of property” (1977, 175). Thus, for example, “wretched, timid and narrow-minded egoism blinded the Prussian bourgeoisie to such an extent that it repulsed the peasantry, its essential ally” (175). As a result, Marx adopted a new stance, according to which only the proletariat can lead any alliance with the liberal bourgeois. Being part of such an alliance, even without having political representation in the government, this bourgeoisie might tacitly agree to the confiscation of certain kinds of property, according to the measures of the Manifesto and the “Demands,” to further its interests. Such a new alliance presumes a political dominance by the proletariat.

The dictatorship of the proletariat by no means excludes the usual civil and political rights. Actually, such rights are an essential component, one might say a pillar, of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Thus in the “Demands,” Marx and Engels, and other leaders of the Communist League, demanded such measures as universal suffrage and the eligibility of all citizens over the age of twenty-one for election to all political posts (1977, 3). The demand for “complete separation of Church and State” (4) cannot in any context be understood as replacing one official state ideology with another, but rather as an essential measure for guaranteeing freedom of expression. As early as 1842–43, mostly in articles published in the Rheinische Zeitung, Marx championed the cause of this freedom, mainly in the form of freedom of the press, vehemently defending the latter against censorship by the Prussian government.

The new social order of the political and economic rule of the alliance between the lower classes, led by the proletariat and the progressive bourgeoisie, under the political dominance or even exclusive political leadership of the proletariat, constitutes the new democracy, as opposed to “vulgar [formal—U.Z.] democracy” (1989, 96), which gained more and more ground in the second
half of the nineteenth century; it “constitutes . . . a transition to the abolition of all classes and to a classless society” (1983, 65).

Epilogue

As we have seen, Marx’s theory of revolution does not include any blueprint for establishing and maintaining a command, state-controlled economy based on the nationalization of all forms of ownership and economic activity as the transition period to communism. Instead, he suggested a mixed socioeconomic system brought by a political alliance between the working classes and the progressive—productive—portion of the bourgeois. Such an alliance, often encouraged by the labor movement when in power, has become the foundation of the modern welfare state. Marx, having suggested such an alliance 150 years ago, should be seen as the founder of the modern welfare state and by no means of Soviet socialism (that is, the regime established by Stalin that sharply deviated form Lenin’s program, which followed Marx’s revolutionary scheme for the immediate future and was the main theoretical basis for the NEP). It should be emphasized that for Marx such a system was not an end in itself or the final end of the socialist transformation of society, but a transitional stage to nonalienated, classless society.

But why did Marx prefer a mixed system that allows for the existence and even growth of certain bourgeois elements to a system based on the nationalization of all economic means?

Two reasons may be offered. First, Marx was a gradualist, that is to say, he did not believe in social and economic transformations that have not materially and intellectually matured to a certain degree within the old socioeconomic order. Human nature, as opposed to animal nature, is historical; people develop their capabilities and shape the structure of their social relations and institutions consciously and change their needs and modes of behavior directly and indirectly. Value preferences have a crucial role in changing social structures. The historicity of human nature does not mean, however, that social changes have no limits. It is not just a matter of the kind and scope of change that certain material—that is, economic and technological—conditions make
possible. Value preferences that are a constituent element of human nature may further limit the scope of change. Thus, while certain groups or classes might seek, due to the material circumstances of their life, a more radical change, other groups might content themselves under the same circumstances with a much smaller change. Moreover, while certain classes might wish to abolish private property, others may wish to preserve it, albeit under new, more favorable conditions. Furthermore, while certain people might be able or willing to act economically without private property being the frame and incentive of their action, others may be able to act only when they are motivated by the drive to preserve or increase their private possessions.

In the famous preface to *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, Marx says:

No social formation is ever destroyed before all the productive forces for which it is sufficient have been developed, and new superior relations of production never replace older ones before the material conditions for their existence have matured within the framework of the old society. Mankind thus inevitably sets itself only such tasks as it is able to solve; since closer examination will always show that the problem itself arises only when the material conditions for its solution are already present or at least in the course of formation. (1987b, 263)

This formulation is not deterministic: human beings themselves put forward the dilemmas to be coped with, but within a certain historical context, or frame. The welfare state may be regarded as the best—but by no means the only—historical solution at a certain stage of development. On the one hand, it suppresses, or at least contains, conservative forces, while, on the other hand, it enables different classes that do not share certain central values to collaborate in building a better society, one marked by the combination of encouraging economic and technological development and reducing social gaps. Such collaboration is not dictated by the conditions, as such dictate does not exist. It can be achieved or frustrated by conscious political activity.

After the
Second World War the Western European countries adopted and developed a welfare state based on such collaboration. Democracy in the Marxian sense is an important aspect of this collaboration, in which both the welfare state and democracy are interwoven. The welfare state is to a certain degree a managed, or planned, economy. However, any planning is all but a state dictatorship, if it is not based on democracy. Democracy as denoting the alliance between the labor movement, or the working classes, and the progressive, productive, portion of the bourgeoisie includes a democratic decision-making process not only at the national level, but also at the level of the individual public or private factory. The concept of the welfare state also means that private ownership of economic means involves social commitments, because these means are part of a social system of production and distribution; their private use must also further the general good by deliberate action. From this characteristic of the welfare state ensues the concept of Mitbestimmung [codetermination], of workers’ participation in the decision-making process at the corporate level.

Second, the combined system of welfare state and democracy enables the gradual development of a new, communist society. This system, which encourages productive activity, and which enables the development of political and economic self-determination of all producers, not so much individualistically, but rather as collaboration with fellow human beings, provides the preconditions for the development of communism. By taking certain elements (land, social services, means of transport, and some economic means), fully or partially, out of the market, the system can initiate a process that may culminate in taking labor out of the market, thus permitting the abolition of instrumental production, termed by Marx the “abolition of labour” and the “abolition of industry.”

It should be noted that Marx suggests that certain steps essentially belonging to the second, communist, phase of the revolution must be taken within the framework of the preconditions, thus creating a trend of transforming production into noninstrumental activity. These first steps, discussed in the ninth measure among the ten revolutionary measures enumerated in the Manifesto, are the gradual convergence of agriculture and industry and the
concomitant gradual abolition of the distinction between country and town. Their essence, I would suggest, is the conciliation between humans and nature, lessening instrumentality toward nature. Instrumental production, termed by Marx “labour” and “industry” (in a philosophical-anthropological sense that should be distinguished from the usual economic-technological sense), has dominated human economic activity since its very beginning and has resulted in a strict division of labor and a strict distinction between different ways of life. Agriculture and country life have always been less instrumental toward nature than industry and town life. The gradual combination of agriculture and country with industry and town would open a process of humanization, or deinstrumentalization, of production, and an “abolition of labour” that can gain pace only when labor is freed from the rule of the market.

Another historical attempt was the state-controlled economy, of which the Soviet Union was the prototype. One of the main features of that system was the suppression of democracy, not only in modern (formal, procedural) or Marxian sense, but even in the old sense, that is, as the sociopolitical movement or rule of the lower classes. Thus, large social gaps and poverty were part of that system. Marx could have never accepted such a solution, since for him democracy at all political and economic levels must be a component of any acceptable solution. Retrospectively we can also say that—compared with Western capitalism, which since the 1930s in the United States and the end of World War II in Western Europe has been shaped as diversified welfare systems—Soviet socialism failed technologically and economically.

Marx never identified the nationalization of most or all kinds of private property—that is, the formation of exclusive, or almost exclusive, state property and the creation of a centralized economy—with socialism or communism. Marx included among the exploitative modes of production what he termed the “ Asiatic mode of production” or “oriental despotism.” This system had developed in typical river-centered countries, such as Egypt, Mesopotamia, Persia and large areas of the eastern Iranian Heights (western Afghanistan and western Pakistan), central Asia (northern
Afghanistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and southern Kazakstan), the north of the Indian subcontinent, and China. Oriental despotism was characterized by a centralized economy, the skeleton of which was the management of a nationwide hydraulic enterprise that controlled the rivers and created large irrigated areas. In those countries, this system could only develop by substantially limiting or even abolishing property rights. Real private property, being the basis of economic independence, would have destroyed the system and might have prevented relative progress. Thus, feudal private property was transformed into “office land” (a term used by Carl Wittfogel in his *Oriental Despotism* [1957]), that is, in a kind of property owned by the state that functioned as a form of salary and not as a basis of independent individualistic economic activity. Sometimes even office land was abolished.

When describing the status of property under oriental despotism, Marx says, agreeing with the French scholar François Bernier: “Bernier rightly sees all the manifestations of the East—he mentions Turkey [that is, the Ottoman Empire—U.Z.], Persia, and Hindustan—as having a common basis, namely the absence of private landed property. This is the clef [key], even to the eastern heaven [the oriental supreme rulers—U.Z.]” (1983a, 333–34). In the *Grundrisse*, Marx says that in the Asiatic mode of production the state “appears as the higher or as the sole proprietor” and he also speaks of the “propertylessness (Eigentumlosigkeit) that seems legally to exist” “in the midst of Oriental despotism” (Marx 1986, 400–401; compare Marx 1974, 376–77). The oriental rulers did not own means of production privately, therefore, but managed property encompassing all the land under their rule, the land being owned or controlled by the state. Marx describes the exploitative nature of the regimes of oriental despotism in “The British Rule in India,” written in English for the *New York Daily Tribune*: “There have been in Asia, generally, from immemorial times, but three departments of Government; that of Finance, or the plunder of the interior; that of War, or the plunder of the exterior; and, finally, the department of Public Works” (1979, 127). Being faithful to himself, Marx could never have suggested that a modern version of the Asiatic mode of production be established and be called socialism.
or communism. The abolition of private ownership of the means of production is not identical with socialism or communism.

Marx’s theory of revolution as presented in this article should, I believe, be adopted by socialists all over the world. This theory involves a gradualist approach for a transitional period and the establishment of a welfare state and an interventionist democracy, namely of a socioeconomic system based on the political alliance between the working classes and the progressive bourgeois classes that encroaches upon the property rights of the conservative bourgeoisie. Such an adoption could change the current direction of globalization.

A main feature of globalization has been the breakdown of the historic alliance between the labor movement and the progressive part of the bourgeoisie and the resulting partial destruction of the Western welfare state. The border-crossing competition enforced upon the manufacturing corporations (productive capital) that have become much less protected in their own countries as a result of the decline of the “interventionist state” and the almost total deregulation of the financial markets, primarily in the interest of financial capital, has changed their socioeconomic conception and behavior. Thus, they join the attack on the welfare state in order to reduce their expenditures, or move factories and labor to developing countries and force the latter to avoid building modern welfare systems. Substantial portions of the leadership of the socialist parties—such as the English Labour Party and the German Social Democratic Party (SPD)—accept the current form of globalization as unavoidable and, mostly out of the will to help industrial capital, join the trend of retreating from the welfare state. This is the essence of the Third Way or New Center (Die neue Mitte), which has been established and furthered by such political leaders as Bill Clinton, a liberal (namely social-democrat) in American terms, Tony Blair of England, and Gerhard Schröder of Germany, and whose leading theoretical exponent is the English sociologist Anthony Giddens. The manifesto Europe: The Third Way / Die neue Mitte, published by Blair and Schröder in 1999, is a clear retreat from the welfare state. This “negative” alliance between industrial capital and socialist leaders necessarily strains or even
breaks the relations between those leaders and the trade unions, namely the working classes.

An alliance between the working classes and industrial capital in the “positive” Marxian sense, the creation of which is by no means an easy task, should strive, for example, to establish a worldwide monetary regime, whose main pillars should be fixed currency-exchange rates (including an institutional mechanism for changing the exchange rate of currencies of countries in acute crisis) and a coordinated international policy of interest rates that might be realized by the national central banks or national governments and should aim at unifying interest rates globally at a low level. Such an alliance would revive the interventionist state and allow countries to bail out manufacturing corporations or to protect their economies by placing coordinated tariffs on imported goods stemming from low-cost production in developing countries. This alliance would outlaw the acquisition of manufacturing and commercial firms by speculative raiders, who are not interested in improving and increasing production. It might create strict separation between financial (money) capital and other kinds of capital (productive and commercial capital, the service industry, etc), forbidding the former to hold stakes in the latter. It would strive to introduce, by phases and a strictly set timetable, a global minimum wage.

The Marxian alliance would also develop social services worldwide, above all free education at all levels and comprehensive free health care, based on progressive income tax. Fiscally, it should pursue—at the national level, and in federative states also at the level of the single state—a Keynesian policy and avoid the policy of balanced budget and austerity that is not aimed at bringing about economic growth, as is often claimed, but rather at deliberately causing or deepening cyclical economic slowdowns and depressions in the interest of speculative capital. Keynesianism has been the theoretical basis of the welfare state and should be revived by the renewed alliance between the working classes and the progressive bourgeois classes.

However, socialist parties will be able to further and lead such an alliance if they both underscore the national and global economic merit of the working classes enjoying material welfare
and intellectual development and do not lose sight of their main aim—the abolition of all forms of exploitation.

I am very grateful to my colleagues, Matthew Silver of Yezreel Valley College and Zach Levey of the University of Haifa, whose comments and suggestions helped me to improve the quality of the article.

Translations from sources not in English were made by the author.

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NOTES

1. The relationship between the abolition of labor and the abolition of alienated social relations, in which the former is primary and the latter derivative, finds its clearest expression in Marx and Engels's discussion of the abolition of private property. In The German Ideology, Marx and Engels say in this regard: “Labour is here again the chief thing, the power over individuals, and as long as this power exists, private property must exist” (1976b, 64). At an earlier stage of his intellectual development, in the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, when he still termed instrumental production “estranged labour,” and not simply “labour” or “industry” (in an anthropological-philosophical sense and not in the usual economic-technological sense), Marx states in this regard: “estranged labour is the direct cause of private property. The downfall of the one must therefore involve the downfall of the other” (1975b, 280). If labor, or instrumental production, is the cause of private property, private property cannot be abolished unless we abolish labor. Or in another formulation: If a certain mode of activity is the cause of a certain social relation, the abolition of that mode of activity will bring about the abolition of that relation. In his 1846 manuscript “Draft of an Article on Friedrich List’s Book Das nationale System der politischen Oekonomie,” first published in 1971, almost ninety years after his death, Marx says:

If it is desired to strike a mortal blow at private property, one must attack it not only as a material state of affairs [as ownership of objects—U.Z], but also as activity, as labour. . . . The abolition of private property will become a reality only when it is conceived as the abolition of “labour;” (an abolition which, of course, has become possible only as a result of labour itself, that is to say, has become possible as a result of the material activity of society [namely by the technological achievements of social production—U.Z.]. (1975a, 278–79)

For Marx, social relations are activities, that is to say, patterns of behavior in which human beings relate to the environment and to each other in a certain way. The instrumental relationship to the environment is a feature of labor.
Since private property is an instrumental relationship to the environment, it is a kind of labor. The environment, i.e., the sphere of means, of this kind of labor includes, alongside natural objects, other human beings. This “labor” (private property), which exploits fellow human beings, has developed out of labor. Instrumental activity is not only a self-relationship—i.e., activity in which the subject uses himself or herself, his or her body and soul, as a means to an end—but a relationship with the outside world as well. In such activity, the environment, nature, is perceived and treated as a complex of means, in a form of tools and material, for achieving the final goal—the desired products. However, other human beings are part of the environment, part of nature, so they are viewed and treated as a means to an end, mainly as live tools. In this way, exploitation develops as social reality. Exploitation is in its essence the use of other people as a means to an end, and this use is a result of instrumental production—of labor. Exploitation, or private property, is a manifestation of labor; it is labor that has widened the sphere of its means, drawing into it human “objects.” Being a manifestation of labor, private property can be abolished in a socioeconomic and technological process that abolishes labor, i.e., transforms production into noninstrumental activity (Zilbersheid 1999, 53–64; 2002, 32–37).

2. The author believes that “gradually” is a more accurate translation here of the German phrase nach und nach than “by degrees,” as it is given in the standard English-language edition of the Collected Works of Marx and Engels (MECW). The widely used Langenscheidts Handworterbuch Englisch (Berlin: 1981) gives for the entry nach und nach: “gradually, by degrees, little by little.”

It has been the long-standing policy of this journal to use the standard MECW, published by Progress Publishers (Moscow), International Publishers (New York), and Lawrence & Wishart (London), for all quotations from Marx and Engels. This consistency serves the convenience of our readers who wish to look up passages cited. In addition, we note that Engels writes in his preface to the 1888 English edition of the Manifesto (the version used in the MECW), “The present translation is by Mr. Samuel Moore, the translator of the greater portion of Marx's Capital. We have revised it in common, and I have added a few notes of historical allusions” (1990, 518)—Ed.

3. The author believes that his translation of the seventh measure is preferable, as in the original text the term “State” does not appear; Marx and Engels speak solely of increasing the number of national factories and instruments of production. “National factories” can mean different forms of public ownership, and not only state-owned factories. See second paragraph of note 2.

4. In my analysis of the economic aspects of the Marxian “welfare state,” I develop some points presented by these authors in their article “The Program of the Communist Manifesto and Its Theoretical Foundations” (Wagner and Strauss 1963).

5. A broad description of the rise and scope of the democratic movement in the last decades of the eighteenth and the first half of the nineteenth centuries appears in Rosenberg 1962.
6. In many cases, it has not been possible to determine actual authorship of articles attributed to Marx or Engels in the Neue Rheinische Zeitung.

7. In the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, Marx says in this regard: “all human [productive] activity hitherto has been labour—that is, industry—activity estranged from itself” (1975b, 303).

REFERENCE LIST


———. 1976c. The “Satisfied” Majority... In vol. 6 of MECW, 438–44.


Commentaries

Revolution without Pain: A Critique of Uri Zilbersheid’s “Welfare State and Democracy in Marx’s Theory of Revolution”

Greg Godels

In the 156 years since the Communist Manifesto was published, millions of workers, peasants, and oppressed people have drawn inspiration from this incendiary work by Karl Marx and Frederick Engels. To a great extent, the famous opening of the Manifesto, “A spectre is haunting Europe—the spectre of Communism” has remained true well beyond the borders of Europe, at least until the recent demise of the European socialist countries.

The words in the Manifesto present a radical vision, a vision of a society without exploitation and oppression. To understand this perspective, Marx and Engels recommend the following easy-to-understand explanation: “the theory of the Communists may be summed up in the single sentence [sic]: Abolition of private property” (1976b, 498). They elaborate as follows:

The distinguishing feature of Communism is not the abolition of property generally, but the abolition of bourgeois property. But modern bourgeois private property is the final and most complete expression of the system.
of producing and appropriating products, that is based on class antagonisms, on the exploitation of the many by the few. (498)

I submit that this is the lesson that most of the millions of Manifesto readers have drawn from the text. I submit that any interpretation of Communism or the goals of Communism that conflicts with this stark, straightforward, and unambiguous statement of principles deviates seriously from Marx and Engels’s meaning. It is one thing to advocate a different vision of Communism, quite another to attribute such a vision to Marx and Engels.

In “Welfare State and Democracy in Marx’s Theory of Revolution,” Uri Zilbersheid offers an interpretation of Marx and Engels that violates and distorts this fundamental position. He offers the following interpretive theses:

1. Communism’s penultimate achievement would be the development of a “nonalienated society” (2004, 68).
2. Marx and Engels were, in some sense, *gradualist* (Zilbersheid’s term; 90, 95).
3. The *Manifesto’s* program is “by no means a blueprint for total nationalization and for establishing a centralized economy” (2004, 70).
4. Marx and Engels advocated a “new social order of the political and economic rule of the alliance between the lower classes, led by the proletariat and the progressive bourgeoisie, under the political dominance or even exclusive political leadership of the proletariat” (89).

Based upon these tenuous and misleading textual claims and a bizarre reading of current conditions, Zilbersheid leaps to the programmatic conclusion that Marxists would be well advised to accept the welfare state and a bourgeois democratic government composed of the proletariat and the “productive” bourgeoisie as the proper direction for revolutionary change.

**Getting Marx and Engels right**

Zilbersheid offers an interpretation of Marx and Engels that is well suited to the post-Gorbachev era. Since the demise of the Soviet Union, many on the Marxist left have embraced a
caricature of Marxism that attempts to bring their views in line with the dominant intellectual paradigms of the Cold War victors. Because “real, existing socialism” appears to have suffered defeat at the hands of “real, existing capitalism,” many intellectuals have endorsed the logically unsanctioned conclusion that capitalist ideology also defeated socialist ideology. Consequently, they have sought to “salvage” Marx and Engels by finding markets, western parliamentary democracy, gradual reform, and class collaboration latent in the Marxian theory of revolution. It is my view that Zilbersheid’s position counts as part of this trend and as such I reject it.

Zilbersheid invests great energy in seeking to show that the “nonalienated” society is the ultimate goal of Marxist revolutionary change. He joins a long line of “revisers” who draw upon the writings of the early Marx to place “alienation” at the center of Marx and Engels’s thinking. Without question, the early writings struggle to characterize the systemic ills of capitalism. Their authors sift through the damage brought on by the industrial system to eventually find the essential features of capitalist oppression: exploitation based upon private property. Where Engels’s views in *The Condition of the Working Class in England* were empirical and impressionistic, Marx’s early writings were often *a priori* and speculative. With their deep study of classical political economy, they began to construct a sharper image. As early as *The German Ideology*, they locate the liberation of the working class in the abolition of private property. Marx and Engels write:

> With the appropriation of the total productive forces by the united individuals, private property comes to an end. Whilst previously in history a particular condition always appeared as accidental, now the isolation of individuals and each person’s particular way of gaining his livelihood have themselves become accidental. (1976a, 88)

Of course, eliminating all forms of alienation would dispose of private property, but this utopian task is not the revolutionary program of the proletariat. Zilbersheid obsesses over the *genus*—alienation—for this particular *species*—private property, but to what avail? It is clear that in all later works, the issue was
settled. Marx and Engels took private property to be the foundation for capitalist exploitation and it was the business of revolution to abolish it.

Engels’s preliminary draft for the *Manifesto*, “Principles of Communism,” supports this point emphatically. In question-and-answer form, the draft asks the direct, unvarnished question: “Question 14. What kind of new social order will this have to be?” (1976, 348). With equal directness comes the reply: “private ownership will also have to be abolished, and in its stead there will be common use of all the instruments of production and the distribution of all products by common agreement, or the so-called community of property” (345).

But does the abolition of private property come overnight? Is it accomplished immediately?

Of course not. The current owners of private property will resist, and intelligent yet effective methods must be employed to transfer ownership to the people. Marx and Engels go to great lengths to caution that only when commodity production has matured will it be opportune to wrest ownership from the capitalist class. And in the words of Engels, “only now has the abolition of private property become not only possible but even absolutely necessary” (349).

Zilbersheid misconstrues these notes of caution to be a sign of a revolutionary gradualism in the thinking of Marx and Engels. Much of his argument turns upon his translation from German into English of a key passage in the *Communist Manifesto* preceding the ten-point revolutionary Communist program. He renders the passage as follows:

The proletariat will use its political supremacy to wrest, gradually, all capital from the bourgeoisie. (italics by Zilbersheid; see Zilbersheid 2004, 71, 98n2)

The authorized English translation is the Samuel Moore version from 1888, revised with Frederick Engels’s assistance and some additional explanatory notes. It reads as follows:

The proletariat will use its political supremacy to wrest, by degrees, all capital from the bourgeoisie. (1976b, 504)
Where Zilbersheid translates emphatically (that is, with italics added) “gradually,” Moore/Engels translates “by degrees.” Read in context, the “by degrees” version is wholly unremarkable. The proletariat seizes power and begins a systematic expropriation of “the instruments of production.” The force of “by degrees” becomes clear in the next sentence:

by means of measures, therefore, which appear economically insufficient and untenable, but which, in the course of the movement, outstrip themselves, necessitate further inroads upon the old social order, and are unavoidable as a means of entirely revolutionising the mode of production. (504)

Thus, the process of expropriation will dictate its own pace, its own rhythm, based upon circumstances and reaction, but ultimately result in total (“entirely”) public ownership.

Zilbersheid reads this incorrectly. Instead he takes the “gradual” translation to sanction a weaker interpretation consistent with only partial nationalization: “Marx and Engels apparently never intended to turn the state into an exclusive owner of the means of production” (2004, 73). “As we can see by a careful study, the ten-point program of the Manifesto is by no means a blueprint for total nationalization” (74).

Of course this interpretation can not be reconciled with the letter and spirit of the Manifesto. Aside from the already cited passages explicitly endorsing the abolition of private property, consider point three of the ten-point program: Abolition of all right of inheritance. If inheritance is abolished, there is no mechanism to pass private property on to a new generation. Private property disappears even without expropriation upon the death of the last property owner. Surely this point underscores Marx and Engels’s commitment to common ownership.

To avoid this seemingly impassable obstacle, Zilbersheid simply begs the question. He turns the text on its head by stating, “It seems that the radical formulation in this connection [abolition of inheritance] does not actually belong to the socioeconomic program of the Manifesto, which is a blueprint for a mixed system” (79).
Never mind what Marx and Engels actually wrote in the Manifesto, since it cannot be fit into Zilbersheid’s scheme!

Where the many endorsements of the abolition of private property in the Manifesto prove troubling, Zilbersheid has a weak and unsatisfying answer: “I would suggest that Marx mentioned a total nationalization as a concession to radical members... in the socialist movement and in his own party” (2004, 73). In fact, however, Marx strengthened the commitment to nationalization in the Manifesto. Where Engels wrote in the Principles of Communism of “Limitation of private property” and “heavy inheritance taxes,” Marx and Engels advocated a more radical vision of “Abolition of property in land” and “abolition of all right of inheritance” in the Manifesto. A comparison of the two texts suggests that Marx was even more strongly committed programmatically to a radical transformation of property relations than his coauthor. Apparently Marx—the more radical of the two on this point—prevailed.

Zilbersheid’s understanding of Marx and Engels’s writings on democracy is inadequate and muddled. In their early years, both men were overly impressed by the revolutionary potential of universal suffrage, especially by the ideology of the Chartist movement. By the time of their collaboration on the Manifesto, they had clearly separated the question into two components: the strategy and tactics of working in the framework of prerevolutionary bourgeois democracy and the construction of a postrevolutionary proletarian democracy. This distinction seems to have escaped Zilbersheid, who finds contradictions in their writings based upon his conflation of the two components.

Communists work with other political classes and their parties for limited common ends in parliament and extraparliamentary actions. But the proletarian revolution is another matter. The Manifesto states that “the first step in the revolution by the working class is to raise the proletariat to the position of ruling class, to win the battle of democracy” (1976b, 504). There is clearly no need for an alliance in proletarian democracy, because if the proletariat succeeds “by means of a revolution, it makes itself the ruling class, and, as such, sweeps away by force the old conditions of
production, then it will, along with these conditions, have swept away the conditions for the existence of class antagonisms and of classes generally, and will thereby have abolished its own supremacy as a class” (505–6) An alliance is neither necessary nor possible when proletarian democracy is established.

This position only strengthened after the failed revolutions of 1848, when Marx incorporated the notion of “dictatorship of the proletariat” into revolutionary theory (Marx 1978, 69, 122, 127). And after the massacre of the Paris Commune of 1871, their contempt for bourgeois democracy was complete, and their advocacy of proletarian rule even more steadfast.

**Painless revolution**

He [Marx] suggested a mixed socioeconomic system brought by a political alliance between the working classes and the productive—productive—portion of the bourgeois. Such an alliance, often encouraged by the labor movement when in power, has become the foundation of the modern welfare state. Marx, having suggested such an alliance 150 years ago, should be seen as the founder of the modern welfare state. (italics by Zilbersheid 2004, 90)

If we are to accept Zilbersheid’s reading of Marx and Engels, we have already achieved the first stage of our communist revolution and lost it to neoliberalism, beginning with Thatcher and Reagan. Today, Bush II, Blair, and Schröder are the caretakers for this counterrevolution that overturned the postwar social-democratic, welfare-statist, bourgeois democratic Keynesian paradise that Zilbersheid sees as the initial elements of communist revolution. Those of us who consider ourselves Communists should, therefore, join hands with the “progressive” bourgeoisie and fight to return to the golden era of the transition to communism.

This is certainly one way to achieve socialism: Declare a victorious revolution and go back to exploitative jobs, poor health care, insecurity, imperialist wars, racism, periodic unemployment, and vast differences in income and wealth. I have shown that there is no basis for this view in Marx. Is it not troubling that Zilbersheid recommends it as the proper stance for socialist, workers, and
It is one thing to work with reformists towards reformist goals, it is entirely another to interpret those reformist goals as somehow revolutionary. There have been other times when the realization of socialism appeared to be far off in the future, but the Communists nonetheless kept Marx and Engels’s inspiring idea alive. It is not a question of what is likely, easy, or certain; rather, it is a matter of what is possible, just, and honorable.

Zilbersheid’s “communist revolution” is certainly no “spectre.” Nor will it “haunt” anyone, anywhere.

The author received many helpful comments from Roger Keeran, Thomas Kenny, and Walter Tillow.

Pittsburgh

REFERENCE LIST


Reply to Godels by Uri Zilbersheid

In response to Godels’s attack on my argument that Marx was a gradualist, I should emphasize that even Marx’s later writings do not repudiate my own line of interpretation. In part 4 of the Critique of the Gotha Programme, for example, he speaks of the two stages
of communism, or of the communist revolution, but suggests that a transition period, which is not identical with the first stage of communism, will precede communism:

Between capitalist and communist society lies the period of the revolutionary transformation of the one into the other. Corresponding to this is also a political transition period in which the state can be nothing but the revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat (1989, 95).

Marx defines the state in this period as the dictatorship of the proletariat because certain measures it enacts under the rule of the proletariat and its allies are all but “despotic inroads on the rights of property” (Communist Manifesto). A main point in his theory of revolution is that socialists should play a major role in the transitional period. In a letter to Joseph Weydemeyer (5 March 1852), Marx says that “this dictatorship [of the proletariat] itself constitutes no more than a transition to the abolition of all classes” (65)—that is to say, the transitional period is still a class society. In part 1, sect. 4, of the Critique of the Gotha Program, Marx, alluding to the Communist Manifesto, urges the socialist parties not to view certain classes, especially the bourgeoisie, “as the bearer of large-scale industry,” but also the “lower middle classes,” namely, small manufacturers, artisans, and peasants, as part of the reactionary forces (his attitude toward the latter was always ambivalent) (1989, 89). Here he practically calls upon the socialists to form an alliance with relatively progressive forces in the transitional period. Politically, if socialists would wage a total war against all capitalists, feudal landlords, and all those who own some economic means, they would practically strengthen the conservative kinds of capital and other conservative forces, as they would force the relatively progressive capitalists and other relatively progressive forces to form an alliance with them.

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In his interesting and provocative discussion of Maurice Conforth’s 1965 response, in the name of Marxism, to analytic moral philosophy (*Nature, Society, and Thought*, vol. 16, no. 3 [2003]), Renzo Llorente urges that “Marxists should be suspicious of any insistence on a (synchronic) transclass universalization of moral precepts” (272n13) because “(appreciable) class inequalities constitute morally significant dissimilarities among agents from different social classes” (266, italics in original).

Up to a point—but what point?—the suspicion Llorente urges should not be very controversial. Even bourgeois judges commonly accept, for example, that shoplifting will not necessarily be equally culpable regardless of the class of the shoplifter, for the obvious reason that differences of class are going to lead to significant differences in different individuals’ possibilities and motivations.

How does this pose a challenge to the metaethical “universalizability principle”? Strictly speaking, not at all. The principle, as quoted by Cornforth and Llorente (214 and 263, quoting Hare 1963, 139), says that a moral judgment “logically commits the speaker to making a similar judgment about anything which is either exactly like the subject of the original judgment or like it in the relevant respects” (Cornforth has “aspects” for “respects”); and the point, of course, is that class differences often do make people and their situations quite unlike in relevant respects.

But just what “respects” are going to count as being “relevant” ethically? That is another matter. Universalizability is a principle


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about what somebody expressing a moral judgment is committed to *logically*—that is, committed to just in order to remain *self-consistent*. Though there are limits to what one can claim to be ethically relevant without being ridiculous, there are no limits given merely in logic to what one can call relevant without ceasing to be *self-consistent*. So it does not even violate the universalizability principle, for example, to judge it wicked to gore the ox belonging to a farmer with fingerprints of pattern ABC, but perfectly *licit* to gore the ox of a farmer with fingerprints of pattern XYZ. As many writers have noted, the *logical* universalizability principle does not take us very far!

Still, people who make moral judgments—i.e., all of us who are not completely conscienceless—are logically obliged to base our judgments on consistent criteria for assessing the cases we judge, however divergent the actual verdicts which can result from differing circumstances in different particular cases. On the other hand, Llorente is surely right to quote with full approval Cornforth’s dissent from the *unqualified* proposition “that the same principles which work in private life when individuals respect each other’s interests are equally applicable in public affairs” (268, quoting Cornforth 1965, 236). All of us who are not pacifists, for example, will agree that the moral assessment of *killing* in private life and in war (including revolutionary war) *cannot* be just the same: the callousness of nonviolence-whatever-the-consequences is just too glaring. Does this mean that in politics anything goes—an any lie, any atrocity? Not at all, but very largely “the answers to questions about the rights and wrongs of personal behavior depend on the answers to questions about the rights and wrongs of social organization” (269, quoting Cornforth 1965, 238).

Marx was certainly no pacifist, but that did not stop him, in the Inaugural Address of the First International, from calling on the international working class “to vindicate the simple laws of morals and justice, which ought to govern the relations of private individuals, as the rules paramount of the intercourse of nations” (1985, 13). In the context, it is clear that the rules he had in mind were promise-keeping, nonaggression, and the like. Of course “paramount” does not mean absolute and eternal.
Different historical conditions call for different norms, and “historical materialism,” as Llorente notes, accordingly “proves incompatible with . . . the transhistorical . . . universalization of moral principles” (272n13, italics in original). But the historical mutability of a norm which is appropriate for the present day should not stop it from being genuinely binding now. Llorente is right to quote Cornforth’s words approvingly: “The divorce which some have made between political questions on the one hand, and moral ones on the other, is totally alien and contradictory to the scientific socialist conception of human ends” (270, quoting Conforth 1965, 361–62). Divorcing politics from morality is even wrong because, as Llorente says, if that is accepted, “all consideration of truly universalizable moral canons is foreclosed” (270). The “universalizability” at stake here must obviously come to something more substantial than just that which is required merely for formal-logical consistency.

But what? The world has seen many a moralist absolutize this or that rule of conduct as supposedly exceptionless and eternal; but, if all these preachings, whatever their partial, relative validity, must indeed ultimately fall short, what are we left with? By what common criterion can these relative degrees of validity be assessed in comparison with each other? Contrary to all dogmas of metaphysical moralism, the validity of any norm of conduct at all can only be relative. Does this mean, though, that nothing whatsoever in ethics is absolute?

Not a bit. In opposition to the entire “metaphysical mode of thought” stands dialectics (Engels 1987, 22–23, and 1989, 298–301). In the present climate of opinion, it was indeed pretty bold of Llorente to cite with appreciation the ideas of Maurice Cornforth, who undoubtedly was, as Llorente says, “a Communist Party intellectual” (262). Writing in his Philosophical Notebooks, another Communist Party intellectual, V. I. Lenin, declared

in (objective) dialectics the difference between the relative and the absolute is itself relative. For objective dialectics, there is an absolute within the relative. (1961, 360; italics in original)
Engels, cited above, after going at some length into the extreme scarcity of genuine eternal truths in the sciences and the historically variable social circumstances of different nations at different times, was prepared to write:

We therefore reject every attempt to impose on us any moral dogma whatsoever as an eternal, ultimate and forever immutable ethical law on the pretext that the moral world, too, has its permanent principles which stand above history and the differences between nations. \ldots That \ldots there has on the whole been progress in morality, as in all other branches of human knowledge, no one will doubt. But we have not yet passed beyond class morality. A really human morality which stands above class antagonisms and above any recollection of them becomes possible only at a stage of society which has not only overcome class antagonisms but has even forgotten them in practical life. (1987, 87–88)

So Engels thinks there has over time been progress in morality. Just what, then, is the transhistorical criterion for assessing historical progress in societies’ (appreciation of) rules of conduct, if not itself any particular rule or rules of conduct? In this connection, Marx and Engels generally stress especially “the development of the capacities of the human species” and “humanity’s leap from the kingdom of necessity to the kingdom of freedom” (Marx 1989b, 348 [“human” emphasized in the original]; Engels 1987, 266–70).

There certainly are analytic philosophers who would strenuously object to the way Engels classes morality as a branch of human knowledge. Even granting the scientific conclusion that class society in general and capitalism in particular are sociologically responsible for the persistence of war, poverty, ignorance, and other forms of human indignity and suffering, and that socialism, on the other hand, would make it possible to end national and gender inequality, progressively develop human potential in both labor and culture to unprecedented levels, enable people generally to become for the first time masters of their own lives, individually and collectively, and thereby open the
door to the further development of human emancipation in what Marx called the “higher phase of communist society” (1989a, 87)—even granting all that, they say that the ethical superiority of socialism and communism over capitalism and the assessment of society’s movement in that direction as historical progress do not rationally follow. And indeed, such is these philosophers’ conception of rationality that for them indeed no value judgment ever can follow rationally. Is there really any good reason, though, for us to take such an impoverished conception of rationality seriously? Marx certainly had a different conception from that of reason and of what is reasonable. He looked forward, he said in Capital I, to a stage of history “when the practical relations of every-day life offer to man none but perfectly intelligible and reasonable relations with regard to his fellowmen and to Nature” (1996, 90, italics added). So he, at any rate, thought certain sorts of social relations among human beings were in keeping with reason more than others were.

Nor do we need to guess how Marx thought postclass society would be organized in the “higher phase of communist society.” Here is the famous paragraph from which that phrase comes:

In a higher phase of communist society, after the enslaving subordination of the individual to the division of labour, and thereby also the antithesis between mental and physical labour, has vanished; after labour has become not only a means of life but life’s prime want; after the productive forces have also increased with the all-round development of the individual, and all the springs of common wealth flow more abundantly—only then can the narrow horizon of bourgeois right be crossed in its entirety and society inscribe on its banners: From each according to his abilities, to each according to his needs! (1989a, 87)

The concluding slogan is often quoted, but we should note its specific content: each and all (voluntarily) contributing to the best of their ability, and each and all, according to their various needs, receiving individually such consumables as will make, overall, for the fullest satisfaction of all those needs. It is this sort of principle of social organization, apparently, which Engels had in mind.
in speaking of a postclass “really human morality” in the Anti-Dühring passage quoted above. To quote the famous words of the Communist Manifesto:

In place of the old bourgeois society, with its classes and class antagonisms, we shall have an association, in which the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all. (Marx and Engels 1976, 506)

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NOTE

*Far from believing, however, that human progress was guaranteed in perpetuity for the future, Engels considered that “for the history of mankind, too, there is not only an ascending but also a descending branch” in view of the eventual cooling of the sun, etc. (1990, 360).

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On Reappraising Maurice Cornforth

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I found Renzo Llorente’s article “Maurice Cornforth’s Contribution to Marxist Metaethics” (Nature, Society, and Thought, vol. 16, no. 3 [2003]) of great interest because I am in full agreement with his contention that the works of Maurice Cornforth (1908–1980), have been unjustly neglected by contemporary scholars of left-wing philosophy. In fact, the claim that Cornforth’s works, along with the contributions of his entire generation of British Marxist intellectuals, have been unfairly overlooked has been a principal preoccupation of my own scholarship for over a decade. For the most part, Llorente’s article is quite well done, especially in capturing Cornforth’s direct and rigorous style of argumentation. There remain, however, some key points of contention I should like to raise regarding how we might best reappraise Cornforth’s work.

My first point of contention involves Llorente’s largely extraneous claim that analytical Marxism represents the most fruitful strain of contemporary Marxist philosophy. Although I admit to having once been enamored with the remarkably innovative qualities of G. A. Cohen’s Karl Marx’s Theory of History: A Defence (1978), I have since become disillusioned with his and other subsequent works by analytical Marxists. On the issue of a postcapitalist order, their conclusions are overly vague, tending toward a broad egalitarianism and a soft social-democratic politics over a vigorous challenge to the existing socioeconomic order. More
fundamentally, it seems clear that Marxist analysis loses much of its critical edge as compared with other methods—behaviorism, postmodernism, etc.—when it abandons its Hegelian roots and dialectical foundations. (Smith 1993 and Ollman 2003 provide useful examples of why this is so.) Indeed, Cornforth himself, although he came to doubt the ontological status of Engels’s dialectics of nature, never abandoned the central role of dialectical methods in Marxian social science (Cornforth 1980, 66–68).

My second point is that the article lacks an appreciation, or at least an acknowledgment, of the broader historical context out of which Cornforth developed the ethical theory found in Marxism and the Linguistic Philosophy (1965). Llorente makes the point that we should appreciate this work as a nondogmatic study by a Communist philosopher of a major trend in (non-Marxist) analytic philosophy. This is not something we would be led to expect from a figure of Cornforth’s standing. What Llorente is in fact doing is to complement Cornforth’s own intentions. For Marxism and the Linguistic Philosophy was written as an attempt to prove that he had shaken off the dogmatic elements of his thinking after a decade of reevaluation.

Cornforth had written two previous works dealing with some aspect of analytic philosophy. His first, Science and Idealism (1946), was a pioneering attempt at a Marxist history of the British empiricist tradition. In it he argued that the development of logical analytic philosophy represented the decline of empiricism from a politically engaged and materialist scientific philosophy to a position of apolitical scholasticism and idealism (Cornforth 1946, 261–63). His second book on the subject, In Defence of Philosophy (1950), was rabidly polemical. Here Cornforth took on the mainstream of modern Anglo-American philosophy as degenerate and reactionary. Taking up the line of Andrei Zhdanov’s On the History of Philosophy, Cornforth denounced, in often vicious terms, logical analysis and indeed virtually all non-Marxist thought as meritless for understanding the nature of the world (Cornforth 1950, 236, 251).

Following the events of 1956, especially the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Cornforth
became more self-reflective and came to view his work as having drifted in a dogmatic direction. After a long period of archival research, Cornforth decided it was time to rethink the relations between Marxism and contemporary philosophy, although he seems to have confined himself to trends in British philosophy (Cornforth 1965, 12).

In note 4, Llorente argues that some connections can be made between the works of G. A. Cohen and Cornforth in that Cornforth acknowledged some of the merits of analytic philosophy and employed a style not unlike it. The fact is that Cornforth was a product of the analytic school. His mentor at Cambridge University from 1929 to 1931 was G. E. Moore, cofounder of the school (with Bertrand Russell). In addition, he studied for a year under Ludwig Wittgenstein. Cornforth, however, came to question the analytic school as he became more interested in Communism as both a cause and an outlook. He came to believe that the school tended toward subjectivism and that it hid behind a veneer of pure (apolitical) scholarship. These were conclusions he came to after reading Lenin’s *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*. By 1965, however, Cornforth had come to believe that analytic philosophy had rooted out much of its subjectivism in the form of the ordinary language philosophy of J. L. Austin and G. Ryle. In addition, he maintained that this new type of analytic philosophy contained elements that could be useful to Marxism (Cornforth 1965, 156). Despite this, if we look at the whole of Cornforth’s work, the principal mode of analytic philosophy that influenced him throughout was that of Wittgenstein. This is something that Llorente shows some grasp of when he quotes Cornforth on the use of language (Llorente 2003, 268). For Cornforth, it was the way sentences are employed that helps determine their social character and thus their logical and political coherence. This Wittgenstein-influenced position was a key element in all Cornforth’s writings and is a sign of his innovativeness as a Marxist thinker.

One final point: writing on Cornforth’s contribution to ethical theory, Llorente missed the opportunity to contrast Cornforth’s work, however briefly, with that of the other key British Marxist philosopher of the time, John Lewis. Unlike Cornforth, Lewis was
an academic and was also of a more Hegelian orientation. More to the point, the bulk of Lewis’s work concerned moral and ethical theory. Thus, he would make an excellent figure to compare and contrast with Cornforth over the importance of the influences of analytic philosophy and the British contribution to Marxist ethics.

I should like to reiterate that this criticism should not be seen as an attempt to diminish Llorente’s informative and interesting article. Instead, let us hope that more interest will be generated in this subject and more stimulating contributions will be forthcoming.

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NOTES


2. The significant fact here is that Ryle was also a teacher and mentor to G. A. Cohen.

3. Lewis, a former clergyman, was once a devotee of the British Hegelian T. H. Green. A Ph.D. in philosophy, (although never appointed to a full professorship), Lewis lectured at various British universities, including Cambridge and the University of London, for over thirty years. From 1945 to 1956 he edited *The Modern Quarterly*, one of Britain’s leading Marxist journals, which also served as the first major forum for Cornforth’s writings.

4. Of all Cornforth’s writings, I recommend for contemporary readers his *The Open Philosophy and the Open Society* (1968). This work is a critique of the anti-Marxist writings of Karl Popper, still very influential among liberal and libertarian critics of Marxism. In it, Cornforth presents a rigorous yet entertaining rebuttal, defending the integrity of Marxism as an critical philosophy, a relevant method for the social sciences, and a democratic political theory.

REFERENCE LIST

Commentaries: On Reappraising Maurice Cornforth


ABSTRACTS

Domenico Losurdo, “What Is Fundamentalism?”—As a self-designation, the term fundamentalist has been proudly adopted by some groups in the United States, yet its principal use today is as a pejorative term by Western societies toward the lifestyle of those who call themselves Islamists. In reality, this use of the term fundamentalism indicates simply the negative reaction of one culture to another, with the characteristics of both cultures assumed to be natural to the respective group. When this is done, no culture can escape the danger of being branded as fundamentalist. Therefore, a serious analysis of this phenomenon is not possible without including the West, and especially the United States, which is the only contemporary state that adheres in its international dealings to the ideology of holy war. Any analysis of fundamentalism that in any way promotes the crusade by the “secular” and “civilized” Western world against “barbaric” and “clerical” Islam is nonsensical in both the historical and logical sense, and is also a political catastrophe.

Christos D. Georgiou, “Analogies between Aristotle’s Ontology and Biological Ideologies of Human Nature”—This article proposes that certain ideas of the Aristotelian biological ontology are analogous to the basic teleological elements of leading ideologies of contemporary biology, specifically sociobiology. Aristotle’s basic idea corresponds to the sociobiological view that human nature is genetically predetermined, basically immutable, and composed of universal and personal behavioral and intellectual characteristics. These are coded in perfect (normal) and imperfect (mutated) genes, the modern analogy of Aristotle’s entelechia and final cause. For sociobiology, society is hierarchically structured as result of the sum total of its
citizens’ universal and individual faculties. The position of every individual in the sociohierarchical scale is determined mainly by “intelligence genes,” a gradation signpost analogous to Aristotle’s vouleftikon.

**Uri Zilbersheid “Welfare State and Democracy in Marx’s Theory of Revolution”—** Marx distinguishes, according to the author, between two phases of the revolution. The aim of the first is to create the preconditions for the second phase, communism. The principles of the prerequisite conditions are a blueprint for a “mixed economy” with equal and comprehensive social services. This “welfare state” should be established by an alliance between the working classes and the progressive part of the bourgeoisie, productive capital. Accordingly, “democracy” should denote this progressive alliance and its program. Marx’s gradualist approach should be adopted by socialists all over the world, according to the author. Such an adoption could change the current direction of globalization.

**Greg Godels, “Revolution without Pain: A Critique of Uri Zilbersheid’s ‘Welfare State and Democracy in Marx’s Theory of Revolution’”—** The author argues that contrary to Zilbersheid’s assertion, Marx and Engels clearly set forth in the *Communist Manifesto* the view that the distinguishing feature of communism is the abolition of bourgeois property. The author rejects Zilbersheid’s view of the first stage of a communist revolution as a social-democratic, welfare-statist, bourgeois-democratic Keynesian paradise. It is one thing to work with reformists towards reformist goals, but once the working class has gained ascendancy and established a proletarian democracy, alliances with the bourgeoisie are neither needed nor possible.

**Danny Goldstick, “On Marxist Ethics”—** The author offers a commentary on a statement by R. M. Hare quoted in an earlier issue of this journal (*Nature, Society, and Thought* 16, no. 3 [2003]: 263): “A moral judgment logically commits the speaker to making a similar judgment about anything which is either exactly like the subject of the original judgment or like it in the relevant respects.” In his elaboration of the Marxist view that class
differences do make people and their situations unlike in relevant respects, Goldstick discusses what respects should be counted as relevant ethically.

In a comment on Llorente’s article about Maurice Cornforth (Nature, Society, and Thought, vol. 16, no. 3), the author takes issue with Llorente’s claim that analytical Marxism represents the most fruitful strain of contemporary Marxist philosophy and argues that Marxist analysis loses much of its critical edge when it abandons its Hegelian roots and dialectical foundations. The author discusses the historical contexts out of which Cornforth developed his ethical theory, pointing out that Cornforth was actually a product of the analytical school, but never abandoned the central role of dialectical methods in Marxist philosophy.

**ABREGES**

Domenico Losurdo, «Qu’est-ce que c’est l’intégrisme?»—Le terme intériste a été fièrement adopté comme auto-désignation par quelques groupes aux États-Unis. Cependant, il est aujourd’hui principalement employé dans un sens péjoratif par les sociétés occidentales, par rapport au mode de vie de ceux qui s’identifient comme islamistes. En fait, cet emploi du terme intégrisme ne fait qu’indiquer la réaction négative d’une culture envers une autre, en supposant la caractéristique de chaque culture naturelle pour le groupe en question. En conséquence, aucune culture ne peut échapper au danger d’être stigmatisée comme intériste. Une analyse sérieuse de ce phénomène n’est donc pas possible sans inclure l’Occident, et surtout les États-Unis, qui est le seul état actuel incluant dans ses relations internationales l’idéologie de la «guerre sainte». Une analyse de l’intégrisme qui encourage de quelque manière que ce soit la croisade du monde occidental «laïque» et «civilisé» contre l’Islam «barbare» et «clérical», est historiquement et logiquement absurde, et c’est aussi une catastrophe politique.
Christos D. Georgiou, « Des analogies entre l’ontologie d’Aristote et les idéologies biologiques de la nature humaine » — L’auteur suggère que certaines idées de l’ontologie biologique aristotélicienne soient analogues aux éléments téléologiques de base de l’idéologie de la sociobiologie contemporaine. L’idée de base d’Aristote correspond à une vue sociobiologique que la nature humaine est génétiquement prédéterminée, immuable, et composée de caractéristiques behavioristes et intellectuelles universelles et personnelles. Celles-ci sont codées en gènes parfaits (normaux) et imparfaits (ayant subi une mutation), l’analogie moderne de l’entéléchie et la cause finale d’Aristote. Pour la sociobiologie, la société est hiérarchiquement structurée, résultant de la somme totale des facultés universelles et individuelles de ses citoyens. La position de chaque individu sur l’échelle sociohiérarchique est principalement déterminée par les « gènes d’intelligence », un indicateur de positionnement analogue au vouleftikon d’Aristote.

Uri Zilbersheid, « Etat-providence et démocratie dans la Théorie de la Révolution de Marx » — Selon l’auteur, Marx distingue deux phases de la révolution. Le but de la première est de créer les conditions pour la seconde phase, le communisme. Les principes des conditions requises sont un schéma directeur de « l’économie mixte » avec des services sociaux égalitaires et variés. Cet « état-providence » devrait être mis en place grâce à une alliance entre la classe ouvrière et la partie progressiste de la bourgeoisie, le capital productif. Ainsi la « démocratie » devrait marquer cette alliance progressiste et son programme. Selon l’auteur, l’approche graduelle de Marx devrait être adoptée par les socialistes dans le monde entier. Une telle adoption pourrait changer la direction actuelle de la globalisation.

Greg Godels, « Révolution sans douleur: une critique de l’article d’Uri Zilbersheid « Etat-providence et démocratie dans la Théorie de la Révolution de Marx » — L’auteur argumente que contrairement à la thèse de Zilbersheid, Marx et Engels ont exprimé clairement dans le Manifeste Communiste leur opinion selon laquelle la caractéristique particulière du communisme est l’abolition de la propriété bourgeoise. L’auteur rejette les vues
de Zilbersheid sur un premier stade d’une révolution communiste en tant que paradis social-démocrate, état-providentiel keynésien et bourgeois-démocratique. C’est une chose de travailler avec des réformistes sur des objectifs réformistes, mais une fois que la classe ouvrière a gagné en influence et établi une démocratie prolétarienne, les alliances avec la bourgeoisie ne sont ni requises ni possibles.

Danny Goldstick, « A propos de l’éthique marxiste » — L’auteur commente la constatation de R.M. Hare citée dans un plus premier numéro de cette revue (Nature, Society, and Thought 16, no. 3 [2003]: 263): « Un jugement moral engage logiquement son auteur à rendre un jugement similaire par rapport à tout ce qui ressemble parfaitement, ou au moins d’une manière significative, au sujet du jugement initial ». Dans son élaboration du point de vue marxiste, précisant que les différences de classe rendent effectivement les individus et leurs situations significativement différents, Goldstick passe en revue les aspects devant découler d’un point de vue éthique.