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From Race to Class Struggle: Marxism and Critical Race Theory

E. San Juan Jr.

Only in the context which sees the isolated facts of social life as aspects of the historical process and integrates them into a totality, can knowledge of facts hope to become knowledge of reality.

—Georg Lukács

What “ought to be” is therefore concrete, indeed it is the only realistic and historicist interpretation of reality. It alone is history in the making and philosophy in the making, it alone is politics.

—Antonio Gramsci

Owing to the unrelenting ideological and political constraints of the Cold War, academic discourse on racism and ethnic/racial relations has erased the Marxian concept of class as an antagonistic relation, displacing it with neo-Weberian notions of status, life-style, and other cultural contingencies. Despite the civil rights struggles of the sixties, methodological individualism and normative functionalism continue to prevail in the humanities and social sciences. The decline of militant trade unionism and the attenuation of “third world” liberation struggles contributed to the erasure of class conflicts. With the introduction of structuralist and poststructuralist paradigms in the last three decades, the concept
of class struggle has been effectively displaced by the concept of power and differential relations.

From the viewpoint of the humanities and cultural studies (fields in which I am somehow implicated), the advent of critical race theory (CRT) in the eighties was salutary if not anticlimactic. For the strategic foregrounding of racism and the race problematic (following feminism’s assault on the Cold War stereotypes of economic determinism and class reductionism synonymous with Marxism *tout court* in the previous decades), CRT served to remedy the inadequacies of the intersectionality paradigm of gender, class, and race. Unfortunately, with the neoconservative resurgence in the Reagan/Bush administrations and the collapse of “actually existing socialism” in the Soviet Union and arguably in China, the deconstruction of bourgeois legal discourse and its attendant institutions will no longer suffice. This is so not only because of the reconfigured international situation and the emergence of neoliberal apologetics and authoritarian decrees, but because of the accelerated class war manifest in ongoing deindustrialization, huge income gaps, unemployment, destruction of welfare-state guarantees, and disabling of traditional challenges to corporate rule.

**Challenge of the epochal divide**

The advent of critical race theory marked a rediscovery of the primacy of the social relations of production and the division of labor in late modern industrial society. A historicizing perspective was applied by Derrick Bell and elaborated by, among others, Charles Mills in his theory of the United States as a “racial polity.” However, a tendency to juxtapose “class” as a classifying category with “race” and “gender” in an intersectional framework has disabled the Marxian concept of class relation as a structural determinant. This has led to the reduction of the relational dynamic of class to an economistic factor of identity, even though critical race theory attacks capitalist relations of production and its legal ideology as the ground for racist practices and institutions.

The intersectionality approach (where race, class, and gender function as equally salient variables) so fashionable today substitutes a static nominalism for concrete class analysis. It displaces
a Marxian with a Weberian organon of knowledge. As Gregory Meyerson notes, the “explanatory primacy of class analysis” is a theoretical requisite for understanding the structural determinants of race, gender, and class oppression (2003). Class as an antagonistic relation is, from a historical-materialist viewpoint, the only structural determinant of ideologies and practices sanctioning racial and gender oppression in capitalist society.

Nonetheless, it was exhilarating to read classic texts in both CRT anthologies of Richard Delgado (1995) and Kimberle Crenshaw et al. (1995), such as Cheryl Harris’s “Whiteness as Property,” Delgado’s “Legal Storytelling,” and Derrick Bell’s “Property Rights in Whiteness.” Not being a legal scholar, I cannot gauge how effective the impact of CRT has been in changing legislation, court procedures, and prison and police behavior, nor how CRT has altered academic practice in law schools. Bell has been exemplary in linking class exploitation and racial discrimination. Racism indeed cannot be understood outside or separate from the social division of labor in the capitalist mode of production and its concomitant reproduction of unequal relations. This is a central insight that has motivated many CRT practitioners. But, as Alan Freeman has noted, the “dilemma of liberal reform” springs from CRT’s inability, or refusal, to reject—not just question, expose, or demystify—the premises or presuppositions of the system. Freeman adds that the various strategies Bell and others have deployed simply preserve “the myths of liberal reform.” He concludes: “Yet it is one thing to call for, and show the need for, the historicization of civil rights law, and quite another to write the history. The task of unmasking, of exposing presuppositions, of delegitimizing, is easier than that of offering a concrete historical account to replace what is exposed as inadequate” (1995, 462). Could it be that for all its power as a rigorous critical analytic of U.S. jurisprudence and mainstream legal theory and practice, CRT has fatally confined itself to this reformist task?

With its derivation from legal realism (Jerome Frank) and critical legal studies (Roberto Unger), it seems that CRT’s adherence to the notions of formal justice, which translates into “another style of class domination” (1984, 136) based on the rule of law,
leads to acceptance of the fact of substantive inequality. To eliminate the effects of systemic domination and subordination, racial justice and gender parity may not be sufficient. As Daniel Bensaid remarks,

Theories of justice and the critique of political economy are irreconcilable. Conceived as the protection of the private sphere, liberal politics seals the holy alliance between the nightwatchman state and the market of opinions in which individual interests are supposed to be harmonized. Marx’s *Capital* establishes the impossibility of allocating the collective productivity of social labour individually. Whereas the theory of justice rests on the atomism of contractual procedures, and on the formalist fiction of mutual agreement (whereby individuals become partners in a cooperative adventure for their mutual advantage), social relations of exploitation are irreducible to intersubjective relations. (2002, 158)

On the other hand, one commentator ascribes to CRT the allegedly Marxist doctrine of “radical contingency” and then faults it for its belief that the experience of the racially oppressed affords valid knowledge of society. CRT’s loss of political neutrality and perspectival objectivity could prevent it from engaging the dominant discourses as well as compromise its revolutionary aspirations (Belliotti 1995). Given the historical stages of its emergence, CRT’s eclectic nonconformity and pluralist constructionism may be the source of its strength and also its weakness in promoting radical institutional changes. One may hypothesize that a reassessment of CRT’s condition of possibility may disclose ways of renewing its emancipatory potential.

Reviewing the historical context of the formation of critical race theory can be a heuristic point of departure. Why, at this conjuncture of the seventies and eighties, did the evil of racism replace the evil of class exploitation for CRT and other progressive intellectuals committed to radical democracy if not a more permanent revolutionary movement toward socialism? Why did the problem of racism overshadow what is now a tamed “classism”? Why did movements for recognition eclipse the working-class struggle against exploitation at the point of production?
Like most liberal academics in the seventies, I reacted to the right- and left-wing opportunisms of the leftist formations that mechanically reduced all struggles to support for “bread-and-butter” unionism. My reading of Robert Blauner’s *Racial Oppression in America* (1972) and contending theories of internal colonialism was a breath of fresh air (see San Juan 1992, 2003). Amid debates on the “national question,” we welcomed the issues raised by Stuart Hall and others concerning the formulaic base/superstructure metaphor, the relative autonomy of the ideological field, and the labor metaphysics; we found challenging the theses on racialized polity and the rationale of white supremacy elaborated in such works as Oliver Cox’s *Caste, Class and Race* (1948). Hall’s observation on the complex constitution of class served as a guide to further inquiry: “Race is the modality in which class is lived. It is also the medium in which class relations are experienced” (quoted in Solomos 1986, 103). This modality, though framed by class antagonism, in practice exercised a cause-free autonomy (following Althusser) that immunized it from any totalizing dialectical virus.

One suspects that with this stress on modality of experience, Paul Gilroy (in *Against Race*) was inspired to condemn the evils of ultranationalism, ethnic absolutism, and “raciology’s brutal reasonings” with a plea for revitalizing “ethical sensibility” (2000, 6). One wonders if this is part of an ingenious political strategy or another deconstructive flourish. Amid the incommensurability of local solidarities and diasporic estrangement, amid the aesthetization and spectacularization of commodities that Gilroy indicts, can we do a return to Kant? Can we regenerate ethical awareness by invoking “visions of planetary humanity” and “cosmopolitan traditions” without understanding their historical determinants and trajectories?

In mainstream social sciences and humanities, the Weberian emphasis on ethnicity (status, roles, etc.) and ethnic marginalization displaced the problem of class inequality (Crompton 1995). Experts like Robert Park, Robert Merton, Erik Erikson, Fredrick Barth, Nathan Glazer, and others focused on identity crisis from the optic of methodological individualism, rational-choice theory,
and other pluralist nostrums. In the Establishment source-book *Ethnicity: Theory and Experience* (1975), Glazer and Patrick Moynihan pontificated on the “persistence and salience of ethnic-based forms of social identification and conflict” over those based on class (Sollors 1996, xiii). Culture, not economics, is the key to understanding problems of injustice, poverty, alienation. With the prevalence of poststructuralist and deconstructive modes of thinking (Derrida, Foucault, Deleuze) in the neoconservative eighties and nineties, the new orthodoxies represented by Michael Omi and Howard Winant’s *Racial Formation in the United States* (1986) and the work of the Birmingham School of cultural studies, in particular Stuart Hall and Paul Gilroy, preempted any quick return to a retheorized mode of class analysis and a reconstituted political economy of racism and sexism.

Let me cite here the prolific revisionary work of David Theo Goldberg. In his *Racist Culture* (1993) and subsequent texts, Goldberg has obsessively pursued a Foucauldian/neopragmatist genealogy of racist discourse and practices, rejecting structuralist conceptualizations as well as the standard approach that reduced racism to an epiphenomenon of economics or politics in which “racism is mostly conceived as ideological, a set of rationalizations for sustaining exploitative economic practices and exclusionary political relations” (1993, 93). Goldberg thus dismisses as narrow and restrictive Robert Miles’s theory of racialization (1989)—the construction of differentiated social collectivities by the way human biological characteristics are signified. For Goldberg, exclusion by virtue of imputed somatic characteristics acquires a privileged position in the analysis of social relations, overshadowing the fact of class exploitation. In so doing, Goldberg and other ludic neopragmatists lapse into a species of nominalism that equates class with stratification, not recognized as constituting a “real totality,” but “as an aggregate of individuals, who are differentiated from one another in terms of various kinds of social and psychological criteria” (Giddens 1973, 76).

Nominalists (like Goldberg) refuse to recognize class as a relational process in historical reality. Limited to a concern with atomistic facts rather than with a world of intelligible necessity,
sociologists of ethnicity likewise confine themselves to heterogeneous experiential data removed from any larger sociohistorical process within which they acquire intelligibility. Instead of historical-materialist principles, techniques of psychologistic and functional instrumentalism are deployed to connect discrete phenomena and validate the normality and consistency of the status quo. This applies to the functionalism of neo-Weberians, hermeneutic and interpretive humanists, and various neo-Marxists who reject the historical-materialist principles of critique, totality, and the dialectical approach to elucidating the dynamics of multifarious contradictions in society.

One staunch opponent of the ethnicity paradigm, Stephen Steinberg, summed up the trends I have been sketching here in his militant book *Turning Back: The Retreat from Racial Justice in American Thought and Policy* (1995). What is ironic is that Steinberg’s sense of being betrayed by his neoliberal colleagues stems from his odd expectation that their view of justice as “fair equality of opportunity” (Gutman 2000, 93) can substitute for class struggle and its drive for systemic transformation. Alternatively, Steinberg is sure to provoke renewed outcries of economism and reductionism.

**Intervention from the mass movements**

The condition of possibility that I referred to earlier, which allowed ethnicity and nominalism to preempt the field of scholarly inquiry and political debate, involves the whole period of development of finance capital in the United States from the end of the civil rights struggles to the birth of the homeland security state. This includes the oil crisis of 1974, the unregurgitable defeat in Vietnam, and the unprecedented political realignments in the U.S. ruling class with the resignation of Nixon, and so on. More significant in terms of geopolitics is the fact that the whole period after World War II involves the largest internal migration in U.S. history, reconstituting the class and racial formations of the New Deal era.

The resurgence of new forms of class struggle in the sixties and seventies, with the mobilization of African Americans and women, together with the unionizing of public employees and
service/white-collar professionals, compels us to refocus our analysis on the reconfiguration of specific historical blocs, to class generation and its trajectories that would explain the nature of capitalist hegemony. Michael Zweig notes that the decline of class politics coincides with the rise of identity politics in a period of the deterioration of living standards for the working-class majority (2000). What cannot be ignored in the recent historical conjuncture in terms of its long-range cultural resonance is the massive new immigration from Asia and Latin America after the 1965 Immigration Act. This influx continues to “thicken” the ethnic contradictions of the post-Fordist working class.

The 1992 Los Angeles urban rebellion was a symptom of an epochal trend that culminated in the reelection of George W. Bush, the passage of the USA Patriot Act, and the establishment of the homeland security state. In short, the crisis of capitalism has moved to a critical stage in which protofascist measures, brutal military aggression in Afghanistan and Iraq, and unilateral preemptive strikes are becoming the norm. How can we, putative organic intellectuals of the masses, intervene?

Cultural studies debates may have catalyzed the groundwork for the emergence of critical race theory (CRT). From a more heterodox perspective, Michael Denning observes that “the ‘turn to race’ was not a rhetorical shift, a refusal of the language of populism, Americanism, and industrial unionism.” Rather, it “was the mark of a profound remaking of the working classes, in the United States and globally” (2004, 153). This turn, however, did not neglect class struggle, by which is meant precisely the struggle over how the social surplus—the unpaid value expropriated from those who do not own or control the means of production—is generated by various modes of exploitation, and then appropriated and distributed chiefly through the agency of the capitalist state and its ideological apparatuses.

Our key heuristic axiom is this: the extraction of surplus labor always involves conflict and struggle. In this process of class conflict, identities are articulated with group formation, and race, gender, and ethnicity enter into the totality of contradictions that define a specific conjuncture, in particular the
contradictions between the social relations dominated by private property and the productive forces. Reformulated, this proposition translates into a principle of causality: the organization of work influences the way in which race and gender are mediated within the hegemony of a social bloc. Class consciousness as a "state of social cohesion" (Braverman 1974, 29) involves layers that have varying duration and intensities expressed in popular and mass culture. A historical-materialist understanding of race relations and racism embedded in the process of class formation and class struggles, in the labor process and cultural expression, distinguishes the research projects of cultural studies scholars like Michael Denning, Peter McLaren, Paul Buhle, Gregory Meyerson, and Teresa Ebert.

Given this emphasis on class struggle and class formation, on the totality of social relations that define the position of interacting collectivities in society, materialist critique locates the ground of institutional racism and racially based inequality in the capitalist division of labor—primarily between the seller of labor-power as prime commodity and the employer who maximizes surplus value (unpaid labor) from the workers. What will maximize accumulation of profit and also maintain the condition for such stable and efficient maximization? The answer to this question would explain the ideology and practice of racial segregation, subordination, exclusion, and variegated tactics of violence.

This is not to reduce race to class, but rather to assign import or intelligible meaning to the way in which racialization (the valorization of somatic or "natural" properties) operates. While social subjects indeed serve as sites of variegated differences—that is, individuals undergo multiple inscriptions and occupy shifting positionalities on the level of everyday experience—the patterns of their actions or "forms of life" are not permanently indeterminate or undecidable when analyzed from the perspective of the totality of production relations. The capitalist labor process and its conditions overdetermine the location of groups whose ethnic, racial, gender, and other characteristics acquire value within that context. I think this is the sense in which Barbara Jeanne Fields argues for a materialist reading of slavery in U.S. history: “A majority
of historians think of slavery as primarily a system of race relations—as though the chief business of slavery were the production of white supremacy rather than the production of cotton, sugar, rice and tobacco” (1990, 99). This one-sided, indeed mechanistic, explanation needs to be corrected with the observation that the production of cotton, etc. reproduces in itself the whole complex of social and political relations of that field—in fact, production of commodities for exchange and profit would not be possible if the reproduction of class relations did not accompany it. Which came first, the actual exploitation or its rationalization, is a trick question posed by disingenuous ideologues whose vulgar materialism can easily consort with the hallucinatory narcotics of superstition and the fetishism of goods and spectacles (Guillaumin 1995). Culture, ideology, politics, and economics are all inextricably intertwined; but their “law of motion” can be clarified through the mediation of a historical-materialist optic.

**Whiteness studies**

Which brings me to the theme of whiteness and whiteness studies, largely inspired by CRT. The intervention of whiteness studies may be considered as a refinement of CRT in its treatment of whiteness as an analytical problem in the determination of class hierarchy (Delgado and Stefancic 1997). It takes off from W. E. B. Du Bois’s insight (in *Black Reconstruction*) that white workers enjoyed “public and psychological wage” regardless of position in the social hierarchy. Whiteness studies has been interpreted as a response to the political realignment in the eighties, illustrated by the appearance of Reagan Democrats and the “cult of ethnicity,” when liberal intellectuals disavowed Black activists like Stokely Carmichael and the civil rights agenda. How can one account for the celebration of ethnic whiteness at a time of severe crisis in the form of de-industrialization, unprecedented lay-offs, widening income gap, disproportionate imprisonment of African Americans and Latinos, and other symptoms of social decay?

In scholarly interventions by David Roediger (*Wages of Whiteness*), Alexander Saxton (*The Rise and Fall of the White Republic*), Theodore Allen, (*The Invention of the White Race*),
From Race to Class Struggle

Michael Goldfield (The Color of Politics), and George Lipsitz (The Possessive Investment in Whiteness), among others, we learn that the core normative belief-system propping up the hierarchical system hinges on white privilege, white supremacy, the foundation of the racial polity (Mills 1997). This construction of white racial superiority prevents class unity and conceals class exploitation. This thesis has been argued earlier by Marxists like Paul Baran and Paul Sweezy (1972) in explaining the deprivation of Blacks after the end of the Civil War. But the proposition of whiteness as a psychological compensation for whites anxious to raise themselves in the “status hierarchy” (Baran and Sweezy 1972, 310) is only one element in a wider critique of capitalist ideology and institutional practices. Race—whiteness—is not an autonomous factor operating apart from the totality of social relations, in particular the political struggles and ideological struggles of the time.

One observer points out that in contrast, the historical-materialist analysis of “whiteness” carried out by Alexander Saxton inscribed the ideological within the process of class politics, mass culture, and historical background (Hartman 2004). Arising as a rationalization of the slave trade and the theft of land from nonwhites, white supremacy evolved as a theory/practice designed to legitimate the rule of dominant groups in fluctuating class coalitions, modified and readjusted according to the complex process of reconfiguring hegemony (moral and intellectual leadership of a historic bloc, in Gramsci’s construal). Thus, it is the totality of capitalist production relations—not an essentializing ingredient such as economic position alone—that explains why the ideological synthesis of white supremacy functioned as a key element in the bourgeoisie’s strategic construction of hegemony through the calculated syncopation or calibration of the relations among the state, the institutions of civil society, and the practices of everyday life (see also Meyerson 1997). When the economic and political (base and superstructure) are separated or fragmented into discursive local effects, the result is an incoherent amalgam of incommensurable categories that cannot provide an explanatory critique to connect various seemingly independent social practices and institutions to one another and to the global
economic situation (Meyerson 2003). If we want to transform the oppressive system based on the skewed social division of labor and the unequal distribution of social wealth, we need a historical knowledge of social totality that would afford opportunities for organized mass intervention.

**Back to the historical maelstrom**

Finally, I can only suggest here a need to shift some of our energies and resources to the task of understanding the oppression of women migrant workers, particularly women of color or “third world” women, as a focus for future research programs. This current period of reaction after 9/11, the global recession, the horrific wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the U.S.-aided counterinsurgency campaigns in Colombia, the Philippines, and elsewhere, demand the formulation by those committed to radical change of a more comprehensive critique of the global totality. This is not to downplay the catastrophes of genocidal strife, environmental disasters, and the AIDS and SARS epidemics, the implications of which can only be grasped as networks of social events with intelligible causality. But an engagement with the international division of labor as an integral component of globalization and its profound, enduring impact on everyday life may help us move beyond narrow empiricism and connect the fragmented categories of race, gender, and status into an intelligible complex that can offer opportunities for organized popular intervention.

The global migration of labor is certainly an integral part of the internationalization of production and the internationalized division of labor. It is now common knowledge that capitalism’s acquisitive and expansive nature led to the uneven development between colonizing industrialized countries of Western Europe, North America, and Japan, and the rest of the world. Migration is a response to the spatial and developmental inequality produced by capitalist accumulation, colonialism, imperialism, Cold War interventions, and preemptive wars. Not only do commodities and capital circulate more rapidly and frequently in the modern world, but also bodies and their capacity to produce, consume, and reproduce the whole cosmology of their repressed existence.
The situation of the Philippines may be taken as a case study in this unfolding narrative of globalization. Colonized by Spain for three hundred years and by the United States for almost a century, the Philippines remains a poor, underdeveloped dependent formation. Ruled by a local oligarchy of compradors bureaucrat-capitalists, and semifeudal landlords reared by more than fifty years of U.S. tutelage, the Philippines failed to develop into a “newly industrialized economy” after World War II chiefly because of the uninterrupted U.S. economic, political, and cultural stranglehold since annexation in 1899, and even after formal independence in 1946 and the removal of huge U.S. military bases in 1992.

In 2002, 67 percent of eighty-three million Filipinos were poor. Unemployment was 11 to 12 percent annually, and underemployment was 17 percent (Ocampo 2002). Due to severe unemployment and the disruption of traditional work processes by the imposed Structural Adjustment Programs of the IMF/World Bank during the long period of the Marcos dictatorship, successive administrations in the Philippines have instituted a systematic export of its citizens, in particular women, to overseas jobs, thereby collecting enormous fees and taxes. Over two thousand people leave the Philippines every day; over nine million Filipinos in over 186 countries remit earnings of over $9 billion, the largest source of foreign currency and enough to pay the enormous foreign debt. These “servants of globalization”—as one textbook calls this largest cohort of migrant contract workers in the world— are praised by Filipino politicians as “modern heroes,” “overseas Philippine investors,” “internationally shared resources,” and other ironic euphemisms.

There are now between 80 and 95 million migrant workers worldwide; about 20 million are Asians. In the last decade, Filipinos in the United States increased to over three million, arguably the largest Asian community. After 9/11, several hundred Filipinos were summarily deported, treated as dangerous criminals, for assorted reasons short of being “terrorists.” The racist discrimination against thousands of Filipino veterans of World War II, nurses and caregivers, and especially former airport screeners,
may be explained not by the USA Patriot Act but by a long history of national oppression and class exploitation which exacerbates invidious categorization by gender and sexuality. Complementing the push-factor of economic deprivation and political instability in this Southeast Asian neocolony is the transformation of the U.S. economy in the last half of the twentieth century. The rise of global cities like New York and Los Angeles restructured labor demand so that immigration policies and laws had to be shaped in order to hire immigrants for low-wage service jobs in certain highly specialized service sectors with the high-income lifestyles of its professional workforce; and for declining industries in need of cheap labor for survival (Sassen 1998, 261). One can see that changes within the dominant economies reflect those in the dependent formations, disrupting the neutral-sounding terms “sending” and “receiving” countries. Precisely this interaction of apparent equality of buyer and seller in the “free market” underlies the unequal status relation of nation-states.

Orthodox immigration experts and neo-Weberians like Sassen posit the market as the major factor in forming class. But this stress on exchange ignores the process of class formation within the web of social relationships that are historically concrete, determinate, and specific (Wood 1995), and leads to treating people as mere bearers of reified structures. Law in capitalism—as the Russian critic Evgeny Pashukanis has shown—expresses the fetishized relations among commodity exchangers; the free market is what Marx called the “very Eden” of human rights. What this market domain hides—no secret now, folks—is the exploitation founded on the consumption of the use-value of the workers bought by capital; the subordination of the collective producers in the labor process; the extraction of surplus, and so on. And this juridical symmetry of apparently free exchanges between seemingly look-alike property owners is what critical theory needs to unmask (Arthur 1978).

On the other hand, interpretive ethnographies of the personal experience of domestics have only trivialized the agency they are supposed to discover. Women workers do indeed enact their intentions and desires, but the powers “instantiated” in their behavior
attest to their overdetermination by larger structures. In Alex Callinicos’s words, “what agents can collectively or individually do depends to a significant degree on their position in the relations of production” (1989, 136).

Theories of the decentered subject or ludic performative positionality touted by postmodernists often prove arbitrary if not vacuous because they lack a concretely nuanced mapping of the historically variable structural determinants of action. To guard against the feared reductionist specters of the past, we obviously need a self-critical, versatile method to undertake a cognitive inventory of internal relations and mediations within any historical conjuncture; only within this framework can we appreciate the value of individual and collective resistance to racism, sexism, and other forms of oppression.

Let me call your attention to the plight of Filipina domestics. Unlike Canada, which has officially instituted a Live-in Caregiver Program, the United States does not regulate the conditions of domestics. Hundreds of cases of abuse of Filipino nannies are recorded daily. Women enter the country with a visa tied to an employer; since there is no work permit, the employer dictates inordinately long hours and intolerable working conditions. Abuses concerning minimum wage, nonpayment of overtime pay, and time off are common. Most domestics here are from the “third world,” separated from each other by their isolation, lack of regulations on the recruiting industry, and the social discrimination of their language, immigration status, nationality, and race. Grace Chang cites the case of women domestics in New York uniting to urge the City Council to pass a bill requiring agencies to issue contracts with humane work conditions, including minimum wage, two weeks’ paid vacation, sick days, etc. Carol de Leon, a Filipina who has firsthand experience of the plight of domestics, noted that the group not only wants to improve working conditions but also to “change the notion that immigrant workers are lazy and uneducated. Because it relates to history, because this country inherited this industry [import of domestics] through American slavery and ideas that this is women’s work. We are calling for respect and recognition for women in this industry” (Chang 2004, 256).
It is crucial to grasp, in addition to the sociohistorical contexts of employment, the unique condition of the labor process that, as we have seen, is already overdetermined by factors of globalization and the politico-economic environment. We need to attend to the exceptional and distinctively late-modern commodification of domestic labor. With acute original insight, Bridget Anderson emphasizes how, in the form of migrant domestic women, “the transnational globalized economy is brought into the home, not just in the goods consumed there, but in the organizing of reproductive labor” (2004, 263). In addition to the global division of labor sketched earlier, we need to analyze the current situation through the theoretical optic of reproductive labor. The concept of reproductive labor involves the complex dialectic of culture, politics, economy, and the mediation of the private and public in everyday life. Anderson illustrates the theoretical usefulness of this concept:

Domestic work—mental, physical, and emotional labor—is reproductive work, and reproductive work is not confined to the maintenance of physical bodies: people are social, cultural, and ideological beings, not just units of labor, and reproductive labor is not organized exclusively for the labor market, although market forces affect it. Under capitalism, human beings’ social relations find expression and are mediated by patterns of consumption. Reproductive labor, then, not only produces workers; it also produces consumers of the products of capitalism, consumers from the cradle (cot or basket? Bed or crib?) to the grave (marble or granite? Embossed or engraved?). (2004, 264)

Domestic work thus reproduces lifestyle, status, beliefs—in effect, the hierarchical system of social relations where identities are defined, the sphere of desire and pleasure marked out, and life chances charted in reciprocal interaction with the framework of production relations. What needs careful underscoring here is how Anderson’s dialectical approach connects the systemic with the sociocultural and ideological when she posits domestic service as the selling of the self in the global market, the marketing of personhood, the fashioning of modern slavery:
The domestic worker is not equated socially with her employer in the act of exchange because the fiction of labour power cannot be maintained; it is “personhood” that is being commodified.

Moreover, the worker’s caring function, her performance of tasks constructed as degrading, demonstrates the employer’s power to command her self. Having allegedly sold her personhood, the domestic worker is both person and non-person. She is, like the prostitute, a person who is not a person, someone for whom all obligations can be discharged in cash. (2000, 121)

Positivist social science has generated a plethora of empirical microstudies of individual life histories of women workers. It has even massively documented the statistics of the feminization and “housewifization” of labor. But this social science has not been able to take into account the pressure of complex global and local socioeconomic forces at work in the national and international migration of women and the ideologies that legitimize them and that they propagate. We need to register the varying impact of inter alia structural adjustment policies on “sending” neocolonies like the Philippines, the histories of colonialism, imperialism, and patriarchy; national debt; the growth of agribusiness; the role of finance capital and outsourcing, as well as laws both national and international. Concomitant are the diverse collective modes of resistance and opposition to the effects of such forces. The analysis and evaluation of this totality of forces and their mutual interaction are what a historical-materialist approach seeks to carry out.

*From racism to class struggle*

Following the lead of Anderson and others, I would reaffirm the need to situate racism in late-capitalist society within the process of class rule and labor exploitation to grasp the dynamics of racial exclusion and subordination. Beyond the mode of production, the antagonistic relations between the capitalist class and the working class are articulated with the state and its complex bureaucratic and juridical mechanisms, multiplying cultural and political differentiations that affect the attitudes, sentiments, and
actual behavior of groups. A critique of ideologies of racism and sexism operating in the arena of class antagonism becomes crucial in the effort to dismantle their efficacy. Moreover, as Bensaid observes in *Marx for Our Times* (2002), “the relationship between social structure and political struggle is mediated by the relations of dependence and domination between nations at the international level.” Linear functionalism yields to the dialectical analysis of concrete mediations.

Viewed historically, the phenomenon of migrant labor, in particular Filipina domestics in North America and elsewhere, demonstrates how racial and gender characteristics become functional and discursively valorized when they are inserted into the dialectic of abstract and concrete labor, of use value and exchange value, in the production of commodities—in this case, domestic labor as a commodity. Contrary to any attempts to legitimate the use of the underpaid services of women of color from the South, the racializing and gendering discourse of global capitalism can only be adequately grasped as the mode through which extraction of surplus value, wage differentiation, and control and representation of bodies are all negotiated.

A study of racist practices and institutions, divorced from the underlying determinant structure of capital accumulation and class rule allowing such practices and institutions to exercise their naturalizing force, can only perpetuate an abstract metaphysics of race and a discourse of power that would reinforce the continuing reification or commodification of human relations in everyday life. We cannot multiply static determinations in an atomistic manner and at the same time acquire the intelligible totality of knowledge that we need for formulating strategies of radical social transformation. A first step in this project of renewing critical race theory is simple: begin with the concept of class as an antagonistic relation between labor and capital, and then proceed to analyze how the determinant of “race” is played out historically in the class-conflicted structure of capitalism and its political/ideological processes of class rule.

It is of course important to maintain vigilance concerning the mystifying use of “race” and the practice of racialization in any
location, whether in the privacy of the family, home, school, factory, or state institutions (court, prison, police station, legislature). Grace Chang (2000) has meticulously documented how people of color, exploited immigrants and refugees, have themselves used racist images and rhetoric in their role as “gatekeepers” to the racialized class system.

Nevertheless, without framing all these within the total picture of the crisis of capital and its globalized restructuring from the late seventies up to the present, and without understanding the continued domination of labor by capital globally, we cannot effectively counteract the racism that underwrites the relation of domination and subordination among nationalities, ethnic communities, and gender groups. The critique of an emergent authoritarian state and questionable policies sanctioned by the USA Patriot Act is urgently necessary. In doing so, naming the system and understanding its operations would be useful in discovering precisely that element of self-activity, of agency, that has supposedly been erased in totalizing metanarratives such as the “New World Order,” the “New American Century” that will end ideology and history, and in revolutionary projects of achieving racial justice and equality. As the familiar quotation goes, we do make history—but not under circumstances of our choosing. So the question is, as always, “What alternatives do we have to carry out which goals at what time and place?”

The goal of a classless communist society and strategies to attain it envisage the demise of racist ideology and practice in their current forms. But progressive forces around the world are not agreed about this. For example, the World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia, and Related Intolerance–NGO Forum held in Durban, South Africa, from 31 August to 7 September, 2001 publicized the global problem of racism but was unable to formulate a consensus on how to solve it. Its final declaration highlighted the historic origin of racism in the slave trade, colonialism, and genocide, and it raised the possibility of reparations for its victims, but did not offer a concrete program of action (see Mann 2002).

Because of its composition and the pervasive climate of reaction, the Forum could not endorse a radical approach that would
focus on the elimination of the exploitation of labor (labor power as commodity) as a necessary first step. Given its limits, it could not espouse a need for a thoroughgoing change of the material basis of social production and reproduction—the latter involving the hegemonic rule of the propertied bloc in each society profiting from the unequal division of labor and the unequal distribution of social wealth—on which the institutional practices of racism (apartheid, discrimination, genocide) thrive. “Race is the modality in which class is lived,” as Stuart Hall remarks concerning post-1945 Britain (Solomos 1986, 103). Without political power in the hands of the democratic-popular masses under the leadership of the working class, the ideological machinery (laws, customs, religion, state bureaucracy) that legitimizes class domination, with its attendant racist practices, cannot be changed. What is required is a revolutionary process that mobilizes a broad constituency based on substantive equality and social justice as an essential part of the agenda to dissolve class structures. Any change in the ideas, beliefs, and norms would produce changes in the economic, political, and social institutions, which would in turn promote wide-ranging changes in social relations among all groups and sectors.

Within a historical-materialist framework, the starting point and end point for analyzing the relations between structures in any sociohistorical totality cannot be anything but the production and reproduction of material existence. The existence of any totality follows transformation rules whereby it is constantly being restructured into a new formation (Harvey 1973). These rules reflect the dialectical unfolding of manifold contradictions constituting the internal relations of the totality. Within this conflicted, determinate totality, race cannot be reduced to class, nor can class be subsumed by race, since those concepts express different forms of social relations.

What is the exact relation between the two? This depends on the historical character of the social production in question and the ideological-political class struggles defining it. In his valuable treatise, *The Invention of the White Race* (1994), Theodore Allen has demonstrated the precise genealogy and configuration of racism in the United States. It first manifested itself when the
European colonial settler system, based on private property in land and resources, subdued another social order based on collective, tribal tenure of land and resources, and denied the latter any social identity—“social death” for Native Americans. We then shift our attention to the emergence of the white system of racial oppression with the defeat of Bacon’s Rebellion in 1677 and the establishment of a system of lifetime hereditary bond servitude for African Americans: “The insistence on the social distinction between the poorest member of the oppressor group and any member, however propertied, of the oppressed group, is the hallmark of racial oppression” (Allen 1997, 243). In effect, white supremacy defining the nature of civil society was constructed at a particular historical conjuncture demanded by class war. The result is a flexible system that can adjust its racial dynamics in order to divide the subordinates, resist any critique of its ideological legitimacy, and prevent any counterhegemonic bloc of forces from overthrowing class rule.

Class struggle intervenes through its impact in the ideological-political sphere of civil society. Racial categories operate through the mediation of civil society that (with the class-manipulated state) regulate personal relations through the reifying determinations of value, market exchange, and capital. Harry Chang comments on the social mediation of racial categories:

Blacks and whites constitute social blocks in a developed setting of “mass society” in which social types (instead of persons) figure as basic units of economic and political management. . . . The crucial intervention of objectification, i.e., relational poles conceived as the intrinsic quality of objects in relation, must not be neglected here. Racial formation in a country is an aspect of class formation, but the reason races are not classes lies in this objectification process (or fetishization). (1985, 43)

Commodity fetishism enables the ideology of racism (inferiority tied to biology, genetics, cultural attributes) to register its effects in common-sense thinking and routine behavior in class-divided society (Lukács 1971). Because market relations hide unequal power relations, sustained ideological critique and
transformative collective actions are imperative. This signifies the heuristic maxim of “permanent revolution” (Lefebvre 1968, 171) in Marxist thought: any long-term political struggle to abolish capitalism as a system of extracting surplus value through a system of the unequal division of labor (and rewards) needs to alter the institutions and practices of civil society that replicate and strengthen the fetishizing or objectifying mechanism of commodity production and exchange (the capitalist mode of production). If racism springs from the reification of physical attributes (skin color, eye shape) to validate the differential privileges in a bourgeois regime, then the abolition of labor power as a commodity will be a necessary if not sufficient step in doing away with the conditions that require racial privileging of certain groups in class-divided formations. Racism is not an end in itself but, despite its seeming autonomy, an instrumentality of class rule.

Reification of nature and all social relations is the distinctive logic of the political economy of bourgeois domination. Racial differentiation and class antagonism converge in the revolutionary process when, as C. L. R. James states in a gloss on Lenin’s thought, the colonized subalterns (such as the Irish in nineteenth-century Britain) and racially oppressed peoples/nations (African Americans, indigenous communities) begin to act as the “bacilli” or ferment that ushers onto the international scene “the real power against imperialism—the socialist proletariat” (1994, 182). Socialist revolution is thus the requisite precondition for ending racism.

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REFERENCES


New Sciences and Our Future

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The problem of a scientific worldview

Criticism of natural sciences

Natural sciences often lost their legitimacy in explaining our world. We are losing our conviction that we have had since Enlightenment that science would sufficiently explain our world and its processes. What is the matter with science and our relation to it?

In particular, one can point to ecological and feminist criticism1 of modern sciences. Also, postmodern thinking tends to blur the difference between science and mere opinion. And although scientists are usually convinced that they are dealing with a “real reality,” some philosophers try to show that natural laws are lies (Cartwright 1983).

Sometimes the question of science is related to whether science is mere analytical abstract thinking or whether it contains dialectics itself. Hegel interpreted science as mere analytical abstract
thinking and criticized it for that. “Nature” in natural sciences seems to be only the “Idea in the form of otherness (1970, 13) or “the decline of the idea from itself.” In this “nature,” the spirit is alienated from itself and “the thinking reflecting on nature must take into consideration, how nature itself is the process of becoming spirit, to sublate its otherness” (25).3

The question now is whether natural science itself can become such a thinking reflection or whether the thinking reflection as epistemology of sciences is a philosophical field related to, but distinguished from, natural science itself.

In this paper, I will only investigate the epistemological status of science, especially of physics as a prototype of modern sciences, and not yet decide that question. Maybe the results will give us some hints.

**What are natural sciences supposed to do?**

If we want to understand science, we must not to take only its results into consideration. We must deal with the entire process of scientific work. For that purpose we need historical investigations, but not only a description of the scientists’ doings. We need to investigate the epistemological foundation of their work.

I think it is accepted that science works with universals. The results of science are sentences about universals. But which form of universals do we mean? And how do the scientists get them?

First of all, an important fundamental assumption distinguishes several schools of philosophy of science. Some schools assume the world to be simply a number of individuals. Ernst Mach took it for granted that the world is given to us as a multiplicity of elements without interaction and change. Bertrand Russell expressly emphasized that all relation between things must be external relations, not internal, because otherwise mathematics would not work. We can think of the world as a manifold of things connected by relations, and we need not to take the whole into consideration (1975, 117). Because Russell is the founder of the mainstream philosophy of science, this opinion has important implications. He does not ask how individual things arise. Is the world only the sum of individual things and their external relations?
I will follow another tradition in the schools of philosophy of science that is not so well known and was mostly rejected in the twentieth century because of its “metaphysical” element. This tradition proceeds from the assumption that the world, through inner contradictions, is a self-developing whole. It is not a blurred, mashed monotony but a “self-particularizing or self-specifying” ever-evolving totality (Hegel 1975, 227).

Now the questions of philosophy of science change. We need not ask how we go from individual things and relations to the general law (problem of induction). We have to ask how we go from the inexhaustible, but subdivided, whole to our knowledge, and what relationship our knowledge has with this world.

When speaking about the world and our knowledge, we are dealing with the question of the criticized “subject-object-splitting.” We are not the whole world, and the entire universe is not a part of each of us. Because we are parts of the world and not completely alienated, we have many relations to other parts of the world and the world itself. Knowledge and science is only one form of such relations. As long as we distinguish among art, work, meditation, and so on, we have a specific kind of subject-object-relation in science. In the scientific process, knowledge-subjects and knowledge-objects are connected, but on the basis of their previous separation. Such a connection is mediated by several means of cognition. Mediation is the key to an understanding of the relationship between world and knowledge.

The mediation is not the same all the time; it changes with the development of the sciences. Ernst Bloch stressed that questions about nature, the realm of what can be experienced, and the audible answers will change with changes in society (Bloch 1985a, 341).

Means of cognition are our technical devices and instruments, as well as the theories about how they work. Other means of cognitions are hypotheses, models, and mathematics (Hörz 1966, 63ff.).

Goethe, in an important critique of the means of cognition, criticized the artificiality of Newton’s means (1833, 21). He tried to use only “natural” means of cognition. But where is the border of the “natural”? All what we *can* do represents a real possibility
of nature. That which we can do shows new possibilities of nature that would not emerge without humankind. Moreover, we too are a part of nature.

Different means of cognitions (such as Goethe’s and Newton’s) offer us different parts of knowledge, and we cannot speak about the “truth” of knowledge without speaking about the respective means of cognition that we use. In this sense, neither Goethe nor Newton arrived at the “whole truth.”

We will deal here with one form of knowledge—physics. Physics is a good example, because physics, especially Newtonian mechanics, is the most criticized science. It has the most “abstract” and “mechanistic” character. Physics is also a good paradigm because of its typical epistemological foundations, which we will find in related sciences too.

**Epistemological foundation of the individual sciences**

**Relation between science and worldview**

Since the Enlightenment, our worldview has been tightly connected with scientific results. We use “the scientific picture of the world as a reference point for new worldview” (Stepin 2003, 109). But there remains a difference between a theory of an individual science and a (philosophical) worldview. *Mechanics* is the term for a physical theory with all the limits of such a theory. A mechanistic worldview may be fed by such a theory, but it is not the same. Therefore it is not correct to say that Galileo and Newton “were very successful in describing the universe using this reduced mechanistic worldview” (Brunner and Klauninger 2003, 31). Although “Descartes introduced strict determinism into the methodology of science,” Newton did not follow him. Even though “Laplace stated that the universe was comparable to a clockwork of infinite precision” (31), these sentences do not characterize modern-day science at all. Such a characterization of modern science since Galileo and Newton would be a reductionism of only one interpretation, such as the interpretation of Newton by Voltaire (see Borzeszkowski and Wahsner 1981 and also Wahsner 1994).

To specify the relation between science and philosophy, it will be helpful to analyze the work of science in detail.
Epistemological foundations of individual and universal sciences

Motion is the subject of physics

Physics deals with nonliving things and their behavior. The subjects of contemporary physics are not properties (like the former occult qualities), but the behavior of things. The focus on behavior stresses that no object, no thing, is absolutely isolated. Objects in physics (since Galileo) are idealized—but (since Newton) never fully isolated. Therefore we can avoid the reproach of mechanism. Newtonian mechanics is not a theory of physical bodies (Bloch’s *Klötzchenmaterie* [block-matter]) and pushes.

In the law of inertia that forms the basis of Newtonian theory—“Every body continues in its state of rest or of uniform motion in a right line, except insofar as it is compelled to change that state by forces impressed upon it”—rest is not basic and motion is not being pushed by impulses or forces. Rectilinear uniform motion is basic (standard motion) and rest is only a special case.

Thus mechanics makes the necessary separation not between rest and motion but between rectilinear uniform motion and accelerated motion, separation in the sense that the first is supposed to be a standard of motion and that only motions deviating from it are explained by physical dynamics. (Borzeszkowski and Wahsner 1998, 17)

Newton took the law of inertia as the starting point of his mechanics. To define rectilinear uniform motion we need Euclidean space. In this sense Newton assumed the existence of an absolute space and absolute time for his dynamics. This space and this time are not the “real” space and time, it is an epistemological assumption.

Because of these assumptions in the Newtonian theory, motion is not an externally induced property; it is the subject of physics itself. There is no isolated thing at rest. We thus see that an appropriate understanding of the “boring” Newtonian mechanics can reveal some important features of this “most mechanical” science, which is often misinterpreted. The subjects of physics are not the bodies themselves but the changes in their behavior, their motion, which are described by measurable quantities and forces.
(not as “causes” of the change of motion but because the forces are equivalent to the changes in their behavior).

The problem of contradictions

Motion as the subject of physics entails a problem: the problem of the contradictions of motion, known since Zeno:

Something moves, not because at one moment it is here and at another there, but because at one and the same moment it is here and not here, because in this “here,” it at once is and is not. The ancient dialecticians must be granted the contradictions that they pointed out in motion; but it does not follow that therefore there is no motion; but on the contrary, that motion is existent contradiction itself. (Hegel 1969, 440)

The Eleatics thought that the world could not be in such contradictory motion, because we cannot envisage of such a world. The Heracliteans assumed that the world is an ever-moving world, but they agreed that we could not envisage it. Renate Wahsner showed how the Atomists found a way out: If there were moving things (atoms) and, in addition, an area of emptiness, we can imagine and envisage the motion of the atoms through empty space (2002, 460).

Dualism

Contradictions of motion became thinkable without logical contradictions because of this distinction between matter and space. Such an epistemological distinction was called “dualism” by Wahsner and Borzeszkowski (1998, 15).

Dualism is a means of cognition. Immanuel Kant understood the epistemological function of Newtonian absolute space and time. The existence of absolute space and time was an assumption of physics; it was not explained by the theory; it was not a part of our confirmed knowledge of the real world. Kant assumed that this a priori assumption is not subject to change. We know now that changes in assumptions are typical for progress in the evolution of science. And these assumptions deal not only with space and
time. We also find the existence of a priori assumptions in regard to the distinction between rectilinear uniform motion (assumed a priori as the standard motion) and accelerated motion (equivalent to dynamical forces). This distinction is needed in order to enable us to measure some forms of behavior of the objects.

Each measurable quantity and calculating science is based on thought determinations not explained by this science but presupposed by it. (Borzeszkowski and Wahsner 1988, 289)

Physics does not only need thinking without logical contradictions. It needs a connection to the real world given by objective sensuousness mediated by experiments and measurements. Therefore the assumptions associated with such experiments and measurements are especially important as a means of cognitions in physics and similar individual sciences. Experiments and measurements in modern physics are not “unnatural”—they are means created by humans for acquiring knowledge of the world. If we want to understand the relationship between the world and our knowledge, we must also take into account the means by which we relate them.

Measurable quantities

Physics does not deal with the real self-contradicting things. It deals with some aspects of their behavior that can be described mathematically and can be compared with reality by experiments and measurements. These are the measurable quantities.

Measurable quantities require comparability. But as Nicholas of Cusa already knew, in reality no one thing has exactly the same qualities as another (1862, 35, 73). But there is also order, harmony, and proportion (75), and we have to find out how to compare several qualities within this framework. Hermann Helmholtz pointed out that “to decide about equality, it is necessary to know the method according to which the comparison is to be made” (1984, 38). Measurable quantities are produced by humans; they are “measurement-theoretically determined thought entities” (Borzeszkowski and Wahsner 2001, 64). These quantities are
not fully arbitrary—they have to correspond to real similarities of behavior. Such a quantity is an abstraction in the that we build nouns from verbs (cf. Helmholtz 1984, 23). But the abstraction is not a mathematical one. We do not only get abstract possibilities of behavior; we get actual possibilities.

For physics the measurable quantities appear as its objects, but the epistemological analysis shows that they are actually means of cognition.

In the measurable quantities we can also see the dualism that has been discussed. The measurable quantities time \( t \) and space coordinates \( q \) are epistemological assumptions; the measurable quantity velocity \( v \) in kinematics and acceleration \( a \) in dynamics are part of the theory.

We can prove how this dualism takes the dialectical contradiction of motion as a dualism: According to Hegel, the contradiction of motion is that “something . . . at once is and is not.” Apart from time \( t \) and space \( q \), we use a third quantity velocity \( v \), which implies a reference to other places. “This does not result in a logical contradiction because there are two different quantities that are algebraically independent from each other that can be assigned to the same body at the same time point \( t' \)” (Borzeszkowski and Wahsner 2001, 13).

Physics conceives the (dialectical) contradiction in the form of dualisms in such a manner that it separates the momenta existing only in a unity and distributes them to the different sides of dualism. (43)

Universal sciences

The epistemological means of each individual science differs from the epistemological means of another individual science. The mediation of subjects and objects of knowledge depends on the concrete quality of the objects (physical, biotic, or social characteristics are distinguished).

In system theories like cybernetics, all objects also have been found to have comparable behavior. The subject of the universal sciences is such comparable, common behavior. In electrical engineering, a common law was found to exist: “effect = a
characteristic of the cause in system x” (see Wunsch 1985, 35). Later, cybernetics became the general theory of behavior of any objects as elements within systems. Systems are an “ordered whole” of a set of elements and relations between them. Such systems can maintain themselves and sometimes also generate themselves. We speak about autonomy and autopoiesis (for more detail, see Collier 2003). This leads our attention to the inner dynamic of the systems.

The abstraction from concreteness leads to a distinction of the concrete thing from its behavior. Behavior only is a subject of general sciences. “The question is not what a thing is, but what it does” (Ashby 1974). But this abstraction takes away the concrete sources of development. We speak about evolution; we can formalize not only continuous change, but discontinuous behavior at bifurcation points as well. But we have lost the concrete sources of development within the quality of the things themselves. Therefore the “problem of emergence” arises. We can describe evolution, but we cannot really account for it.

Foundations of theories of self-organization

Theories of self-organization belong in a more narrow sense to a special field of physics, thermodynamics, and in a wider sense to systems theory.

Self-organization in thermodynamics is based on the same epistemological foundations as physics. Like other fields of physics, thermodynamics uses measurable quantities, and its relation to reality does not differ from other fields of natural science.

We call models that refer to thermodynamic quantities, such as amount of substance, energy, and their flows thermodynamic models. (Ebeling 1990, 36)

It has been said that “irreversible thermodynamics is the actual realistic thermodynamics because all real processes are always irreversible” (Schnakenberg 1998). But there is no question which theory would be “more realistic.” Every scientific description (reversible and irreversible thermodynamics too) is based on assumptions that do not allow an ontologization of their categories.
And there is another argument against the idea that the theory of self-organization would be quite another worldview than the "older" physics:

Since there is no sharp boundary between dynamical physics and thermodynamics (because time-directed solutions may be deduced from the basis laws under certain supplementary conditions), we might suggest that the second law of thermodynamics can be derived from the laws of dynamical physics, too, by assuming supplementary conditions. (Borzeszkowski and Wahsner 1988, 292)

New aspects of physics of self-organization involve the consideration of nonequilibrium processes and the possibility of quantities changing by leaps and bounds.

But as Borzeszkowski and Wahsner showed, “the new features in regard to time appearing in thermodynamics are not founded on the dynamical laws but rather on supplementary conditions compatible with them” (1988, 294). And because thermodynamics does not deal with the specific quality of the things undergoing processes, it cannot explain real evolution. The specific universality (thermodynamic systems as its objects) is the advantage of the thermodynamic theory of self-organization, but also it gives reason for its limits.

Of course, the process of cognition now seems to be a “dialog” (Prigogine and Stengers 1986)—but there is nothing said about specific (concrete, historical) means of cognition. The object does not become a “subject” in the manner that a subject is defined in philosophy (a being reflecting on itself with confidence). There is nothing more than the general knowledge that “nature recognizes itself,” because human beings also belong to nature. But to characterize cognizing beings as natural beings and subjective beings, we need more than the abstract theory of self-organization.

The aspect of self-organization as a universal theory that is new in comparison with physics is that its universals are more abstract than the physical universals. It reduces the totality of the world much more (see Warnke 1981, 138).

The often-used category “complexity” grasps qualities only in a quantitative, formal form, not qualitatively, concretely in
content. Our theory of self-organization embraces only the form of processes and evolution, not the content. It describes how processes and evolution work, but not, what is changing and what path the evolution follows.

Like classical physics, the theory of self-organization “does not exclude history, but it does not grasp it immediately” (Borzeszkowski and Wahsner 1989, 133). The described processes are nothing but moments of complete cycles of evolution; they do not describe the development itself. We can reproduce the emergence of new structures formally, but we are not able to grasp (begreifen— not only verstehen [understand]) its concrete content. The problem of emergence cannot be solved.

That physics can neither be turned into a theory of development nor describe the world in its totality results from the fact that it has to determine and presuppose etalons [standards] in order to become a measuring science. (Borzeszkowski and Wahsner 1999, 256)

Determinism in science

Our scientific results have to be used in our practice. But in which way do they influence our orientation? The deductive-nomological view of explanation and prediction by using scientific laws is usually employed. We can derive a deduction or conclusion from premises that contain a law (Hempel 1965). Here concrete, real facts are taken to be subsumed by “covering laws.”

This view is only one interpretation of real science. It takes the (logical) form of the results of science and does not take into consideration the scientific work of human beings as a process.20 If we expand philosophy of science from pure logic to analysis of science as such, we will thereby understand that even Newtonian theory cannot be reduced to an abstract deductive-nomological view. Even in Newtonian theory, a scientific fact is never “considered as an event that is mechanistically determined by laws” (Myelkow 2003). As shown by Hofkirchner (2003, 139), the mechanistic interpretation of Newtonian theory is only one interpretation—the most famous one. It is not the only one, however. We need not identify this interpretation of the theory with the content of the theory itself.21
When we wish to determine how natural or other laws determine our possibilities or our action, we have to distinguish among several types of determination. Causation is only one of them. And law and causation are not the same (even in the classical sciences). What are the important aspects of this problem?

- Law and system hierarchy: In an earlier work, I discussed the relativity of lawfulness relating to the hierarchical system structure (Schlemm (2003b, 56). We cannot determine whether the world itself is strictly determined or not. Therefore, a dialectic of necessity (behavior of the system) and chance (within the behavior of the elements) is present in classical sciences as well.

- Difference between law and causality: A law describes the “general, necessary, and essential connections in the interacting system” (Hörz 1982, 217). Causality, in contrast, embraces the effect on a system of a cause that through a given complex of conditions leads to a field of realizable possibilities (Hörz 2003, 276). Causation is not the only determination; the variety of conditions cannot be described merely by causation (Hörz 2003, 276). Whereas a law is a reproducible and universal-necessary connection, causality is the directed mediation of a lawful connection in time. “Each law exists as connection in a complex of causal relations” (Hörz 1976a, 371), but it is not identical with “causation” itself.

- Difference between law and conditions: Laws are “general, necessary, and essential connections” not under all, but only “under certain, conditions” (Hörz 1976a, 366). A law does not describe directly the behavior of objects. It describes only the possible behavior; additional (real) initial and boundary conditions determine the (real) behavior of the objects. If there are planets around a star, they will behave in accordance with the Keplerian laws. But how many planets are around a star and where they are is a question outside these laws. In relation to these laws, these aspects are accidental.

- Difference between reality and possibility: The Newtonian law of motion \( \frac{d(mv)}{dt} = F \) gives an infinite set of possible trajectories. To obtain a description of real motion, we have to add specific initial conditions. This formula is not absolutely abstract because
it describes actual possibilities. But it does not describe the reality itself, the real process, because it gives only the possibilities.

- Specifying the dialectic of necessity and chance: Classical physics as well does not deal only with strictly determined processes. The role of conditions and the difference between causality and law is also valid for that science. Therefore, already in this type of science, we have to take into account a dialectic of necessity and chance. Dialectical determinism does not mean strict causation, but the “theory, that all objects and processes are conditioned and determined within an entire connection with other objects and processes (Hörz 1976a, 356). This corresponds to a “less-than-strict-determinism” (Hofkirchner 2003, 135). The view about determinism depends on the level: a “system” is defined to be a self-reproducing entity, and therefore we obtain a dynamical law for the behavior of the systems. Its elements may have more freedom; their behavior is not fully determined by the laws of the system (see “law and system hierarchy” above). There is a connection—a unity of the accidental behavior of the elements and the necessary tendency of the system. “The can-be is also lawful” (Bloch 185b, 172).

- Integrated Law: All these aspects are united under the integrated law (called statistical law by Hörz when he introduced it) The philosophical conception of statistical law regards laws (systems of laws) as general, necessary, and essential connections between objects and processes in a system, where, under the conditions of the system, a possibility is necessarily realized (dynamic aspect), but where there is a field of possibilities for the elements. A probability distribution exists for the random realization of this field (stochastic aspect), and the transition from one state into another is conditionally realized by chance with a certain degree of probability (probabilistic aspect) (Hörz 1982, 215; Hörz, Pöltz et al. 1980, chap. 3, sec. 5). Necessity is given if a wholeness of conditions is given. In each concrete situation, the given wholeness of conditions selects the “necessarily realizing” possibility (or possibilities). If our existence and actions are parts of the conditions, we can select or create new conditions (building bridges or houses).
Emergence of new fields of possibility: When we take into consideration the decisive role of conditions, we can estimate that a change of conditions can also change the operation of the laws. Within the laws is a given field of possibilities for the behavior of the elements. As long as the field of possibilities is stable, the stochastic distribution may change. This is called modification type I by Hörz and Wessel (1983, 134). But the field of possibilities may also change, as long as the dynamic aspect remains (modification type II). We know that in real evolutionary processes another modification type exists: the law itself may vanish if its conditions of existence are vanishing. Depending on the new conditions, other laws will also emerge with their fields of possibilities. In this connection, we also find the “emergence of causes,” but in a wider view. (Dobronravova 2003, 21).

The new sciences, like the theory of self-organization, add some new aspects to this view. The most important new aspect is the high sensitiveness to small accidental influences at bifurcation points (Dobronravova 2003, 19), sometimes called “butterflies effect.” This characterizes a specific chance spontaneity as the “third kind” of determination between determinism and indeterminism (Myelkow 2003, 78)—the decisive role of a “singular individual” (Niedersen 1990, 79; cf. Schlemm 2003b, 69). Hörz already discussed such situations in 1967. He mentioned the “essential chance” that can lead to qualitative changes of systems (1967, 864). After the development of self-organization theories, it was possible to specify our knowledge about the constitutive role of chance. We know about fluctuations as “variations between two possible states of the system, from which at least one possible state realizes itself without the possibility of determination of the conditions for this possibility” (Hörz 2002).

The modification of fields of possibilities is connected with the possibility of ramifying at bifurcation points. We have to take into consideration the breaking of symmetries in a new way (Hörz 1988, 217).

It is clear, that new properties developing in the process of self-organization “cannot be predicted from even perfect knowledge of the old properties” (Brunner and Klauninger 2003, 323f.).
The determination of each step of non-linear dynamics with the help of iteration formulas in non-linear studies does not provide the possibility of long-term predictions due to the influences of small differences in parameter values (these differences already exist at least because of quantum fluctuations. (Dobronravova 2003, 22)

**Philosophy of the future**

**Knowing**

All our knowledge cannot tell us what will happen. First we have to take into consideration the difference between our knowledge and the real world because of the epistemological assumptions (see subsection above entitled “Epistemological foundations of individual and universal sciences”) and second, the knowledge itself contains fields of possibilities (see section “Determinism in science”).

By means of statistical laws we can give trends of the future, but we cannot set up exact forecasts. (Hörz 2002)

We must not identify a law with a tendency, because it is also possible and necessary to combine contradictory tendencies (Hörz 1974, 1211). Only fields of possibilities and distributions of probability are given in an objective sense (Hörz 1976b, 960).

Historical necessity, field of possibilities, conditions and distributions of probability remain objective, can be recognized, and can be used by the selection of the possibility that will be realized. (Hörz 1974, 1209)

The world is not absolutely undetermined. Because of mutual interactions and a general coherence of worldly processes, we can establish components of these determinations. Because of given conditions at each moment, evolution contains “relative goals,” which are the main tendencies within a given field of possibility (see Hörz 2002). In society, there are more mediations between objectively given conditions and subjective behavior than in nature without conscious beings. The societal life of humans also gives them the additional possibility of changing the conditions of
their society. Therefore the action of human beings is rather freer than that determined by given laws. But law and freedom are not only contradictions; they need each other in a dialectical way.

**Human activity**

We can only speak about the dialectic of law and freedom if we speak about practical life, about actions of humans. Although human activity may overcome (societal) laws, its effectiveness depends simultaneously on the existence of laws.

By means of statistical laws we can give trends of the future, but we cannot set up exact forecasts. The contrast to a mechanistic view is not connected with the view that the future would not be designable. The world is changing within the laws and not without rules. (Hörz 2002)

We referred to objective “relative goals.” People can decide freely whether they want to realize such a goal or change the conditions in another way. Only if such a decision is made do “objective demands” then arise to reach such a designated goal. In order to reach the goal, the conditions have to be changed in the right way, depending on determinations and laws. In such a way “freedom is realized necessity, because freedom of action is really mediated with the law of necessity” (Bloch 1954, 546). “Will is matched with the course of the things,” and will becomes an “especially active part of the realized tendency” (546). The societal activity of human beings becomes a part of the conditions (Hörz 1973, 182).

The subjective factor may change the layer of conditions, may cancel them, or create new conditions. But it cannot change the laws that are prerequisites of changing, canceling, and creating. (Bloch 1954, 548)

Sciences of society can indicate “which essential conditions have to be realized in order to realize the wished possibility” (Hörz 1967, 864). Human beings are able to act, “producing the conditions that are realizing the possibility that is contained in the law and that is desired” (865). In this way we get a “responsible activism” (dialectic of the feasible and the desirable) (Hofkirchner 2003, 148).
Knowledge does not directly give instructions for actions, and our subjective will cannot immediately change the reality. We have to analyze several mediations like norms and interests.

Freedom in action is not running amuck, but active unison with matured and maturing lawful conditions. Objective law is not a boundary, but a helpful baton for a demand that aims at a better future. (Bloch 1954, 566)

Sometimes the possibility to decide within a given field of possibility is stressed (Hörz 1968, 331). Sometimes it is believed that a new range of possibility has arisen (Hörz 1968, 331).

Freedom is the realizing of possibilities as goals of activity that are contained in the field of possibilities of laws, based on competent decisions. (Hörz 1991, 75)

Laws themselves can be modified by changing the fields of possibility and probabilities (Hörz and Wessel 1983, 134). But the most important possibility of activity arises from a change in the existence of fundamental laws. Whether this possibility is taken
into consideration distinguishes different types of research on the future.

Another question is whether the given conditions or the goals are primary. Usually we think that the given conditions in the real world are the starting point. But human beings are not only products of their conditions, they have the ability to anticipate, and anticipation determines their motivations. Therefore “not the severity of their situation and the imposed suffering are motives to think about another state in which the people would have a better life; on the contrary toil and suffering are revealed in a different light, and we decide that they are unbearable from the day we can think of another state” (Sartre 1997, 756).

Because of this dialectic of activity and knowledge, human freedom does not need indeterminism. Because all parts of the world are connected in a (dialectically) determined way, we have the possibility of changing them by creating new societal laws, new fields of possibilities, and selections from those fields. The laws and fields of possibilities in society are mainly determined by the evolution of the productive forces (which include human abilities and needs). But the individual behavior of human beings has another type of individual possibility. With respect to societal laws, humans humans are the only elements; they have their own field of possibilities (cf. Holzkamp 1983). Therefore individuals are not only products of their societal environment; “one is always responsible for what is made of one” (Sartre 1969, 45).

Jena, Germany

NOTES

1. Feminist criticism contains criticism of science as an institution and the low participation of women in decisive areas of science, criticism of the androcentric content of science, criticism of the so-called paradigm of natural sciences with “hierarchical and dogmatic structures of thinking” like objectivity, distance, subject-object splitting, and the mathematical form of modern sciences (Wiesner 1995, 237).

2. “The wealth of natural forms, in all their infinitely manifold configuration, is impoverished by the all-pervading power of thought, their vernal life and glowing colours die and fade away. The rustle of Nature’s life is silenced
in the stillness of thought; her abundant life, wearing a thousand wonderful and delightful shapes, shrivels into arid forms and shapeless generalities resembling a murky northern fog” (Hegel 1970, 7).

3. **Sublation** is the English word for the German *Aufhebung* in the threefold Hegelian sense: destruction, preservation, and lifting up.

4. “Newton’s mechanics still has to be regarded as the prototype of physical theory. . . . This does not refer to the range of validity of physical theories but to the structure and character of their concepts, all physical theories are constructed according to the rules of classical mechanics, . . . all physical theories share basically the epistemological status of classical mechanics.” (Borzeszkowski and Wahsner 1999, 251–52)

5. Hegel distinguished between the abstract *universal* and the real *universal*. “The notion is generally associated in our minds with abstract generality, and on that account it is often described as a general conception. We speak, accordingly, of the notions of colour, plant, animal, etc. They are supposed to be arrived at by neglecting the particular features which distinguish the different colours, plants, and animals from each other, and by retaining those common to them all. This is the aspect of the notion which is familiar to understanding; and feeling is in the right when it stigmatizes such hollow and empty notions as mere phantoms and shadows. But the universal of the notion is not a mere sum of features common to several things, confronted by a particular which enjoys an existence of its own. It is, on the contrary, self-particularizing or self-specifying, and with undimmed clearness finds itself at home in its antithesis. For the sake both of cognition and of our practical conduct, it is of the utmost importance that the real universal should not be confused with what is merely held in common. All those charges which the devotees of feeling make against thought, and especially against philosophic thought, and the reiterated statement that is dangerous to carry thought to what they call too great lengths, originate in the confusion of these two things.” (1975, 227)

6. Bertrand Russell wrote, “Science . . . is knowledge of a certain kind, the kind, namely, which seeks general laws connecting a number of particular facts (2001, xxvii).

7. Therefore “the Newtonian worldview was characterised by its belief in absolute immutability of nature, and a reductionistic methodology” is not the right interpretation (Fuchs 2003, 200). First we have to make a distinction between Newtonian physics and the “Newtonian worldview.” In order to have the possibility of measuring motion, *measuring standards* and *rigid bodies* need to be defined—and this assumption of the scientific theory of measurement distinguishes physics as a science from worldviews as parts of philosophy. If “the Hegelian philosophy of nature systematically incorporates all that is denied by Newtonian science” (Prigogine and Stengers 1986, 96), what can this say about physics as a science? Science cannot be judged by philosophical standards (see discussion in the section “Epistemological foundations of individual and universal sciences”).

Second, Newton himself did not support such a “Newtonian worldview” (see Newton 1934, 398–99; 1981, 147). There is a great difference between
the worldview of Newton and the mechanistic worldview of Voltaire (see Borzeszkowski and Wahsner 1981 and the original texts of Newton and Voltaire in it). Borzeszkowski and Wahsner maintain that “the notion of an inherently mechanistic nature of classical mechanics results from confusing this physical discipline with its inadequate interpretation by a mechanistic philosophy” (Borzeszkowski and Wahnser 1999, 252).

8. In our everyday view, things seem to have properties that belong to them independently of their interactions. Bodies have an (inertial) mass. Mass is a measure of the resistance/inertia of the body to acceleration. Thus mass is defined through the interactions of the body. Inertial mass belongs to standard motion (inertial motion); “this inertia is mainly linked with the measurement-theoretical determination of space-time; and gravity is mainly linked with the interacting matter” (Borzeszkowski and Wahnser 2001, 60). Both masses “do not designate properties of the objects for themselves but they have sense and meaning only within the framework of the theory of motion” (59).

Descartes and other scientists and philosophers before him were not aware of the distinction between momentum ($p = mv$) and force ($F = ma$). In their view, a body was set in motion by an impulse—as in billiards. In the worldview developed by Descartes, the motion of bodies was imparted to them by vortices in the liquid-type medium in which they were immersed (1870, 108).

9. This does not mean that this assumption can be or has to be justified outside the theory itself. All units of measurement acquire their meaning only from within the theory.

10. Leibniz tried to work without such a standard motion but he and his disciples never could establish another form of mechanics. For example, they were not successful in unifying Kepler’s three laws with their physical hypothesis.

11. Another example: The measurable quantity “heavy mass” describes the behavior of bodies in a gravitational field produced by other things with heavy mass. “It does not make any sense to say about a single body (a body for itself) that it is heavy” (Borzeszkowski and Wahnser 2001, 59).

12. We must not mix this epistemological dualism with an ontological assumption about a duality of the world. This dualism does not mean that the world itself is dualistic.

13. Therefore it would be a mistake to assume that classical sciences would work without such means. Myelkov describes the classical “immediate” relation between law and events or facts in the classical sciences without referring to such means (2003, 77). This picture follows an abstract logical analysis of natural laws that has lost the content of scientific work. According to Myelkov, nonclassical science takes into account the “means of observation,” and post-nonclassical sciences takes into account the sense of an event in addition to the means of observation. It would be interesting to examine carefully how the means of cognition are also used in the classical sciences, and how they are obscured. I think that all (individual) sciences use such means, but the mainstream theory of science ignores them at least in the classical sciences.

14. Translated by the author. All translations from non-English sources are by the author.
15. Whereas the constructivists assume they can (re)construct the measurable quantities like velocity, mass, charge, and so on before dealing with physical theories (dynamics) (Lorenzen 1987, 1988); Wahsner and Borzeszkowski stress that the theory of measurable quantities cannot be finished before the actual physics begins (Borzeszkowski and Wahsner 1992, 250). The theory determines which measurable quantities are required.


19. The Hegelian categories Verstand (understanding) and Vernunft (reason) differ (see Schlemm 2005).

20. When I stress the work of humans as a process, I do not only mean that historical and sociological studies are necessary, but that we have to take into consideration epistemological assumptions that change in time.

21 Hofkirchner describes the interpretation of the third axiom of Newtonian theory (actio est reactio) as cause-effect causation. Sometimes the second axiom too is interpreted as causation (of acceleration by forces). But the content of the second axiom is only that the quantity of acceleration is proportional to the quantity of force. The force $F$ is not a cause (that would be an overinterpretation of Newtonian terms); it is a “symbol for the term which had still to be introduced” (Borzeszkowski and Wahsner 1998, 21). Force is not a directed cause from one object to another one; it expresses a mutual relation between them. The third axiom limits the possible force terms that must be inserted into the second axiom (21).

22. Causation implies an asymmetry in time, but causation is not a process in which cause precedes the effect. Cause and effect are logically simultaneous: “It is in the effect that the cause first becomes actual and a cause” (Hegel, 1975, 216). Also, accidental events are caused, because no event or object is taken out from the universal connections of the world. To speak about dialectical causation, we need not reduce it to a view that from a certain cause arises a certain effect.

23. Sometimes one speaks of a “law of causality.” The statement that that all effects are caused (cf. Hörz 2004, 275) may be understood as a principle, rather than a natural law.

24. The difference between dynamical and purely statistical and integrated laws is explained in Schlemm 2003b.

25. The interpretation of ramifying as a process in time requires the (not self-evident) correspondence of the increasing parameter with time.

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Globalization and Class Struggle in Germany

Jerry Harris

Throughout the world, globalization is creating the conditions for class struggle. Nation-centric patterns of accumulation are being overturned by a transnational system of production. This process, geared to each nation’s existing political and social structure, affects each country in a different manner. This dialectic between descending forms of national accumulation and the ascending power of globalism is the dominant contradiction in the world. It is a contested process played out on the political stage and in the economic struggles between capital and labor and between competing groups of capitalists.

These conflicts are present at every level of German society. The German working class enjoys one of the highest living standards and levels of social entitlements in the world. These developed out of a strong socialist and trade-union tradition and the industrial growth that rebuilt the country after World War II. Germany, as a front-line state facing the Warsaw block, also needed to be a positive example for capitalism. This pressured German industrial and finance capitalists to accept many social-democratic demands, bringing relative stability to labor/management relations. In turn, the German industrial base became a leading world exporter in autos, chemicals, machine tools, and other important products. Even today, Germany remains the largest exporter of manufactured goods in the world and contributes one-third of the...
European GDP. National production provided the strong job base and profits that created the postwar German economic model, with its strong social contract and consensus-building method of codetermination of capital and labor.

Today the most powerful corporations in Germany are also some of the world’s most transnationalized. The owners and managers of these corporations are part of the transnational capitalist class (TCC), and are the most political, influential, and economically dominant sector of the German ruling class. This sector of German capital, along with its representatives in the major political parties, are retooling German society to fit the new global mode of accumulation. This entails transforming labor relations, the role of the state, and the social structure that had been built to accommodate a nation-centric economy. These changes have naturally created rifts within German society with those social forces, both in labor and nationally based capital, that are invested in the old system. This challenge, with its alternative forms of organization and labor relations, sets the stage for the major political and economic struggles now taking place.

**The structure of German globalization**

To understand the current stage of development of capitalism in Germany, we need to explore the transnational base of Germany’s major corporations. As noted in the *Financial Times*, “More than in other European countries, German companies have detached themselves from their home base and projected themselves as European or international concerns” (Atkins 2004b).

In 2001, Germany accounted for eleven of the world’s top one hundred nonfinancial transnational corporations (TNCs). Table 1 shows their world rank by foreign-held assets and their transnationality index (TNI) that combines the ratios for foreign-held assets to national assets, foreign sales to national sales, and foreign employment to national employment.

These corporations are among the largest in the world and their managers and owners are a key contingent within the TCC in Germany. Compared to TNCs headquartered in other countries, Germany ranked behind the United States, which hosts 28 of the
top 100 TNCs; the UK, which hosts 16; and France 12. But over-
all, Germany is headquarters for 8,522 TNCs, the largest num-
ber in the world, as well as host to 13,826 foreign affiliates doing
business inside the German market. Such large-scale presence of
both parent TNCs and foreign affiliates reflects their economic
dominance and their growing social and political base as well. In
comparison, the UK hosts 3,132 parent TNCs and 13,828 foreign
affiliates, while the United States is home to 3,235 TNCs and host
to 15,712 foreign affiliates (UNCTD 2003, 222). In 2002 the over-
all transnationality index for Germany as a country (foreign assets,
employment, and sales in ratio to their nationally held percents
plus the amount of foreign direct investment as a percent of gross
fixed-capital formation) had risen to 18 percent, the same as the
UK, but greater than France at 11 percent and the United States at
9 percent (UNCTD 2003, 6). Additionally, foreigners hold about
40 percent of all stocks traded on the Frankfurt DAX.

### TABLE 1 World rank of foreign-held assets by German TNCs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Corporation</th>
<th>Rank in Foreign Held Assets</th>
<th>TNI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Deutsche Telekom</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volkswagen</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E.On</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RWE Group</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BMW</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DaimlerChrysler</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BASF</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deutsche Post</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bayer</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ThyssenKrupp</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bertelsmann</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: UNCTD 2003, 187*
Cross-border merger and acquisitions (M&A) activity is an important indicator of globalization. These activities reveal the level of transnational corporate integration, the growing interconnection of global production chains, and the expansion of the postnational economy. Table 2 compares the amount of cross-border M&A by sales and purchases of the world’s largest economies from 1998 to 2002. Germany’s position reflects its high level of transnationalization.

Examining the M&A activity of the top 20 TNCs between 1987 and 2001, we find German corporations involved in the most deals with the second-highest value in dollars. While this is a limited number of TNCs, we see here the concentration of power that exists in the dominant sector of capital. These 20 TNCs accounted for one-fifth of the total value of cross-border M&A activity. Table 3 includes 17 of the top 20 TNCs involved in cross-border M&A over fourteen years of activity.

This high level of global integration is another indicator that TNCs are no longer based in nation-centric economies. From 1987 to 2001 there was a total of 59,273 cross-border M&A worth over four and a half trillion dollars. The following year German TNCs were involved in 24 of 81 cross-border M&A worth $1 billion or more, revealing the depth of their global activity.

### Table 2. Cross-border merger and acquisitions, 1998–2002

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Sales $million</th>
<th>Purchases $million</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>1,043,943</td>
<td>591,468</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>525,160</td>
<td>872,614</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>400,838</td>
<td>313,050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>130,690</td>
<td>171,726</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>120,283</td>
<td>381,326</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>56,866</td>
<td>79,651</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: UNCTD 2003, 289–93*
Foreign direct investment is another key indicator of globalization as TNCs pour capital across borders linking national production and investments. In 1999, Germany had the greatest amount of value added by foreign affiliates—16.4 percent of its GDP as compared to 4.1 percent for France and the UK (UNCTAD 2002, 275).

In Table 4, we see that, even after the world economic downturn of 2001, transnational networks continue to grow.

**TABLE 3. Cross-border merger and acquisitions, 1987–2001**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>TNCs</th>
<th>Value $billion</th>
<th>No. of deals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>Vodafone, BP, Zeneca, BT</td>
<td>460</td>
<td>198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Daimler-Benz/Chrysler, Deutsche Telekom, Mannesmann, Allianz, Deutsche Bank</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>354</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>AXA, Aventis, Suez</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>Nestlé, Roche Holding, Zurich Insurance</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>General Electric, Citigroup</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>280</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: UNCTD 2002, 89*

**TABLE 4. Growth of transnational networks**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>FDI inward stock as percent of GDP 1999</th>
<th>FDI inward stock as percent of GDP 2002</th>
<th>FDI outward stock as percent of GDP 2002</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>29.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>28.2</td>
<td>45.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>25.2</td>
<td>40.8</td>
<td>66.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>14.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: UNCTD 2003, 275*
These tables show the power and position of transnational capital in German society, but the following review of some of the largest individual TNCs will help deepen our investigation. Siemens is the largest electrical engineering and electronics company in the world and the largest manufacturer by sales outside the auto industry. Spanning 190 countries with 600 manufacturing sites, it has a global workforce of 420,000 and a transnationality index of 56.8. It is still Germany’s largest employer, with 167,000 workers, even after 86,000 layoffs over the past twelve years. In contrast, the company’s global workforce grew by 56 percent over the same period. Siemens is among the top 100 employers in the United States, with 70,000 workers spread throughout all fifty states. Its next largest concentration is China, where the corporation employs 21,000 (http://www.Siemens.com).

BASF is the world’s largest chemical corporation and describes itself as a “transnational company focused primarily on Europe, the USA, Latin America and the Far East.” Of its fourteen most important sites, only two are in Germany, with three in the United States (http://www.BASF.de). Recently its biggest move has been in Asia, where it is the number one chemical investor in China. Germany’s other great chemical corporation, Bayer, defines itself in similar terms, writing “the cornerstone of our business activities are in Europe, N. America and the Far East.” Bayer owns 350 companies operating on all continents, with its combined European sales representing just 40 percent of its totals (http://www.Bayer.com).

The German auto industry has a particularly strong national identity, but its production is thoroughly transnationalized. DaimlerChrysler is one of the best examples of a merged transnational corporation. It describes itself as a “truly global company,” with a “global workforce and a global shareholder base.” It operates manufacturing sites in seventeen countries and sells its stocks in Frankfort, New York, and Tokyo (http://www.DaimlerChrysler.com). Although the corporation has met problems in joint ventures with Mitsubishi and Hyundai, its trucking operations with China is planned as an export base to Russia, India, and South Korea. DaimlerChrysler’s truck business is the world’s largest and most globally integrated, with a single range of major parts...
used throughout Europe, Japan, the United States, and Brazil (Mackintosh and Dombey 2004b).

Volkswagen (VW) has one foot planted in global production and the other in national soil. Its largest shareholder is still the state of Lower Saxony, and just over half of its workforce is in Germany. With state and union representatives joining together on its board, VW has found it difficult to shed workers and cut costs. Still, VW has nineteen global production sites, over 80 percent of its sales are in foreign countries, and it ranks fifteenth in the world in foreign-held assets (www.Volkswagen-ag.de). VW has the largest share of China’s rapidly growing auto market, and has also moved into Eastern Europe, producing cars in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland. Recently, it became the largest employer in Slovakia, where wages are one-sixth of those in Germany. VW has been an active player in the merger and acquisitions market, taking over Bentley, Bugatti, Seat, Skoda, and Audi (Mackintosh 2004).

Bertelsmann, another transnational with a strong German identity, recently pushed through a controversial 50–50 merger with Sony Music. The expanded company will control over 22 percent of world music sales and cut about 25 percent of its workforce. Bertelsmann’s broadcasting arm, RTL, also has a transnational focus and is more dependent on growth in Spain, France, and the UK than on its declining market share in Germany. Even its traditional German media rival, ProSieben, is now owned by a U.S. investor group.

Similar transnational accumulation patterns are evident in Europe’s largest telecommunications operator, Deutsche Telekom, whose main growth is in the United States, while its German market struggles with feeble returns. Underlining its transnational investment strategy, Deutsche Telekom paid $2.5 billion for Cingular Wireless, taking over its mobile networks in California and Nevada. The company owns between 49 and 60 percent of the telecommunication networks in Hungary, Slovakia, Croatia, Poland, and the Czech Republic. The German government is expected to sell its remaining 43-percent share in Deutsche Telekom, formerly a state monopoly.
In information technology, Germany’s SAP is Europe’s biggest software maker, but Germany only accounts for about 10 percent of its revenues, with 45 percent coming from the Americas and 19 percent from Asia/Pacific (Wassener and Waters 2004). Inside Germany the information technology industry is concentrated between Dresden and Freiberg in an area dubbed “Silicon Saxony.” A center of the Soviet bloc’s microelectronics industry, today the area still retains about 760 IT companies and 11,000 employees. But Dresden is evolving into a transnational center of production, particularly with the projected investment of $4.8 billion by the U.S. chipmaker Advanced Micro Devices (AMD). Government subsides have helped the region but are not limited to German companies. AMD received $745 million in local, regional, and federal help. AMD has also entered into a joint venture that includes DuPont and Infineon, a memory chipmaker spun off from Siemens (Williamson 2005). Infineon has not limited its efforts to Germany, but is also investing a billion dollars in a new fabricating plant in China, with additional expansion into Eastern Europe.

Another indication of the transnationalization of German corporations is in the corporate boardroom, where foreign nationals are taking leadership positions. This includes Deutsche Bank, whose chief executive, Josef Ackermann, was born in Switzerland; MAN, whose new chief executive, Jakan Samuelsson, was born in Sweden; Lufthansa, now led by Austrian Wolfgang Mayrhuber; and RWE, headed by Harry Roels from the Netherlands (Atkins 2004d).

**The TCC and class conflict**

Operating through their dominant position in the German economy, transnational capitalists have been actively reshaping German labor relations with frontal assaults on wages and hours. These attacks reflect a transnational political and social view that no longer sees a national accord between capital and labor as a necessary arrangement or competitive advantage, since globally networked production undercuts previously established social contracts by its reorganization of labor. So when Bosch,
the German car-components company, forced French workers to abandon the 35-hour week with no increase in pay, similar demands quickly jumped borders to Germany. TNCs, including Bosch, Siemens, MAN, Linde, Opel (owned by GM), Mercedes, and DaimlerChrysler all called for extended working hours, often coupled with threats to go abroad.

Siemens was the first to demand an extended workweek at two of their plants, pushing hours from 35 to 40 with no increase in pay. As outgoing CEO Heinrich von Pierer noted, “I am interested in the social well-being of Germany. But we have to improve our costs position in Germany because at the moment our costs are higher than in many other places where we operate. If we’re seeing 4 per cent annual growth rates in economies outside Germany and only 1.5 per cent in Germany, then it is obvious we’ll see greater employment growth in the Siemens workforce abroad than at home” (Marsh and Wassener 2004). Attempting to defend their contract, the German trade union IG Metall mobilized 25,000 members in street protests. In response, Siemens threatened to move half its jobs to Hungary, where operating costs were 30 percent lower, and successfully forced the union to accept longer hours.

Dieter Hundt, head of the German employers’ association BDA declared the contract would “help create a new collective bargaining culture” for Germany (Münchau and Atkins 2004). And Rudolf Rupprecht, chief executive of MAN, the engineering and truck conglomerate stated, “If the 40-hour week is going to re-emerge slowly, we would rather be in the front rather running behind breathing in the exhaust fumes of others. The trend towards the 40-hour week is unstoppable and that sometimes means more work for the same money” (Atkins 2004a).

The corporate offensive next spread to DaimlerChrysler, with similar demands on hours and wages and threats to move production to South Africa. This time the union mobilized 60,000 members in protest, only to concede eventually once again. Transnational capitalists celebrated the victory, as Keith Hayes, an analyst at Goldman Sachs, said; “This is definitely the start of a trend. There’s a new spirit of accommodation. . . . This is a really
good step forward” (Jenkins and Wassener 2004). Smelling blood in the water, VW continues the onslaught, demanding flexible work rules and a two-year wage freeze. Even this most German of transnationals could not resist taking advantage of the more competitive labor accords.

Transnational capitalists have focused on German workers because at 1,446 hours per year they work less than employees anywhere except the Netherlands (Williamson 2004a). Klaus Zimmermann, president of the German Institute for Economic Research, complained that “We have created a leisure society, while Americans have created a work society. . . . Our model does not work anymore” (Landler 2004). But only about nine million German workers labor between 36 and 39 hours per week, with ten million actually putting in 40 hours or more. According to the ISO research institute, full-time employees already average 42 hours a week in western Germany and 43 hours in the east. Moreover, days lost to strikes are extremely low; during the 1990s Germany averaged only 4.8 compared to 42.5 in the United States (Williamson 2004a).

Driving up work hours is only one goal the TCC has for Germany; the other is driving down the overall social costs of labor. As Elga Bartsch, executive director of Morgan Stanley, argues, “excessive labour costs are one, if not the main, reason for Germany’s weak economic performance. . . . Getting a grip on labour costs is essential in order to regain price competitiveness. . . . If anything, the labour market reforms implemented by the government have been too late (and too little). But certainly not too soon” (Bartsch 2004). Notice the problem is not labour productivity, which even the IMF admits is about on par with the United States, but, as it argues, “The real lag is in terms of the use of labour” (Atkins 2004c). The problem therefore is twofold: to get employed Germans to work longer hours and force unemployed Germans back into the workforce for less pay.

The TCC has turned to the Social Democrats to deconstruct the social accords the party was instrumental in building. The main leaders of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) have linked their future to transforming the German state and its welfare and social security
Schröder, along with Tony Blair, was an originator of the Third Way, a neo-Keynesian version of globalization that was fashioned to soften class conflicts and create the human capital necessary for transnational production. But the SPD’s Agenda 2010 has included cuts in the health-care system, pension benefits, and unemployment coverage, while providing tax cuts for corporations and rules that make it easier to hire and fire workers. The cuts are not as deep as those advocated by the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), but it is clearly an agenda driven by globalist’s concerns.

Among the most controversial changes are those in unemployment benefits, designed to force people back into the workforce at below normal wage levels. These deep cuts in benefits are known as the Hartz laws, named after Peter Hartz, a VW executive appointed by the government to overhaul Germany’s labor laws. The Hartz laws also created a category of low-paid part-time employment called “minijobs.” Companies are relieved of social-security payments and other taxes associated with hiring new workers, while gaining access to a pool of temporary labor that has already grown to 7.6 million people. Another result of driving the unemployed into low-wage labor is greater competition between Germans and immigrants. Germany has 7.3 million immigrant workers, the largest immigrant workforce in Europe, most filling unskilled jobs.

The Hartz IV cuts in unemployment benefits caused a political explosion, particularly in eastern Germany, where the 18.5 percent unemployment rate is double levels in the west. During the summer of 2004, Monday demonstrations became a regular feature in Leipzig, growing to 90,000 by the fourth week. The demonstrations spread to other cities, including Stuttgart, Cologne, Dresden, Magdeburg, and Berlin, at one point reaching half a million protestors. Critics of the reforms point out that millions of jobs in eastern Germany have been destroyed since reunification, and that cuts in benefits cannot drive people to work when there are no jobs. As Andreas Ehrholdt, leader of the Magdeburg protestors, said, “We do not need charity, we need work” (Benoit 2004b).

Although SPD leaders eventually were willing to make some minor concessions, their loyalty to globalization remained
unshaken. Commenting on union opposition, SPD chairman Franz Müntefering stated, “The welfare state in Germany was born as an answer to national capitalism, which no longer exists. The trade unions are still fighting a national battle” (Benoit 2004f). The drive to reshape the working class to fit the new global relations of production is a central task for both political and economic elites. Only through the transformation of the social structure of accumulation can the TCC realign the Germany economy. To achieve these goals, the SPD can count on support from transnational capitalists like Ludolf von Wartenberg, director of the German industrial federation, who stated, “Everyone must stand behind the decision (to cut benefits) and support the implementation of the reforms” (Williamson 2004b). The EU political leadership in Brussels also urged Germany to push older workers and mothers to work, gear education for corporate requirements, ease protections against dismissals, and decentralize wage negotiations.

While global capitalists go about cutting wages, benefits, and security, they worry about the lack of domestic demand and consumption. Locked into their neoliberal dogma and led by the logic of globalized competition, they see the problem as the solution. As one commenter observed, “Structural reforms are needed to make German labor competitive and help turn globalisation from a threat to an opportunity” (Benoit 2004b) Yet it is exactly these structural reforms and competitive efficiencies that are driving down German living standards and buying power. Complaining about the lackluster German economic recovery because of depressed consumption, an editorial in the *Financial Times* argues the “only choice is to press on with product and labour market reform in the hope that this will stimulate demand. In this regard Germany once again is one of the best exhibits of the eurozone’s chronic weakness: inflexible labour supply and early retirement . . . inefficiencies like this must go” (*Financial Times*, 6 July 2004). But getting older workers to labor for reduced wages is hardly a solution that will propel the German economy upward. As Marx pointed out long ago, driving down the cost of labor has always been the Achilles heel of capitalism, resulting in overproduction, under-consumption, and economic crisis.
In a globalized economy, this tendency has even more serious implications. With depressed consumer spending in Japan, Germany, and Europe, the United States market has been the main engine of the weak world economic recovery since 2002. But spending in the United States is supported by huge financial bond investments by China and Japan that prop up the value of the dollar and create a huge accounts deficit. With the global economy depending on balanced consumption to strengthen all major world markets, this puts everyone at risk. Yet the continuing drive by the TCC for efficiency and low labor costs undercuts consumer markets not only in the overly exploited third world, but in the developed world also. As national economies are bound more closely to circuits of global accumulation, recession and growth become interlinked worldwide cycles. What threatens one tends to threaten all. With Germany producing one-third of Europe’s GDP, stagnating demand not only affects the German national economy but the weak world recovery.

All but forgotten are the Keynesian investment booms after World War II that created jobs at decent wages, resulting in the U.S. consumer society and the German economic miracle. But capitalism has outgrown such models of national development, and now draws its logic elsewhere. As Wolfgang Münchau points out, wages and welfare “cannot explain the unexpected, sharp and persistent decline in economic growth since 2001. This decline has been almost entirely due to a fall in private-sector investment . . . 12.1 per cent over three years. For a mature industrial economy this is an extraordinary decline” (Münchau 2004). Yet transnational capitalists continue to blame high wages and welfare for stagnation even as they worry about weakening consumer markets.

The internal logic of transnational capitalism remains in force because of global competition. After all, why invest in Germany when low-wage countries like Poland, China, and Mexico are hungry for jobs? Its only answer is to destroy the economic model linked to the previous social structure of national accumulation. These changes are underlined by the expansion of the EU to Eastern Europe, with its attractive low-wage and tax structures.
Even Austria has moved to cut its corporate tax rates and labor-protection laws, attracting high-profile defections from Germany. While workers continue to protest offshoring, Germany’s six top economic institutes warned against political moves that would deprive businesses of tax advantages and “reduce the productivity gains afforded by specialization within the international division of labour” (Benoit 2004d). The global organization of labor results in greater productivity at lower wages abroad, resulting in world overproduction with greater unemployment and underconsumption at home. This, in turn, propels the demand for cheaper labor and longer hours to create a competitive labor market in Germany, and somehow all this is supposed to lead to a renewal of a vigorous consumer market.

Instead, the resulting political instability is evident in the class conflict over unemployment benefits and also in the political crisis within the SPD. Much of the SPD’s history is based in the working class and the institutional support received from the trade unions. With frontal assaults on working-class security, this base is rapidly leaving the party. Since Schröder took office in 1998, the SPD has lost close to 20 percent of its members and suffered defeat in a number of important regional elections. In the June 2004 elections to the European parliament, it scored its lowest total in a federal election since 1945, with only 21.5 percent of the vote. An even greater indication of crisis is that out of 439 electoral districts, the SPD was the leading party in only 12, less than the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS). The PDS, successor party to the former East German Communist Party, has now renamed itself the Left Party after fusion with the western German Electoral Alternative for Jobs and Social Justice (WASG). Facing electoral defeats and the lost of 130,000 members, Schröder resigned as chairman of the SPD, but this hardly satisfied the internal opposition.

Klaus Ernst, head of the IG Metall trade-union branch at Schweinfurt, stated, “The SPD has not just betrayed its electoral promises, it has betrayed its founding principles” (Benoit 2004e). Michael Sommer, head of the DGB trade-union federation, added he would “never make peace with the kind of social reforms”
pushed by Schröder’s government (Benoit 2004c). Opposition to
the SPD’s neoliberal agenda culminated with some trade unionists
and left-wingers of the party creating WASG. The unions them-
selves have suffered a decline in membership over the last decade,
and their defeat in a number of major contract battles indicates
their own weakness.

With both major parties committed to neoliberal globalism,
the working class has turned to both the Left and Right in search
for an effective opposition. In recent regional elections, the PDS
emerged as the second largest party in Brandenburg, with 28.3
percent of the vote and also came in second in Saxony. In a poll
taken on political attitudes, 76 percent of east Germans remain
convinced that socialism was “in principle a good idea” (Benoit
2004a). Far-right parties also grew, the National Democratic Party
of Germany winning 9.4 percent in Saxony and the People’s
Union managing 5 percent in Brandenburg. Meanwhile both the
SPD and CDU saw huge losses, the CDU losing 16 percent of its
support in Brandenburg and the SPD scoring below 10 percent in
Saxony, a historic low. Such electoral swings reflect the struggle
over neoliberalism and the fact that both major parties are domi-
nated by globalist sectors of the capitalist class.

**Nationalist/globalist conflicts**

Globalization has not only created tensions between the capi-
talists and working class, but divisions between nationalist and
globalist wings of the bourgeoisie. One of the most interesting
cases involves Vodafone’s takeover of Mannesmann and the result-
ing court case against six of Mannesmann’s former directors.

The $185 billion buyout of Mannesmann by Britain’s
Vodafone/Airtouch was the most expensive deal in corporate his-
tory and created the largest wireless telephone corporation in the
world. Not only does the company control the biggest euro mar-
tkets in Britain, Germany, and Italy, it has holdings in more than
thirty countries, including the United States and Japan. Vodafone/
Mannesmann also achieved a monopoly over wireless commu-
nication, putting it in position to be the largest Internet portal in
Europe.
The takeover of Mannesmann was a protracted battle in which both corporations tried to gain advantage by moving directly into the other’s market. In January 1999, Vodafone acquired Airtouch in the United States, an important minority partner of Mannesmann. Mannesmann fought back by entering the British market and buying out the large mobile phone network Orange for $33 billion. When Vodafone stole away another Mannesmann partner, this time in an Internet deal with Vivendi in France, it had finally maneuvered into a dominant competitive position. Although both corporations had strong domestic identities, their respective governments steered clear of being drawn into a nationalist brawl. Even as Mannesmann was threatened by a hostile foreign takeover, Schröder judged government interference could jeopardize future mergers in which German corporations would continue their global integration.

To think of the English, Germans, or any national group as winners in these mergers is to miss their essential character as transnational deals engineered by denationalized elites with common goals and interests. Even as Mannesmann’s CEO, Klaus Esser, struggled to devise a better negotiating position, he declined to use nationalist political rhetoric as a strategy to defend his corporation. Tens of thousands of union members protested the proposed merger, as did most German investors. Yet Esser ignored his domestic audience and appealed to his global shareholders to hold out for a higher share price. When Vodafone upped their offer by £77 million, the majority of shareholders bought the deal. Esser’s main goal was to build a new transnational giant beneficial to his international investor base, and not to protect a “German” company. Although considered a national champion in reality, Mannesmann was already a transnationalized corporation, with many institutional investors in the United States and Britain. Mannesmann also had important global holdings, such as Italy’s second largest phone company Infostrade and major U.S. interests in phone, publishing, and music.

As the dust settled, nationalist anger over the deal continued to boil, resulting in a controversial trial in 2004. Six former directors of Mannesmann, including Ackermann of Deutsche
Bank, were accused of breaching their fiduciary duties for awarding 60 million euros ($74 million) in executive bonuses, including 15 million euros to Esser. In essence, the prosecution accused Mannesmann executives of being bribed into accepting Vodafone’s offer. Driving the case was popular anger over huge bonuses at a time when many Germans were facing cuts at work. But for the TCC, the case was about whether or not Germany was ready to accept higher standards of executive pay common in the Anglo-American model. Therefore the real issue was over executive privileges adjusting to global corporate standards or holding to traditional lower levels of compensation set by the German social contract. The outcome was a weak compromise in which the judge ruled no criminal activity, but also stated the bonuses were inappropriate.

The controversial case quickly spilled over to the issue of making executive pay levels public. The German tradition of making corporations responsible to a variety of stakeholders, including workers and communities, continued to fire resentment over excessive pay. Unions were rapidly seeing their traditional power eroded, their members working longer hours, and a weakening of union influence on corporate boards. One concession within their reach was making executives disclose their salaries, in an attempt to moderate pay levels to show “solidarity” with workers taking cuts. At first uncomfortable, executives began to accept disclosures because it moved Germany closer to Anglo-American business culture, the template for global corporate practice. The executives realized that ultimate results would be higher compensation rates as corporations compete for the best executives with transparent pay levels.

Still the German tradition of codetermination is a continual problem for executives pushing their corporations further into transnational practices. Infineon chief executive Ulrich Schumacher was forced to resign when he threatened to move corporate headquarters to Switzerland. And Jürgen Schrempp, head of DaimlerChrysler, faced harsh criticism within his board over failed links with Mitsubishi Motors. Resistance to globalization not only comes from union members on the board of directors,
but also sectors of the business community that believe in the German postwar consensus model. The relationships, habits of business, economic success, and long-established political and economic interests built into social consensus are all obstacles to transnationalization creating multilevel conflicts in German society. The struggles between the national and globalist political/economic blocs are determining the specific nature of German transnationalization.

**National champions?**

As the transformative process of globalization deepens, a wide range of battles have erupted between competing capitalist groups. The debate over national champions is a fascinating mixture of global competition couched in nationalist rhetoric. The main players encompass German and French transnationalists, as well as EU political elites from Brussels. The controversy began when France’s finance minister Nicolas Sarkozy, the most free-market advocate in the conservative government, began to promote a national industrial policy to protect French engineering and pharmaceutical TNCs. When Sarkozy prevented Siemens from having a role in restructuring the troubled French engineering corporation Alstom, Schröder scolded the minister for being “extremely nationalistic,” and came out with his own plan for creating a national champion in the German banking industry.

Both Sarkozy and Schröder are being pushed by popular national political pressures as workers and the middle class show mounting anger over deindustrialization and offshoring. Sarkozy, who has high hopes of becoming the next president, is openly feuding with Jacques Chirac for popularity, while Schröder’s neoliberal policies have his party on the edge of disaster. In addition, TNCs will use any advantage to protect and extend their competitive position, including seeking refuge under nationalist rhetoric. But these conflicts also reflect a transitional period in which divided interest and consciousness can play an important role. Transnational capitalists may still feel rooted to their culture and still have important economic interests invested in their country of origin. All these factors can produce political battles that
rage back and forth between nationalist and globalist tensions, as a synthesis of interests begins to emerge with elements of the old national accumulation structure still present in the new transnational system.

All these factors were in evidence when the French government prevented the Franco-German pharmaceutical group Aventis from accepting a friendly takeover by Switzerland’s Novartis. Instead, the French government backed a $57 billion bid from Sanofi-Synthelabo, whose major stockholder is the French oil group Total. After completing the deal, Thierry Desmarest, chief executive of Total, commented, “It is important that big French companies have their decision-making centers in France. . . . I think this project has numerous advantages for our country” (Arnold 2004). But the purely French character of the merged corporation is questionable, since Aventis had 9,000 workers in Frankfurt, a German CEO, and half of its management board from the old German drug company Hoechst.

Underneath the nationalist rhetoric, Desmarest’s main concern is to work around Europe’s commitment to national health care that constrains pharmaceutical profits in the face of neoliberal competition from America. Both France and Germany have imposed price cuts for some drugs, Germany driving down costs by 16 percent for some pharmaceuticals. As Roche chairman Franz Humer reacted, “Europe needs to wake up. This sort of pricing environment is helping to drive investment abroad” (Dyer 2004). Faced with mass support for cherished social programs from the national era, European TNCs are forced to moderate their political project. But in order to help level the playing field, European transnational capitalists are quite willing to use state intervention. Although nationalist in form, the French government’s intervention actually strengthens the competitive position of this Franco-German globalist firm. Merging Sanofi and Aventis will create the world’s third largest pharmaceutical TNC, ready to compete on the global stage. Thus global capitalists transform the function of the state to serve their class interests, while using nationalist rhetoric to defend their actions. Reacting to the French cry for a national champion, the chief executive of Novartis, Daniel Vasella, said, “I’ve never
seen anything like it.” To argue Aventis was “purely French was strange” because Rhone-Poulene had acquired the U.S. company Rorer, then merged with a German company Hoechst, which itself had bought out the U.S. corporation Marion Merrell Dow (Johnson 2004). Hardly a “national” champion, but the capital grouping around Sanofi and Total were able to use their ties to the French government to fight off Novartis successfully.

Another key issue is that an important sector of the globalist hegemonic bloc includes well-paid professionals who work for large TNCs, many in the drug industry. Maintaining political legitimacy and consolidating support for the globalist project remain important national concerns as each country shapes its own particular insertion into the global economy. Therefore retaining a base in certain job sectors is still a necessary task, and the knowledge-based pharmaceutical industry accounts for eight percent of the French GDP. Therefore globalist projects have important national considerations, as they rearrange local economies to fit transnational networks. This can create a political mixture at the local level that makes certain aspects of their nationalist rhetoric ring true. This is how the synthesis takes form, using the state to serve transnational projects, while still reflecting elements of national concern.

Volkswagen is another TNC that will use nationalist appeals to protect its competitive position in Germany. When the European Commission moved to open EU markets to independent manufacturers selling spare part replacements for autos, VW demanded government protection. Yet Bernd Pischetsrieder, VW chief executive, called French and German attempts to create national champions “nonsense.” And when asked about Germany’s “VW law,” which protects the automaker from takeover, Pischetsrieder stated that it was “because politicians want to be re-elected.” “I don’t think it has any other than emotional importance” (Mackintosh and Dombev 2004a).

Commenting on Pischetsrieder’s attack on national champions, the Financial Times, in an editorial on 9 July 2004, praised “business executives such as Mr. Ackermann and Mr. Pischetsrieder who can see clearly the truth to which the politicians are foolishly
blind. Companies with global ambitions are capable of finding partners to give them scale and reach, but find they are blocked by outdated legislation, excessive regulation and tax structures from a pre-globalisation era.” Attacking the old accumulation structure is exactly the intent of the VW executive. Yet on an individual basis, TNCs will take advantage of nationalist measures when they protect their own interests but promote transnational policies as a strategy to realign the national economy. Again we see the adoption of nationalist traditions to promote transnational ends emerging as elements of globalization.

**Global finance vs. the national economy**

Inside Germany, the most hotly contested battle over national champions is in the finance sector. After World War II, banks and insurers were key players in rebuilding financial and industrial strength. Financial institutions held large direct interests in industrial companies and developed a culture in which financial executives held many nonexecutive positions on industrial boards. For example, Josef Ackermann of Deutsche Bank is also on the board of Siemens, Linde, Lufthansa, and Bayer. This mutual support network was known as Deutschland AG, but with globalization, major banking and insurance companies have begun to divest large chunks of their old industrial shareholdings. Also under threat are low-cost loans to Germany’s midsized business community (Mittelstand) from the regional Landesbanks. The Mittelstand sector generates 60 percent of the GDP, employs 70 percent of the workers, and provides 80 percent of training positions (Jenkins 2004c). Traditionally they have depended on bank lending for finance, but now face a credit squeeze as the financial sector has developed more global interests.

Lastly, Germany has three levels of banking that includes private-sector banks, not-for-profit cooperatives, and state-owned regional saving banks. This system of 2,700 banks has served the national economy well by providing a strong range of local and regional financial resources, but has limited the size of the larger institutions. Germany’s top five banks have only a 3.8 percent share of the country’s deposits, lagging far behind other European
markets. For example, the top five banks in Sweden have 75 percent of total deposits, top UK banks have 67 percent, and similar institutions in France 47.6 percent. Among the top ten global banks by assets, Deutsche Bank is the only ranking German institution at number six. But in terms of market capitalization, it ranks only tenth among European banks (Jenkins 2004e). Foreign financial services have also been slow to enter Germany, with assets of just 4.7 percent compared to 51 percent of foreign-controlled financial services in the UK and 25 percent in Belgium (Huhne 2004).

In order to survive global competition, German financial institutions are under intense pressure to grow through consolidations and mergers. But in order to achieve competitive size, they need large partners outside of Germany’s divided and smaller institutions. Global institutions are able to offer an array of services, overwhelming national banks that cannot match their resources. A merger-and-acquisition wave is already starting to sweep through Europe, with nine countries involved in six large cross-border mergers since 1999. Schröder has responded by calling for a consolidation of German banks to create a national champion, but as Gary Parr, deputy chairman of Lazard, points out, “no one country is large enough to provide an adequate base. The combined market capitalization of Citigroup and Bank of America, for example, is larger than that of all the publicly traded banks in France and Germany combined” (Parr 2004).

Some of Germany’s biggest banks have already developed global growth strategies by focusing on expansion into eastern Europe. Commerzbank has made acquisitions in Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, and moved their back-office work to Poland, the first German bank to do so. Hypovereinsbank (HVB) bought into Bank Austria, gaining access to an 850-branch network throughout central and eastern Europe. They plan on building another two hundred branches spanning eleven countries. Announcing the plans, chairman Erich Hampel said, “We have set ourselves a clear target. We want to become the undisputed number one in central and eastern Europe” (Wagstyle 2004). HVB has also held merger discussions with Spain’s top bank, Santander Central Hispano. Deutsche Bank entered global ranks when it
acquired the UK’s Morgan Grenfell in 1989 and, later, Bankers Trust and Scudder from the United States.

But nationally based capital groupings still have strong interest in maintaining the old structure. State guarantees against financial bankruptcy enable local industry to borrow from government-owned regional banks at low rates. This creates a powerful base for national capital organized around Germany’s savings banks in Deutscher Sparkassen- und Giro-Verband, the Mittelstand companies, and local and regional governments that have direct interests in the regional Landesbanks. State backing of low-interest loans undercut private commercial banks, but the practice is about to end under pressure from the EU. As one commenter points out, “That will be good for German capital markets and bad for German companies that depend heavily on debt to finance themselves... given the increasingly defensive and inward-looking attitudes in some German boardrooms... It is just possible that the temptation in Germany Inc. will be to try to turn back the forces of reform, transforming the protectionist impulses of national champion strategies into even more negative and anti-competitive actions” (De Jonquieres 2004).

Just such defensive attitudes were voiced by Dietrich Hoppenstedt, president of Deutscher Sparkassen- und Giro-Verband, who called on private-sector banks to “abandon the ‘old mindset’ of being the enemies of state-owned savings banks and start thinking of Germany... What disturbs me most is that these banks only look from the point of view of what is good for their shareholders, not what is good for the market, the economy or their customers” (Jenkins 2004c).

Hoppenstedt was responding publicly to statements by Rolf Breuer, Deutsche Bank supervisory board chairman and head of Bundesverband deutscher Banken, the private-sector banking federation. Speaking about the pressure on Deutsche Bank to find a national partner, he said, “We do not deny our roots. We stick to our history and tradition. But the majority of our customers, the majority of our employees, the majority of our earnings are not German. So why should we be the German icon?” In a press interview Breuer went on to attack just about every aspect of the
national economic model. He supported increasing the number of foreign executives, called for longer hours and less pay, criticized codetermination, urged the Landesbanks to merge with foreign partners, and attacked Germany for driving away pan-European corporations with high taxes and rigid trade-union regulations (Jenkins 2004d). A more clearly articulated transnational agenda would be hard to find.

The conflicts between globalist and national financial interests are being played out in several arenas. The nearly bankrupt Landesbank WestLB was taken over by Thomas Fischer, who had headed up risk management at Deutsche Bank. Fischer’s strategy is to take the regional bank and turn it into a global institution. As he states, “My ideal is a well-arranged universal bank in the Citigroup mould. . . . I’m running a bank based on profit. That is what Landesbanks have to understand. Profit is quality” (Jenkins 2004b).

At the center of struggle to globalize German banking is Deutsche Bank. Ackermann, who took over as chief executive in 2002, has been a powerful force for transnationalization. But Ackermann and his globalist allies have been struggling to overcome the legacy of the country’s industrial heritage and have faced both internal opposition and a wide range of foes throughout German society. Ackermann had promised raising the bank’s pretax profits rate to 25 percent, but was burdened with a $32 billion portfolio of traditional German industrial stocks that average just 1 percent returns. Large banking investment in industry has been a pillar of the German economic model and Deutsche Bank maintained stocks in such giants as Bayer, Munich RE, RWE, Linde, Allianz, and DaimlerChrysler. With the support of the bank’s international investors, Ackermann was able to unload $25 billion in industrial stocks. Strengthening Ackermann’s globalist position are investment bankers in the New York and London Deutsche Bank branches, which account for 70 percent of the institution’s pretax profits.

Deutsche Bank is also one of the most important players in global money markets that are tied together by a vast web of cross-border currency flows. Money markets trade about
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$1.9 trillion every day, and are the biggest and most global markets in the financial world. The top five banks in currency speculation include UBS at 12.36 percent of the market, Deutsche Bank at 12.18 percent, Citigroup at 9.37 percent, JP Morgan at 5.78 percent, and HSBC at 4.89 percent (Hughes 2004). Trading in money worth hundreds of billions every day, these banks become less invested financially or politically in the strength of any single currency. All currencies are part of their market, and so the differences in rate, volatility, and arbitrage become their main concerns.

Another division is created by growing denationalization of the executive leadership. Certainly, many German managers are pushing for globalization, but there are also interesting splits between the Deutsche Bank executive committee, half of whom are non-German, and the supervisory board, most of whom are German. In addition, some of the brightest rising corporate stars are non-German executives, such as Indian-born Anshu Jain, whose fixed-income division led the bank with a growth rate of 28 percent. The struggle between pro-German traditionalists and globalists has been openly acknowledged. As one senior executive stated to the press, “The truth is the supervisory board is stuck in the 1970s. It is 90 percent German and 90 percent non-bankers. Yet they can heavily influence our strategic direction and they would simply veto a cross-border move.” Another bank insider commented, “Lately, it’s been like a massive civil war. But sooner or later, the reactionaries will resign or get fired” (Jenkins 2004a).

Tensions began to build as Ackermann explored possible cross-border deals with Lloyds, Barclays, and Credit Suisse. But it was his interest in a merger with Citibank that set off the furor over national champions. Opposition to a cross-boarder merger did not just come from German traditionalists, but also representatives of the biggest TNCs. A number of the bank’s biggest customers, including Siemens, SAP, Allianz, DaimlerChrysler, and Deutsche Telekom, met with Schröder to voice their opposition to a foreign merger (Ehrlich 2004). Here we see evidence that transnational capitalists will often pursue their immediate
economic interest over the general interests of their class. Most of these TNCs have representatives on the supervisory board of Deutsche Bank and want to protect their influence and their access to easy loans, which would be weakened in any cross-border deal. For Schröder, it provided greater cover to call for a German national champion, with political support from both the transnational and national wings of capitalism as well as unions and workers already angry over losing jobs to foreign flight.

The chancellor urged Deutsche Bank to look at Postbank, the country’s biggest retailer, with 62 percent government ownership. As Schröder stated, “We need an institution in Germany that is globally competitive” (Schmid, Clausen, and Lebert 2004). But Schröder is not particularly wedded to a purely German entity; he has also suggested a European champion: “I’m in favor of using all opportunities to create competitive European entities that transcend national egoism . . . that can compete against American and Asian companies in the globalized economy” (Benoit 2004b). Many observers have worried over the new state interventionism of Germany and France. But they fail to focus on the role and purpose of the state’s efforts, typically inferring any state activity is a throwback to nationalist politics. Schröder’s goal is to help integrate Germany into the global economy, seeking out the proper rearticulation that takes into account the balance of political forces. This is what Leslie Sklair has called “emergent global nationalism . . . the view that the interests of one’s nation or nation-state . . . are best served if it can find a lucrative set of roles within the ever-expanding global capitalist system” (Sklair 2001, 137).

Third Way social democrats like Schröder have redefined national interest through the prism of globalization. They argue that Germany’s future economic health and social welfare are tied to being a competitive component in the global chain of accumulation. Therefore, realignment and insertion become the national political agenda, and the SPD political role is to use the state to help accomplish the transition. Their attacks on traditional national labor relations are part of this trajectory, an effort to create a new social structure of accumulation that is more efficient, will allow Germany to grow, and therefore benefit the
general population. The same logic drives the quest for a national champion. This is not a campaign to reestablish some Fordist industrial-era policy, but a complex class struggle to find a compromise sensitive to the history and circumstances of Germany. As Dieter Hein of the Frankfurt research group Fairsearch has observed, “Politicians hold the key . . . they have to create the framework that will allow strong banks to emerge. That means restructuring the state sector” (Major 2004). This also means getting regional governments and cities to relinquish control over the Landesbanks and opening the state sector to global competition. All these economic and political interests are expressed through the actual class struggle so that an organic synthesis emerges to create globalization in Germany.

As William Robinson has pointed out, “State managers are exposed to multiple contradictory pressures, including distinct sets of local and transnational demands. . . . State managers may respond to the agenda of a transnational elite, but they must simultaneously sustain legitimacy, or at least attempt to, among nation-based electorates and often develop contradictory strategies and legitimation discourses” (2004, 133).

As we weave our way through the complex maze of conflicts, we see that Germany’s global realignment reflects its own historic circumstances and the strength and organization of class forces within its society. The dominant transnational class faction continues to battle national groupings organized in finance, production, trade unions, and local governments. In addition, national populism has erupted into protests and created a crisis of legitimacy for the major political parties. Even members of the TCC have internal differences that at times clash with the overall interest of their common class project. But clearly the central contradiction that conditions these different sets of conflicts is that between the old and newly emergent structures of capitalist accumulation. Therefore our study of globalization must focus on both aspects of the dialectic: the particular national patterns of insertion produced by uneven development, and the universal forms of accumulation and class relations forged by transnational capitalism.

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In July 2005, the South African Communist Party (SACP), tracing its origins to the founding of the Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA) in 1921, celebrated its eighty-fourth anniversary. After being banned in 1950, the CPSA went underground and relaunched itself as the South African Communist Party in 1953. It continued the struggle for national liberation in a unique alliance with the African National Congress (ANC), within which its members also played leading roles.

The growing strength of the national-liberation movement, aided in part by important material support from the Soviet Union and its allies, forced the unraveling of apartheid beginning in 1990 and culminated in the victory of the African National Congress in the parliamentary elections of 1994. The SACP did not run as a party in the elections. Instead, its leading members ran as candidates of the ANC. In the course of the national-liberation struggle, the alliance had also been extended to include the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU).

A two-sentence welcome on the home page of the SACP reads as follows:

The South African Communist Party was founded in 1921 and has always been in the forefront of the struggle against imperialism and racist domination. The SACP is a partner in the Tripartite Alliance consisting of the African National Congress and the Congress of South African Trade Unions.
In this issue of *NST*, we reproduce in the Marxist Forum section an article on the eighty-fourth anniversary written by SACP General Secretary Blade Nzimande. He discusses how the SACP is responding to many of the current problems in the country.

A second item in this section consists of two of the articles in the constitution of the SACP that define its character and its general approach to the goal of bringing socialism to South Africa.
Building a Vanguard Party of Power, Influence, and Activism: Eighty-Four Years of the South African Communist Party

Blade Nzimande, General Secretary

On Saturday 30 July 2005, we shall be officially celebrating the eighty-fourth anniversary of our party, the South African Communist Party. We therefore dedicate this edition of Umsebenzi Online to celebrate this occasion, by outlining some of the achievements of the SACP over the last twelve months and the challenges for the year ahead and beyond.

The national anniversary celebrations will take place in Witbank, in the Mpumalanga provinces. We shall be holding an official SACP anniversary dinner on Friday, 29 July, and a national mass rally on Saturday 30 July 2005. We have however decided that as a party of activism our national rally will be preceded by a march to the banks and credit bureaux to officially launch a series of mass activities we shall be embarking upon in the lead up to the Red October Campaign for 2005. This national march will be demanding that the workers and the poor whose names are listed in the faceless Credit Bureaux must be removed, as a once-off amnesty, to give millions of our people a chance to start their (economic) lives anew. This action will be followed by a combination of pickets, demonstrations and marches in our other provinces during the months of August and September.

In addition our national march will also be demanding a new model for the financing of low-cost housing by the capitalist banks.
We demand that the twenty-year-old mortgage bonds calculated on compound interest must be reviewed as it is inappropriate and unaffordable for bondholders in the low-cost housing sector. These two demands are central in taking forward our financial sector campaign and in the struggle to roll back the capitalist market in the provision of basic services and affordable credit to millions of the workers and the poor of our country. These are important building blocks towards a socialized financial sector that prioritizes people’s needs over profit. We are therefore calling upon the people of Mpumalanga to join us in their thousands in this action.

Some key achievements and milestones over the last twelve months

Our Special National Congress held in eThekwini [formerly Durban—ed.] in April this year boldly and correctly pronounced that we are seeking to build the SACP as a vanguard party of power, influence and activism. This was informed by the fact that over the past year some of our campaigns were beginning to bear some fruit towards addressing the needs of the overwhelming majority of our people. It was also underlining the importance of mobilizing the working class as the principal motive force of our revolution, and that only through its collective muscle will the interest of the overwhelming majority be advanced.

Over the last twelve months our financial sector campaign has notched some important victories. In October 2004, exactly four years since the launch of our Red October campaign for the transformation of the financial sector, the major capitalist banks announced the launch of a new affordable bank account for workers and the poor. This was in direct response to our struggle and call for universal access to affordable banking and other financial services for millions of our people who had been excluded from these services in the past. This account now stands at more than 1 million new customers, 56 percent of whom being women.

In addition, the Financial Sector Charter Council, made up of community representatives, labour, government and business was formally constituted towards the end of last year. This Council is an important platform through which to continue to wage our
Marxist Forum: South African Communist Party

struggles, to supplement ongoing mobilisation, and to hold the capitalist financial institutions to account on how they are responding to the challenge of provision of finance for development.

The capitalist financial sector has also committed itself to provide R42 billion [US$6.5 billion] to finance low-cost housing in our country. This is the first time ever that South African mainstream banks had committed themselves on funding low-cost housing. We however reiterate that for this money to make an impact on housing the workers and the poor, we need a new model for low-cost housing, an issue we are taking up as part of the eighty-fourth anniversary celebrations.

Indeed over the last twelve months this and other SACP-led campaigns have witnessed other victories and advances. Parliament earlier this year has passed a new Co-operatives Bill, which is expected to be signed into law by the President relatively soon. This has been an important campaign for the SACP over the last five to six years. Also now tabled before parliament is a National Credit Bill, which aims to regulate the provision of credit and regulate the Credit Bureaux, thus laying a basis for the creation of a new credit regime in South Africa, a credit regime that is sensitive to the needs of the workers and the poor in our country.

There could have been no better way to celebrate our eighty-fourth anniversary than the holding of the first National Land Summit—a key demand from a number of organizations representing the landless, and a central demand of our Red October Campaign on Land and Agrarian transformation last year. The Summit will be held during the same period as we celebrate our eighty-fourth anniversary, from 27 July to 31 July. The holding of this Summit provides an important opportunity for a comprehensive review of land and agrarian reform in South Africa since the advent of our democracy. We call upon all progressive formations working with the SACP on this campaign to adequately prepare and earnestly engage at this Summit, advancing the perspectives of the landless and farmworkers.

To us as the SACP it has become clearer over the recent past that there are serious issues that need to be debated and reviewed at the Land Summit. The major reason for the slow pace of land
reform has been a lack of an overarching land and agrarian policy, linking land reform to agrarian transformation, food security and uses of urban land. The land reform strategy thus far has been limited to land restitution and land tenure—important objectives in themselves—but not much beyond these two pillars. Central in this strategy has been the market based “willing buyer, willing seller” model, which is proving to have failed to accelerate land reform.

The SACP will therefore be arguing strongly at the Land Summit for a comprehensive state-led, land and agrarian “industrial strategy,” which should strongly incorporate food security, land for housing, access to land and support mechanisms for sustainable agricultural production for the landless poor, expropriation of land to create viable local farming communities and a comprehensive land audit on ownership and usage of land in South Africa. We are however under no illusion that a once-off land summit can achieve all these goals. Our strategy therefore would be to try and reach agreement on post-Summit processes to realize whatever commitments will be made, with clear time-frames where necessary.

One further significant achievement of the SACP over the last twelve months has been, through the above struggles, to deepen our influence and perspectives and build important presence and linkages within a wide range of progressive organizations, including some churches, mass organizations, trade unions, co-operatives and non-governmental organizations. These are important developments towards the realization of one of the key objectives of our medium term vision (MTV), to (re)build a working class-led popular movement to build people’s power as the centre of gravity in driving transformation in our country.

The SACP has also during this period thrown its full weight behind the mobilization of organized workers to defend their jobs and fight poverty. We joined COSATU’s highly successful national strike and stayaway from work on 27 June 2005. Our platform for supporting and participating in this action was based on what we have identified as key four immediate demands of the working class in South Africa during this period: Jobs, Basic services for all, Access to affordable credit and Access to land and agricultural
activities. This has served to deepen relations between, and SACP presence within, our trade-union ally and largest trade-union federation in the country, COSATU, and further enhanced the prestige of the SACP amongst organized workers.

The above achievements have contributed significantly to the steady growth of our membership, and in building a Party cadre that is immersed in people’s daily struggles, as part of building a vanguard Party. We have also learnt important lessons from this activism, that the stubborn South African capitalist system cannot be successfully challenged other than through patient but concerted effort at building the political capacity of the main motive forces of our revolution—the workers and the rural landless masses. These are important advances in building elements of, capacity for, and a momentum towards socialism. Through these campaigns we have constantly agitated and sought to educate the mass of our people about the failure of capitalism to address even the most basic of their needs.

However, South African communists have not only been involved in the mass campaigns outlined above. Communist cadres have continued to play an important role in government, as ministers, members of parliament and provincial legislatures, members of provincial executive committees, as mayors, councillors and public servants. The combination of communist work both inside and outside the state—though not without its own tensions—has provided our Party with vital experience and also helped to enhance the SACP as a party of power, influence and activism.

**Challenges that lie ahead**

The fundamental challenge that faces the South African revolution at this juncture is to transform the current brutal capitalist accumulation regime underway into one that defends and creates sustainable jobs, and to fight poverty. Over the last twelve months we have seen important progress in the workings of the Alliance. In April this year we held an important Alliance Summit which, amongst other things, agreed on a joint programme of action on the ground as well as commitment to address the economic challenges in our country. We have also
seen further commitments by government to play a more interventionist role in the economy and commitment to keeping key state-owned enterprises in the hands of the state to drive a process of investment in infrastructure.

However, this commitment is at the same time accompanied by some hesitancy on the type of relationship we need to build between the state and the capitalist market. Whilst, as an Alliance, we have committed ourselves to a developmental state that is active and interventionist, there is continuing reluctance by government to take decisive action in areas that as a Party we have identified as crucial in turning the economy around. For instance government is resisting a full-blown process to develop an overarching industrial strategy to drive growth and development. In addition government is reluctant to pass legislation on prescribed assets and forcing community reinvestment by the banks.

It is within the context of this hesitancy that there is now a new emerging notion, called “stakeholder capitalism.” This is nothing but a (liberal) humanitarian approach to appeal to the “conscience” of capitalists to sacrifice higher profits in order to address poverty and unemployment in our country. This notion fails to understand some basic facts about capitalism in general, and South African capitalism in particular. South African capitalism has been a product of brutal colonial and apartheid dispossession and super-exploitation of the black working class. Despite enormous progressive transformation of South Africa’s labour market and development of progressive social policies since 1994, the current accumulation regime continues to have strong features of its colonial and apartheid origins: import dependent, export orientation, job shedding, and racially and gender skewed. It is an economy that still favours white and men, and is unable to meet even the most basic of needs of the majority of the population.

Our own struggles during the past eleven years of our democracy have taught us that no humanitarian appeal through notions of “stakeholder capitalism” will change the behaviour of the capitalist class. But it is only through a combination of working class-led mass and state power that will transform the current accumulation
regime. The recently held ANC National General Council (NGC) has helped us enormously in identifying the nature of the economic and development challenge in our country.

In rejecting some of the major arguments and proposals contained in the main discussion document on the economy, the ANC NGC resolved, amongst other things that

... the ANC and Government must produce a coherent development strategy. Elements of this would involve identifying where we need to move to and what strategic leaps we need to get there. The legacy of colonialism and apartheid continues to reproduce patterns of development and underdevelopment in our society. At a general level, we can approach these problems in terms of two economies: the first is developed, globally integrated and modern, while the second is underdeveloped and marginalized.

Nevertheless, we should be clear that we have one economy, albeit structurally divided and polarized along lines of wealth and inequality, development and underdevelopment.

As such, there can be no Chinese Wall between interventions in the first economy and the second economy. Our interventions should aim to restructure the economy as a whole. This includes interventions in the “first economy” to restructure towards more labour absorbing growth.

We must also specifically address the question of interventions for bottom up development, particularly in the townships and rural areas. Such interventions include investment in social and economic infrastructure, supporting local development and employment initiatives, especially for the activities of small enterprises and cooperatives and investment in education, training and health. The barriers of discrimination, as well as deficiencies in the spatial patterns of our communities, must be overcome in order to build staircases from the second into the first economy. We also need to build mechanisms that link people in the first economy—salary earners and businesses—to support activities in the second economy.
On industrial policy the NGC resolution added:

South Africa’s economy has been historically dependent on the resources sector, particularly mining. The pattern of development that this has generated continues to constrain our economic growth. This results in challenges that affect every aspect of our economic transformation and development strategy.

Addressing the challenges of poverty and unemployment requires us to lead the economy toward a new pattern of development, involving a diversified industrial base. This in turn requires a clearly articulated industrial strategy. Such a strategy should be based on a clear assessment of our industrial policy interventions to date, and learning that has been generated from such interventions.

It is a strategy that should:

- Seek to promote sectors that are likely to generate labour-absorbing growth in the future and those that may not in themselves be labour-absorbing, but which have strong linkages to labour-absorbing sectors.
- Establish clear and well-articulated plans in relation to declining sectors, including long term and comprehensive conversion programmes. This should include a consideration of the role that cooperatives can play.
- Be informed by an integrated spatial framework.

The SACP is strongly of the view that this should be our strategic and practical approach to the challenges of growth and development in our country, and resists the temptation of making new policies and advancing new (unclear) theoretical concepts through the media. The SACP will throw its full weight in the struggles and policy development processes aimed at realization of these important economic resolutions by the ANC NGC. It is because these resolutions are closest to some of the key positions we have been advancing as the SACP since 1994.

As we celebrate our eighty-fourth anniversary, the SACP is also acutely aware that the struggle to deepen and consolidate the national democratic revolution cannot be waged in isolation from regional, continental and global realities today. It is for this
reason that over the last twelve months the SACP has continued to strengthen its multilateral and bilateral engagements with many communist parties and other progressive forces in the world today.

In taking forward the struggle of international solidarity, in the coming months, the SACP intends to intensify its work in building progressive left socialist networks in the continent, starting in Southern Africa. The key challenge in the African continent, as well as in the Southern African region, is that of accelerating the struggle for the completion of the original mission of the national liberation struggle and the many liberation movements that led this struggle. We say this being aware of the many achievements made by the national liberation struggle, especially national self-determination and initial post independence achievements around education, health, and other social spheres. However many of these gains have now been seriously eroded.

The original vision and mission of national liberation struggles was that political democracy and independence, important as these are, need to be accompanied by social and economic emancipation. It was a vision and mission that understood that the national liberation struggle shall remain incomplete for as long as our people remain in economic bondage, poverty, illiteracy and disease.

It would however be naïve and not truthful if we do not accept the fact that in many instances the original mission and vision of social and economic emancipation has suffered severe setbacks and, in some cases, it could even be argued that this original progressive mission of the liberation movements has been derailed. This derailment has been a result of a combination of factors. Some of these factors include the disastrous results of the economic structural adjustment programmes, the bureaucratization of a number of liberation movements now in power, and the post-1990 acceleration of the simultaneous integration and marginalization of the African continent into imperialist globalization.

Therefore the SACP is of the view that the key challenge of this period in the African continent is the revitalization of the mission of the liberation movements, especially through the mobilization of the progressive motive forces for change. However, critical in
this regard is the revitalization and reviving of the Marxist socialist strand of the liberation movement, which at one stage provided the key strategic vision for many liberation movements. This strand has receded significantly since the coming into power of many liberation movements.

As a modest and initial contribution to this task the SACP intends in the next few months to initiate a process of networking amongst many of the political mass formations and activists that share the vision of socialism in the region and continent. However in so doing, we should properly understand that the immediate challenge is the revitalization of the original mission of the many liberation movements in our region especially. The struggle for socialism in our regional and continental context must be through the intensification of the struggle for the completion of the national liberation struggle, in all its dimensions, the political and socio-economic aspects. The revival of the Marxist tradition within and outside the former national liberation movements is also essential in critically engaging with the many new developments on our continent, including developments such as the formation of the African Union and its adopting of the NEPAD [New Partnership for Africa’s Development] programme.

A key contemporary challenge in the region for instance is that of seeking to deepen the (re)building of unity of the many strands within the former liberation movements: revolutionary nationalism, the socialist traditions, (re)building progressive mass and trade-union movements, as well as integrating the relatively new progressive strands around gender and environmental struggles, and the many experiences on implementation of sectoral policies accumulated during the post-independence period.

Looking at some of the achievements attained by our Party over the last twelve months, we can indeed be truly proud, as we celebrate our eighty-fourth anniversary, that our party has played a critical role in the struggles for the reconstruction of our country. We are also proud for the contribution we have made in the mobilization of key motive forces around their immediate socio-economic demands and needs. This continues to place us in a key strategic position in playing an important role to tackle the
challenges that lie ahead. We are more than ever convinced that the South African revolution needs a vibrant, vanguard SACP, and that capitalism has failed to address the needs of our people and therefore the continued relevance of socialism as the only rational and humane alternative.

Communist Cadres to the Front, With and For Workers and the Poor!


Aims and Guiding Principles of the South African Communist Party
(From the Constitution as amended at the Eleventh SACP Congress in 2002)

3. Aims

3.1 The SACP strives to be the leading political force of the South African working class whose interests it promotes in the struggle to advance, deepen and defend the national democratic revolution and to achieve socialism.

3.2 The SACP shall pursue this by means of educating, organising and mobilising the working class and its allies in support of our Party and its objectives of completing the national democratic revolution and achieving socialism.

3.3 The SACP shall strive to win acceptance as a vanguard by democratic means and in ideological contest with other political parties.

3.4 The ultimate aim of the SACP is the building of a communist society in which all forms of exploitation of person by person will have ended and in which all the products of human endeavour will be distributed according to need. The attainment of such a society will require an interim socialist formation in which reward will be measured by contribution.
3.5 At all stages the SACP commits itself to a social order that will respect completely the cultural, language and religious rights of all sections of our society and the democratic rights of the individual. The SACP will recognise the right to independence of all social organizations and political parties that function within the ambit of South Africa’s Constitution. This implies a multi-party political framework in which there will be regular, open and free elections. Within such a framework the SACP will primarily dedicate itself to advancing the interests of the working class and its allies in democratic contest with other political forces in all spheres of life.

4. Guiding principles

In leading the working class towards national and social emancipation, the SACP is guided by those principles of Marxism-Leninism whose universal validity has been proven by historical experience. The foundations of these principles were laid by Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, and Lenin and enriched by other great revolutionaries. In applying the general principles of Marxism-Leninism, the SACP is, in the first place, concerned with their indigenous elaboration and application to the concrete realities of our own developing situation. More particularly, the SACP will work:

4.1 To end the system of capitalist exploitation in South Africa and to establish a socialist society based on the common ownership of, participation in, and control by the producers of the key means of production. Such a society will respect and protect all personal non-exploitative property.

4.2 To organise, educate and lead the working class in the struggle for socialism and the more immediate objectives of defending and deepening the national democratic revolution and of achieving national and social emancipation. The main aim of the unfolding national democratic revolution is to complete the national liberation of the African people in particular and black people in general, to ensure the destruction of white supremacy, and the strengthening of democracy in every sphere of life. By participating in this revolution, the SACP aims to eradicate patriarchal relations, weaken and ultimately destroy the economic and
political power of the capitalist class through struggle for working class hegemony over society, in particular the ownership and control of the economy and the achievement of one united state of people’s power. In this state, working class interests will be dominant and the economic conditions will be created which make it possible to move towards social emancipation and, eventually, the total abolition of the exploitation of person by person in both public and private spheres of life.

4.3 To organise, educate and lead women within the working class, the poor and rural communities in pursuit of the aims of the SACP; and to raise the consciousness of the working class and its allies around the integral and oppressive nature of gender relations within South African capitalism.

4.4 To participate in and strengthen the revolutionary alliance of all classes and strata whose interests are served by the immediate aims of the national democratic revolution.

4.5 To spread the widest possible understanding of our basic ideology and its application to South African conditions, particularly among the working class.

4.6 To combat racism, tribalism, sex discrimination, regionalism, chauvinism and all forms of narrow nationalism.

4.7 To encourage an ongoing national and international dialogue with all organizations committed to peace, transformation of gender relations, non-racialism, democracy and the preservation of our environment.

4.8 To promote the ideas of proletarian internationalism and the unity of the workers of South Africa and the world.
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A Marxist Critique of the Sociology of Religion: A Review Essay

Leonard Goldstein


*Social Origins of Religion* is a translation of Roger Bastide’s 1935 *Eléments de sociologie religieuse.* Bastide is credited by the present publisher with combining in this work structural anthropology and ethnopsychiatry in a study of religions as systems. It offers readers today an insight into the sociology of its time and demonstrates the explanatory inadequacy of positivism.

James L. Peacock, in his foreword, gives an intellectual biography of Bastide, sets the book in its cultural and scientific setting, and indicates what he regards as its present significance. In a world where “predictions of secularism have been replaced by awareness of threatening religious forces, new cults, fundamentalism,” he argues, Bastide revisits a broader perspective on religious life that may in part “revitalize” it (Bastide 2003, xxii).

In the introduction, “The Objects, Limits and Methodology of Religion,” Bastide opts for a definition of sociology to which he claims “the vast majority of sociologists subscribe”—the study of “groupings based on shared beliefs and practices” (xxvi). The book has four parts: “The Sphere of the Sacred,” “Social Elements of Religious Life,” “Religious Systems,” and “The Origin and
Evolution of Religions.” Its conclusion comes as a bit of a surprise because it abandons science for mystical religiosity by declaring that an understanding of the subjective side of religion is inaccessible to scientific analysis.

Covering most sociologists with anything serious to say about various aspects of religion, Bastide’s book is in effect a report on the state of the art up to the mid-1930s. He considers in greater or lesser depth sociologists and ethnographers who deal with religion from Comte to Frazer, including the great and the less great: E. B. Tylor, Herbert Spencer, W. Robertson Smith, Max Müller, Andrew Lang, Percy Lubbock, Sigmund Freud, Émile Durkheim, Marcel Mauss, Henri Hubert, Max Weber, and Lucien Lévy-Bruhl, among others.

There are omissions, some serious, some not. The whole early nineteenth-century German critique of religion is largely left out: that of the left Hegelians, Ludwig Feuerbach, David Friedrich Strauss, Bruno Bauer, and Karl Marx and Frederick Engels. Feuerbach’s contribution is reduced to an absurdity, while that of Marx and Engels to a sophomoric economic determinism. It is parochial to exclude Feuerbach because he was a theologian/philosopher but not a sociologist, Marx and Engels because they were economists, and Jane Ellen Harrison because she was a classical archaeologist. This approach imposes a category of a specialization that was beginning to develop only in the second half of the nineteenth century and was full-blown by Bastide’s time. Defining the sociology of religion as he does, Bastide excludes much of the best thinking on the social relations of religion prior to the time of the creation of the specialization. Why R. H. Tawney is excluded I can only conjecture.

Equally puzzling is the absence of discussions of heresy, atheism, religious self-mutilation, and the social relations of theology—that is, why certain theological ideas emerge when they do as expressions of particular social tendencies and ideas, such as the Peace of God movement of the late tenth and early eleventh centuries or the doctrine of the infallibility of the pope on faith and morals of the late nineteenth century. There is no space here to discuss these omissions in detail, but a few remarks may be made with respect to heresy.
Bastide may have left out a discussion of heresy because it is either not religious or antireligious. But heresy is not disbelief; it is an alternative form of religion, a form of religion that has sectarian utopianism at its core. It can, therefore, break out into revolutionary action that aims to establish on earth in the here and now a messianic commonwealth, such as Müntzer attempted in Mühlhausen during the German Reformation. Bastide thus ignores the social relations of heresy. This is surprising not only because there is enough historical evidence to make a sociological analysis well within Bastide’s definition of the field of relevance, but also because Bastide’s chapter 10, “Relations between Religious Systems and other Social Systems,” includes a discussion of the relations between politics and religion (e.g., the state and church), but leaves out the sects as a revolutionary force against the church and state to establish the millennium at the present time. Here analysis gives way to endless sociological description, clearly evident in the discussion of the divine king (2003, 150–51) or of political sovereignty, without showing how religion was used to establish and maintain class society.

In spite of such deficiencies, the book covers a great deal of ground: magic, totemism, mana, soul and spirits, myth, dogmas, taboo, the sacred, rituals, sacrifice, rites of passage and initiation, prayer, organization of religion, social conditions of religious life, relations among religious systems, religion and politics, and religion and economic life. Commendable as this broad treatment is, it often results in summary if not scant treatment of important subjects.

At the same time, “The Origin and Evolution of Religions” surely requires a hypothetical approach hardly compatible with the positivist approach required by his definition of the discipline. This part is divided into three chapters: “Theories,” “Historical and Ethnographic Data,” and “The Laws of the Evolution of Religion.” I should like to deal in some detail with the problems raised by Bastide’s analysis in these chapters.

Bastide begins his review of theories attempting to explain the origin of religion by rejecting John Lubbock’s view (1870, 121–26), which, in Bastide’s words, “asserts the existence of an initial stage among the most backward peoples where there would
be absolutely no religion,” and refutes the argument by stating that “later explorers have proved all his examples to be unsubstantiated, and nothing at all remains of the supposed atheism of primitive humanity” (2003, 167). Not quite, for Lubbock does not say that all early primitive peoples were atheistic. Some were, and some were not. Nor does Bastide give the references for the evidence that would disprove Lubbock’s view. Bastide allows the inference that religion is of the earliest stage in the development of thought of humankind. But even by Bastide’s time there was sufficient evidence to hypothesize that humankind in the form of the hominid had the use of tools and tools to make tools, indicating the ability to conceptualize and to have some form of language. Engels by the late 1870s could see this and argue that it was labor, the hand, and a developing brain that produced humankind (1987; Oakley 1957, 199–200). Bastide’s positivism makes him ignore all the paleological evidence and opt for a mystical religion.

Bastide then cites Comte, Guyau, and Van Ende to the effect that they have “tried to identify the seeds of mystical feeling even among animals,” for example, “in the terror beasts feel when faced with cosmic catastrophes or the approach of death and in the mute adoration of human genius.” Rejecting these views because contemporary psychology rejects these superficial analogies, Bastide goes on to write:

Religion is a purely human fact. It alone is characteristic of all humanity. Thus, would not the role of the sociology of religion be to trace the mystical scope of social evolution? (2003, 167)

The major task, I would have thought, would be the origins of conceptualization, abstract thought, the role of memory, conditioned reflexes, and what Pavlov called the second signal system—that is, the transition from signal to symbol, to abstract thought. If one feels uneasy here because Bastide foregrounds the mystical scope of religion, the unease turns to doubt that the sociology of religion of the type Bastide employs can lead to any real understanding of religion, for at the end of his book his positivist approach leads him to conclude that “the religious life is not exclusively mental and interior” but embodied in a church with
rituals and ideas that “can be called collective”—that is, shared by a group. This view leads him to reject the notion that we can explain religion by seeing it “simply as a hypostasis of society,” a defensible but debatable proposition, so that to propose it “would be a departure from pure positive science.” The second reason he has taken this “strictly deterministic view” is that “in science there is only necessity,” so that only a positivist approach is possible. The concluding sentences read:

However, if in addition to collective trends and social needs, religion translates the solitary soliloquies of the soul, the secret stirring of the heart, and the nostalgia of the mind seeking the absolute, then determinism will be permeated by unpredictable beginnings, mysterious seeds, and promises of unfamiliar flowers. The sociology of religion can observe their presence, but it cannot explain them. (Bastide 2003, 207–8)

Having rejected the notion that religion is a hypostasis of social relations, Bastide replaces, as I have already said, a potential scientific analysis of religion with mystical religion. In any case, insofar as idealism of a platonic variety holds ideas to have existed from eternity (including \( E = mc^2 \)), the question of the origin and structure of concepts does not arise, all the less so as their structure remains eternally the same. But in view of the historical fact that ideas emerge at particular times and places, have particular structures, serve the cultures for which they were created, and can become obsolete, any idealistic view of concepts such as Bastide seems to employ is totally useless for an adequate understanding of religion.

The weakness of Bastide’s method becomes clear when he attempts to refute Durkheim’s insight that the totem and eventually the god is a hypostatization of existing society. He approaches Durkheim’s view of the origin of religion through late nineteenth-century understandings of mana. Bastide writes of the views of King and Marott that they “consider humanity’s initial religious idea to be that of an impersonal power spread out in things” (2003, 175). Bastide regards these views as mistaken and refers the reader to his discussion of Lehmann’s remarks on mana (40–41),
observing that “even if this conception of mana were correct, it would still seem strange that humanity would have begun with the idea of an impersonal force. This idea appears very difficult for the brain of a primitive to form because it is too theoretical” (176). This leads Bastide directly to a critique of Durkheim’s idea of mana and the Australian totem as the basis of his view of the origin of religion. (I quote Bastide at length here to avoid a plethora of single and double quotation marks.)

Durkheim’s sociological theory deals with this difficulty. He begins with preanimism, but tries to prove that the idea of mana came first by explaining its origin. We must focus on this point because a book on the sociology of religion naturally must give precedence to theories overtly claiming to be sociological. Durkheim’s discussion starts with Australian totemism, which he defines as the clan members’ worship of the plant or animal they consider to be their ancestor. However, when examined more closely, totemism is not really the worship of such plants or animals. They are only symbols and clan insignia. The religion passes through them to the anonymous force of which they are the vessel. Thus, if the totem is both the mystical power and the emblem of the society, perhaps the god and the society are one, and the totem “can therefore be nothing else than the clan itself, personified and represented to the imagination under the visible form of the animal or vegetable which serves as totem” (Durkheim 1915, 206 [1912, 295]). This assimilation of the god with the group is justified by the argument that the society alone “has all it needs to awaken the feeling of the divine in people’s minds.” Like a god, it constrains and obliges and is also “a force upon which our strength lies” (Durkheim 1915, 209 [1912, 299]), a reservoir of inexhaustible energy. This makes it understandable that religion has persisted throughout civilizations. It corresponds to something real, to the social existence, which is a universal, permanent fact. (Bastide 2003, 176–77)

And then he raises a question that he answers with a paraphrase from Durkheim:
How could the feeling of community have metamorphosed into an impression of the divine? The answer to this lies in the fact that the clan assembles for intense rituals during totemic ceremonies. The communion of people participating in the same rites generates extremely strong collective emotions, and when the individual returns to a calmer state he has the impression that he has fallen from a world where he lived more keenly. That world of fiery emotions will be what he will call the sacred world, and mana will be only the hypostatization of the emotional power. (Bastide 2003, 177)

Bastide summarizes Durkheim to the effect that for Durkheim and his school, neither dreams nor contemplation of nature can engender the feeling of the divine because they are facts of common experience, but the sacred is beyond experience. Thus its origin must be external to humans, in other words, social. However, what Durkheim says against dreams and nature can, as Delacroix justly notes, be turned against him, for society is also a natural fact. Thus, real society, with its frameworks and organization, cannot be an object of faith. What is required is an ideal society, forged within the soul steeped in values. Yet here the individual reappears. If we consider that it is not society itself but great communal excitement that is the real source of the divine for Durkheim, the difficulty does not disappear. It only changes, for why would not the same apply to individual mysticism and the solitary trembling that throws the inspired into a trance? (Bastide 2003, 177–78)

On this discussion three points might be made:

1) Concept as abstract representation of reality

Since I have discussed the problem of concept formation elsewhere (Goldstein 1988, chap. 3), I can be brief here. The central idea is that consciousness is the theoretical shape of the social structure in which humankind lived and worked—its relations of production, so to speak. Durkheim was seriously concerned with concepts, the social character of their structures, and with concepts
as collective representations (Durkheim 1976, 432–44). He writes that concepts

not only come from society, but the things which they express are of a social nature. Not only is it society which has founded them, but their contents are the different aspects of the social being: the category of class was at first indistinct from the group; it is the rhythm of social life which is at the basis of the category of time; the territory occupied by the society furnished the material for the category of space; it is the collective force which was the prototype of the concept of efficient force, as essential element in the category of causality. However, the categories are not made to be applied only to the social realm; they reach out to all reality. (440)

And he ends the paragraph with a question: “Then how is it that they have taken from society the models upon which they have been constructed?” To this question he gives, surprisingly, a very general answer that is not useful. For the real world he presents, although it has negative characteristics, is a world without conflict, without antagonistic opponents with opposing material interests, so that Durkheim’s world is not the real world at all. The world in which ideal society and religion can best be understood is the world of antagonistic conflict, and that world has been best understood and analysed through the use of the historical materialist method Durkheim vigorously rejects (423). Yet, for all its philosophically idealistic character, Durkheim’s analysis of the social basis of concepts is powerfully suggestive, since what is fundamental to it is in the tradition of Feuerbach, Marx, and Engels; Durkheim partially develops this, but acknowledges it only in polemic against it.

Bastide seems to disagree with Durkheim on the relation between the clan and the totem—namely, that the one seems to be said to be identical with the other. Durkheim writes that the totem symbolises and expresses two different sorts of things. In the first place it is the outward and visible form of what we have called the totemic principle or god. But it is also the symbol of the determined society called the clan. It is its
flag; it is the sign by which each clan distinguishes itself from the others, the visible mark of its personality, a mark borne by everything which is part of the clan under any title whatsoever, men, beast or things. So if it is at once the symbol of the god and of the society, is that not because the god and the society are only one? How could the emblem of the group have been able to become the figure of this quasi-divinity, if the group and the divinity were two distinct realities? The god of the clan, the totemic principle, can be nothing else than the clan itself, personified and represented to the imagination under the visible form of the animal or vegetable which serves as totem. (1976, 206)

When Durkheim writes that the totem “can be nothing else but the clan itself, personified and represented to the imagination under the visible form of the animal or vegetable which serves as totem,” he means that the totem and the god are concepts, representations of real social relations. This is clearly the sense of the passage if we keep in mind Durkheim and Mauss’s earlier work on classification, where they write that the “first logical categories were social categories; the first classes of things were classes of men, into which these things were integrated. It is because men were grouped, and thought of themselves in the form of groups, that in their ideas they grouped other things, and in the beginning the two modes of grouping were merged to the point of being indistinct” (1970, 83). Bastide sees the relation as “the assimilation of the god with the group” (2003, 176), identifying the concept with objective reality, giving Durkheim’s analysis the flavor of scholastic realism. Bastide is not entirely at fault in his understanding of Durkheim, because Durkheim had written that if the totem “is at once the symbol of the god and of the society, is that not because the god and society are only one?” (Durkheim 1976, 206). The phrasing is unfortunate, but the line need not be read so literally.

2) Society as the source of the god

Bastide appears to agree with Durkheim that society is the source of the god and its nature, that it constrains and obliges and
is also a force upon which our strength lies. But instead of drawing out the implications of the idea, Bastide ends up with a platitude, that religion is a force of strength and a constraint, making it “understandable that religion has persisted throughout civilizations. It corresponds to something real, to social existence, which is a universal, permanent fact” (2003, 176–77). What, in fact, had Durkheim written and what inferences might have been drawn? Durkheim writes that

In a general way, it is unquestionable that a society has all that is necessary to arouse the sensation of the divine in minds, merely by the power that it has over them; for to its members it is what a god is to his worshippers. In fact, a god is, first of all, a being whom men think of as being superior to themselves, and upon whom they feel that they depend. Whether it be a conscious personality, such as Zeus or Jahveh, or merely abstract forces such as those in play in totemism, the worshipper, in the one case as in the other, believes himself held to certain manners of acting which are imposed upon him by the nature of the sacred principle with which he feels that he is in communion. Now society also gives us the sensation of a perpetual dependence. (1976, 206)

A few pages on he further characterizes the divinity:

But a god is not merely an authority upon whom we depend; it is force upon which our strength lies. The man who has obeyed his god and who, for this reason, believes the god is with him, approaches the world with confidence and with the feeling of an increased energy. Likewise, social action does not confine itself to demanding sacrifices, privations and efforts from us. For the collective force is not entirely outside of us; it does not act upon us wholly from without; but rather, since society cannot exist except in and through individual consciousness, this force must also penetrate us and organize itself within us; it thus becomes an integral part of our being and by that very fact this is elevated and magnified. (1976, 209)
In short, for Durkheim, according to Bastide, the feeling of the divine does not come from dreams or observing nature, since these, the facts of common experience, cannot induce the feeling of the divine. “The sacred is beyond experience,” so that “its origin must be external to humans, in other words, social” (Bastide 2003, 177). But, argues Bastide, “society is also a natural fact. Thus, real society, with its frameworks and organization, cannot be an object of faith. What is required is an ideal society, forged within the soul steeped in values. Yet here the individual reappears. If we consider that it is not society itself but great communal excitement that is the real source of the divine for Durkheim, the difficulty does not disappear. It only changes, for why would not the same apply to individual mysticism and the solitary trembling that throws the inspired into a trance?” (Bastide 2003, 177–78). The answer to Bastide’s question is that the individual alone cannot generate the communal excitement that is the source of the divine, nor can the individual alone induce the “solitary trembling that throws the inspired into a trance.” It is what the group does as a group that induces the particular feelings in each individual. Without the participation of the individual in the productive life of the whole, the individual cannot generate the psychic and emotional experience that expresses social existence, social solidarity, the sense of belonging to a living, organic whole. Bastide’s individualistic approach clearly shows his value position.

If we ignore the problematic nature of Bastide’s comments on Durkheim and consider the paragraphs from Durkheim himself (the two from page 206 and the one from page 209 cited above), a question remains. If the god is created by society, and if the god appears to individuals as a power over them, an authority upon whom they depend and are constrained to obey, a force upon which their strength lies, what, in fact, is the social source of the god and what structures it? The answer will depend on whether one is considering prehistoric or historic humankind. In a passage already quoted, Durkheim himself suggests an answer without, however, following the suggestion except in and through individual consciousness. The collective social force “must also penetrate us and organize itself within us; it thus becomes an integral part of our
being.” From this relation one could argue that the god emerges as an aspect of the fundamental relation of the individual to the whole. The “authority” to which the individual feels subordinate and that offers a force to be relied on is the living social whole itself with its power to survive and to protect the individual. That individuals feel subordinate to a force and authority outside themselves is the subjective experience of the relation of the part to the whole. The strength and power that the individual feels as superior is the strength of the social whole in its struggle to survive and its success in surviving. No single individual has the power to survive alone. The collective is the source of the power and ability to survive. The individual alone cannot do what the collective social whole can do, so is dependent on it, but the dependence is not subordination to a hegemonic power. Individuals with their activity and energy contribute willingly to the (economic) activity of the whole as they relate to the environment within which they must struggle to survive. To be sure, only individuals can act and create and only individuals can have consciousness. But individuals can act and create only within a structured social whole, which, in turn, structures their actions and creativity. At the same time, individuals contribute strength and creativity to the whole. Individuals are at best aware of existing within a collective whole whose power and strength is greater than their own. The relation between the individual and the collective is one of interdependence: the one does not and cannot exist without the other. The relation is dialectical.

To put the matter a little differently: the social interdependence is mediated by the individual apprehension of the social relation experienced as emotional ties, psychic bonds, the push-and-pull, the give-and-take of communal existence. The totality of these psychic and emotional ties that all experience and share is what Durkheim has called the “collective consciousness.” It is, then, the collective itself, its power, that individuals feel as superior and upon which they depend. There is (as yet) no antagonistic, estranged subjectivity of the individual toward the whole; there is, rather, interdependence, cooperation not out of conscious choice but out of sheer necessity such as the very early hominids
might have had in what for want of a more accurate term can be called a horde, no longer the troop or band of the earlier arboreal anthropoids.

It is probable, as Glynn Isaac argues from archaeological evidence, that the early hominids he describes as “protohuman” (1979, 119) had tools, carried food to a home base, and shared it there (a sharing not characteristic of modern anthropoids), and communicated “perhaps by means of very rudimentary proto-linguistic signals” (122). In such hordes there are individuals, possibly individuality, but not personality, for which a different social formation is prerequisite (Harrison 1963, 472, 475; Lethbridge 1992, chap. 3), one that will, indeed, develop later. The bonds that keep the hominid horde together are much like, but not the same as, the social bonds that keep a troop of modern baboons together, a genetically based complex signal-communication system (Hauser 1997, 437–33). This system can in no way be described as religious. The visible gestures and acoustic signals the individual hominids make are material bonds that hold them together in an organic social whole, gestures and signals that have not yet become signs, for which different social conditions are prerequisite.

To speak of a sacred principle holding the individual to certain manners of acting, and with which the individual feels in communication, is to impose on creatures of the distant past, some millions of years ago, a kind of conceptualization not yet possible, if only because the brain and nervous system required for such conceptualization did not yet exist. To describe the feelings of the early hominids as sacred or profane, or to suppose they had values or morals, is to mystify the material social semiotic system within which they lived. To do so is tantamount to describing behavior of baboons in terms of the sacred and profane, to anthropomorphize creatures that never developed mentally beyond the signal. To think this way today is to think in terms of creationism, and ignore the mountain of evidence for the evolution of the cosmos and the living creatures on the earth in favor of mystical beliefs for whose material existence there is not the slightest shred of evidence. All this in no way denies that religious thought exists, and that
it developed in various times and places. Its various origins and forms must be subjected to rational analysis, paleoanthropological as well as sociological and anthropological. No grounds exist to believe that at this early stage of social development there was anything like religion, a conceptual form that might include some of the categories of modern religion such as god, sacrifice, or sin. With respect to sacrifice, for example, a horde living at subsistence level cannot sacrifice food—even if it had such a concept as sacrifice—without creating for itself a serious threat of hunger or starvation.

3) Religion as “ideal society”

The “ideal society” to which Bastide refers reflects Durkheim’s view that real society is not the basis of religion (Durkheim 1976, 420), for real society is “full of defects and imperfections,” where evil goes side by side with the good, injustice often reigns supreme, and truth is obscured by error. Such a society cannot “inspire the sentiments of love, the ardent enthusiasm and the spirit of abnegation that all religions claim of their followers.” Still, someone did conceive of a perfect society, but that “society is not an empirical fact, definite and observable.” It is, rather, “a fancy, a dream with which men have lightened their sufferings, but in which they have never really lived. It is merely an idea which came to express our more or less obscure aspirations of the good, the beautiful and the ideal.” Sources for the concept of an ideal society must be sought elsewhere. They come, argues Durkheim, “from the very depths of our being; . . . there is nothing outside of us which can account for them. Moreover, they are already religious in themselves; thus it would seem that the ideal society presupposes religion, far from being able to explain it.” Although religion does reflect “even the most vulgar and the most repulsive side of reality” (421), the source of this idealized world is reality. It is not a natural faculty of men to idealize, to substitute for the real world another different one, to which they transport themselves, as some argue, but religion itself that already has systematic idealization as a characteristic. Animals do not have this ability to imagine a world other than that within which they live: “men alone have
we have seen that if collective life awakens religious thought on reaching a certain degree of intensity, it is because it brings about a state of effervescence which changes the conditions of psychic activity. Vital energies are overexcited, passions more active, sensations stronger; there are even some which are produced only at this moment. A man does not recognize himself; he feels himself transformed and consequently he transforms the environment which surrounds him. In order to account for the very particular impressions which he receives, he attributes to the things with which he is in most direct contact properties which they have not, exceptional powers and virtues which the objects of every-day experience do not possess. In a word, above the real world where his profane life passes he has placed another which, in one sense, does not exist except in thought, but to which he attributes a higher sort of dignity than to the first. Thus, from a double point of view it is an ideal world. (422)

The idealizing phenomenon appears to be a product of social (collective) and psychic vectors and is based on religious sentiment—that is, it is in a state of high psychic excitement that humans create an ideal world that, however, exists only in thought and to which they ascribe a higher sort of dignity. The ideal world is both a religious and a socially generated nonreligious concept. What follows might help explain this apparent contradiction.

Durkheim goes on to argue that the formed “ideal is a natural product of social life. . . . A society can neither create itself without at the same time creating an ideal.” Durkheim rejects the ideas of those who “oppose the ideal society to the real society, like two antagonists which would lead us in opposite directions, they materialize and oppose abstractions,” for, he goes on to write, “the ideal society is not outside of the real society; it is part of it. Far
from being divided between them as between two poles which mutually repel each other, we cannot hold to one without holding to the other” (422).

Durkheim’s argument here is not adequate. If one interprets the imagined perfect society in terms of a theory that ideational structures are reflections of social structures, then the imagined perfect society is nothing else but utopia. Since I have discussed utopian thinking in an earlier study (Goldstein 2004), I will add little to what I have said there. The essence of utopian thinking is that it arises and can only arise in class-divided society, and comes from the oppressed class (Mannheim 1946, 191). In its unbearable wretchedness and misery, the oppressed working class looks back into the past to the relative security and peace of communal tribal life, and projects its hope for the end of its present misery into an indeterminate future when life could be lived in freely available abundance and in communal brotherhood and sisterhood. If Durkheim sees a relation between the ideal of a perfect society and religion, the reason is that the central idea of Christianity, the promise of redemption for the believer after death, is essentially utopian. For redemption means that the believer will enjoy community, peace, and security forever.

Since utopia is a concept like any other concept, it is surprising that Durkheim does not analyze the concept as he earlier had the social nature of primitive classification that he saw as a representation of totemic or tribal relations. Bastide refers to Durkheim’s analysis (176), quoting Durkheim accurately enough, but paraphrases the idea to the effect that Durkheim “assimilates the god with the group,” effectively killing any interest of someone who might have wanted to see how this vintage Marxist notion was used and what it could produce. In the conclusion of his book, Bastide again rejects this approach to the understanding of concept formation and their shapes, remarking that the relation of religion to society cannot be explained “under the pretext that the facts of religion are related to social structure, see religion simply as a hypostasis of society” (207). Instead of pursuing this type of analysis of concept formation, Bastide ends up with religious mysticism and waffle (206). Bastide refers to
Durkheim’s “ideal society” (177), but he divagates on individual mysticism instead of submitting Durkheim’s analysis to useful criticism.

Let me summarize here what I have been saying about Durkheim and Bastide on the concept of the ideal society. Durkheim sees the concept of the ideal society as a natural result of social life. Just as the negative aspects of social life are natural to humans, so is the ideal equally natural to them. We are thus left with no convincing analysis for the origin of utopia, or of who created it and why. Their views are inadequate because their understanding of social reality is inadequate, primarily because their world is devoid of real social conflict.

I have already argued that in origin utopian thought is the thought of the exploited, regardless of how other classes may later use or abuse it. The exploited in their misery recall a better life of the past and project the hope for the surcease of their present misery into an indefinite future. Winspear locates the conditions for an early expression of at least part of this view in Hesiod, who “portrays miserable social conditions [of the small peasantry] in Boeotia, which he ascribes to the oppression of corrupt judges and lords and ‘gift-devouring’ princes.” Winspear goes on to write that Hesiod “treats the beliefs and traditions of the common people and expresses nostalgia for the Golden Age of happiness—a tradition which of course, recalls the comparative security of conditions in gentile or tribal society then passing away.” (1956, 39n).

Golden Age, the millennium, paradise, the ideal society, heaven, utopia—all these express both the distress of the exploited and their hope for its eventual end implicit in these eschatological illusions. Here the real social antagonisms of class find vivid expression from the point of view of the oppressed. If exploitation develops from tribal society, there is nothing natural about the concept of an ideal society, as Durkheim argues. Millenarianism is a form of thinking developed as the lower classes express their reaction to class exploitation, a reaction to the force used by the exploiting class to maintain that exploitation. But for Bastide, as for Durkheim, real social conflict or social contradiction does not
exist or is disputed. Durkheim, for example, in a passage already cited, asserts that his theory of the social origin of religion cannot be seen as “a simple restatement of historical materialism” and that “to show that religion is something essentially social, does not mean to say that it confines itself to translating into another language the material forms of society” (1976, 423). This canard more often than not takes the form of accusing Marxists of saying that religion is social protest in religious disguise, or perhaps a variant of the same criticism, that there is no such thing as “pure” religion. I assume that means that it is politics when in the Magnificat Mary says that the Lord “hath scattered the proud in the imagination of their hearts. / He hath put down the mighty from their seats, and exalted them of low degree. / He hath filled the hungry with good things; and the rich he hath sent empty away,” But when she says that “My soul doth magnify the Lord, / And my spirit hath rejoiced in God my Saviour,” that is pure religion.

Marxists make the connection between early Christianity and the exploited classes on the basis of this and other texts that excoriate the rich, and also because orthodoxy has ameliorated the antagonism between rich and poor in the institution of charity, and also on formulations asserting that the poor are always with us. Further, if religion is the form social criticism at that time took, the reason is not some banal notion that Marxists have said that religion is social criticism in religious disguise, it is rather that no other form of social discourse was available to present such criticism.

Engels put it this way: “The Middle Ages had attached to theology all the other forms of ideology—philosophy, politics, jurisprudence—and made them subdivisions of theology. It thereby constrained every social and political movement to take on a theological form. The sentiments of the masses, fed exclusively on religion, had to have their own interests presented to them in a religious guise in order to create a great turbulence” (1990b, 395). I would interpret Engels in the following way. A sectarian like Müntzer does not present the interests of the peasantry in “religious” disguise as Engels’s text might suggest. Müntzer does not have secular social ideas that he then puts into an attractive, populist “religious disguise” like a public relations agent. Müntzer,
through his theological training, actually thought this way. It is the language of Amos, Daniel, or the book of Revelations. The conflict between the peasantry and landlords seems to match the biblical situations, so that the biblical language becomes the appropriate discourse. The vivid metaphorical language is there, as is the will to destroy the world, mammon, or the Golden Calf, or to drive the money changers out of the temple, to create a utopia in the form of the promised millennium.

Bastide, in his turn, refuses to see that concepts, including religious concepts, are representations of social relations. But this is precisely what Durkheim had done in his analysis of primitive classification, and he refers to this analysis generally in the early part of his book when he writes that it is the function of the categories to express the relations that exist between things, that “ideas which have been elaborated on the model of social things can aid us in thinking of another part of nature” (1976, 18). This insight remains in his book at this general level and is never fruitfully used.

Bastide, as I have said, never gets close to this extremely important analytical tool. He does not see that concepts, including religious concepts, are representations of apprehended social relations and not merely existing institutions, that concepts develop and change as the social structure develops and changes, or that different groups have different religious views depending on their position in the social formation. One could suppose that he had such a view, since he talks of religion consisting of different systems of ideas, dogmas, and myths. But he talks of a “religious instinct” that gives rise to these ideas. He quotes a certain Cournot, who “distinguishes religious instinct from the ideas through which it is expressed.” He summarizes further:

Religions can be born or die, or be replaced by other religions, but what is born or dies in this way is only a system of ideas, dogmas, and myths. The religious instinct that gave rise to them is innate in humans and always persists, building new forms on the remains of the old. Psychology tries to explain this instinct, but sociology focuses on the changes in the systems of ideas to which it gives rise. (Bastide 2003, 200–201)
That there is a religious instinct is an unproven assertion, while the pragmatism of the sociology is evident.

It is, then, reasonable to argue that this earliest consciousness is in no way religious. Durkheim’s conception of the collective consciousness is thoroughly materialistic. For Durkheim to maintain, however, that this consciousness is religious, the apprehension of the divine, is simply a contradiction in his argument. Jane Ellen Harrison in 1912 saw the denomination of early concept formation as religious primarily as an error of method. It was, she writes,

currently supposed that religion was a kind of instinct of the soul after some sort of god or spirit—as the doctrine became more rarefied—some innate power of apprehending the infinite. . . . The error arose partly from ignorance or carelessness as to facts, and partly from the mistake in method common to all pre-scientific enquiry, the mistake of starting with a general term religion of which the enquirer had a preconceived idea, and then trying to fit into it any facts that came to hand. (1963, 29)

Furthermore, the modern paleoanthropology of the hominid indicates that a creature at the earliest stage of humanity could use a tool, and use a tool to make a tool, but it would hardly think in any terms we might call religious.

In conclusion. Offering itself as a scientific study of religion, Bastide’s book is a plea for individual mystical religion. In method it is positivist, empirical, and ahistorical, with several serious consequences. First, it avoids speculation about the origin of religion, and although it does deal with theories about the problem, it makes no contribution to its solution because its positivism rejects even rational speculation. Second, it leads to avoidance of investigating the complex interplay of causative forces in understanding the shaping up of ecclesiastical institutions, since attempting to follow them would be to “leave sociology and do history” (2003, 117), an intellectually debilitating separation of specializations. Third, it rejects Durkheim’s analysis of the social relations of religion, as the hypostatization of society as either
religion or god—a defensible but debatable position, and proposing it “would be a departure from pure positive science” (207), and having done so, opts for theology. Even here, it offers no history of theology, nothing on the shaping forces of Protestantism as the revolutionary theory of developing capitalism in its struggle against an entrenched and moribund feudalism with a Catholic quasi-communalistic ideology to placate the masses and an ecclesiastical hierarchy whose authority exacted absolute obedience to Church and State. Fourth and finally, it avoids the contradiction between the communalism of the Eucharist and property, a contradiction that has plagued the churches long before Gratian, with the result that it offers no analysis of heresy and, consequently, no understanding of the sectarian forms it assumed.

For all that, the book does have a certain value. In paperback it is an inexpensive addition to any library with a serious interest in religion; it is of value to anyone interested in the state of sociology at the time, and to anyone studying sociology as a discipline.

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NOTES

1. The idea that mana is an impersonal force does not occur to the primitive as idea. It does not do so since the social structure is largely actional and has not yet produced a self-consciousness through which thought becomes an object of reflection. Bastide here confuses what the primitive thinks and how modern sociology analyzes this thought.

A somewhat different confusion occurs earlier where Bastide quotes Hocart’s refutation of Codrington’s view of mana: “the natives certainly never told Codrington that mana was impersonal because they could never have conceived of such an idea” (Bastide 2003, 40). So the inference is, how could Codrington possibly know what they thought mana was? Why the primitive mentality could not conceive of such an idea is not clear, and there is possibly also a sly dig at a kind of pragmatism where the primitive supplies you with the evidence that produces positive science. Why primitive individuals could not have ideas and report on them is an important question and requires an analysis of the relation between the given social structure and the form of their ideas—that is, a type of awareness, as I have indicated, in which thought itself becomes an object of inquiry. What is also possibly involved here is the relation between ritual and myth, or the sequence in which they occur.
2. Engels does indeed say that religion is often the disguise for representing material interests. For example, he writes that the uprisings of the peasants and town plebeians against the landlords, “like all mass movements of the Middle Ages, were bound to wear the mask of religion and appeared as the restoration of early Christianity from spreading degeneration; but behind the religious exaltation there were every time extremely tangible worldly interests” (1990a, 448). It is in the context of Engels’s historical/political situation that such brutally clear statements were made.

3. I have argued elsewhere (Goldstein 1988) that the new Keplerian-Copernican-Galilean cosmology of the Renaissance, and also linear perspective, are insights that emerged out of the new process of production using heavy machines driven by wind or water and divided labor. For divided unskilled labor makes it possible to conceptualize labor as homogenous and therefore quantifiable and comparable. This new way of thinking also makes it possible for Machiavelli to say that men are the same at all times and in all places, thus bringing to an end feudal hierarchical conceptualization. The new way of thinking can apply to physical nature or social/political analysis.

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ABSTRACTS

E. San Juan Jr., “From Race to Class Struggle: Marxism and Critical Race Theory” — The misuse of the term *class* in defining group and individual identity has led to its confusion with status, lifestyle, and other ideological contingencies, vitiating the innovative attempt of critical race theory to link racism and class oppression. Reinstating the Marxist category of class derived from the social division of labor will provide the key to clarifying the changing modes of racist practices. Filipina domestics are an example of a global social class actualized in its specific historical particularity. Critical race theory can be renewed by adopting class struggle to resolve racial injustice.

Annette Schlemm, “New Sciences and Our Future” — It is necessary to reconstruct what the purpose of science is, and how this purpose is served. We find that science differs from a more general worldview. Sciences possess their own epistemological foundations that must be taken into consideration. This reconstruction gives us knowledge needed to assess the possibilities of the sciences, as well as their limits. The relationship between dialectical determinism and the role of science in guiding human activity is also discussed.

Jerry Harris, “Globalization and Class Struggle in Germany” — The central dialectic in the world today is between the descending social structures of national accumulation and the ascending forms of transnational capitalism. Each country has its own set of contradictions as contingents of the transnational capitalist class restructure the state and class relations to fit the new mode of production and accumulation. Consequences of the new modes of production and accumulation in Germany are examined to illustrate transnational capitalist class restructuring of the state, class relations, and political parties.

Leonard Goldstein, “A Marxist Critique of the Sociology of Religion: A Review Essay” — In a detailed analysis of *Social Origins of Religion* by Roger Bastide, the author argues that positivism fails as an approach to the sociology of religion. He finds the book does not fulfill its claim to be a scientific analysis of the origin and social context of religions, but is rather a defense of individual mystical religion. Bastide does offer insight into the sociology of the time, however, and this critical analysis demonstrates the need for a conscious theory of value.

ABREGES

E. San Juan, Jr., « De la lutte de race à celle de classe : le marxisme et la théorie critique de race » — L’usage impropre du terme classe à définir l’identité d’un groupe ou d’un individu a mené à sa confusion avec la situation, la mode de vie et d’autres éventualités idéologique, viciant l’essai innovateur de la théorie critique de race à lier le racisme à l’oppression de classe. La réintégration de la catégorie marxiste de classe puisée dans la division sociale du travail fournira la clé à éclaircir les modes changeantes des pratiques racistes. Les domestiques philippines sont un exemple d’une classe sociale mondiale qui se réalisent dans sa particularité historique spécifique. La théorie critique de race peut se renouveler en adoptant la lutte de classe à résoudre l’injustice raciale.

Annette Schlemm, « Les sciences nouvelles et notre avenir » — Il est nécessaire de reconstruire ce que c’est le but de la science et comment ce but se sert. Nous trouvons que la science diffère d’une vision plus générale du monde. Les sciences possèdent leurs propres fondations épistemologiques que l’on doit considérer. Cette reconstruction nous donne le savoir nécessaire à évaluer les possibilités des sciences aussi bien que leurs limites. L’auteur discute aussi le rapport entre le déterminisme dialectique et le rôle de la science à guider l’activité humaine.

Jerry Harris, « La mondialisation et la lutte de classe en Allemagne » — La dialectique centrale dans le monde d’aujourd’hui se
trouve entre les structures sociales descendantes de l’accumulation nationale et les formes ascendantes du capitalisme transnational. Chaque pays a sa propre série de contradictions pendant que les contingences de la classe capitaliste transnationale restructurent l’état et les rapports de classe à ajuster à la nouvelle mode de production et d’accumulation. L’auteur examine les conséquences des nouvelles modes de production et d’accumulation en Allemagne afin d’illustrer la restructuration de l’état, les rapports de classe, et les partis politiques par la classe capitaliste transnationale.

Leonard Goldstein, « Une critique marxiste de la sociologie de la religion : un essai critique » — Dans une analyse détaillée du livre Social Origins of Religion (Origines sociales de la religion) par Roger Bastide, l’auteur discute que le positivisme échoue comme une façon d’aborder la sociologie de la religion. Il trouve que le livre n’accomplit pas sa revendication d’être une analyse scientifique de l’origine et le contexte social des religions, mais il est plutôt une défense d’une religion mystique, individuelle. Cependant, Bastide offre une compréhension de la sociologie de l’époque, et cette analyse critique démontre le besoin d’une théorie de valeur consciente.