

# NST

## Nature, Society, and Thought

a Journal of Dialectical and Historical Materialism

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Nature, Society, and Thought

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Submissions should be made in triplicate, typed, double-spaced, with at least 1-inch margins. Normal length of articles is expected to be between 3,000 and 10,000 words. All citations should follow the author-date system, with limited use of endnotes for discursive matter, as specified in the *Chicago Manual of Style*, 13th edition. Manuscripts should be prepared in accordance with the MEP Publications Style Guide, which appears in the current issue, pages 123–128. The *Chicago Manual* is the general guide on all other matters of style.

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## **Appeal for *NST* Sustainers**

*Nature, Society, and Thought* has entered third year of publication. The comments we have received from our readers indicate that we have been fulfilling their expectations. To maximize the accessibility of the journal, we have kept our subscription rates relatively low. A journal such as ours, however, is heavily dependent on multiuser (library) subscriptions to defray a part of the cost of publication. As many of you are aware, library budgets have been sharply curtailed in recent years. Libraries have also found that new journals often cease publication after a few issues and are therefore hesitant to take on new subscriptions until they are convinced of the lasting character of the journal. In this situation, our income from subscriptions does not yet cover the cost of publication. We have been meeting the publishing deficit by applying revenues from other activities of the Marxist Educational Press. But since these too do not adequately cover the cost of operations we cannot continue this practice without weakening our book publishing and conference programs. We are therefore appealing to our readers to become *NST* sustainers. While we appreciate contributions in any amount, we ask you to consider becoming a regular contributor by pledging a tax-deductible annual contribution of \$100 or more. We shall express our appreciation with a complimentary subscription to *NST*

## EDITORIAL

With this issue *Nature, Society, and Thought* Is entering its third year of publication. In our opening editorial in volume 1, number 1, we described ourselves as expanding the work of the Marxist Educational Press “in opening channels for the publication of outstanding Marxist scholarship in the mainstream of Marxist thought.” On rereading these words, our readers may quite legitimately question the word “mainstream” in view of the ideological disarray in which some Marxist movements find themselves today in various parts of the world.

Marx, Engels, and Lenin in their own lifetimes differentiated between revolutionary Marxism on the one hand, and departures from it—either of an opportunist or dogmatic/sectarian nature—on the other. That the problems in developing a democratic model of socialism under conditions of capitalist encirclement have led to an intense, and in some countries a destructive, struggle between these tendencies does not detract from the validity of the Marxist critique of capitalism. The principal contradiction of the capitalist mode of production between the social character of production and the private character of the appropriation of that production remains irreconcilable. While, as Robert Steigerwald writes in his article “What Lies Ahead for Socialism” in this number of *Nature, Society, and Thought*, it is difficult, if not impermissible, to draw definitive conclusions about the developments in the socialist world from afar, Marxists in the United States can agree on the continuing predatory character of monopoly capitalism at home and abroad. To the extent that we remain in ideological solidarity with other Marxists in recognizing the decisive role of the interests of the working class in the future course of social development, we can consider ourselves in the mainstream of Marxist thought.

An editorial in this journal is not an appropriate vehicle for an assessment of the character of the changes in the various socialist countries. All Marxists, however, should welcome the possibility of more open exchange of views with our colleagues abroad and at home and the increasing availability of information in all areas, including the course of theoretical discussions in the past.

Worldwide, the theoretical discussions among Marxists are raising many questions involving fundamental concepts of Marxist theory,

for example, the suggested possibility of nonclass or above-class democratic political structures in capitalist and socialist states, the world balance of forces and the policy options of imperialism, the incompatibilities between the level of development of the productive forces and the relations of production under capitalism and socialism. We appeal to our readers to submit papers on these and other topics that seem to you most important. We are not satisfied with the range of issues *NST* has so far been able to address, dependent as we are largely on spontaneous submissions. The pages of our journal are also open to comments on articles, and such response has begun to appear in our "Commentaries" section. We are looking for other avenues to extend and deepen the systematic discussion among Marxists so clearly needed at the present time.

Through its week-long MEP Summer Institute at the University of Minnesota, 5-12 August 1990, the Marxist Educational Press will provide an opportunity for the discussion of some of these fundamental theoretical questions. Two outstanding U.S. Marxist scholars, historian Herbert Aptheker and political scientist Michael Parenti, will be joined by a leading West German Marxist philosopher, Robert Steigerwald, as lecturers. In addition to the questions of general Marxist theory, each will organize discussions within his own speciality. Dr. Steigerwald has also proposed a discussion on conservatism, Marxism, and contemporary theories of evolution. Registration will be limited to seventy-five persons. Reserve your place by sending in your registration fee early: \$150 (\$90 unemployed and low-income seniors) to MEP, University of Minnesota, 215 Ford Hall, 224 Church Street, S.E., Minneapolis, MN 55455. Low-cost dormitory housing with board will be available at daily rate of \$25.50 (double occupancy)—arrival date August 4. A few single-occupancy rooms will be available at \$28.50 per day on request.

# Plant Closings and Class Struggle

Harry R. Targ

## *Introduction*

A central feature of the political and economic landscape of relations between capital and labor in the 1980s has been the fluidity of capital (Bluestone and Harrison, 1982). A trend towards capital flight beginning in the 1960s has led to the loss of literally millions of U.S. jobs since then. Job security, the bedrock assumption of the industrial working class since World War II, has been shattered as factories, stores, and offices close, leaving devastated communities in their wake (Goodman 1979; Perrucci et al. 1988).

Capital flight and plant closings suggest that the kinds of problems the U.S. working class is now facing cannot be overcome by traditional forms of struggle for workers' rights. Along with shopfloor struggles, strikes, battles over the shape of state policy and union contracts, workers now must defend themselves against the shrinking U.S. industrial base, its movement to other countries, and shifts in the nature of investments. Workers and their allies already engaged in these struggles need to expand even further their repertoire of responses.

This paper begins with an articulation of the global political economy of plant closings, briefly comments on the nature of class struggle as it has been traditionally defined, surveys worker responses to plant closings, and finally discusses the need for an invigorated working-class movement to save jobs and to assert the primacy of the community over profit.

## *The political economy of plant closings*

“We don't feel alone; it's all over the United States. Reaganomics have caught up with us all. We think it's a disgrace that there are empty

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factories in every town in the United States” (former RCA worker in central Indiana).

“I just want a job that I can depend on and live on the wages that I work for and work hard for. I just want to work. PLEASE” (former RCA worker in central Indiana).

These statements reflect the experiences and concerns of workers who lost their jobs when an RCA television cabinet-making factory closed in Monticello, Indiana, in December 1982, displacing eight hundred workers. These experiences have been repeated thousands of times both before and after the Monticello closing. In fact, as suggested by Bluestone and Harrison (1982), capital flight became a central feature of the U.S. economy in the 1980s. Of concern to researchers and activists is how and why the U.S. political economy has evolved to one in which the declining industrial base and its attendant job loss became a fixture of the economy.

Looking back to the 1940s, we can identify a time when the United States was virtually a hegemonic power in world affairs. The United States had a monopoly of nuclear weapons until 1949 and had the world’s preeminent war machine. Undergirding U.S. military power and diplomatic influence in the world was a U.S. economy of overwhelming dominance in the global economy. The Soviet Union had suffered twenty million deaths and enormous damage to its infrastructure. Eastern and Western Europe were devastated. On the other hand the United States economy emerged from the war thoroughly rejuvenated from the depression of the 1930s (Targ 1986). As David Horowitz estimated, there had been a “radical transformation of the world’s industrial power structure” such that “three-quarters of the world’s invested capital and two-thirds of its industrial capacity were concentrated inside one country, the United States; the rest was shared over the other 95 percent of the earth’s inhabited surface” (Horowitz 1971, 74).

Between 1938 and 1943, at the height of wartime production, total manufacturing production increased by two and one-half times. During the early postwar years, manufacturing production was roughly double what it had been before World War II. Similarly, U.S. exports increased from totals of about \$3 billion in the 1930s to \$10 billion in 1945 and \$14 billion in 1947 (Paterson 1973, 6).

Measured by most indicators, U.S. economic dominance in the global economy was substantial. By 1950, two years after Marshall Plan aid began to reconstruct Europe and five years after the war,

the U.S. gross national product was three times greater than that of the Soviet Union and at least six times greater than that of any U.S. ally (Organski 1965, 210-12).

The transformation of the world economy proceeded as the U.S. economy changed. New levels of concentration and centralization of the U.S. economy occurred during and after World War II. Wartime contracts stimulated further growth in the largest U.S. corporations. Prime contracts issued to corporations from the government totaled \$175 billion and were dispersed to over 18,000 corporations from June 1940 to September 1944. However, two-thirds of this money, or \$117 billion, went to the top 100 corporations; 30 percent to the top 10 corporations. In fact, 30 corporations received 49 percent of the total amount of prime defense contracts. One recipient alone, General Motors, received \$13.8 billion in defense contracts. (The Smaller War Plants Corporation 1972). The effect of wartime government policy led to an increase in working capital for the 802 corporations listed by the Securities and Exchange Commission from \$8.6 billion in 1939 to \$14.1 billion in June 1945, an increase of sixty-four percent. A congressional committee predicted an increase in economic concentration after the war because of the advantages big business accrued during the war (The Smaller War Plants Corporation, 1972).

Therefore the impact of the war on the Soviet Union, Western Europe, and the United States set the stage for the latter two to define the character of the postwar international economic and political order. The United States had the technology, industrial plant, scientific expertise, and workforce to produce for the world. The largest corporations in the United States had been the major beneficiaries of the war effort. United States foreign policy was used then to institutionalize economic dominance on the world stage.

In the years following the war, the U.S. economy continued to dominate the world. United States exports rose from \$10.3 billion in 1950 to \$143.7 billion in 1978 and U.S. direct foreign investments rose from \$11.8 billion to \$168 billion during those years (Blake and Walters 1976; *Statistical Abstract of the United States* 1951, 1979, 1980, 1981). United States banking assets overseas grew from \$3.5 billion in 1960 to \$155 billion in 1974 (Hawley 1978, 130). Despite the emergence by the 1960s of economic challenges to the United States, the United States still accounted for about sixty percent of the world's foreign private investment in 1970. Twenty-three of the 50 largest multinational corporations in 1975 were U.S.

owned; four of the top ten corporations were U.S. oil companies (Modelski 1978, 46-47).

By the 1960s however, the United States had begun to experience challenges to its political and economic hegemony, challenges that would become increasingly significant in the 1970s and 1980s. First, of course, a socialist world was formed that eventually encompassed about forty percent of the world's population. Despite substantial difficulties, large parts of this world grew economically without benefit of extensive trade and aid from the capitalist world. Second, national-liberation movements emerged all across the Third World, threatening to weaken the hold of international capital. Along with revolutionary ferment, governments were calling for a New International Economic Order to reform international capitalism. Lastly, movements in protest of U.S. foreign policy threatened to destabilize the society in the 1960s and powerful protest movements flowered throughout Europe, North America, and Japan. For the United States, the Tet offensive in January 1968 became a metaphor for the declining relative power of the United States.

These political forces paralleled the emergence of a deep economic crisis in the United States. Between 1950 and 1978, the gap between the gross national product of the United States and the Soviet Union, France, West Germany, and Japan had narrowed. The gross domestic product of six European countries was equal to three-quarters of the gross domestic product of the United States in 1950, and in the 1970s was 20 percent greater than the United States (*Statistical Abstract of the United States* 1981, 878). The U.S. percentage of the world's production of petroleum, steel, iron ore, coal, wheat, and automobiles declined between 1950 and 1978. U.S. manufacturing output in the 1970s declined relative to that of Canadian, French, German, Italian, Japanese, and British factories (Krasner 1982, 22-49; *U.N. Statistical Yearbook* 1976-80).

Also, 1971 was the first year in the twentieth century in which the United States suffered a trade deficit. From 1970 to 1980, the dollar value of exports increased by \$177.5 billion while imports increased by \$200.8 billion. Exports as a percentage of GNP increased from 4.3 percent in 1970 to 8.5 percent in 1980. Imports as a percent of GNP rose from 4 percent to 9.5 percent in the same period (*Dollars and Sense* 1980, 10-11).

In terms of domestic performance, the U.S. economy suffered stagnation throughout the 1970s and recessions in 1975 and at the

end of the 1970s. Many indicators of economic performance in 1980, 1981, and 1982 reminded people of the Great Depression. For example, the levels of utilization of manufacturing capacity, which was up to 90 percent in the mid-1960s, averaged in the low 80 percent range in the 1970s, and was down to 74.8 percent in 1981. Business failures, averaging 37 per 10,000 from 1970 to 1977, jumped from 24 per 10,000 businesses in 1978 to 83 per 10,000 in 1982. Domestic investment in capital spending for plant and equipment was down in 1979, 1980, 1981 (Silk 1982, sec. 3, p. 1). As always, workers suffered the most from the domestic performance. Official unemployment rates ranged from 4.9 percent to 8.5 percent officially in the 1970s, reached in excess of 10 percent in 1982, and have stabilized at between 5 and 7 percent since the economic "recovery" of 1983 and 1984.

All the above trends bear a relationship to the rates of profit of U.S. corporations. Bluestone and Harrison summarize a study showing that the after-tax rates of profit of U.S. corporations began a process of decline in the late 1960s and continued in the 1970s. Rates of profit of nonfinancial corporations fell from 15.5 percent between 1963 and 1966 to 12.7 percent during 1967 to 1970. Profit rates for 1971 to 1974 were 10.1 percent, and 9.7 percent for 1975 to 1978. Bluestone and Harrison themselves examined rates of profit in twelve industrial sectors between 1963 and 1975, noting a 46.3 percent decline in profit rates (Bluestone and Harrison 1982, 148).

The declining rates of profit of U.S. corporations in the 1960s and 1970s were coupled with large increases in U.S. direct foreign investment. Considering the later decade, between 1975 and 1978 the average increase per year in direct foreign investment was \$13 billion, and in 1979 and 1980 increases in annual foreign investment were \$24.1 billion and \$26.7 billion respectively. Further, the percentage of foreign earnings of total U.S. corporate earnings increased in the 1970s over the 1960s (*Statistical Abstract of the United States* 1981, 833). For example, in 1960 eleven percent of all U.S. corporate earnings came from foreign investments. In 1965 the figure was ten percent. In 1970 the percentage of earnings from foreign operations rose to 16 percent and by 1979 the figure was up to 18 percent (*Statistical Abstract of the United States*, 1981, 552).

Also, many multinational corporations derived a third to one-half of their profits from foreign operations. Bluestone and Harrison report that by the late 1970s, foreign profits accounted for a third

or more of the total profits of the 100 largest multinational corporations and banks, a percentage that had risen since the 1950s (Bluestone and Harrison 1982, 42). Finally, as Weisskopf and others have shown, rates of profit for foreign investments have typically been double that for domestic investments (Weisskopf 1972, 426-35). As the economic crisis in the U.S. economy deepened, corporations (and banks) increasingly turned to foreign operations. This dynamic contributed significantly to the tendency for factories to close and jobs to go overseas during the last twenty years.

Indeed, the most dramatic manifestation of capital flight overseas was the escalating volume of plant closings all across the United States. Bluestone and Harrison report that

when the employment loss as a direct result of plant, store, and office *shutdowns* during the 1970s is added to the job loss associated with runaway shops, it appears that more than 32 million jobs were destroyed. Together, runaways, shutdowns, and permanent physical cutbacks short of complete closure may have cost the country as many as 38 million jobs. (Bluestone and Harrison 1982, 26)

Candee S. Harris has reported more recently on plant closings in the early 1980s. She notes that in 1982 there were 1.4 million fewer manufacturing jobs than in 1970. Between 1976 and 1982, closings of large firms cost the United States 16 million jobs. Almost one-third of these were in manufacturing. "Rates of employment loss due to closings of manufacturing branches doubled in the 1980-82 period over the 1978-80 period, combining with lower replacement rates to produce a net decline of 5.2 percent in manufacturing." Since 1976 about 900,000 manufacturing jobs per year were lost due to plant closings (Harris 1984, 26).

In 1986 the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) of the U.S. Congress published a report entitled *Technology and Structural Unemployment: Reemploying Displaced Adults*. The OTA study found that 11.5 million workers lost jobs between 1979 and 1984 due to plant shutdowns, relocations, and layoffs; 5.1 million of these workers had been working for at least three years. By 1984, 1.3 million of those who had held their jobs for three years were still unemployed. About one-half of the jobs lost since 1979 had been in manufacturing. The OTA estimated that between 1970 and 1984 nearly all new jobs created in the United States were in the

service sector (only one percent in manufacturing). Since 1979, manufacturing employment dropped by almost 1.5 million workers (U.S. Congress, 1986).

The OTA commented on the impact that plant closings and job loss had on workers:

In the past few years, millions of U.S. workers have lost their jobs because of structural changes in the U.S. and world economies. Some of them—especially younger workers with skills in demand or the right educational background—have little trouble finding new jobs. Others—hundreds of thousands a year—remain out of work for many weeks or months, even for years. Many of the displaced are middle-aged unskilled or semi-skilled manufacturing workers, with long and stable job histories. (U.S. Congress 1986, 3)

Other recent studies suggest fundamental shifts in the occupational structure resulting from capital flight and plant closings. For example, Audrey Freedman, a labor economist at the Conference Board, noted a 25-percent increase in the number of temporary and part-time workers in the total workforce between 1975 and 1985. By 1985 about 29.5 million of the 107 million U.S. workers were temporary or part-time (Serrin 1986, 9).

Further, a Bluestone and Harrison study completed for a joint economic committee of the Congress, discovered that over half of the eight million net new jobs created from 1979 to 1984 in the United States paid less than \$7,000 a year. Consequently, the standard of living of a growing number of U.S. workers was being threatened. “The redesign of full-time into part-time or part-year work and the spread of wage freezes and concessions from one industry to another all suggest a decline in annual earnings” (“Low-Paying Jobs” 1986, 18).

Of course, plant closings have stimulated and facilitated wage and benefit concessions and a general environment of challenge to union influence in the economy. By 1985, the downward trend in wage gains in the private sector continued for the fourth straight year. First-year wage increases in 1985 averaged 2.3 percent, the lowest figure since such data have been systematically gathered. Also, the 1980s witnessed a rise in lump-sum payments instead of wage increases (less costly to employers) and a steady rise in two-tier wage plans allowing a lower scale of wages for new workers. Of all contracts

negotiated in 1983, 1984, and 1985, some 29, 27, and 25 percent, respectively, called for wage freezes or cuts. Therefore, throughout the 1980s unions reluctantly agreed to concessions or “give-backs” on wages and benefits to forestall layoffs and plant closings (“Bargaining Trend” 1986, 1).

The local impacts of the workings of the global political economy can be seen by studying workers and their communities. A recent study of the RCA television cabinet-making plant referred to earlier illustrates the suffering caused by plant closings. Eight months after the RCA closing, 71 percent of those responding to a questionnaire (about 40 percent of the 800 displaced workers responded) were still unemployed. The percentage of men reemployed full time was double that of women. Of those laid off in the year prior to the final closing, 54 percent were still unemployed. Those who had been reemployed were earning 67 percent of their former salaries (women 59 percent).

Workers had to cut expenses, including food, clothing, home upkeep, charitable contributions, and dental care. Between 40 and 50 percent cut back or eliminated health care, health and life insurance, and children’s schooling expenses. One-third had experienced headaches and one-fourth had stomach trouble as a result of the closing. Thirty-seven percent were smoking more; ten percent were drinking more. The displaced workers also evidenced higher levels of depression and lessened sense of personal control than a comparison sample of workers at another local plant who had been continuously employed (Perrucci et al. 1988).

These findings are very much like those of comparable studies. What makes most plant-closing experiences even more devastating than individual cases of unemployment is that whole neighborhoods and towns and cities lose their major sources of income. The factory closes and then the supermarket, restaurants, and clothing stores suffer. Unemployed people need more public services and private assistance at a time when the financial base for providing these services has dwindled. In many cases two persons from a single household and several persons from an extended family worked for the same plant, so that whole support systems were decimated.

While U.S. workers were losing their jobs to plant closings, Third World workers were increasingly being relied upon to produce cheaply manufactured goods. Wage levels in countries receiving foreign investments were very low. Thai workers earned \$1.50 an

hour in 1983, Taiwanese workers \$1.66, South Koreans \$1.69, Hong Kong workers \$0.98. Salvadoran workers earned \$4 a day; Guatemalan, Haitian, and other hemisphere workers earned less (Brecher 1985). Many factories had no health-and-safety regulations to protect the workers from harmful chemicals or from damage to the eyesight. Foreign investors are, of course, attracted by countries with authoritarian regimes in which the trade unions are under state control, severely restricted, or even prohibited.

In sum, therefore, the U.S. and the global economy changed over the forty years of the post-World War II period from one in which the United States was the overwhelmingly dominant actor to one in which many capitalist nations compete for profits. The U.S. corporations found their rates of profit falling as capitalist competitors and Third World changes altered the U.S. economic leverage. To overcome declining profit rates, U.S. investors sought to employ cheap labor abroad and to crush worker organizations at home. Consequently, capital flight rose from its modest amount in the 1960s to a level which brought about a major transformation of the U.S. economy away from its manufacturing base in the 1970s and 1980s. Plant closings had become a major threat to job security and workers' rights by the 1980s.

### ***The character of class conflict in the United States***

Class conflict has taken a variety of forms in the United States. Workers in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries had to struggle against the capitalist drive to extend the working day, a struggle epitomized by the eight-hour-day movement of 1886 that gave force to the formation of the American Federation of Labor. In the 1890s, capital and labor conflict began to incorporate disagreements about who was going to control the work process, who would organize production, and the speed at which such production should proceed. In the twentieth century, Taylorism (physical speedup using time-and-motion studies to break up tasks into simple repetitive motions) and personnel management were introduced into factory production to increase management's control over the work process and, in Harry Braverman's words, to separate conception from execution in work so that workers could be removed as conscious agents in affecting how work was to be done (Braverman 1974).

Throughout the period of the rise of industrial capitalism workers have engaged in efforts to extend the recognition of their organizations in their relationships with employers. From the days of the Knights of

Labor to the American Federation of Labor, the Industrial Workers of the World, the Congress of Industrial Organization, and the modern AFL-CIO, workers have had to sit-in, strike, picket, rally, respond to company and governmental violence, and engage in various forms of electoral and legislative politics to achieve the right to organize unions and have these unions represent workers in factories, fields, shops, and offices.

The U.S. working class has suffered many defeats in the struggle between capital and labor as a result of divisions within its ranks. Racism and sexism have historically been used to divide workers, often making their organizing efforts less effective. The packinghouse moguls of the early twentieth century in Chicago made a point of hiring workers from different ethnic and racial groups so that the slaughterhouses would be filled with workers who could not even converse with each other in the same language. Later, after World War I, these same owners fed the Black-white distrust in the packing houses to deflect the demands for unionization to demands for racial exclusivity in the plant and the neighborhood. Operation Dixie, the last major CIO drive to organize the South after World War II, was fatally wounded by the accusations of Southern politicians and factory owners that unionism meant Black control of the workplace and the union hall to the detriment of white workers. Similar attempts were used to keep male and female workers battling each other for union power and workers' rights. After World War II, powerful forces in U.S. society warned of the danger to job security of returning soldiers if women were allowed to remain in the workforce.

Throughout the period of U.S. capitalism, workers have struggled for the reduction of working hours, the right to form unions, control of the work process, adequate wages, improved benefits, regularized and effective grievance procedures, worker input in corporate decision-making, expansion of the social wage in the society, and protection of jobs and income. The issues and the forms of struggle have been many and have occurred in a variety of contexts of interclass *and* intraclass relationships. The objective basis of class struggle has changed in its historical particularities, but the fundamental conflict between capital and labor to extend control over the product and the production process has remained the same.

Along with the changing objective features of class struggle, levels of class consciousness have changed as well. During various historical periods, workers struggled against capital with the belief that capitalists

could be made to understand the plight of the working class, or that the state could be enlisted on labor's behalf to improve working conditions, or, more fundamentally, that struggles over concrete issues were part of a process of conflict over the ultimate control of the means of production. In other words, U.S. history is replete with intense and broad-based struggles between capital and labor that have their fundamental cause in the contradiction between capital and labor in capitalist societies. However, the specific issues and the level of awareness of the contradictions between capital and labor have varied from period to period. The often-limited understanding by workers of the inherent contradictions between capital and labor does not mean that class struggle as a continuous feature of capitalist society has not existed.

Ollman put the issue of class struggle clearly when he wrote: "All that a class does, or what happens to it, that directly or indirectly affects its power vis-à-vis other classes is class struggle" (Ollman 1987, 78). He refers to Gramsci's notions that class struggle encompasses "wars of position," which involve jockeying for advantage with adversary classes, and "wars of movement," which involve open confrontation among classes throughout society. Also, the varieties of class struggle are shaped by existent class structures. Szymanski has argued that class structure affects how class consciousness will develop, who will be the agents of change, what will be the objects of conflict, what kinds of organizational skills contending parties have, and what possibilities of change exist.

The class structure itself is subject to the logic of the mode of production that generates it—in capitalist society, the dynamic logic and contradictions of the capital-accumulation process as well as the development of the productive forces it induces. Thus, in the last analysis, to understand the logic and dynamic of class struggle, one must understand the logic and dynamic of the mode of production within which it occurs (Szymanski 1983, 83).

Since the character of class struggle and class consciousness varies historically and since the existent forms of class structure shape the nature of such struggle, the current state of class struggle has to be understood in terms of the stage in which the political economy of capitalism is found. Plant closings and capital flight provide the context for the latest phase of class struggle. Plant closings are a response by capital to workers' gains over several years. They constitute a strategy to control workers at home and abroad for purposes

of increasing rates of profit, which over the last two decades have declined. Among the unique features of capital flight as a corporate strategy is that it chooses not merely to change the work process, work rules, or conditions and benefits of work, but rather it seeks to eliminate work across large geographic areas of the United States. The elimination of work may become a permanent feature of the economic landscape, or jobs may begin to return to the United States at some point in the future when labor can be purchased more cheaply at home or corporations are driven out of Third World countries. In either case, the strategy of disinvestment is transforming the shape of the U.S. economy and is global in character. Consequently, this dramatic new strategy demands new kinds of responses from workers.

### *Worker responses to plant closings*

Responses to plant closings may be conceptualized along two dimensions. First, workers and their allies have organized around specific plant closings. Second, workers and community organizations have developed movements to stem the tide of deindustrialization in general. As to specific closings, action has occurred in response to the threat of a closing or to the actual closing itself. Deindustrialization movements have addressed issues ranging from plant-closing legislation to economic democracy and a new industrial policy. The most common pattern is for workers to respond to a particular closing after it has occurred and only later perhaps to haltingly transform their political activity to oppose deindustrialization in general.

Before discussing responses to impending closings and postclosing situations, we should note that some union contracts do contain provisions relevant to plant closings (see Lawrence 1987). About fifteen percent of such contracts require corporations to give some advance notice of a closing or union participation in any decision to close a plant. United Food and Commercial Workers (UFCW) contracts with packinghouses, United Auto Workers (UAW) contracts with Ford and General Motors, and the International Union of Electrical Workers (IUE) and United Electrical Workers (UE) contracts with General Electric and Westinghouse have had six-month notification provisions.

A few union contracts have restricted the corporation's right to close a plant during the life of a contract or to close because the corporation now gets its goods produced in another plant. Contracts also have provided for severance pay in the event of a plant closing.

Typically such provisions provide a week's pay for each year of employment.

Further, some contracts provide for the extension of health and other insurance benefits for some extended period beyond the closing. For example, in a 1979 contract, the United Rubber Workers secured a thirty-month extension of medical benefits if a plant closing occurred. Other provisions represented in small numbers of union contracts allow for early retirement, interplant transfers, relocation allowances, and job training. These provisions, which provide some protection for workers displaced as a result of a closing and a modest deterrent to those corporations considering closing one of their plants, exist in only a small percentage of contracts in plants, offices, and stores that are under union jurisdiction. Given the limited impact of these contract provisions, workers have had to engage in a number of other actions to fight against plant closings.

In response to the prospect of an individual closing, some workers have begun to look systematically at "early warning signs" of an impending shutdown so that opposition to such a corporate policy can be mobilized before it is too late (Haas 1985, 34–38). The Midwest Center for Labor Research and other labor support groups counsel workers to watch for signs of a closing. Workers should evaluate the significance of their corporation's opening another plant elsewhere to produce the same line of merchandise. Also, workers should be concerned if the company allows machinery and physical plant to become obsolete. Also, a plant on the verge of closing will cut back work time, will end overtime work, and will begin to lay off workers. Other signs of a possible closing include the reduction in product lines, irregular production schedules, shortages of parts, reduced advertising, and cuts in research and development. Workers have also followed the corporation's fortunes in the business press to get further clues about corporate intentions.

Sensitivity to early warning signs of a plant closing has afforded workers the opportunity to begin planning for such time when they will be out of work. Also, the early warnings have stimulated workers and their friends to organize to keep a plant open before it closes. By the time the plant closes, efforts to keep it in the community become more difficult.

After a plant has announced a closing or when a company has threatened to leave the community if workers do not accept concessions, workers have organized coalitions to fight against the corporate move. Also, fightback coalitions have been formed to reverse closures

that have already taken place.

For example, the Nabisco corporation announced it was closing its Pittsburgh plant in 1981. In response, a labor, religious, and community organization, the Save Nabisco Action Coalition, was formed. A local community organization contributed a professional organizer to develop SNAC. An early activity of the coalition was to examine the financial profile of the company to see if a closure was justified by economic crisis. The researchers discovered that the company was profitable.

Further, SNAC uncovered the fact that a member of the Nabisco board of directors was on the board of a local bank. They decided on the strategy of pressuring the bank via threats to withdraw savings from it to force the board member to oppose the Nabisco closing. Also, the international bakers' union threatened to strike all Nabisco plants unless the decision to close was reversed. As a result of this combined local and national pressure, the company reversed its decision to close. SNAC then transformed itself into a new organization to pressure for the passage of a municipal plant-closing ordinance (Haas 1985, 38\39).

Several researchers have written of the Morse Tool Company story in New Bedford, Massachusetts (Haas 1985, 39-40; Doherty 1985; Slaughter 1987, 1). Gulf and Western, which had purchased the old tool company in the 1970s, threatened to close the plant if the local union, United Electrical Workers Local 277, refused to accept concessions. The union commissioned sympathetic labor researchers to study Gulf and Western's investment patterns. They discovered that Gulf and Western was engaged in a national strategy to divest its holdings after milking them of profits. Armed with this information, UE went public and explained why their demands for modest pay increases were justified. In response to Gulf and Western resistance, the union local went on strike. It also engaged in a community coalition to get Gulf and Western to invest more in Morse Tool or sell to a more responsible owner. After the New Bedford City Council and the Massachusetts House of Representatives passed resolutions endorsing the worker-led coalition, the company settled its dispute with the union.

Two years later, Gulf and Western said it would sell Morse Tool. The New Bedford City Council resolved to use its powers of eminent domain if a suitable buyer was not found. The buyer of

Morse Tool later developed financial problems and filed for bankruptcy. Two companies had tendered bids to purchase the company. In an unprecedented act the judge ordered the owner to sell Morse Tool to the buyer that had offered the lower purchase price because the other bidder was committed to closing the plant. The judge's decision was fostered by a large UE local delegation at the trial in Boston. The local used all its pressure to see that the new owner of Morse Tool would commit itself to the workers and the community. Reacting to the victory after Gulf and Western left New Bedford, the UE local president advised others:

Do everything possible. Rally the city or the town behind the workers. Without the support of the community forget it. Together we saved Morse for the city as well as for the workers. (Haas 1985, 40)[

In the Youngstown, Ohio, case, a religious task force was instrumental in establishing a worker/community coalition to explore the purchase of steel plants that were closed. They raised four million dollars in capital funds but were stifled in their efforts when the Carter administration refused to provide government loans to support the venture. After this failure, the coalition participated in the formation of the Tri-State Conference on Steel, a formation which helped organize food banks, fought to extend unemployment benefits, provided medical care, and evaded some home foreclosures. They also organized a conference, out of which came a proposal for a Steel Valley Authority (Haas 1985, 40–42).

In the RCA closing in central Indiana, a business and local government coalition talked of a community buyout of the TV cabinet-making plant after the company first announced the closing in July 1982. In August, the company announced its postponement of the closing, thus ending the buyout effort. In September the company negotiated the closing of the plant with the carpenters' local. No new efforts emerged to buy or forestall the closing. However, a Workers Aid Council was formed by union activists to provide for the welfare needs of displaced workers. The WAC members learned about all available government-agency and private services and informed displaced workers that the WAC would give whatever help it could. Over the next several months, after the closing, WAC members counselled many displaced workers and confronted the state unemployment agency, state politicians, and local businessmen and bankers over meeting the workers' needs. These activities therefore

were primarily designed to aid victims of a closing, not to struggle against it.

Haas reported on other fightback and worker-support actions surrounding plant closings. These included activities ranging from picketing and boycotting products produced by a company announcing a closing to worker buyouts of stores and factories. As suggested earlier, union locals have also made wage concessions to forestall closings. Some union locals have given thought to economic conversion to save local plants from financial crisis. Consequently, workers' responses have included preclosing, closing, and postclosing strategies.

From an interesting comparative perspective, Rothstein examined the political strategies of workers in two diverse settings: the steel-plant closings in Youngstown, Ohio, and similar closings in Longwy, France. The steel-plant closing in Longwy set in motion a series of militant trade-union actions by three unions having a presence in the plant. Longwy workers organized demonstrations, strikes, factory occupations, and sabotage. They established a radio station to mobilize public support for their cause. The national offices of two union federations, the CGT and CFDT, prepared detailed plans for renovating the steel industry in general even before the Longwy plant closed. The premium seemed to be on action as the unions involved themselves in mass demonstrations, occupation of corporate meeting rooms, blocking roads and railroads, organizing children's demonstrations, and a mass march in Paris.

All this militant action did not forestall the closing of the Longwy steel plant but it did lead to increased closing benefits and the adoption of closing policies that reduced the trauma of economic dislocation. Seven months after the announced closing, the unions and company signed a closing agreement that called for restructuring of the plant without layoffs. Of some 21,000 workers, 12,500 would earn early retirement; 4,800 would voluntarily resign and receive a bonus; 4,000 workers would be transferred; and, lastly, some job reductions would be postponed.

Comparing the Longwy and Youngstown movements, Rothstein sees the former case as illustrating more militant class struggle. In the French experience the relevant unions, local and national, were fully involved in struggle from the beginning, while the Youngstown steelworkers and the USWA haltingly joined a struggle initiated by religious leaders. In the French case, workers more effectively mobilized allies in the community and around the nation than did

the Youngstown coalition. In terms of consciousness, Rothstein summarizes general survey findings to suggest that French workers had a much higher degree of class consciousness than U.S. workers. French workers were more likely to see conflicts over workplace issues, jobs, wages, and benefits as endemic to the struggle between capital and labor than were U.S. workers. French workers were more likely to see collective action as necessary to maintain workers' interests. French workers were more likely than U.S. workers to conceptualize their jobs as central to their lives and hence to view them as central to their quality of life. Finally, French workers were more likely to view layoffs and plant closings as by-products of economic crisis. The Longwy workers were more likely to view their strategy for struggle within the framework of class struggle.

Along with responses to specific closings, worker-led coalitions have organized around the larger issue of deindustrialization. The most common effort along this line has been the movement to establish plant-closing laws at municipal, state, and national levels. Plant-closing legislation ranges from minimal bills requiring some advance notice of an impending shutdown to bills that require public hearings, severance pay, tax grants to locales losing a plant, extended medical benefits beyond a closing, and job-training and transfer rights. Only a few states and a handful of municipalities have adopted any such policies and the U.S. Congress finally passed a minimum advance-notice bill in 1988.

One plant-closing movement started in north-central Indiana in response to the RCA plant closing in Monticello and three Kroger store closings in Lafayette, Indiana. The Northwest Central Labor Council and an allied labor group known as the Displaced Workers Assistance Agency (DWAA) marshaled a campaign to secure the passage of a maximal plant-closing bill in the state legislature. With the assistance of the state AFL-CIO, such legislation was introduced in three separate years. Because of the Republican control of both houses and the virulent opposition of the Chamber of Commerce and other business groups, the bill never was discussed in committee and hence has never reached the house or senate floors.

To build public pressure, particularly from workers, the DWAA wrote and distributed materials on the bill to central labor councils, organized a plant-closing conference, and participated in statewide labor conferences on the subject. While worker interest as measured by response to personal contacts at conferences was positive, the

DWAA was not able to create a plant-closing movement around the state, which was its original goal.

Such a movement, it was hoped, would be based upon the presumption that corporate interests in profit should not take precedence over worker and community interests. A plant-closing movement would both raise worker consciousness and bring some added protection against the national economic crisis. Some success has been achieved where plant-closing movements have occurred as to the first goal; less has been achieved as to the second.

***Class struggle and deindustrialization: The future***

Worker responses to plant closings and deindustrialization have concentrated on reacting to individual cases. Movements with a broader vision have been more limited in scope, intensity, and success. In view of the political-economic changes in the United States, most particularly the radical deindustrialization of the economy, there is a profound need to build a worker-led political movement to protect existing workers' rights and resources and to transform U.S. society in a more egalitarian and democratic direction. Most concretely, recent trends suggest that the U.S. manufacturing working class is being threatened as jobs, incomes, and transfer payments are systematically being destroyed.

Consequently, a new workers' movement, germinating in workplaces, union locals, rank-and-file union caucuses, and community and state worker-led coalitions, must identify a series of general goals to respond to the economic crises of the 1980s. Such new movements must end unchecked capital mobility. Mergers and unproductive corporate investments that waste resources, increase monopolization of the economy, and stimulate patterns of plant shutdowns must be stopped. Legislation prohibiting profitable companies from leaving communities must be endorsed. Also, a new movement should work toward the total elimination of unemployment and for the adoption of government policies that provide for the basic needs of all. Such a movement should work toward full participation of workers in decision-making in political and economic life.

The prospect of continuing and building a mass-based movement for jobs and justice requires an analysis of the ongoing class structure and the possibilities for political action. Different settings of plant closings suggest a variety of interclass and intraclass fractions that could be mobilized for political purposes. First, of course, plant

closings have been targeted against unionized manufacturing workers. These workers have experienced the loss of their jobs, income, and union organizations. Second, nonunionized workers have also experienced plant closings, and, in many cases, experienced more minimal closing settlements than unionized workers. Third, many workers in auxiliary manufacturing and service jobs in communities where plant closings occur have lost employment as the ripple effects spread throughout a community. Fourth, international unions have to varying degrees developed programs to respond to the closings which their own locals have experienced and to their general loss of membership. Fifth, members of communities in which plant closings have occurred have experienced the deleterious ripple effects of these events such as the reduction of the community's tax base, the decrease in contributions to charities, and the shrinking of public services. Sixth, small-business people are victimized by closings because their customers are no longer able to consume as much due to loss of income. Seventh, in many communities where closings have occurred, church activists and intellectuals from nearby universities and state labor-studies programs have participated in various fightback movements for ethical and political-ideological reasons.

The brief examination of responses to plant closings above and an analysis of the class interests (of both workers and small-business people) and the moral convictions of those undergoing closings suggest a core of possible activists that may be mobilized to work for economic security in U.S. society. In addition, one should expect support for a popular movement for economic security from those millions of marginalized workers whose occupational status is less advantaged than manufacturing workers. The emergence of a movement for change can be expected to catalyze those who are permanently unemployed, discouraged workers, part-time workers, and workers earning the minimum wage. A new mass movement for social change would have as its core unionized and nonunionized workers, displaced workers, and under- and unemployed workers.

Therefore, any coherent and organized response to capital mobility would be worker-led but would be significantly aided by allies from the religious, academic, and small-business sectors of the community. Indeed, this model is precisely that of the Morse Tool struggle in New Bedford, Massachusetts, that was successful in forestalling a closing. This kind of coalition, which was successful in the

particular case, could be the basis of a more general struggle for economic security in the society at large.

With the present level of class consciousness and political organization in U.S. society, however, any large popular organization would not be expected to be mobilized at the outset by socialist ideology. The kinds of objectives and goals of this movement would have to be articulated in terms of particular values to be achieved (such as economic security, access to quality health care, and democratic participation in the workplace). The development of a program in these terms would not be in contradiction with a broader program of building socialism nor would it be manipulative, because the program developed by such a coalition could be accepted by socialists and nonsocialists alike.

Within the context of these goals, some activists and scholars have begun to use the language introduced by Franklin Roosevelt when he proposed an Economic Bill of Rights in 1944. This new Bill of Rights included the right to a useful and economically rewarding job, the right to earn enough to provide for food, clothing, and recreation, the right of farmers to produce and sell enough to earn a decent income, the right of business people to engage in commerce free from competition and domination by monopolies, and the rights to adequate housing, medical care, education, and economic security in one's older years.

Armed with the commitment to achieving these rights, a worker-led coalition should engage in legislative work, consciousness raising, the revitalization of the labor movement, and organization-building to develop a progressive political force in the United States. This force should be committed to collective and militant action and should be conscious of the interconnections between peoples' struggles at home and around the world. The latter requires a consciousness of the global character of the capitalist system and the understanding that U.S. support for reactionary regimes and movements in the Third World supports the reserve army of cheap labor overseas that makes capital flight desirable. Perhaps the most basic insight that eventually must be accepted by a progressive worker-led movement is that the very jobs on which workers depend are being threatened and the global political economy of capitalism is the basic context of the struggle that workers are engaged in with capital.

*The Labor Studies Research Group  
Purdue University*

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# **Distinction Between the Spheres of Action of Formal Logic and Dialectical Logic**

**Erwin Marquit**

Intensive debates have been taking place among Marxists, especially since the 1960s, on the relationship between dialectical and formal logic. Although the debate continues, increasing numbers of dialectical materialists do not see formal logic and dialectical logic as mutually exclusive or incompatible logics.<sup>1</sup> In a previous work, I expressed the view that formal-logical contradictions (in the sense of two-valued logic) are impermissible in any theoretical activity and that the examples of formal-logical contradictions often attributed to Marx were formal-logical contradictions in form but not in content, a device used by Marx to underscore their dialectical character (Marquit 1981; see also Narski 1982).

The standard reference books on Marxist-Leninist philosophy usually do not take an explicit position on this question, leaving the debate to the philosophical journals and monographs (see, e.g., Frolov 1984). On the other hand, such reference books often characterize logic as the laws of thought, and follow Engels in characterizing dialectics as the most general laws of nature, society, and thought (Engels 1972, 267).

My purpose here is to draw attention to a departure from this practice and consider its implications for the relationship between formal logic and dialectics.

In a philosophical dictionary for the natural sciences, the GDR logician Horst Wessel writes that (formal) logic is:

the science which investigates certain aspects of linguistic forms (terms, propositions, and logical operators). Sometimes one erroneously views the laws of logic as general laws of existence

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or as laws of thought. Terms are words and phrases that signify objects and express characteristics. Logical operators are linguistic means (words, phrases, and, for example, punctuation marks) which, taken by themselves, have no meaning, that is, they neither signify objects nor express any characteristics. Examples of logical operators are the words “is,” “and,” “not,” “or,” “if...then...,” “all,” “some,” “the fact that...” and so on. Statements which mean something are formed from terms and logical operators. Examples of propositions are: “The table is made from wood.” “The dog is not barking,” ... The definition of the terms “proposition,” “term,” and “logical operator” is not possible on basic grounds. The structure of propositions, the structure of terms, and the logical operators were created by humans together with the language and there are no a priori barriers to the introduction of new logical operators as well as new structures of statements and terms... [The task of logic] is to deal with the deficiencies of natural languages in regard to logic, whereby the rules for the application of terms, propositions, and operators are specified, systematically investigated, and presented. Moreover, logic also establishes rules for the application of a number of concrete terms which are used in colloquial languages and in the languages of the various sciences.<sup>2</sup> (Wessel 1983)

Wessel’s description, however, does not deal with the relationship between formal and dialectical logic. Using the first sentence of his description as a starting point, I shall now attempt to state this connection. It will turn out, among other things, that his assertion that formal logic is erroneously viewed as laws of thought needs closer examination.

The term *logic* is usually used in the following context. At a certain stage in the process of cognition or explication we apply logic to the theoretical representation of objective reality on some level of abstraction, in which process we may incorporate, if necessary, theoretically appropriated results of specific empirical activity to enrich (generalize) or concretize (for practical application), as the case may be, the theoretical representation of this objective reality. In other words, logic deals with certain types of interconnections in thought separating moments of practical activity. Consider, for example, the recent discussions around cold fusion. An experiment was performed on the basis of the theoretical projections of the

experimenters. According to the predictions of the theoretical analysis, a thermonuclear reaction should take place. A large amount of heat was observed to be released in the experiment. When the experiment was repeated by others, the projected amounts of neutrons, also predicted theoretically, were not observed. The two moments of experimental activity were (a) the totality of experimental research that led to the undertaking of the original experiment and (b) the efforts to confirm the occurrence of a thermonuclear reaction by others with a special emphasis on the detection of the presence of neutrons. The application of logic to the physical theory led from (a) to (b). The absence of the theoretically predicted number of neutrons became the basis for the initial rejection by the physics community of the conclusion that a thermonuclear reaction had taken place (although the nature of the process that gave rise to the release of a large amount of heat is still the subject of serious consideration).

Formal logic does not deal with all types of interconnections. For example, theoretical systems usually form a hierarchically structured complex of concepts and laws. Thus, Marx's theory of surplus value, which arises from his law of value, is not derivable from the law of value by means of formal logic alone. What Wessel's description of formal logic asserts is that in the process of elaborating such connections, the formulation of propositions and the interconnections among them must be compatible with the laws of formal logic.

Dialectics, on the other hand, deals with the interconnectedness of things as the source of their unceasing change and development. At the roots of this interconnectedness lie oppositions or opposing tendencies, the interactions of which are responsible for the relative stability of the system as well as for the changes that continually occur in the object and its subsystems. Materialist dialectics views the material world as primary to thought and therefore focuses its attention on the dialectics of matter. In viewing thought as the appropriation of the material world in the sphere of consciousness, materialist dialectics accords thought a relative independence, so that not only does the material world give rise to our ideas, but the ideas, in their development, give rise to other ideas. Dialectics, therefore, does not replace formal logic, but it does insist, as Hegel pointed out, that the interconnections embraced by formal logic be viewed dialectically.

Lawler argues that Hegel does not deny the validity of formal logic, but criticizes the failure to interpret it dialectically (Lawler

1982). One example discussed by Lawler is the law of identity, which is sometimes expressed as  $A = A$ . Lawler cites Hegel's criticism at merely representing the logical structure of such a statement as  $A = A$ , which, according to Hegel, would be a tautology and not serve any useful purpose. Lawler asserts that Hegel, rather than rejecting the law of identity, retains it, but only in conjunction with what Hegel refers to as "the other expression of the law of identity," namely, the law of noncontradiction, *A cannot at the same time be A and not-A*, which he considered to be a higher form of the same law. "Usually," writes Hegel, "no justification is given of how the *form of negation* by which this law is distinguished from its predecessor, comes to identity." Hegel continues:

But this form is implied in the fact that identity, as the pure movement of reflection, is simple negativity which contains in more developed form the second expression of the law just quoted. . . . In this proposition, therefore, identity is expressed as negation of the negation. *A* and *not-A* are distinguished, and these distinct terms are related to one and the same *A*. Identity, therefore, is here represented as *this distinguishedness in one relation or as simple difference in the terms themselves* (1969, 416).

Hegel's attitude toward logical contradiction is more complex than that described above. For Hegel, dialectical contradictions are logical contradictions, but our thought is incapable of applying the law of identity and the law of noncontradiction simultaneously. This is illustrated by his comment in connection with Zeno's paradox of the arrow:

What makes the difficulty is always thought alone, since it keeps apart the moments of an object which in their separation are really united.

Elsewhere I show that Hegel's idealist dialectics, which starts with the Idea as undifferentiated being and requires the identity of undifferentiated being with differentiated being in order to unfold the world from the Idea, is the source of his need to assert the (logically) contradictory character of dialectical contradictions, a requirement not shared by materialist dialectics (Marquit, 1990).<sup>3</sup>

Formal logic is narrower than the more general concept of logic, which can also include the dialectics of thought. Therefore the

dialectics of thought can be called dialectical logic. Despite their referring to different things, formal logic and dialectical logic are not mutually exclusive. One is not superseded by the other; they are mutually necessary. The fact that dialectics embraces formal logic does not imply that it replaces it, just as the fact that dialectics embraces all the sciences does not mean that dialectics replaces the individual sciences. Formal logic has its own field of activity, just as does any individual science. As a science connected with linguistic expression, however, formal logic has a special connection with the sphere of thought. The process of thinking certainly involves linguistic expression, even if it is asserted that some aspects of thought are possible without it. It is therefore necessary to include formal logic, along with dialectical logic, within the concept of the laws of thought.

Finally, it must be stressed that the fact that formal logic deals with linguistic expression does not mean that it does not have a material basis in objective reality. The objects of formal logic are concrete ideas, which, in turn, are the means by which our minds appropriate the objectively existing reality on some level of abstraction. Getmanova, in discussing logical negation, notes that every kind of logical negation has its objective basis in the objective reality of which it is a reflection, that is, an object does not possess certain characteristics, that a given individual does not belong to a given general (1972, 122). Wolfgang Segeth, in a comment that is not inconsistent with Wessel's position, adds: "Formal-logical negation is actually a subjective operation, a human operation, but, of course, the result of this operation agrees with objective reality, it depends on it, not on humans" (1984, 190). The dialectical-materialist concept of matter is rooted in the proposition that the objectively existing material world is the ultimate source of human consciousness. The connections between logic, dialectical or formal, and the material world should not be vulgarized by reducing the connections to simple, direct ones. Many levels of abstraction and the entire history of human experience have been involved in the elaboration of these connections. Since both logics appropriate in thought the interconnections of properties and processes in the material world, both have to be used, consciously or unconsciously, in analyses of these properties and processes.

Consider, for example, one of the most elegant examples of the unconscious application of dialectical logic to solve an important conceptual problem in mathematics, that of the nature of continuity.

The traditional association of continuity with infinite divisibility led to problems with the set of rational numbers, which does not form a continuum. For example, Galileo and Leibniz thought that continuity of the points on a line was associated with the density of points, that is, given any two points, there is a third point between them (Boyer 1968, 6). Similarly, given any two rational numbers, there is a third rational number between them. But the set of real numbers includes irrational as well as rational numbers, so the infinite divisibility of the rational numbers is not a sufficient basis for establishing the essence of continuity. The first to establish this essence was Richard Dedekind in 1872 in a striking demonstration of dialectical reasoning (1901). In doing so, he was also able to establish the relationship between the rational numbers and the irrational numbers. Dedekind saw that the essence of continuity was not to be found in a “hang togetherness” of the points on a line, but in just the opposite property, a division now known as the *Dedekind cut*. In the case of real numbers (or correspondingly, the points on a line), one way to make a Dedekind cut is the following: Divide the set of real numbers (or points on a line) into two classes such that every member of the first class is less than (or, correspondingly, to the left of) every member of the second class, where each class has at least one member and where the first class has no highest number (or right-most point). Any one number, but only one number (or point), at time can bring about that division. In this way, the secret of continuity is to be revealed in a discontinuity! The continuity of the set of real numbers is obviously not affected by the cut being made at a rational or irrational number. Thus if we take the square root of two to effect this division, then the first class contains all numbers less than the square root of two and the second class contains the square root of two and all numbers higher than it. The dialectical character of the relationship between the two classes, that is, the embracing of continuity through the unity of the two mutually exclusive, mutually conditioned classes into which the numbers (or points) have been divided, is expressed with the aid of formal logic. The members of each class are identical insofar as they belong to their respective classes (although different insofar as they are ordered sequentially within the class); members of one class cannot at the same time be members of the other class, and so on. It would make no sense to assert that the dialectical relationship expressed here represents change or development, just as one could not assert that formal logic cannot be used to

represent the physical processes responsible for stellar evolution, such as the gravitational collapse of a star upon the depletion of the thermonuclear fuel that sustained its relative structural stability. With the aid of formal logic, physics is able to apply mathematical methods to embrace the quantitative changes that lead to the sudden qualitative change in the structure of the star after many billions of years of relative stability.[

In summary, formal logic and dialectical logic are both reflections of the laws of objective reality. Both serve as complementary methodological tools in the sphere of thought and complement each other as laws of thought. Dialectical logic subsumes the entire sphere of human thought. But the various forms of consciousness, in general, require linguistic (or symbolic) expression and formal logic concerns itself with certain aspects of this expression of consciousness and the extension of its content. Formal logic, therefore, must be used in the application of dialectical logic to those aspects of material systems that are relatively stable as well as to those aspects of material systems that are undergoing change and development.

I wish to thank Professor Werner Ebeling for the hospitality shown me at Humboldt University, Berlin, GDR, where most of this work was carried out. I also wish to thank Professors Igor S. Narski and Ulrich Röseberg for most helpful discussions.

*School of Physics and Astronomy  
University of Minnesota*

## NOTES

1. For a summary-survey of discussions on this questions, see Marquit, Moran, and Truitt (1982) and Narski (1981).
2. My translation.
3. Hegel does not state explicitly that logical contradictions are permissible. He does argue, however, that the two sides of a dialectical contradiction are identical to each other while being the negative of each other at the same time and in the same respect, which is one of the most common expressions of a logical contradiction in classical logic (see, for example, Hegel [1969, 441]; also Marquit [1990]).

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# Property Criminals as the Lumpenproletariat: A Serendipitous Finding

**Kenneth D. Tunnell**

*What kind of crime is the robbing of a bank compared to the founding of a bank?*

Bertolt Brecht

## ***Introduction***

The central objective of this research was to enhance our understanding of criminal decision-making; that is, how criminals resolve decision problems of whether or not to commit a crime, how various alternatives within the decision problem were considered, and how their objective circumstances contributed to the decision. A purposive sample of sixty adult male repetitive property offenders incarcerated in Tennessee prisons was selected. Each offender had committed a high frequency of burglaries and armed robberies. To obtain the research objectives, I interviewed each offender. The interviews focused on each subject's *criminal calculus*, i.e., his decision-making based on his assessment of the perceived benefits and risks of crime commission.

The risk-benefit calculus was explored to determine how repetitive property criminals make decisions about whether to commit or not to commit a crime. To arrive at such a determination, I had each participant recall the most recent and typical crime that he had committed and could remember clearly. The crime and all events, conversations, and thoughts were reconstructed to illuminate the decision to commit a specific crime, various alternatives considered in the context of the of the decision problem, perceptions of the likelihood of various

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outcomes, and the effects of those perceptions on decisions.

The interviews, which produced empirical data on individuals in specific situations, were audio tape-recorded and later transcribed. The dialogues were then subjected to standard qualitative data analysis to better understand the dynamics of criminal decision-making and the criminal calculus. The qualitative analysis was twofold. First, patterns among these offenders' responses were identified, from which generalizations were drawn and typologies constructed. Second, field notes were recorded throughout the course of the research. These were used to make analytic "sense" of the repetitive criminal's calculus (e.g., Patton 1987). These field notes allowed for a "thinking aloud" process which encouraged the emergence and pursuit of other lines of inquiry that developed from the flexibility of this ethnographic research design. A conclusion from one such line of inquiry is that the majority of these offenders can be located within a lumpenproletarian "class."<sup>1</sup>

### ***Criminals as the lumpenproletariat: A theoretical review***

The lumpenproletariat, in Marx and Engels's words (1948, 20), is the "passively rotting mass thrown off by the lowest layers of old society"—the lifeless or useless proletariat.

Class" typically is "adjudicated" by Marxists and neo-Marxists by one's relationship to the means of production (see, e.g., Wright 1985). The lumpenproletariat has been referred to as the "excluded class," which indicates they have no relationship to the means of production (Szymanski 1983). The members of the lumpenproletariat are both without such a relationship and are a necessary product of accumulation. Their existence is a structural phenomenon, a product of a streamlining production process that consistently excludes groups of individuals from participating in the production of goods and services.

Marx and Engels (1948) analytically situated petty criminals within a "class"—the lumpenproletariat, "the dangerous class, the social scum."

Other theorists include within this class the permanently unemployed, drug addicts (some of whom are criminals), the mentally ill, and dependents of the state (Szymanski 1983). Their way of life allegedly gives rise to a similar subcultural consciousness unique to them and different from that of other classes.<sup>2</sup> The lumpenproletariat's political consciousness especially is unstable, a fact which is often

manifest in such divergent activities as rioting against state authority and breaking up labor strikes. This fickle characteristic of the lumpenproletariat has been well documented by Marx's (1934) analysis of the French Revolution and Traugott's (1985) description of the Parisian Insurrection.

Marx (1981) viewed crime, in relation to the development of capitalism, as a violation of criminal legislation by individuals who had little choice but crime for their livelihood. "Crime,"<sup>3</sup> then, typically is committed by those displaced by the growth of capitalism. Writing of "free will" (e.g., freely choosing to commit a crime), Marx (1981) critically suggests that this concept is used as a universal which ignores material conditions and the differences in one group's conditions over another. To understand people's participation in crime, we should examine the concrete social circumstances in which they are situated. This implies that some individuals, to survive, have no other choice but to commit crimes. Some may be as "free" not to choose crime as a means of existence as the working class is not to choose wage labor as a means of existence.

The lumpenproletariat is a class with potentially revolutionary power, but one which does not recognize that power. Its members are unconscious of their threatening presence to the social order if by nothing more than their sheer number. As a result, most street crimes are highly individualistic hedonistic acts and generally "not connected to any broad conception of social and political change" (Wright 1973, 16). Engels (1958) also considered crime a potentially rebellious act by those displaced and dehumanized by the conditions produced by capitalism. The rebellion, however, is individualistic, rather than communal, and is repressed easily without satisfying the rebellious actors. Elsewhere it is implied that the lumpenproletariat is dangerous to an antisystemic revolutionary movement (e.g., Marx and Engels 1948; Draper 1978).

One poignant structural explanation for the lumpenproletariat's failure to recognize its power is that the members have not been subjected on a daily basis to capitalist exploitation, since they typically are outside the mainstream legitimate work world, (since they are displaced and are unable to function as wage laborers). Without this exploitation, they lack even "embryonic" class consciousness. This exclusion from legitimacy and regular wage-labor is illuminated in the qualitative data analysis and the illustrative dialogue provided in the next section. Also, in the next section, I offer a descriptive

account of the ways the sixty property offenders make decisions about the alternatives available to them in their objective material circumstances. I will show that the great majority had few alternatives to crime and that their criminal actions represent individual utilitarian acts with little consciousness of any broader practice.

***Criminal participation: A structural conceptualization***

Recent deterrence and decision-making literature indicates that investigators should examine closely an important theoretical component of decision-making—namely, the alternatives considered by the decision-maker while resolving a decision-problem. Investigators of criminal decision-making recently have pointed to the need for specific information about the offender's mental calculus to determine his perceptions of his legitimate opportunities for obtaining money (e.g., Feeney 1986). These perceptions, it is realized, are shaped, in part, by the individual's objective circumstances.

Previous research indicates that criminals often have legitimate jobs (e.g., Akerstrom 1985). Holzman (1983), using LEAA data of 1974, found that 95 percent of his sample of criminals had full-time jobs at the time of their arrests. But they "moonlighted" in illegal occupations and envisioned themselves as entrepreneurs who would someday be self-employed. These findings indicate that previous respondents have had legitimate alternatives, such as work, available to them. Two related points emerged from my research, one of which is vastly different. First, nearly all sixty participants were not employed full-time at the time of their arrest and most were either unemployed or underemployed. Their objective economic conditions are important for understanding the alternatives available to them and considered by them when resolving criminal decision-problems.

Rather than focusing on individual differences among Holzman's (1983) sample and mine, I find more explanatory power in structural changes that have occurred within the domestic labor market. The labor market has "tightened" and employers now demand from employees more education, specialization, computer skills, and stable work experience than ever before. It has become a buyer's market. Just as fifteenth-century peasants were marginalized by a change in production processes, these individuals with few job skills and little education increasingly have been displaced and increasingly have lost what little stake in conformity they had. The following dialogues are illustrative.

Q. Did you see any alternatives at all, like did you think you had a chance at a job?

A. Yeah, but at that time jobs were hard to find especially for a young man that didn't have no education and been in trouble, you know.

Q. Did you see any alternatives to committing robbery?

A. I tried [to find a job]. The moment you said you was put in jail or a reference to something like that, you was out.

Legitimate opportunities for the majority of the respondents to earn a decent wage were limited structurally. They were aware, at least intuitively, of the odds against them, and often opted for illegitimate means to obtain immediate success goals (Merton 1968; Gordon 1973). The majority had "everything going against them." That is, most had dropped out of school or were dismissed at a young age and were unable to develop marketable job skills. Thus, when they did work they nearly always relied on menial jobs and moved frequently from one job to another. All sixty had been in prison at least one time before and after their first incarceration found themselves labeled and stigmatized as "ex-cons." They then experienced those well-known difficulties associated with being an ex-convict.

Q. Did you see any other alternatives to committing robbery like a job, did you think you could find a job?

A. I tried. Back there in them days the moment you said you was put in jail or something like that, you was out. When you commit the crime, you commit it and you get sentenced to pay a debt to society. But that debt's never paid. You cannot pay that debt. You're screwed the rest of your life.

A second finding similar to Holzman's (1983) is that a typical self-perception among many of the sixty was to envision themselves as entrepreneurs, innovative ones too be sure, but entrepreneurs nonetheless who dream of one day owning their own businesses. They have a desire to apply the skills they possess (e.g., coolness and nerve) to a legitimate autonomous job, as the following typical comment illustrates.

A. I'm going to live out my fantasy or whatever it is, you know, about getting this house and building me a business of my own, you know, I want to be the boss.

Dreams of self-employment give them hope of earning a decent legitimate wage and exercising their nerve. This, they believe, would

provide them autonomy, which would allow them to create and revise the rules guiding their own work. These projections are representative of their often-distorted perceptions of the objective legitimate options available to them.

Q. Do you think being locked up will have a negative impact on your trying to find a job?]

A. Probably not, because I'm going to be self-employed. I'll probably get a grocery store with a little gas station hooked to it and sell beer. And with a little luck a Stop and Go or something. I have a good business mind.

Most have lived on legitimate earnings very infrequently during their lives. But, after having served two or more incarcerations, and nearing their release, they believed they would be able to survive and be somewhat content on legitimate earnings. Again, their distorted perceptions of their objective legitimate options became manifest. They typically had little idea that they may be destined to reap subsistence wages. Their belief was supported by the fact that they had lived comfortably in prison on their prison earnings and that they certainly could live as comfortably in the "free world." They failed to consider that they had almost no living expenses while incarcerated.

A. I see if I can work in [prison] making \$40 or \$50 a month and can survive and live off of that, then I won't have no problem going out in society working if it's nothing but minimum wages.

Doubtless, education, job skills, work experience and a "clean record" provide individuals with legitimate opportunities (i.e., they provide social status, mobility, and economic stability). Lacking these particular assets in their lives, the respondents innovated by replacing legitimate means to owning material possessions with illegitimate. Recent research points to similar patterns suggesting that "social conditions... may limit opportunity and reduce an individual's investment in society, leading to both drug abuse and criminal behavior" (Innes 1988, 2).


Legitimate employment certainly was considered an alternative to crime at some point in their lives. But they were aware of the meager wages they were destined to reap, the difficult jobs they would have to work, and the conditions under which they would be forced to labor.

Q. At that time you said you were out of work and you took this [gun] running job. Did you see any other alternatives that you could have chosen?

A. Not there unless I wanted to go to work in the coal mines with my wife's cousins. I couldn't see myself coming out of a coal mine at four o'clock in the afternoon, black sooted face.

They did not *consciously* think of working each time they confronted a criminal decision-problem. In fact, only two offenders reported seeking legitimate work while resolving the criminal decision-problem. Another two reported that while committing crimes they previously had sought legitimate work, but to no avail (see chart for alternatives). The majority previously had appraised working for a wage and had rejected that option due to one or more of the following: (1) their inability to secure employment;

A. Nobody would hire me. Employment was impossible so I started robbing.



(2) the limitations that a legitimate wage from a menial job afforded;

Q. Did you think of anything else you could do for money, at that time?

A. I figured shoot, why go out and work when a man can go out here and do this right here and make a whole lot of money just in a little bit.

or (3) their refusal to work for a living.

Q. You didn't used to work did you?

A. Not at all. I wouldn't work if you asked me to work. I thought it was other ways to do things besides working. I thought you were a fool to work, you know. Why should you work, you fool. You ain't never going to have nothing. That's what I used to say.

Q. How about picking up an odd job for half a day?

A. No, I thought I was too cool, too cool, man. I thought I was too good. That would have been against my dignity to try to work. I wouldn't want nobody to know that I was doing that.

They believed at that time in their lives that work, if secured, would provide them with less-than-fulfilling wages and psychological rewards. Based on their experiences in the legitimate work world, they were conscious that legitimate work, if obtainable, would offer only subsistence wages. Also, in a restrictive controlled work place, they would not be free to use the skills they had developed (e.g., cool, nerve, and network connections). They typically believed that legitimate work failed to offer not only autonomy but satisfaction.

Q. Does work bore you, legitimate work?]

A. Yeah. If I can't get something that keeps my mind working and keeps me going I can't. . . . I ain't got that good a damn mind, but I mean I've got to keep busy.

Q. And burglary does that for you?]

A. Oh, hell yeah. I was having too good a time. I thought this is fun. Hell, the whole town is mine.

Therefore, it is clear that this sample's access to legitimate employment and lifestyles was severely limited structurally. They were unable to (1) obtain employment or (2) obtain employment that paid them more than a subsistence wage. Their exclusion from the

labor force may result from constrictive changes in the labor market and the growing demands on would-be employees to possess certain skills, legitimate employment histories, and legitimate lifestyles.

Many of these sixty were addicted severely to drugs to the point that they could not maintain a regular full-time job. Likewise, a recent Bureau of Justice report, based on survey research of a large sample (N = 27,000), reveals that one-half of state inmates sentenced to prison for property crimes were daily drug users (Innes 1988).

A. I knew [crime] was wrong, but like I say, man it was wrong in the eyes of the beholder, you know. I mean, I'm needing a shot of dope, it's not wrong for me to go get it, you know. I have to get it, however I can. To me it wasn't wrong. I had to have it and I had to get it from somewhere.

Many participants reported they committed crimes to purchase drugs to which they were addicted. They knew that crime would be a monetarily rewarding and rational way to obtain what they needed.

Q. Why did you do it, at that time?

A. I was doing drugs real heavy, powerful drugs, and I liked it and by me liking that I took them chances. I really didn't think about the risk period then hardly. All I thought about was just getting dope and I'd go to any lengths to get it. The urge for that dope is stronger than getting caught so I'd go ahead and do it. I was doing it just to get money and it was for that damn dope. I didn't really, you know, think about all the trouble, you know, I'd end up in or anything. I was just wanting to get the money for dope.

Also, a legitimate job with a salary that they realistically could have expected to earn would have offered them less money than they needed to support their serious habits.

A. I tried to stay away from crime other than selling cocaine. I was determined not to rob any more and when my cocaine sales did not contribute enough to my cocaine consumption, then it became necessary that I rob. Nobody would hire me. I was an ex-con and I tried, I really tried to get gainful employment. There was nobody looking to hire me with my

record. I went in as a juvenile and came out as an adult and didn't have any legitimate employment resume to submit. Employment was impossible. So, I started robbing.

These individuals had no alternatives available to them other than fundamentally altering their lifestyles (i.e., just saying "no" to drugs).

The majority (43 of the 60) reported that they *did not* consider any alternative to the crime that they committed.

Q. Did you ever talk about doing anything else to get the money or did that ever enter the conversation?

A. No, that never came up... we never did talk about, you know, going and looking at this, finding a job. It was always, you know, taking something, you know, and it never crossed our mind, you know, why don't we go and check out this job, you know, this and that. That wasn't even—well, it wasn't on my mind, you know, and didn't none of the rest of them ever bring up the conversation.

Q. Did you think about any alternatives to make money that day [the day of the burglary]?

A. Oh, besides breaking in there?

Q. Yeah.

A. No, that's the only one I, that's all I knew of at the time.

This heuristic device of not contemplating alternative actions is a reflection of their often-limited objective circumstances and is in line with the principle of immediate utility, which states that a "course of conduct is the right one... if and only if it is the best alternative under the circumstances; and the best alternative is the one that has the best overall consequences" (Hill et al. 1979, 48). Given their objective circumstances, many of these offenders, especially the severely drug-addicted and the permanently displaced, may have chosen the best alternative generally since crime often allowed them to obtain their *immediate* needs. Thus, recent calls for an examination of alternatives available to repetitive criminals yields similar results as research on the class structure of state-prison inmates. In the first, there are almost no alternatives available; and in the second, the class structure is disproportionately skewed toward lower-class individuals. Both findings reflect class position. This research supports the assumption that objective conditions strongly influence perceptions. The offenders' criminal calculus included little

assessment of alternatives since their circumstances disallowed their pursuit of any realistic alternatives.

***Lumpenproletariat consciousness***

The lumpenproletariat is that “class” that structurally is excluded from participating in the labor force. These particular sixty property offenders are considered members of the lumpenproletariat based on the generally accepted Marxian indicator of class—by one’s relationship to the means of production. These individuals essentially have no relationship to the means of production.

Reflecting their class location, these property criminals communicated a consciousness indicative of lumpenproletariat consciousness. They not only failed to recognize any antisystemic power that they and others like them may have had, but they also lacked the insight and evaluative skills necessary to critically assess the legitimacy of the capitalist judicial system. Their decisions and statements about the system’s legitimacy are a reflection of the dominant ideologies reproduced socially and systemically and do not reflect antisystemic consciousness. For example, having been sanctioned two or more times formally and numerous times informally, nearly all now conclude that predatory crime is morally and legally wrong and that criminals should be punished. Most now believe that imprisonment is an appropriate form of punishment. Some support the use of capital punishment for those crimes defined as “capital.”

A. People know between right and wrong, you know. If they go out and, you know, rob something, you know, like I say, if you’re going to do crime, expect to get time.

Q. Do you think crime is wrong?

A. Yeah. A person should be punished for it.

Almost all have failed to critically evaluate: (1) the objective conditions that may have propelled them to repetitively commit crimes; (2) the very system that has punished them for their crimes; (3) the inequities of the capitalist judicial system; and (4) the inhuman nature of systematically punishing people through imprisonment.

Now these sixty offenders not only accept the state’s punishment for crime commission but also the “rehabilitative ideal.” They accept the state’s definition of “criminals” as those who are in need of resocialization, retraining, and reentry into society.

A. If a man doesn’t change in here he deserves to stay.

Although these particular offenders may not be “rehabilitated,” they believe they have been reprogrammed or resocialized to conform. Not one of the sixty challenged the legitimacy of the very system that punished them, the legitimacy of the economic system that gives rise to their displacement, or the logic and inequities of the criminal justice system. They do not challenge the dominant ideology that street crime poses a serious threat to individuals and that the solutions to criminality are individual rather than social.

Many of the sixty reported that now the only crime they believe is justifiable is a crime of self-defense.

A. Well the only type of crime that I think is ok is if you're defending yourself. I think if a man is trying to kill me and if I kill him I don't think I should go to the penitentiary for that.

This is ironic since all of these participants, at one time or another, have placed victims in positions of defending themselves and since most were prepared to harm the victims if they did try to defend themselves. This newfound logic of justifying this crime again reflects the attitudes of society generally and is part of the participant's “buying into” acceptable attitudes and behaviors of conventional society.

The only exception to the acquiescence demonstrated among the offenders, was a desire for revenge among only two participants, both of whom were armed robbers. They claimed to have suffered severely due to official government policy and decision-making. Both claimed to have lost legitimate earnings at the hands of an unjust and callous government. They acted criminally for revenge, striking out at legitimate targets as representations of government. Their crimes were expressive acts and they believed they were getting even with the status quo or the state.

One armed robber's motivation clearly was shaped by his “definition of his situation.” He claimed to have lost nearly all of his legally earned capital when it was wrongfully collected from him by the Internal Revenue Service. It was then that he decided to enter crime as a way of retaliating against legitimate society. Refusing to work a legitimate job became a principle with him since he defined work as vanity, where individual workers end up with little to show for their labor.

Q. Did you try and find a job?

A. I was determined then that I wasn't going to work and make a living. I wasn't going to go out and work all day

and week after week and pay the government for working. I mean this is the way I felt then. I felt that if I went out and got a job, which I did, and I was making \$60 to \$70 a week. They took federal tax out, they took state tax out, they took Medicare out, they took Social Security out, and by the time I got my check they had already took out \$30 or \$40. So why would I work to pay the government for working, you know. That's the way I felt.

The other armed robber expressed similar rebellion against a government that he believed had done him an injustice and refused to assist him in solving his problems. He was homeless at the time of his most serious crimes.

A. The government did this somewhat to me too, you know, by denying me benefits.

Q. Your Social Security?

A. Yeah. I mean I was desperate. I didn't know what the hell I was going to do because I couldn't even keep the roof over my head. I moved into my car and I slept in my car for a long time. I've had three back surgeries and now I've got heart trouble on top of the back surgery, so how in the hell am I going to get a job? My wife took me to — Mental Hospital because I did have an alcoholic problem and drugs and I asked her to take me there. She did and I got turned away from over there, saying they didn't have the funds or money to help me and there was no room for me. No place for me there.

Q. And you had gotten turned down for Social Security before that?

A. Right. I had many problems. It got to the point where I knew I needed help and I couldn't get it. And that whole chain of events got me right to prison. I was on my Social Security, you know, and they cut it out and when they cut it out it like to cut my life off. I lost my Social Security, I lost my truck, you know, and I didn't know what the hell I was going to do. I done it out of desperation and frustrated at life, no help, no money, living in a car. I couldn't even take a bath, you know, nowhere to take a bath. I felt less than worthless.

This expressive generalized "striking out" is evidence for the lack of a broader practice among these somewhat more enlightened

offenders. This evidence confirms the observations of Engels (1958) and Wright (1973) that crime is highly individualistic and disconnected from any conception of social policy. Again, their consciousness was shallow and their actions were not well thought out. Their targets were individuals and small businesses rather than governmental agencies, officials, or representative of legitimate capitalist order.

The majority of these repetitive property offenders gave little attention to the inequities that capitalism produces. A surprising confirmation of this is that only one of the sixty expressed any antisystemic motivation based on his observations of wealth inequalities. The following dialogue with him illustrates this.

- Q. What kind of mood were you in that day you did the burglary?  
A. The only time I ever robbed anything I had to be in a real shitty mood, I mean, just damn the world, nobody cares about you, do what you think is best. Let me tell you, a lot of people make me madder than hell.
- Q. What kind of people?  
A. Well people that ain't got shit can't get nothing from the people that has got it. I still get real pissed about that.
- Q. Do you mean about how unfair things are?  
A. Like they advertise about those kids, the ones overseas. They're always on the radio asking for money, you know, send twenty dollars to adopt a kid, you know and all this shit. The sons-of-bitches around here has got millions of dollars and thousands of dollars laying up in a bank getting rusty and they won't send them kids a damn dime.

From the above dialogue we can see a form of class-based consciousness among this individual. Again, it was a rarity for any participant to allude to the inequities of the capitalist system and only he acted even marginally antisystemically. The other fifty-nine respondents gave little thought to anything more than the immediacy of their needs and wants. Almost all now accept the state's definitions of crime, criminals, and prescriptive punishment.

### ***Conclusion***

This paper presents a serendipitous finding from ethnographic research on the decision-making processes of repetitive property criminals—namely, that property criminals analytically can be located

within the lumpenproletarian class. Their location is a result of their displacement due to the logic of the capitalist system. Their class position reflects the fact that the means of production are inaccessible to them. Not only are they dispossessed of ownership, but they are dispossessed of any relationship to the means of production and hence access to working as wage laborers. Their consciousness of a structure that displaces groups of individuals and punishes those who circumvent legitimacy to gain material wealth reflects a noncritical ideology. They have not developed any semblance of practice or antisystemic strategy. These offenders are part of the excluded class—the lumpenproletariat—and have not thought about the system that excludes them. They attribute their problems and situations to their individual faults and decisions. They fail to realize that their options are severely limited. Both their exclusion and their lack of consciousness reflect their lumpenproletariat position within the class structure of the United States.

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*Department of Criminal Justice*  
*Eastern Kentucky University*

## NOTES

1. There is disagreement over the definition of “lumpenproletariat” and “class.” Much theoretical and less hermeneutical literature is available. Since there is such little consensus about the meaning of these terms, researchers are left to use their discernment for joining data with conceptual terms. This is just what I have done, by using a structural approach to show the connection between theory and research. For more information on these terms and their use in the literature see: Clelland and Carter (1986); Draper (1978); and Traugott (1985).
2. Mills (1956) and Useem (1984) describe a subcultural consciousness that is inextricably wedded to a unique lifestyle among an

elite or capitalist class. Mainstream sociologists have long described “high-brow” and “low-brow” cultures which are a result and reflection of class and material conditions.

3. “Crime” is used here to refer to “street” or “predatory” crime rather than corporate or organizational crime. Organizational crime is elsewhere explained as a by-product of capitalist expansion or accumulation, committed by individuals in positions of power. Doubtless, individuals who commit street crimes do not commit crimes from positions of power. Their crimes often are explained in relation to their powerlessness, or their exclusion from participating in the capitalist structure and labor force.

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# **A Critique of the Theory of the Praetorian State**

**Gordon Welty**

Amos Perlmutter's theory of the part which professionalism and praetorianism play in the relationship of the military apparatus to the modern state represents the "establishment" social science's summation regarding the nature of military coups and, in general, of the relationships between the military and the state. This theory continues a "revisionist" tradition of political analysis which questions whether the military apparatus is able to promote societal development. These doubts have been occasioned by such debacles for the establishment as the collapse of the Batista, Ky-Thieu, Pahlavi, Idi Amin, and Somocista regimes, and the immanent collapse of the Pinochet regime. As Samuel Huntington, himself an "old hand" in these matters, puts it, "Perlmutter sets forth a comprehensive general framework for the analysis of modern civil-military relations" (in Perlmutter 1977, x). Hence Perlmutter's theory warrants our close attention.

Our critique has three parts, corresponding to the elements of Perlmutter's theory. First we analyze Perlmutter's typology of nation-states, next his treatment of military interventions, and finally, his interpretation of the nature of the military apparatus itself. In each part a Marxist analysis is juxtaposed to Perlmutter's treatment of the issues at hand.

## ***The forms of the capitalist state***

A presupposition of the relationship between the military apparatus and the modern state is the form or forms of the state. The relationship and the form will correspond. Perlmutter proposes that there

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have been four types of nation-state in existence since 1789: the classical type, the settler colonizing type, the colonial (i.e., colonized) type, and the revolutionary (national liberation) type. There are two major problems with this typology: first, it is not exhaustive, and second, it is ahistorical. These problems are perhaps due to shortcomings in Perlmutter's effort to "combine the conceptual framework of social science and that of comparative history" (Perlmutter 1977).<sup>1</sup>

When we say that the typology is not exhaustive, we mean that it suffers from significant omissions. Consider the metropole; clearly the "settler colonizing type" and the "colonial type" lie outside its domain. Does this mean that there are only two types of metropolitan nation-states—classical and revolutionary? Hardly. Major omissions in Perlmutter's typology of the metropole include *absolutist states* such as the Austro-Hungarian Dual Monarchy, *multinational states* such as Great Britain, Canada, and Belgium, and *corporate states* such as Fascist Italy. And this is to focus our attention on the typological characterization of the metropole of capital, let alone the periphery.<sup>2</sup> Not even the legerdemain of Weberian ideal types can reduce these essentially differing types of the state to the "classical type" which, according to Perlmutter, has "a mature regime . . . ; a stable, integrated, culturally homogeneous population; and undisputed territorial boundaries" (1977, 26).

When we speak of ahistoricity, we mean that the dynamics of the historical process are reified—conceptually frozen—thereby significantly misrepresenting that process. The ahistoricity of Perlmutter's proposed typology is thoroughgoing. Consider the "colonizing" type. Settler colonialism is the spawn of metropolitan capitalism's sphere of circulation. Yet there are indisputable stadial differences among settler colonialisms—differences which cannot be glossed over by an uncritical invocation of Louis Hartz's concept of "fragment cultures" (Perlmutter 1977, 27). For instance, there are the settler colonies spawned during the stage of mercantile capitalism, such as the United States, which has long since transcended settler colonial status to become a hegemonic nation in the imperialist stage.<sup>3</sup> Then there are the settler colonies consolidated during the stage of imperialism, such as South Africa which reflects the *unity* of Anglo-Dutch imperialism while remaining in essence a settler colony (compare, for example, Bunting 1964). Again, there are the settler colonies spawned during the era of fascist pluralism, such as the Zionist

colony in Palestine which reflects the radical pluralism of fascism in its theocratic and ethnic racism and separatism, even though remaining in essence an outpost of imperialism.<sup>4</sup>

In sum, Perlmutter's typology of nation-states is inadequate, since some nation-states are left out, and others which have been included simply don't fit. Indeed, the typology has little to recommend it except its apologetic value of associating Zionism with the "mission-oriented values" of the North American and Australian nation-states, and overlooking the much closer affinities of Zionism with the values of the South African Broederbond. Consider, then, as an alternative the following schematic of a historical and materialist analysis (compare also Hobsbawm 1975).

As Marx and Engels point out in *The German Ideology*, the specificity of any *social formation* has several aspects, including (a) the population, which is geographically distributed (i.e., has extension) and has a particular composition (intension), (b) its productive organization, which is its "definite mode of life" (*Lebensweise*) or structure of collective activity, involving (c) its means of production and "technology," which has a particular level of development (extension) and variety and efficiency (intension), and finally (d) its natural environment and other external exigencies, which are humanity's geological, hydrographical, climatic, and other conditions of existence (compare Marx and Engels 1975, 5:42).

There were three stages in the development of the productive organization of world capitalism during the nineteenth century. As the century began, the stage of *mercantile capitalism* was the embodiment of progress *vis à vis* its feudal precursor. Notable formations of this stage were *absolutist states* and *nation-states* in the metropole of capital, and *settler colonies* in the periphery. Examples of the former would be Spain or Great Britain; of the latter, Quebec, Jamaica, or later, Algeria.

By the late 1820s, the emergence of the metropolitan business cycle had demonstrated that mercantile capitalism was being superseded by a second stage of capitalism, that of *competitive capitalism* with its atomism and mechanism. Some of the hitherto peripheral entities, e.g., the United States, were assimilated into the metropole in their own right, while *protectorates* became a notable formation in the periphery.<sup>5</sup> Examples of the latter include Aden, China, Egypt, and much of Latin America (under the Monroe Doctrine).

Finally, by the 1880s, several of the most advanced capitalist

nation-states began to partition and repartition the remainder of the globe. They did so on behalf of the horizontally integrated trusts and monopolies in the means-of-production and energy producing sectors of their economies. This signalled that competitive capitalism was being superseded in turn by a third stage of capitalism, that of *finance capitalism* or *imperialism*. Major formations of this stage were *imperialist states* in the metropole of capital, and *colonies* in the periphery. Examples of the former would be the United States or Wilhelmine Germany; of the latter Puerto Rico, Tanganyika, or Cochin China. Between the two major kinds of forms were a number of “transitional forms,” such as the protectorates, the settler colonies, etc.<sup>6</sup>

By the early 1920s, the internal contradictions of imperialism had caused the collapse of one of the major if somewhat lesser-developed imperialist states, czarist Russia. Through the military debacle of World War I and the successful October Revolution of 1917, the interdependency between Russia and the other imperialist states was ruptured and this state entered a new societal sphere which superseded capitalism altogether. This new sphere was that of socialism. Major formations of this sphere have proved to be *soviet socialist republics* and *people’s democratic republics* (See Afanasyev 1980, 130. On the latter formation, see Marx and Engels 1975, 6:294–95, 350.)


By the early thirties, trade-union organizations and progressive political parties threatened to repeat the socialist revolution in several of the remaining imperialist states. This tendency was violently suppressed on behalf of the (by now) vertically integrated oligopolies of those states; this gave the appearance that imperialism was being superseded by a fourth stage of capitalism, the stage of *fascism*.<sup>7</sup> Notable formations of this “stage” were the *corporate states* and their “internal colonies.” Examples were Nazi Germany, clerical-fascist Portugal, etc. In actuality, however, the radical pluralism of fascism was unable to overcome (during World War II) the unity of Anglo-American imperialism when the latter was conjoined with the forces of the socialist sphere. Thus the stage of imperialism has remained the preeminent stage of productive organization of the capitalist sphere throughout this century.

By the middle fifties, the exhaustion of Anglo-American imperialism in its defeat of fascist pluralism, conjoined with the vitality of national liberation forces everywhere, rendered the colonial forms

untenable for imperialist control. By the same time, developments in means of communication—in electronic technology and computational capacity, etc.—made these forms unnecessary as well; the periphery of the imperialist sphere has been transformed into a set of *neo-colonies* with little more than nominal sovereignty (compare Nkrumah 1966). Examples include Indonesia, Kenya, the Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan, and Zaire. At the same time, the exhaustion of imperialism, conjoined with revolutionary forces, expanded the socialist sphere to include Angola, Cuba, Mozambique, Vietnam, etc.

This developmental analysis of nineteenth and twentieth century capitalism can be schematized as follows:

Characteristic Formations



This schema should not be hypostatized. There is always a measure of fluidity both in the extension and the intension of such categories. For instance, when Stephen Decatur attacked the North African ports (the so-called “Barbary Coast”) in the early nineteenth century, evidence was thereby given that a settler colony could be transformed into a metropolitan nation-state, namely the United States.

Now that we have schematized a historical analysis of the forms of the state under capitalism, let us consider the terms in which Perlmutter situates the praetorian state. He conceives praetorianism in a larger framework which lies directly in the tradition of bourgeois political science associated with the names of Roberto Michels, James Burnham, et al. In his discussion of modern authoritarianism, Perlmutter indicates that he has “established four fundamental modern authoritarian models: the party-state, the police state, the corporatist state, and the praetorian state” (1981, 28). More types! Hence the praetorian state is a species of the *genus* authoritarian state. What is the authoritarian state? Perlmutter provides a definition: “Authoritarianism is a system of relationships between state and society and between political and societal sources of power. It is based on a type of domination which is dependent on centralized executive control and coercion” (1981, 24). Furthermore, this “system” is a polar type, to be contrasted to the “democratic regime.” Specifically, it has two essential components: a *political elite* and a set of *political organizations* which “politicize society,” institutions which “subordinate politics to policy” (Perlmutter 1981, 7–8).

Within these terms, Perlmutter has sought abstractly to differentiate the Nazi, the fascist, and the corporatist models of the *genus* authoritarianism (1981, 95–128). His attempt fails; he is forced to concede of Fascist Italy, for instance, that “Corporatism soon afterward became synonymous with fascism” (1981, 112). He finally suggests—quite offhandedly—that praetorian, corporatist, (Mediterranean) Fascist, and Nazi “models” represent increasingly developed forms of the *genus*, where the military apparatus plays a decreasingly significant role in guaranteeing the political order.<sup>8</sup>

On his conception, there are three kinds of institutions which combine into the authoritarian state: the authoritarian party, the “bureaucratic-military complex,” and the “parallel and auxiliary structures.” As Perlmutter puts it, “The type of authoritarianism

is determined by the roles of the three instruments of authoritarianism.” Each of the species of authoritarian state mentioned before, while employing all three institutions or “instruments,” will favor one kind of institution over the others (Perlmutter 1981, 9, 24). The praetorian state, in particular, “draws its major support from the military establishment.<sup>9</sup> It is thus the relationship between the military apparatus and the state which is the crucial consideration in Perlmutter’s conception of the praetorian state.

***The relation of military apparatus to the state***

Perlmutter conceives the relationship of the military apparatus to the nation-state in terms of the triadic interrelationship of that *apparatus*, the *political regime*, and the *political community*. So long as the interaction of the regime and the community is *stable*, he holds, the military apparatus will remain subordinate to the political regime. If the interaction of regime and community becomes *unstable*, then the military may intervene in the domestic political order. As we have seen, Perlmutter’s typology of “nation-states,” hence of the relationship between their political regimes and their communities, is inadequate for a cogent discussion of the modern world. Moreover, the notion of national “communities” within the capitalist sphere is a gross misrepresentation of the antagonistic structure of its productive organization. Thus the dichotomy of “stable” versus “unstable” interactions is merely an obfuscation of the real dialectic of the military apparatus in the various capitalist formations.<sup>10</sup>

His abstract obscurantism becomes further evident when Perlmutter puts forth what he calls “sufficient explanations” for military interventions in civilian politics. A “military group replaces an existing regime...when the military is the most cohesive and politically the best organized group...[and] when no relatively more powerful opposition exists.<sup>11</sup> There is little new or illuminating in Perlmutter’s “axiomatics;” as Ruth First expressed it, “coups d’état occur because governments are too weak to rule, but radical forces are too weak to take power” (1970, 452).

This point, as well as the more general distinction between a military coup and a revolution, is implied by Lenin’s *fundamental law of revolution*: a revolution can succeed when the lower classes will no longer bear the yoke and the upper classes are unable to carry on as before (Lenin 1968, 31:85). When it is only an inability of the upper classes to rule, when the masses are not in a state of

revolutionary ferment, then the military apparatus can intervene.

Be that as it may, it is obvious that Perlmutter has only “explained” *successful* military coups, those circumstances when “a military group replaces an existing regime.” But that doesn’t explain anything at all, since he acknowledges that “regime vulnerability may be exploited by any organized political force, including the military” (Perlmutter 1977, 99; also Huntington 1968, chap. 4). He provides no explanation of why the military apparatus exploits “regime vulnerability” in this case; why some other “organized political force” exploits it in another case. Thus Perlmutter’s analysis is not illuminating of the topic of the relationship of the military apparatus to the nation-state.<sup>12</sup> We will now provide a preliminary reconsideration of these relationships in terms of the historical and materialist analysis of the formations of global capitalism already sketched out.

The relationship of the military apparatus to these capitalist formations is *essentially* one of the apparatus serving the interests of the capitalist class through the manipulation of violence towards the toiling masses (whether domestic masses or not). As one wag has put it, the Egyptian army would have had more success in the Sinai if the tanks had turned their guns toward the east rather than toward Cairo. The capitalist organization of the military apparatus to serve these interests is embodied in the “professional soldier” and the military bureaucracy. In part, Perlmutter concedes this: “the modern army is a bureaucratic army, just as the modern nation-state is a bureaucratic state.” Again: “in most aspects of its development the modern professional military organization has generally emulated modern corporate organizations.” And further: Perlmutter is “not implying that the modern professional officer type inhabits industrial-capitalist or modern societies exclusively...[because] modern professional armies existed in noncapitalist, nonmodern states (like Prussia before 1848).<sup>13</sup>

But Perlmutter also seems to equivocate on the point that the military apparatus serves the interests of the capitalist class. He cites Talcott Parsons’s well-known claim that professionals are “neither ‘capitalists’ nor ‘workers’” (Perlmutter 1977, 33; compare also Parsons 1954, chaps. 2 and 18). Parsons’s theme is that the professions are a third stratum between the classes of capitalist society. But this is hardly the whole story—as we know from the extensive discussion of *dritten Personen* in historical social science, the existence of a stratum is no evidence of the independence of that stratum.

“Existence” is an ontological consideration; “independence” is a relational one.

This essential relation of military apparatus to class (through the mediation of the state) is itself multiply contradictory; the military apparatus of any of these formations serves the interests of the metropole.<sup>14</sup> Perlmutter would surely dispute this: “in the modern nation-state the officer corps and the government bureaucracy as a whole are dependent on and responsible to their client, the regime” (1977, 38). Consider, however, that both Shamir-Peres and Mubarak, for instance, represent regimes which are heavily staffed from their military organizations. Which depends on which—military apparatus upon the regime or vice versa? Consider this further. The Camp David accords internalized one aspect of the Middle East conflict within the U.S. Department of State in Foggy Bottom. Meanwhile, U.S. hegemony over the weapons systems internalizes the other aspect of the conflict within the U.S. Department of Defense in the Pentagon, in the interests of the military-industrial complex. These aspects of the conflict create conditions of independence—not for the “sovereign states”—but for the military apparatus, in both instances independence from the regime itself.

Moreover, we take the military apparatus to be in an essentially antagonistic relation to the masses of the particular formation.<sup>15</sup> The apparatus secondarily serves the interests of the national bourgeoisie or other national elites where those interests are distinct from—and compatible with—metropolitan interests. For instance, the military apparatus of the periphery can massacre peoples outside the sphere of capitalism, to the amusement or consternation of the metropolitans. This military resolution of the “natives problem” generates several antagonisms in turn; consider the recent Brazilian apparatus’s policy of extermination directed toward the indigenous peoples of the Amazon basin, or the current Guatemalan apparatus’s genocidal policy towards the indigenous peoples there.

Where the interests of metropolitan and national bourgeoisie are conflictive, it is unlikely that the peripheral military apparatus will remain unitary. Recall the fate of the Argentine junta after the Malvinas (Falklands) conflict. As Michel Martin has stressed, such an apparatus is characterized by “fissiparté”—the tendency to split.<sup>16</sup> Internal struggles in a peripheral military apparatus tend to further metropolitan interests because of its technological dependency. Thus only exceptionally will the military apparatus serve interests

other than metropolitan. Hence the rise of the “praetorian soldier,” who is the personification of the servitude of the military apparatus to the metropolitan state and the interests it represents. A prime example was Field Marshal Idi Amin’s regime which was supplied by Britain with liquor and other luxury goods for his officer corps, shipped in regular weekly flights from London to Entebbe until well into 1979, a few months before the Tanzanian invasion which toppled the “Conqueror of the British Empire” and his “Kleptocracy.”<sup>17</sup> Little wonder, then, as William Thompson estimates, less than 10 percent of all coup makers have *social reform* as a primary motive (1973, 44–45). If reform is not their interest, what motivates the praetorian? Almost as an aside, Perlmutter corroborates that “political involvement of the [praetorian] officers may also be abetted by foreign intervention, such as the United States counterinsurgency training and military aid” (1977, 103). James Dickinson has commented (in a personal communication) that “other institutional connections to the metropole include, of course, the CIA role in teaching the military how to conduct a coup, since presumably military training does not include how to overthrow civilian (or military) governments.

By stressing the distinction between “historical” and “modern” authoritarianism, and between “historical” and “modern” praetorianism, Perlmutter pays lip service to his “conceptual framework of comparative history” while obscuring that praetorianism is essentially the promotion of imperialism, the imperial dynasty, the imperial rather than national interests. Thus the military *apparatchik* is indeed “Janus-faced,” as Perlmutter is fond of pointing out. One important if overlooked aspect of this duality is the unity in opposition of the “professional” and the “praetorian” soldier, the duality of the bureaucratic routine and the charismatic coup. Neither element of this duality is primary vis-à-vis the other; both are secondary to one other, which as we have seen is capitalism in its various forms.

What supersedes this dialectic of the professional/praetorian military apparatus of the capitalist society of the periphery? No form of military coup alone will suffice, not even the so-called “progressive coup,” because this continues the dialectic. The facility with which Nasser’s “progressive” regime became Sadat’s comprador regime is a case in point. Perlmutter presents some evidence that coups in the Middle East have been “more durable and

sustaining” when the army acts in concert with a political party. But what “endures,” what is “sustained,” is purely formal; it has no necessary content (Perlmutter 1977, 165; compare his 1981, 133–34). Clearly, what supersedes the dialectic of the professional/prætorian military apparatus is the elimination of the apparatus itself, which eliminates the basis of the “man on horseback.” There are two alternatives here.

The military apparatus is eliminated—or, more properly speaking, is dialectically *sublated*, a process which at once supersedes and preserves—either from within or from without. From within, the establishment of political cadres in each military unit representing the progressive political party subordinates the military apparatus to the state. From without, the success in civil war—truly a war of national liberation—of an egalitarian “peoples’ army” vis-à-vis the military apparatus will ensure the sublation of the apparatus. Let us attend to each of these alternatives.

The radical encadrement of the military apparatus tends to emerge in the revolutionary rupture of the metropolitan capitalist order. Under these conditions, the structure of the military’s contradictory relations cannot simply be reduced to its antagonistic relationship to the domestic masses. Given more complexly contradictory relations, the possibility is enhanced of progressive forces emerging within the officer corps itself. This is particularly likely given defeat in imperialist war, which brings other antagonisms to the fore. These progressive forces become the officer corps of the “new army,” always under the tutelage of the political cadres. An example of this is the Red Army following the October Revolution of 1917. What about the other alternative?

The replacement of the military apparatus in toto tends to emerge in the revolutionary rupture of the capitalist order in the periphery. The primacy of the military apparatus’s antagonism towards the toiling masses conjoined with its metropolitan subservience if not outright loyalty, necessitates the liquidation of the officer corps, mercenaries, and career soldiery. The absence of an “external threat,” the irrelevance of “defense,” permit such a liquidation. Remaining conscripts, unofficered as they have thus become, can then be demobilized or else be absorbed into the successful peoples’ army. Examples of this are the struggle of the Viet Minh and the Liberation Armed Forces peoples’ armies against “Emperor” Bao Dai’s comprador apparatus and ARVN, and the struggle of the Sandinista

National Liberation Front peoples' army against the Somocistan "Nicaraguan National Guard," a creature of the United States. Both the "new soldier" of the radically encadred military apparatus and the guerrilla of the peoples' army are considered revolutionary soldiers.

The first appearance of such a revolutionary soldiery followed the Jacobin levée of 1792–93.<sup>18</sup> This was both a politically encadred army and a "peoples' army." Its anticapitalism was ill-defined due to the immaturity and progressive tenor of France's capitalism, although Babeuf and a few other visionaries saw beyond this. The revolutionary wars toppled the *ancien régime* in the Rhineland as well as the Oriental despotism in Egypt, and occasioned the overthrow of settler colonialism and slavery in Santo Domingo. The same revolutionary wars led, tortuously and only after their messianic movement in Europe was stilled, to the insurrection in Buenos Aires and the national liberation of Latin America.

While Napoleon Bonaparte was willing to use the vast manpower embodied in these revolutionary armies, he bureaucratized them, thus ensuring their compatibility with the developing capitalism. Napoleon, it must be recalled, was an officer from the artillery corps, and always preferred massed artillery barrages to masses of soldiers. Only by grossly overstating the significance of evidence such as the youthful Bonaparte's 1794 publication *Souper de Beaucaire*, which is more a reflection of the progressive era than a genuine tendency in Bonaparte's opportunism, can he be represented as a revolutionary (Soboul 1974, 610).

A second appearance of the revolutionary soldiery followed the Prussian defeat of Bonaparte III at Sedan on September 2, 1870. The collapse of the Second Empire led to the proclamation of the Republic on September 4 and the popular defense of besieged Paris against the Prussians. Confronted by the treachery of President Adolphe Thiers and General Louis Trochu on behalf of French capitalists and Bismark's forces, the Parisian working people declared the world-historic Commune de Paris in March 1871. The draft and the standing army were immediately abolished, replaced by the Garde nationale (the Republican Federation of the National Guard), constituted of all able-bodied Parisian citizens. "Armed Paris" held out against the traitorous Thiers in Versailles until the end of May. Finally, some 40,000 Communard men, women, and children, by then disarmed, were massacred by the erstwhile Bonapartist troops,

Prussian prisoners of war released to Thiers by Bismark (compare Jellinek 1965). The forms of military organization established in 1871 became influential models for the later Russian revolutionary forces.

Having discussed the forms of control over the military forces in a country subsequent to a revolutionary rupture with capitalism, we now return to the topic of the essential characteristics of the military apparatus within the various social formations of capitalism.

### ***The military apparatus and social reproduction***

Let us briefly consider the catastrophic failure (mentioned at the onset) of the ideology which informed the imperialist establishment's dependence upon military regimes for "development." That ideological failure has necessitated the current "revisionism." By the early sixties, Huntington had proposed a typology of the officer corps which distinguished career versus non-career officers on the one hand, and the management of violence versus "non-military skills" on the other hand. In the era of national liberation movements, the "violence managers" would "stabilize" an "emerging nation" while development would be facilitated by those with "non-military skills." Indeed an entire doctrine of "civil action" conjoined with "counter-insurgency" activities of the military apparatus began to emerge in these terms (compare Huntington 1963, 785–86; Glick 1966). This doctrine failed on at least two counts: it overestimated the numbers and roles of those members of the officer corps possessing "non-military skills" and more importantly it overlooked the common situation that the officer corps had with other occupations, whatever the career aspirations and skill types of its officers. As Perlmutter, Huntington, and others have noted, the military *apparatchik* is a bureaucratized professional. Hence we will focus our attention there.

First, we should point out Perlmutter's excessive dependence upon the Weberian theory of bureaucracy. As far as the domestic police activities of the military apparatus are concerned, Michael Buren has noted the inappropriateness of Weber's analysis, embodying as it does "unquestioned assumptions based on the bureaucratic ethic of business organizations." As far as external military activities are concerned, Janowitz and Little have emphasized that "the combat soldier is hardly the model of Max Weber's ideal bureaucrat following rigid rules and regulations."<sup>19</sup> Since Weber's time—and we should

recall he died in 1920—the conception of the military apparatus has been radically revised by the recognition of the role of the “informal group,” a distinctly non-Weberian conception (compare Stouffer 1949, 130–32). Hence Weber’s ideal-typical theory is questionable pertinence to the topic at hand.

Second, this Weberian conception is ahistorical, assuming as Weber did that the monocratic bureaucracy was the terminus of organizational development (Weber 1978, 987–89). A more historical understanding than Weber’s would have recognized that the Prussian “legal-rational” bureaucracy emerged from the bourgeois struggle against nepotism and other dynastic tendencies of feudal-Junkerdom, i.e. under specific historical and material conditions.

Third, this Weberian conception is part of a mechanistic ideology reflecting the emergence of the high and extensive division of industrial labor in detail under competitive—and then finance—capitalism. It is thus not surprising that it is the contemporaries, Weber and Frederick Taylor—who are identified as the luminaries of the “classical” school of organization theory, viewing people as mechanically functioning at their tasks.<sup>20</sup> Moreover, the social and historical ground of this “school”—the mechanical nature of its ideological reflection—has been fully demonstrated (compare Sohn-Rethel 1978, part 3).

Finally, the wholesale importation into the discussions of the Arab nation of the Weberian particularities—which after all reflect a national-chauvinism obsessed about the survival of the Wilhelmine Reich, caught as it was geopolitically between the British and the czarist Russian Empires—is a hypostatization of the first order. These particularities may be germane to Zionist apologetics—for which Perlmutter is well known—but hardly to the general problem of the relationship of the military apparatus to the various metropolitan and peripheral formations of capitalist society.

By contrast, let us now examine the concrete types of reproductive occupations in bourgeois society as they are characterized in classical social theory. The domain of social activity—of *praxis*—is partitioned, in classical social theory, into *productive* activities and *reproductive* activities (for previous discussions of these topics see Welty 1978; Marx 1963, 288). The former activities are productive of surplus value; the latter, whether or not necessary for the production of such value, are activities which are *not* directly productive of such value. Perlmutter, perhaps unwittingly, acknowledges that the military

officer is a “nonproducer” (Perlmutter 1977, 36). But this should not be taken to mean that the military apparatus does not engage in reproductive activities. These reproductive activities are *formally* nonproductive and tend *substantively* to be reproductive of the working class and class relations.

It is evident that the military apparatus, when acting domestically—its activities ranging from police functions up to the conduct of civil war—is both formally and substantively engaging in reproductive activity.<sup>21</sup> When acting externally to the state-entity, however, the military apparatus neither directly nor substantively engages in reproductive activity. Its activity is instead reflected: we will consider in turn its action in imperialist adventures vis-à-vis the periphery, and then its action in interimperialist wars.

First, consider imperialist adventurism. These activities of the military apparatus, even though external to the imperialist state, are nonetheless reflected back into the substantive reproduction of domestic class relations through the subsequent transfer of imperialist superprofits. Some “third roaders,” romantic populists, etc. have supposed that these superprofits serve the interests of the entire metropolitan working class, or the white portion of the working class, rather than—as Lenin took pains to argue—those of the imperialists and a limited “labor aristocracy.” These romantic suppositions are oblivious to the distributional issues which such a transfer implies (compare, for example, Amin 1977, 77–78). Until the institutional forms of such transfers to the entire working class (or the white portion of the working class) have been explicated and demonstrated, we must conclude with Lenin that the recipients of superprofits are limited to the capitalists and their labor lieutenants (Lenin 1968, 22:276–78). This serves to enhance class relations in the metropole.

Moreover, these imperialist adventures secure strategic raw materials and cheap means of subsistence for the metropole. Both these aspects—the necessity of exporting capital to secure imperialist superprofits and the necessity of controlling the supply of raw materials—must be taken as two sides of a dialectical unity. Lenin, for instance, stressed the former and noted the latter aspect, while Bukharin, writing under Lenin’s tutelage, noted the former and stressed the latter aspect (Lenin 1968, 22:240–42, 260–61; Bukharin 1929, 40–46 and chap. 6; also Cohen 1973, 25–27). Bukharin explicitly rejected Karl Kautsky’s thesis that imperialism was solely the metropolitan tendency to expand into agrarian countries in order to

acquire control over raw material sources (Luxemburg and Bukharin 1972, 254).

By lowering the value of these agricultural and other raw materials, of course, the socially necessary labor time for the metropolitan production of any other commodity tends to be lowered as well, while the “standard of living” of the metropolitan working class remains constant. For example, the world-wide rise in petroleum prices since 1973, led by Venezuelan and Indonesian pricing decisions, has raised socially necessary labor time and lowered the “standard of living” of the metropolitan working class. Thus the external activity of the military apparatus, in its reflection, serves the substantive reproduction of the working class and enhances class relations in the metropole.

Next, consider inter-imperialist wars. These military activities of any two imperialist states will tend to be internal to (at least) one of the states. In that abstract sense, the activities of the military apparatus are *not* external to the imperialist state. “Enlist now; defend the fatherland!” This is the ground of social chauvinism, whereby the activities of the military apparatus become directly constitutive of the working class, not only in the sphere of ideology but in class struggle as well<sup>22</sup>

At another level, imperialist war decimates the metropolitan working class, and particularly part of the natural leadership stratum of that class.<sup>23</sup> This cripples that generation in its subsequent domestic class struggles.

Moreover, the “victorious” nations of imperialist wars show a higher birthrate after the cessation of hostilities than do the “vanquished” nations (Ulanis 1971, 255–60). This domesticates and places additional burdens upon the working class of the “victorious” nation. All these facilitate the postwar reestablishment of exploitative relations; thus the reflection of interimperialist military activity substantively reproduces the metropolitan working class and the class relations.

Now that we have established that the activities of the military apparatus are included within the domain of social reproduction, we can consider the nature of bourgeois control of that apparatus. The issue of control involves questions of social interests and societal needs. In whose interests is control exercised? What societal needs does the control address?

***Bourgeois control of the military apparatus***

The domain of reproductive activity as defined above includes both implicit and explicit institutions. The “family” is the implicit institution, subordinate to other institutions and organizations in civil society (compare Welty 1978, 9).

Of the explicit institutions of reproductive activity (including the military apparatus), either (a) members of the working class and the toiling masses perceive themselves as needing the services which these activities constitute, or (b) they perceive themselves *not* to need those activities. In the first case, members of the working class and the toiling masses voluntarily seek the services that are available, and those activities themselves are either (a’) simply regulated (by “second order,” as it were, bourgeois institutions—the entrepreneurial professional school and the licensing board, etc. such as the occupation of dentistry)<sup>24</sup> or else (a’’) they are unregulated (such as the occupation of coppersmith) or they are only adventitiously licensed (such as the occupation of rainmaker). As we have noted elsewhere, the uniform extension of licensing of occupations such as physicians and optometrists, and the variable extension of licensing of other occupations such as taxidermists and phrenologists is a criterion of the qualitative distinction between “professions” versus “licensed occupations” as conventionally construed within a given social formation (Welty 1978, 12). The object of regulation for any occupation in this case is the *form* rather than the *content* of the activity.

In the second case (b), where the members of the working class and the toiling masses do not perceive themselves to need the activities, these activities are *coercively* administered and bureaucratically controlled, whether or not they are also regulated by licensing boards (Welty 1978, 10). In this case, the object of bourgeois control is the *content* of the reproductive activity.

All of these distinctions of forms of bourgeois control within the domain of reproductive activity can be displayed in Figure 2.

Several characteristics of those reproductive activities which are bureaucratically controlled deserve our careful attention, since they pertain directly to the military apparatus. As we mentioned above, the relationships of the military apparatus mediated through the state are multiply contradictory. One of these is the relationship of the military professional to (his) clientele. Coercion, as an aspect of the




FIGURE 2

*internal relation* of professional to client, is in essence an antagonistic relationship. Another of these is the bureaucratic relationship of the military professional to the state apparatus. Bureaucratic control, as an aspect of the *exterior relation* of the professional to the state, is a contradiction in the “autonomy” (agency) of that reproductive activity. Thus those reproductive activities (such as those of the military apparatus) which are both professionalized (through professional schooling and commissioning) and bureaucratized—are both subjectively (personally) and objectively (organizationally) *stressful* (Welty 1978, 10–11; also Kahn 1964). How can this potentially disabling stress be moderated?

Particularly, the *balkanization* of an occupation of reproductive

labor resolves some of the subjective and objective contradictions of both the internal and exterior relationships of bureaucratized professions (Welty 1978, 11). These occupational contradictions come to be sublated by the “basic” contradictions which dominate the racist, sexist, or national chauvinist society. This balkanizes the bureaucratized profession whereby the occupational antagonism becomes a “non-basic” contradiction. (On these categories of contradiction, see Afanasyev 1980, 89–90.) For example, the “client” can be clearly identified with the regime rather than the people (which is the object of coercion), through ethnically particular recruitment of the officer corps.

Let us consider briefly an instance of balkanization, the development of *age chauvinism* in the military apparatus. The possibility always exists that the progressive forces of an antagonistic society, perhaps by infiltrating the military apparatus itself, will mobilize the soldiery to revolt against the imperialist or neocolonialist state (compare Chorley 1973). On the one side, these progressive forces will have tactics and strategies to unify recruits or even some career soldiers with the masses (Lenin 1968, 41:204–7). On the other side, the apparatus will develop counter-tactics and counter-strategies to maintain military discipline and control in the ranks.<sup>25</sup>

These reactionary strategies and tactics are practiced in the face of the multiply contradictory and demoralizing demands placed upon the soldiery by the “professional autonomy” of the modern military apparatus on the one side and the bureaucratic demands for “shooting automata” on the other side.<sup>26</sup> One of these reactionary strategies is that of enhancing age chauvinism which Karl Leibknecht defines as “artificially introducing by every means the distinction of class according to age” so as to diminish the unity of the soldiery with the toiling masses. Youth are structurally vulnerable to this manipulation because they are immanently leaving their parents’ homes, and do not yet have their own homes and families. Old social bonds are weakening; new bonds are yet to be established. Thereby youth from the working class and the toiling masses practice military violence against their own people and become “murderers of their own comrades and friends, of their parents, brothers, sisters, etc.”<sup>27</sup>

This kind of balkanization, as well as all the others dictated by the complexly and multiply contradictory relationship of the military apparatus to the various formations of capitalist society, must be

studied in depth. Such studies are not conceptualized, let alone undertaken, in Perlmutter's theorizing. Indeed, the facile rationalization of "establishment" social science precludes such study.

### *Conclusion of the critique*

There are several ironic twists to Perlmutter's theorizing. As one illustration, rather than recognizing that Israel and South Africa are approximated in Harold Lasswell's conception of the "Garrison State," Perlmutter takes great pains to debunk that analysis (Lasswell 1941; Lasswell 1962; Al-Qazzaz 1973, 144–46). Instead, Perlmutter follows David Ben-Gurion in proclaiming that the Zionist colony actualizes the polis of Hellenic thought (Perlmutter 1977, 251; Perlmutter 1970, 51). This must be the apex of the ahistoricity of bourgeois thought... until we recall that the polis was based upon the slave labor of "barbarians," captured in war.

In our reexamination of Perlmutter's theory of military professionalism and the praetorian state, we have uncovered several major and debilitating problems. These include his typology of nation-states, which most interestingly omits both multinational states and corporate states.<sup>28</sup> Perlmutter's analysis of settler colonialism is remarkably ahistorical and tendentious, blithely associating the colonization in the United States with the Zionist colony in Palestine, as well as overlooking the colonization of South Africa and Namibia, etc. Further problems include the nature of the relationship between the nation-state and the military apparatus. Perlmutter "explains" only successful military coups, and the conjuncture of social forces which precipitate a coup—whether successful or not—remains obscured; of course the etiology can be cloaked, masked if the event is agreeable. Finally, Perlmutter's typology of "professional," "praetorian," and "revolutionary" soldiers depends extensively and uncritically upon the Parsonsian and (even more so) the Weberian doctrines of professions and organizations. The relevance of these doctrines is questionable, and the inter-relationships of the three types of soldier are not scientifically developed in Perlmutter's theory. All of this leads us to the conclusion, to emend Huntington's encomium somewhat, "few scholars will accept Professor Perlmutter's argument.

*Department of Sociology  
Wright State University*

NOTES

1. This is, of course, Auguste Comte's program (compare Comte 1839, 450–52). The methodological issue is that Perlmutter's "framework of social science" is implicitly *ahistorical* as his "framework of comparative history" is implicitly *unscientific*. Hence the explicit amalgam of the two frameworks will be jointly ahistorical and unscientific (i.e., neither exhaustive nor uniquely inclusive in its categories).
2. Alternatively, see the differentiation of the metropolitan states in Lenin (1968, 39:202).]
3. For some of the themes of this transformation, see William A. Williams (1969).
4. See Welty (1984). Perlmutter alludes to fascism—"a much maligned concept"—in the Middle East in (1981, 108), but he limits himself to "Arab areas."
5. On "center" and "periphery," see Dickinson (1983, 26–27); on "atomism," see Marx and Engels (1975, 4:418–43); on "protectorates," see Lenin (1968, 22:263–64). It is surely worth mentioning that Marx himself had sketched his conception of the praetorian state in an 1858 article in the *New York Daily Tribune* (compare Marx and Engels 1975, 15:464–67). After the Revolution of 1789, French ruling classes had frequently depended upon the armed forces to ensure their domination. Ultimately the inability of bourgeois democracy to correlate privatized interests with general interest—of the class, let alone the society—led to the breakdown of the political order: the 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte. Under Napoleon III, then, the armed forces *became* the ruling class: this was to "represent the State in antagonism to the society" (ibid, 465).
6. See Welty (1984, 63–64). This is the dialectical complement to Lenin's differentiation of the metropolitan states; see note 2 (above).
7. This is the theme of Dutt (1935). Vertical integration was not confined to the organization of means of production and the labor force alone; for the means of communication and the mass audience, see Benjamin (1969, 244, note 8) on the passing of the silent motion picture and the rise of the radical

pluralism of fascism.

8. Perlmutter (1981, 124–26, 156–57). Furthermore, since “authoritarian systems should be analyzed along a continuum” (1981, 8), this is a developmental continuum. Arab and North African regimes are praetorian, while Latin American regimes are corporatist (see 1981, 124, 130–32).
9. Perlmutter (1981, 41). Furthermore, “the military is obviously the locus of power in the praetorian state” (1981, 41; compare 1981, 132).
10. Moreover, the dichotomy of “stable” versus “unstable” has little explanatory value in its own right; see Yough and Sigelman (1976).]
11. Perlmutter (1977, 100; see also 1981, 129): “Praetorianism occurs when the military elite, or a segment of it, seeks to maximize its political influence in the absence of a serious political and structural rival and an effective elite organization.”
12. On the tautological nature of much of these “sufficient explanations,” see Rudé (1964, 266–68). This absence of illumination is hardly alleviated by invoking an “urge to power” as does Lissak (1973, 71).
13. Perlmutter (1979, 24, 10, and 10–11). Strictly speaking, of course, the “modern professional military organization” cannot be said to “emulate” something which it *preceded*, it perhaps goes without saying that “corporate” here is to be distinguished from “corporatist.”
14. See Nordlinger (1970). Perlmutter in fact argues that this is the case, but only for Latin American “corporatism” (1981, 151–52).
15. Johnson (1958); also Nun (1967). Perlmutter concedes that for the military apparatus on the periphery “new professionalism responds primarily to problems of internal security” (see 1981, 123).
16. Martin (1973); see also Gregory Bateson’s (1936) discussion of the processes of “schismogenesis.”
17. The latter term is Stanislaw Andreski’s characterization of a “government of thieves”; see his (1968, 110–33).]
18. Soboul (1974, Pt. 2). Thus the “emergence of mass armies” is categorically *not* the “Napoleonic innovation” proposed by Perlmutter (1977, 30).
19. Buren (1975, 229–30); Janowitz and Little (1965, 42). The

disposition of the perpetrators and abettors of the My Lai massacre of March 1968 (compare Peers 1979), the Operation Litani massacre of March 1978 [cf. "Operation Litani" *Jerusalem Post*, no. 967 (May 1979)], the Sabra and Shatila massacres of September 1982 [cf. Kapeliouk (1982) and *The Beirut Massacre*, New York: Claremont Research and Publications (1982)], and similar military "excesses" against unarmed civilians, is strong evidence on behalf of both the scientific inappropriateness of Weber's doctrine, and the officer corps' recognition in practice of this inappropriateness.

20. Cf. Roberts (1974, 504). The "division of labor" between Weber and Taylor was less developed than one might expect. Weber, for instance, did not limit himself to the organization of "mental labor" alone; see his "*Psychophysik der Industriellen Arbeit*" (1924).]
21. Welty (1975, 253–55); much of the immediately following pertains to the foreign service officer as an occupation of reproductive activity as well.
22. Lenin (1968, 21:15–17); symptomatic is Bernstein (1961, 169–71); see also Lewis Richardson's (1946) discussion of "the doctrine of mutuality."
23. Willis (1975); also see Lutterman, Russell and Zeitlin's research on combat deaths of U.S. servicemen in Vietnam, reported in M. Zeitlin (1970, 174–5). We have benefited from our discussions with Jim Russell on this topic.
24. It should not be supposed that entrepreneurial organization is necessary for *any* reproductive occupation; see, for instance, Blendon (1979, 1457–8)
25. The observations in Weber's address to the Officer Corps of the Austro-Hungarian Royal Imperial Army can be taken as illustrative; see Eldridge (1971, 191–93). History has proved Weber quite nearsighted here.].
26. The term is Karl Leibknecht's (1972, 24). He was presumably following Dugald Stewart's characterization of workers under capitalism as "living automatons" (Stewart 1855, 318).
27. Leibknecht (1972, 20, 25–27). For phenomenological insight into the relationship of age chauvinism to fascism, cf. Adorno (1969, chap. 17, especially 691). Perlmutter almost attains these insights in his discussion of the Nazi youth culture (1981, 99–101, 110).

28. Perlmutter (1977, 27, 184) does in passing mention “the twentieth-century totalitarian nation-state” and “fascism” which stood for “modernism and revolution.”

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**REPLACES AD PAGE.**

# **Limiting Racist Speech in the United States vs. “Freedom” of Speech: A Marxist View of the Apparent Constitutional Dilemma**

**Doris Brin Walker**

## *The context*

Marxists in the United States generally recognize their special obligation to be in the forefront of the fight against racist speech and organizations; an integral part of their Marxist thinking includes the centrality of the fight against racism in the building of domestic and international working-class unity and effective class struggle. Reaganism has substantially exacerbated the racism endemic in the United States, founded on Black slavery and explicit in the original Constitution (prior to adoption after the Civil War of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments). Supreme Court Justice Thurgood Marshall recently rated Reagan “at the bottom” of U.S. presidents as to racial justice; that rating is reflected in the atmosphere which made possible, for just one example, the crimes of Bernhard Goetz (the subway vigilante who shot four Black youths who had not attacked him) and the refusal by the jury at his trial, and by a substantial section of the U.S. public, to condemn those crimes.

“Freedom of speech” in the United States must be viewed in the context of U. S. history and culture. These include the circumstances of the adoption of the Bill of Rights as the first ten amendments to the U.S. Constitution and the development of news as a commodity, whose sale and distribution is dominated by the Western capitalist countries, especially by the United States.

Before authorizing adoption of the U.S. Constitution, the new

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citizens of the new democracy extracted from their leaders a firm commitment to early adoption of the Bill of Rights, consisting of the first ten amendments to the Constitution. Based on colonial experience, they had a profound distrust of government, hence their demand for safeguards including freedom of speech, press, and association. But to impose the eighteenth-century perceptions of government oppression on newly liberated peoples of the twentieth century is to assume that these peoples need and want the eighteenth-century kinds of protection from their own recently formed states. Too often, it is externally caused subversion and destabilization from which they really need and want protection.

Thus, “freedom of speech” in developing and underdeveloped countries in Africa, Asia, Latin America must be viewed in the context of what is happening within those countries and between them and the Western capitalist countries. The peoples of those countries are demanding the right to receive information relevant to their problems and aspirations, and the right to distribute accurate information about them, all in the context of their own history and culture.

### *Statement of theses*

From time to time some U.S. Marxists propose new statutes to outlaw expressions of racism and white-supremacist organizations.<sup>1</sup> Writings of both Engels and Lenin lead to twin conclusions about such proposals to outlaw racist speech.

(1) In fighting racist speech and organizations Marxists should use to the utmost all tools made available by the bourgeois-democratic state. These tools include demonstrations, boycotts, leaflets and other publications, elections, and lawsuits based on existing statutes. Lawsuits can include more than individual suits to redress wrongs caused by racial discrimination; also possible are *mandamus* actions seeking court orders mandating prosecutors to enforce existing applicable statutes, injunction actions to try to stop government interference with First Amendment rights, and even intervention as *amici curiae* (friends of the court) on the side of the prosecution when defendants are racists charged with violating an existing applicable statute. Also useful are existing and proposed statutes which increase the penalty for “hate crimes,” violent crimes which are proven to have been motivated by racial (or religious

sexual, or ethnic) prejudice. Examples include California Penal Code Section 422.6.<sup>2</sup>

Also of great importance would be mass pressure for enforcement of the recently enacted statute implementing the U.N. Convention on Genocide. This carefully drafted statute, derived directly from the Convention, is explicitly directed against certain genocidal speech, as well as against genocidal actions. The new statute is quoted and discussed below.

(2) Marxists should be very careful to insure that any such proposed new statute directed against racists does not undermine the historical rationale for the bourgeois-democratic rights of free speech, press, and assembly, and so lead to a ruling-class rationale for outlawing the speech and the groups which it hates, such as Marxist organizations and their publications.<sup>3</sup>

### ***Argument***

*1. The legal, theoretical, historical, and practical context in which such proposals should be viewed.*

The First Amendment to the United States Constitution reads as follows:

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.

The Fourteenth Amendment has been held by the Supreme Court to make the First Amendment applicable to the fifty states and their various public entities, e.g., counties and cities, and presumably, to the so-called "Commonwealth" of Puerto Rico.

There have been proposals by U. S. Marxists to enact anti-Ku Klux Klan statutes which appear to be in derogation of the commands embodied in the language of the First Amendment. These proposals have generally not analyzed, and often have not even acknowledged, the First Amendment problem inherent in them. There has been little analysis and discussion of the problem in Marxist circles.

On a theoretical level, such proposals ignore the Marxist analysis of the role of the state; they ignore the profound difference in the significance of enactment of such state-enforced statutes in a socialist country and in the United States. This proposition, basic to my second

thesis concerning preservation of First Amendment rights, I will expound in section 3 below

On a historical level, such proposals ignore the fact that in the United States statutory limitations on speech and association have been used by the state repeatedly against leftists in general and Marxists in particular.

On an organizational level, such proposals have not, so far, succeeded in mobilizing anything approaching a nationwide mass campaign. At best, the proposals have supplied a rallying cry against specific outrages in various localities. At worst, the proposals produce illusions about the role of the capitalist state and the conditions under which that state can be forced by the people to take meaningful steps to combat racism.

On a pragmatic level, such proposals have ignored the frequent and widespread failure in the United States to enforce applicable statutes, such as the laws against rape, murder, assault, battery, trespass, vandalism, certain kinds of threats,<sup>4</sup> and discrimination in jobs, housing, etc. on account of race or sex; the failure to use in the courts applicable provisions of the United Nations Charter;<sup>5</sup> and the failure of Congress until November 1988 to enact implementing legislation to put into effect the U.N. Convention on Genocide.

## *2. Implementing the Genocide Convention*

The U.N. Convention on Genocide has been adopted by many nations. The well-known 1951 polemic/petition of Black citizens, "We Charge Genocide," addressed to the United Nations (written by U.S. Communist Party leader and lawyer William L. Patterson) brought the Genocide Convention its first wide public recognition, especially in the United States. The Convention was approved by the U.S. Senate early in 1986, but with a limitation that it not be formally ratified as a binding treaty until both houses of Congress enact a statute making genocidal conduct criminal under U.S. law. As noted, such enactment finally took place on 4 November 1988.

The Genocide Convention Implementation Act of 1987 (the Proxmire Act) (18 United States Code, Sections 1091–1093) defines "genocide" substantially as it is defined in Article II of the U.N. Convention. It reads as follows:

1091. *Genocide*

- (a) *Basic offense* – Whoever, whether in time of peace or in time of war, in a circumstance described in subsection (d) and with the specific intent to destroy, in whole or in substantial part, a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group as such –
- (1) kills members of that group;
  - (2) causes serious bodily injury to members of that group;
  - (3) causes the permanent impairment of mental faculties of members of the group through drugs, torture, similar techniques;
  - (4) subjects the group to conditions of life that are intended to cause the physical destruction of the group in whole or in part;
  - (5) imposes measures intended to prevent births within the group; or
  - (6) transfers by force children of the group to another group; or attempts to do so, shall be punished as provided in subsection (b).
- (b) *Punishment for basic offense* – The punishment for an offense under subsection (a) is –
- (1) in the case of an offense under subsection (a)(1), a fine of not more than \$1,000,000 and imprisonment for life; and
  - (2) a fine of not more than \$1,000,000 or imprisonment for not more than twenty years, or both, in any other case.[
- (c) *Incitement offense* – Whoever in a circumstance described in subsection (d) directly and publicly incites another to violate subsection (a) shall be fined not more than \$500,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
- (d) *Required circumstance for offenses* – The circumstance referred to in subsections (a) and (c) is that –
- (1) the offense is committed within the United States; or
  - (2) the alleged offender is a national of the United States (as defined in section 101 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101)).

(e) *Nonapplicability of certain limitations* – Notwithstanding section 3282 of this title, in the case of an offense under subsection (a)(1), an indictment may be found, or information instituted, at any time without limitation.

1092. *Exclusive remedies*

Nothing in this chapter shall be construed as precluding the application of State or local laws to the conduct proscribed +by this chapter, nor shall anything in this chapter be construed +as creating any substantive or procedural right enforceable by law by any party in any proceeding.[

1093. *Definitions*

As used in this chapter –

- (1) the term “children” means the plural and means individuals who have not attained the age of eighteen years;
- (2) the term “ethnic group” means a set of individuals whose identity as such is distinctive in terms of common cultural traditions or heritage;
- (3) the term “incites” means urges another to engage imminently in conduct in circumstances under which there is a substantial likelihood of imminently causing such conduct;
- (4) the term “members” means the plural;
- (5) the term “national group” means a set of individuals whose identity as such is distinctive in terms of nationality or national origins;
- (6) the term “racial group” means a set of individuals whose identity as such is distinctive in terms of physical characteristics or biological descent;
- (7) the term “religious group” means a set of individuals whose identity as such is distinctive in terms of common religious creed, beliefs, doctrines, practices, or rituals; and
- (8) the term “substantial part” means a part of a group of such numerical significance that the destruction or loss of that part would cause the destruction of the group as a viable entity within the nation of which such group is a part.

The Genocide statute now gives the people of the United States, including Marxists, a promising opportunity to organize and fight for

enforcement. Indeed, if enforced, the statute would “Ban the Klan” as an effective racist organization. The statute’s definition of genocide is narrowly drawn, specific and explicit as to its application. Given its international origin and the international recognition of the meaning of its language, it affords substantial protection against any effort to use it as a rationale for enactment of legislation abridging First Amendment rights, including those of Marxists.

Especially significant is the language of 18 U.S.C. Section 1091(c) (taken from Article III(c) of the Convention), which subjects to heavy punishment a person who “directly and publicly incites another” to commit genocide. A helpful analogy, in the “free speech” context is the familiar proscription (first elucidated by Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes) against falsely “crying ‘Fire!’ in a crowded theater.” It is, of course, permitted to cry “Fire!” if the theater is, in fact, on fire. The proscription is against a *false* cry of “Fire!” which is very likely to cause panic and violence in the rush for the exit. That false panic-causing cry is comparable to “direct and public incitement.” It is not speech protected by the First Amendment.

A mass campaign for the U.S. attorney general to enforce the statute is practicable; the popular basis for such a campaign already exists. Domestic and international moral pressure brought the Senate’s approval of the Convention and the enactment of the implementing legislation. Greatly intensified pressure can push the attorney general to enforce the law, giving the people a new, additional and powerful weapon in the fight against racism and against the fascist tendencies racism promotes.

*3. The importance of fighting to preserve First Amendment rights: the significance of bourgeois-democratic rights in a bourgeois democratic state.*

Lenin, frequently citing Engels, commented at length on the bourgeois state as “a machine that enables the capitalists of those countries to maintain their power over the working class and the peasantry....The more democratic [the state] is, the cruder and more cynical is the rule of capitalism. One of the most democratic republics in the world is the United States of America, yet nowhere...is the power of capital,...over the whole of society, so crude and so openly corrupt as in America” (Lenin 1965, 484–86)<sup>6</sup>[

Engels described in 1895 the responses of European bourgeois

states to the use by Marxists of propaganda and parliamentary elections and other bourgeois-democratic rights to educate the masses, which the Marxists were doing “with a success which drives the enemy to despair” (Engels 1933, 187)<sup>7</sup> “[In their despair] the parties of order...cannot live without breaking the law...[without] breach of the constitution, dictatorship, return to absolutism.” “They make new laws against revolution.” “[They will] transform the whole penal law into india-rubber” (190).

Precisely so, in the United States today. The Constitution is ignored. Congress is ignored. The presidency is used to impose unconstitutional absolutist policies and to take flagrantly illegal actions. Laws enacted, in the words of the Preamble to the Constitution, to “establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, . . . promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty” are broken openly and with impunity,<sup>8</sup>

With respect specifically to the First Amendment, Engels’s sarcasm could not have been more prophetic. For example, consider the recent (1987) arrests and deportation charges (under the Cold War/McCarthyite McCarran-Walter Act) against legal and long-time Arab residents of the United States: that they are . . . members of an organization . . . that causes to be written, circulated, distributed, published or displayed written or printed matter advocating or teaching economic, international and governmental doctrine of world communism.” Thus, in real life, the First Amendment itself provides no effective, self-executing guarantee for freedom of speech, press, and assembly. Only by constant, full exercise of those rights and by constant struggle against all state efforts to destroy or limit them can we keep them from becoming more than mere words in the Constitution.<sup>9</sup>

The First Amendment does have special significance because it is written, a part of the first written constitution of any nation.<sup>10</sup> Because its commands are explicit, all who work to change our society benefit immeasurably. We can assemble in Marxist scholars’ conferences and express our various Marxist views under their protection. If ever we get our act together, and if the time is ripe, and we begin actually to win large numbers of people, the masses, to socialism and Marxism, the First Amendment will help to inhibit, to handicap, state repression. And it will influence the kind of socialism eventually achieved.

### **Conclusions**

Marxists in the United States today should fight for enforcement of the Genocide Convention Implementation Act.

Marxists in the United States should do nothing to undermine the authority of the First Amendment. Rather, without illusions, we should insist upon its authority, use it to the utmost and cherish it as if inviolable, as one of the apples of our eyes.

An earlier version of this paper was presented to the 1987 Marxist Scholars Conference, University of California, Berkeley, by the author and was published in *The National Lawyers Guild Practitioner*, vol. 44, no. 4 (Fall 1987).

*Attorney-at-law*  
*San Francisco*

### **NOTES**

1. The prohibition against racial, sexual, linguistic, and religious discrimination is mentioned throughout the Charter, e.g., Articles 1(3), 13(1), 76(c).

2. *California Penal Code Section 422.6*:

(a) No person, whether or not acting under color of law, shall by force or threat of force, willfully injure, intimidate or interfere with, oppress, or threaten any other person in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him or her by the Constitution or laws of this state or by the Constitution or laws of the United States because of the other person's race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, or sexual orientation.

(b) No person whether or not acting under color of law, shall knowingly deface, damage, or destroy the real or personal property of any other person for the purpose of intimidating or interfering with the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to the other person by the Constitution or laws of this state or by the Constitution or laws of the United States, because of the other person's race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, or sexual orientation.

(c) Any person convicted of violating subdivision (a) or (b) shall be punished by imprisonment in the county jail not to exceed six months, or by a fine not to exceed five thousand dollars (\$5,000), or by both the fine and imprisonment; provided, however, that no person shall be convicted of violating subdivision (a) based upon speech alone, except upon a showing that the speech itself threatened violence against a specific person or group of persons and that the defendant had the apparent ability to carry out the threat.

3. Nothing in this paper is intended to call upon Marxists to support civil-libertarian defense of racist (or sexist) speech or organizations. The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) undertakes such defense in the name of the First Amendment. I criticize the ACLU when it undertakes *affirmatively* to seek state protection (by court order or by the police) for those organizations and their hateful speech. The First Amendment is aimed explicitly at government interference with free speech and association, and it should be used to prevent such interference. The First Amendment, on its face, does not call for state action to protect racist (or sexist) speech. The National Lawyers Guild has recognized this distinction by written resolution, stating the Guild's policy never to take any action to support racist or sexist speech or organizations.

Also, this paper does not deal with ruling-class domination of the news media in the United States and throughout all of the nonsocialist world, the consequent blocking of dissemination of facts and ideas which expose and attack monopoly transnational capitalism, and the right of exploited peoples to demand a new international information order, directly and through UNESCO and other organizations.

4. *18 United States Code Section 241:*

If two or more persons conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any citizen in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or Laws of the United States, or because of his having so exercised the same; or

If two or more persons go in disguise on the highway, or on the premises of another, with intent to prevent or hinder his free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege so secured –

They shall be fined not more than \$10,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both; and if death results, they shall be subject to imprisonment for any term of years or for life.

This federal statute is a part of the so-called “Anti-Klan Act” of 1870” (it does not actually name the Ku Klux Klan), passed after the Civil War and after the adoption of the Thirteenth (abolishing slavery), Fourteenth (extending constitutional rights to all persons born or naturalized in the United States), and Fifteenth (guaranteeing the right of *all* citizens to vote) Amendments. It and other sections of that act have occasionally been used by U.S. Attorneys in prosecuting racists, and such prosecutions have occasionally been successful.

5. Under Article VI, clause 2, of the Constitution a ratified treaty is part of the supreme law of the land, of equal dignity with federal statutes. The United Nations Charter is a treaty; it came into force on 24 October 1945. Its most significant human rights clauses are articles 55 and 56. Article 55 provides:

[T]he United Nations shall promote...universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.

Article 56 provides:

All members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in cooperation with the Organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55.

The prohibition against racial, sexual, linguistic, and religious discrimination is mentioned throughout the Charter, e.g. Articles 1(3), 13(1), 76(c).

6. Pertinent writings include Engels’s *The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State* and his “Introduction” to Marx’s *The Class Struggles in France*, and Lenin’s *State and Revolution* and “Left-Wing” *Communism: An Infantile Disorder*
7. With his characteristic humor and relish Engels described the dilemma in that period of the bourgeoisie who not long before had themselves been revolutionaries and rebels:

The irony of world history turns everything upside down. We, the “revolutionaries,” the “rebels”– we are thriving

far better on legal methods than on illegal methods and revolt. The parties of order, as they call themselves, are perishing under the legal conditions created by themselves. They cry despairingly...legality is the death of us; whereas we, under this legality, get firm muscles and rosy cheeks and look like eternal life. (189)

8. It is important to recognize that the United States is far from unique in its failure (and refusal) to implement either the letter or the spirit of constitutional provisions and statutes which it finds inconvenient for some reason. All bourgeois-democratic states frequently do the same. For example, the Federal Republic of Germany has explicitly outlawed the Nazi party by name. But in the FRG the Nazis and their ideological descendants have reorganized under new names, and are growing in numbers, strength, and influence, without noticeably effective government interference.
9. In February 1989, two years after the arrests (and after this paper was written), a United States District Court held the the exchanges to be unconstitutional under the First Amendment.
10. Great Britain has no written constitution. Parliament has enacted statutes severely limiting speech and the press, most notably the notorious Official Secrets Act.

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### **On Zeleny's "On the Relation of Analytic and Dialectical Thinking"**

There are many wise pronouncements scattered throughout Jindrich Zeleny's article (*Nature, Society, and Thought*, vol. 2, no. 2 [1989]: 153–61). I agree that chance and necessity, as well as variability and invariance, form a dialectical unity, and especially that the development of dialectical materialism provides a productive alternative to the sophistry of postmodernism. But I am puzzled by Zeleny's overall thesis and direction. He ends up discussing the transcendental analytic vs. the transcendental dialectic (p. 159), which I do not at all understand, and ends with the relation between the relative and the absolute (p. 160). The essay fizzles out. Let us see why.

According to Zeleny, reality and rationality must be viewed in terms of historicity—I would add: which means motion. Second, thinking is essentially practical, historical, and sociological (p. 154). Zeleny here leaves out the most crucial ingredient of thought: abstraction, the foundation of theoretical cognition. By leaving this out, Zeleny unwittingly continues the vulgarization and distortion of the nature of subjective dialectics that began with the Stalin period.

Zeleny goes on to say that analytic thinking is based on the principle of abstract identity. Ahistorical conceptual structures are also important; they are stable, but variable, and limited in their ability to account for the qualitatively new. This is thinking in fixed categories, based on abstract identities, as exemplified in Kant's notion of alteration of accidents vis-à-vis permanence of substance (pp. 154–55). Process and development have logical and ontological priority over ahistorical structures, as exemplified in the ontology of sets. The concept of set membership is not the foundation-stone of thought; it is derivative, a moment in the flow of motion. "The fundamental form of the flow of motion is the inseparable unity and opposition of antithetic determinations" (p. 157). Analytic thinking by

itself is a form of metaphysical thinking, which posits absolutes, whereas dialectical thinking is based on the unity of opposites. However, analytic thinking is necessary, within the framework of dialectics (p. 158). This is as far as Zeleny gets before I lose him.

Let us deal with the facts of Marx's methodology. One of my personal favorite intellectual mottoes comes from Marx's general introduction to the *Grundrisse*, in which he describes his own philosophy of science: that thought proceeds from vague notions of a complex whole, to determining the decisive abstract general relations of a system under investigation, to the reconstruction of the concrete as a concept. This is essentially the process of scientific idealization rendered in other terms. It is of the essence of dialectical thought as opposed to empiricism, holism, contextualism, and sociology (un-dialectical historicism). Elsewhere, Marx remarks that the abstractions of classic political economy were not abstract enough, and that in social science the power of abstraction replaces the laboratory.

This kind of textual evidence suggests that Marx did more to Hegel's dialectic than simply turn it upside down. Anyone who takes Marx's method seriously must recognize that the complete and correct use of abstraction and theory-building is the *sine qua non* of Marxist philosophy. This is a far more sophisticated philosophical view than the simplistic declaration that the role of philosophy is to change the world rather than to describe it. Those who attach themselves only to Marx's famous thesis on Feuerbach are taking refuge in middle-class moralism and intellectual mediocrity, pragmatism, and sycophancy.

Let me add that, in contrast to empiricism, Lenin includes as part of the world-picture not only the external material world, but the cognitive process of apprehending both the material world and itself.

The role of philosophy is to stimulate the kind of thinking that gives insights into the world not often achieved by spontaneous cognition. That is how philosophy as philosophy serves as a revolutionary force and guide to action. Anyone who ignores that cannot be a Marxist philosopher.

There is nothing Marxist in Zeleny's statement that thinking is essentially practical, historical, and sociological. John Dewey would have said as much.

Zeleny continues some dubious thinking about logic. (1) Zeleny, like many others, apparently misinterprets (in my opinion) Aristotelian logic (which is, in essence, a cognitive tool for making

consistent statements) as an ontology of fixed, isolated entities. Many thinkers within and without the Marxist tradition (e.g., Korzybski, Trotsky) would superficially invalidate Aristotelian logic because the nature of change invalidates the law of identity. (2) Like many Marxists, Zeleny would seem to hold the view, always formulated vaguely, that classical logic is a limiting case of dialectical logic, the latter being a more fine-grained tool for dealing with the real world. Whatever merit there is in this line of argument is vitiated by a basic lack of understanding of the nature of abstraction, and its nadir is reached in the sloppy reasoning of John Somerville (*The Philosophy of Marxism: An Exposition*). A clearer formulation would have to incorporate modern developments in mathematical logic. (3) Zeleny's argument weaves in and out of the realms of subjective and objective dialectics, confusing the two. This is as well the essential weakness of the thinking in (1) and (2).

The redeeming aspect of Zeleny's discussion is that he seems to imply, and I would agree, that formal logic is the mediator between subjective and objective dialectics. Zeleny's article would have gone somewhere had he recognized this distinction between the two realms of dialectics and further considered the relation of the abstract to the concrete and the formal to the material.

Formal logic aims at consistency, and logical inconsistency forces us to create a more abstract picture of reality on the theoretical plane to overcome such inconsistency. Formal logic thereby enables us to sort out genuine from bogus dialectical reasoning (such as the sophistry of Korzybski and the general semanticists). It may be true that the very notion of motion is inherently contradictory. Yet the development of the calculus eventually entailed the removal of the original logical contradictions within it, a theoretical advance to which the usual scientifically illiterate Marxist contributed nothing. Ultimately it will be impossible to remove all contradictions from mathematics or from the apprehension of reality in general, yet the deepening and ever-more-abstract character of formal thought driven by the search for consistency and coherence constitutes the genius of cognition and is an essential ingredient of subjective dialectics.

The old saw that the truth is always concrete is a dangerous half-truth. The inverse is more apropos: the concrete is apprehended only through abstraction. Thought thrives on the creative tension between the formal and material, the abstract and the concrete. The distance

between the two poles, in contradistinction to the collapsing tendency of fraudulent non-Aristotelian thought, should be maximized to the utmost. The connection must not be severed as is characteristic of feudal and bourgeois thinking. The very essence of subjective dialectics is the simultaneous separation and interrelation of the abstract and the concrete. The goal of theoretical, logical thinking is the consistent mapping of abstractions onto the fluid, material, concrete world. Dialectics says this goal cannot be fully attained, yet that is the process, an inexhaustible process.

The statement that set membership is a moment in a flow of motion has an intuitive appeal but is not at all clearly thought out, since Zeleny makes no distinction between the nature of a formal system in itself and its application to the fluid material world.

Of course, change, motion (mathematically represented by the continuum) is the decisive element. There is an inherent tension between the contradictoriness of change and logical consistency, but the essentially empiricist concept of logic that sometimes passes for dialectics cannot be allowed. Too often has dialectical materialism been collapsed into historical materialism. The emasculation of subjective dialectics is the product of intellectually mediocre Marxists. Zeleny may have good instincts, but I do not know whether he is going in the same direction as I am.

Ralph Dumain[  
*Washington, D.C.*

### **Response by Jindrich Zeleny**

I agree with Ralph Dumain that abstraction is an indispensable ingredient of thought and that Marx did more to Hegel's dialectic than simply turn it upside down. I also agree with Dumain's view on how philosophy as philosophy serves as a revolutionary force and guide to action.

It seems to me, however, that Dumain misses the point of my paper. I cannot accept Dumain's criticism that my paper continues the vulgarization of subjective dialectics. Despite Dumain's critical comments, I keep believing that my paper can be considered a positive contribution to the elaboration of some aspects of subjective dialectics which have usually been ignored in the presentation of

dialectical-materialist philosophy.

In my view, both analytic and dialectical thinking use abstraction. The point of my paper is to elucidate both the difference and the relationship between the forms of abstraction used in analytic and dialectical thinking. The weakness of Dumain's comments seems to consist in the use of an undifferentiated notion of the "power of abstraction" for criticizing an attempt to differentiate between the forms of abstraction and thus provide an insight into "the complete and correct use of abstraction." Instead of amending and correcting my account of different forms of abstraction and their relationship to one another, Dumain presents his unarticulated general criticism by claiming that my position completely omits abstraction, which is not the case.

Another weak point of Dumain's criticism seems to be its attempt to embrace many themes with which my paper does not deal. I do not deny their importance, nor the wisdom of Dumain's reflections on them, but here Dumain is only presenting his own conjectures and not commenting on the actual views that I have expressed in my published writing. For example, when I speak about the historical, practical, and social nature of thought, I am not reducing logical and epistemological problems to the sociology of knowledge, as some adherents of sociological pragmatism would do. A fruitful discussion of this problem would require that account be taken of my real view on the subject as given in detail in my *Dialektik der Rationalität* (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1986).

The author of the comments invites us to deal with the facts of Marx's methodology and expresses some interesting interpretations of Marx. A detailed interpretation of "the facts of Marx's methodology" has been presented in my book *The Logic of Marx* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1980). I would appreciate having discussions about controversial interpretations, but this would require more space than available here.

I take problems in philosophy of logic to be very important in contemporary materialist dialectics. Nevertheless, I cannot answer Dumain's remarks about my "dubious thinking about logic," because they are based on conjectures and do not represent an argumentative criticism of my views on the subject as presented in elaborated form in chapter 5 of my book *Dialektik der Rationalität*, where the place of mathematical logic within the dialectical-materialist type of rationality is treated.

In sum, I have a feeling that I can do a great deal together with Ralph Dumain in reconstructing subjective dialectics and in ridding it of its vulgarization. Some substantial differences in our conceptions nevertheless remain, but these require further discussion.

## **On Doris Brin Walker's "Limiting Racist Speech"**

Having been asked to comment upon Doris Brin Walker's paper (this issue, 85–96), I happily do so all the more since I find myself in agreement with its two recommendations: that we Marxists should seek enforcement of the Genocide Convention Implementation Act and that we should not undermine the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.

I do this quite readily because the Genocide Convention is a product of the struggle against racism. Marxists have played a leading role in this effort since before the U.S. Civil War; opposition to racism is, of course, of the essence of Marxist thinking and acting. This was true from its beginning and has become increasingly urgent as the racist scourge has become more and more virulent.

Certainly, in this effort Marxists have not been alone; fortunately, many allies have always been present. Indeed, the movement against racism long antedates Marxism; it begins with the beginning of racism and its earliest and most effective opponents have been and are its immediate victims.

In this connection, it is worth observing—especially since Walker's paper gives an opposite impression—that William L. Patterson's organizing and presenting of the antigenocide volume in 1951 (for which, as well as other sins, Mr. Patterson went to prison) followed upon the 1946 Petition to the United Nations sponsored by the National Negro Congress and a similar, much expanded, effort the next year organized by Dr. Du Bois on behalf of the NAACP. In all three cases it was U.S. opposition within the United Nations which kept these antiracist manifestoes from implementation.

Occasionally, I find in the paper what I think are mistakes. For example, in its first paragraph occurs the statement that slavery is "explicit" in the U.S. Constitution. This is wrong; on the contrary,

the word does not appear in the Constitution until its explicit prohibition in the Thirteenth Amendment. The main author of the Constitution, James Madison, made clear at the time that he thought it “would be wrong to admit in the Constitution the idea that there could be property in man” and that therefore the damnable word was—explicitly—omitted from the Constitution. This was of considerable importance in the struggle against slavery and was germane, for instance, to the differences between William Lloyd Garrison and Frederick Douglass (Aptheker 1990, 93, 154). It continues to be of some importance in the struggle against racism.

I want to emphasize my own conviction that racism is never simply an idea; it is both an idea and a practice. I am convinced that history, and present reality, confirm this and the literature is vast and, of course, beyond the scope of this brief comment. But its truth is of fundamental concern in the question of the outlawry of racism.

Further, the reality of such outlawry has been touched upon by the paper’s author, but I think with insufficient emphasis. Laws relevant to this exist not only in some U.S. jurisdictions, but also in countries like Canada, the Netherlands, France, and Great Britain. A similar law exists in the German Federal Republic. That their enforcement, especially in the latter, leaves much to be desired is another question (see, for example, Angenfort 1989).

Here laws routinely (now) prohibit racist expressions (as in advertisements) as well as racist acts (as by employers, hotel owners, etc.)

And, of course, the history of the United Nations—founded upon the overcoming of fascism—is filled with resolutions and declarations denouncing the promulgation of racism, in idea or practice (some of which Walker cites), culminating in its antigenocide stance, finally ratified by Washington. It should be added that the Potsdam Agreement prohibits racist practice or literature for the German people (see Aptheker 1987, especially pp. 165–70)

In the past, the “right” of advocating racism was often invoked in this country. It was part of Abolitionism’s history. For example, when Garrison was invited to debate slavery with a leading Southern apologist, he angrily declined, affirming that he did not see what there was to “debate.” He insisted that freedom of speech had nothing to do with enslavement.

When the vicious film *Birth of a Nation* was first shown in the United States in 1915—depicting African-Americans as beasts and

glorifying the KKK, there were some on the board of the NAACP who objected to Du Bois's proposal to mount a campaign against it and to picket theaters showing it. They objected on the grounds that this violated the Bill of Rights. Not so, said Du Bois; this film justifies slavery, excuses lynching, glorifies the KKK, and does all this while African-Americans are being vilified and crucified. This is not a matter of the Bill of Rights, said Du Bois; this is a matter of justifying slaughter, of condoning racism. The board voted with Du Bois and he personally led picket lines against *Birth of a Nation* (the favorite film of the sitting president of the United States). Du Bois was right and so was Garrison and so was William Lloyd Patterson.

The Bill of Rights is a precious instrument meant to restrain injustice and to further freedom. It is not an instrument for inhibiting, let alone paralyzing, struggle against social injustice, of which racism is the single most awful example, especially in the United States.

Herbert Aptheker  
*University of California Law School*  
*Berkeley, California*

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## Response by Doris Brin Walker

I have long respected and admired Dr. Aptheker, so that I am particularly pleased that he finds himself in agreement with my two recommendations. I wrote the paper in order to make those two recommendations as strongly as I could. Following are my own brief comments on his comment.

My statement that slavery is "explicit" in the original U.S. Constitution is not a mistake. Article 1, Section 2 of the Constitution

apportions representatives and direct taxes among the states “according to their respective numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole number of *free persons*...three-fifths of all other persons” (emphasis supplied). The only “other persons” to which that provision refers are those persons who were not then “free,” namely, those who were slaves. The dictionary definition of “explicit” does not require that a reference be any more specific in order to be “explicit.” See Webster’s *New International Dictionary* (unabridged) 2d ed., p. 897. (It is interesting to note that in the “enumeration” of persons, i.e., the Census, required by this constitutional section, free women were not counted.)

I note Dr. Aptheker’s comment that the paper gives “insufficient emphasis” to the “outlawry of racism” in such countries as Canada, the Netherlands, France, Great Britain, and the German Federal Republic. I believe that here he gives insufficient attention to the differing legal histories of those countries. Concepts of free speech and the right to dissent differ from country to country, depending upon the historical struggles and the culture of each country. Dissent/free speech in the United States has had greater legal protection than in most, perhaps all, of the other countries of the world. That unique protection has substantial significance.

### **On Aptheker’s “The Theory of Peaceful Coexistence”**

In his commentary [*Nature, Society, and Thought*, vol. 2, no. 3 (1989): 367–76] on Herbert Aptheker’s “The Theory of Peaceful Coexistence” [*Nature, Society, and Thought*, vol. 1, no. 3 (1988):345–58], David Englestein notes that the Communist Party of the Soviet Union “at its Twenty-Seventh Congress voted to drop from its program...the definition of peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems as a ‘specific form of class struggle.’”

Probably there was something inexact all along in describing peaceful coexistence as a form of class struggle. I always took this formulation to *mean* that (1) class struggle continued even under conditions of peaceful coexistence, and that (2) the struggle to *secure, maintain, and extend* peaceful coexistence is a class struggle

because the key obstacle is certain deep-seated capitalist interests in the bourgeoisies of the imperialist countries (not that these interests are necessarily the only relevant ones influencing even the imperialist bourgeoisies' policies). But, of course, if that is what was meant, then that is what should have been said.

Englestein objects to the implication he detects of a willingness to “equate the interrelations between states of opposing social systems with the concept of the irreconcilability of class conflict, that is, to deny the possibility that that peaceful coexistence might continue over a long period—to negate the very foundation of peaceful coexistence, which is built on noninterference in the internal affairs of countries, respect for the independence and sovereignty of all countries, cooperation on the basis of complete equality, and so on” (p. 370).

Presumably Englestein will accept, for instance, that the international relations between the United States and Cuba or Nicaragua are relations of class struggle—and therefore, insofar as any other states assist Cuba and Nicaragua, however peacefully, the relations between those states and the USA are relations of class struggle *to that extent*. But Englestein will doubtless point out, correctly of course, that these interstate relations can also, at the same time, be wholly or partially relations of cooperation in some other respects. Why then does he insist so unqualifiedly that “the *international relations* of the Soviet Union and the United States...are not class-struggle relations” (p. 370, his emphasis)?

It is reading a lot into the 1961 formulation (“peaceful coexistence as a form of class struggle”) to interpret it as denying the possibility of prolonged peaceful coexistence or the imperative necessity, with few exceptions, to respect the independence and sovereignty of all countries.

Englestein is probably basing his reading on developments coming after 1961, and even after the 1967 essay of which Aptheker's later article in *NST* in a lightly revised [in 1986—Ed.] version. The possibility of such an interpretation of “peaceful coexistence as a form of class struggle” is a better reason for now dropping the phrase than for reading such meanings into Aptheker's 1967 essay.

Danny Goldstick  
*Philosophy Department*  
*University of Toronto*

## Background Materials

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### What Lies Ahead for Socialism

**Robert Steigerwald**

*The author, a well-known West German philosopher and leading figure in the German Communist Party, wrote this article for a forthcoming issue of the theoretical journal Marxistische Blätter, of which he is editor. Dr. Steigerwald will be a lecturer at the MEP Marxist Summer Institute at the University of Minnesota, 5–12 August 1990 (see page 6 for details). The English translation is by Erica Lepp.*

The European socialist countries are experiencing a time of deep crisis. The crisis encompasses all areas of society, including economic and political life, and extends into ideology. In my opinion, the essence of this crisis is that the model of socialism created in the Stalin era has proved incapable of solving the problems of our time. Whether this model was better suited to former conditions or whether it was wrong possibly even from the very beginning, bound to lead to a dead end, cannot be discussed here.

In what way has it been demonstrated that this model is inappropriate for our time? It was not able to solve the tasks set before it by the scientific and technological revolution even though capitalism was able to achieve remarkable results in this area. The model was not able to develop the capacity and the conceptions necessary for the solution of the problems facing humanity today. It could not bring about a transition to a concept and reality of socialism that meets the needs of the present. The survival of socialism required a break from this model.

What was fundamentally wrong with this inherited model of socialism? Above all, it had a completely false understanding of democracy.

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Despite its valid critique of bourgeois democracy, it was unsuccessful in creating a qualitatively new socialist democracy. Lenin and many of his coworkers made a serious and strenuous effort to create such a new type of democracy, a socialist democracy based on the councils (soviets). Stalin and his supporters, however, were characterized by an attitude which, in essence, was one of contempt toward the masses, toward the people. This attitude was the point of departure for their solution of problems. I do not refer here to the extremes of terroristic use of state power. Such methods did not occur in other socialist countries, which nevertheless find themselves in the same crisis. Therefore the fundamental error lies in the underdeveloped "democracy" in the state and the Party, rooted in a contempt for the people.

This approach involved a paternalistic-authoritarian form of exercise of power. The cult of personality was simply a logical result of this. This authoritarian style was extended to all areas of social life and led to a bureaucratic-authoritarian style of leadership, from the economy to theoretical work. Though not immediately evident, in the long run it resulted in not putting to adequate use, or ignoring altogether, the readiness or possibility of motivating the masses to employ their powerful productive force.

I have already said that this reached into theoretical work. The authority of the leader(s), not the process of scientific discussion, decided theoretical questions. It was thus no accident that in the encyclopedias the Party leader appeared as the greatest philosopher, economist, statesman, etc., at least in each respective country. Under such conditions, falling behind in the theoretical field, at the least a tendency to dogmatism, is almost unavoidable.

The lack of a really developed socialist democracy with its own openness and popular control over all social processes also contributed to the appearance within the leading nucleus of the Party of a conspicuous, deep-seated moral degradation without parallel; it resulted in a process of corruption, of betrayal of the values of socialism, of inevitable and widespread alienation of the leadership from the people, from their interests and needs. This had to have a strongly negative effect on the attitude of a large part of the people toward the socialism that had evolved.

In this way there accumulated a complex of practical and theoretical factors that together with the present crisis called forth the deep contradiction which exists, on the one hand, between the socioeconomic basis and the political-ideological superstructure (theoretically formulated, this is the essence of the present crisis) and, on the

other hand, also in its particular elements, thereby manifesting itself in the economy, politics, ideology, and theory.

If this assessment is correct, then the key to the solution of the problem lies in the development of socialist democracy—not democracy in general, because there is no such thing. Democracy always involves a particular epoch and in each epoch a democracy of certain forces.

We are thus dealing with the creation of a modern type of socialist democracy. A simple “Back to Lenin!” is not enough. We are dealing with new questions today, such as the survival of humanity, which did not exist in Lenin’s time. Also the people, that is, the subjective primary productive forces and their practical and theoretical resources, and hence the objective production forces, today have become totally different.

All of the socialist countries today find themselves, if I see it correctly, in the search for this new type of socialist democracy. And they are encountering serious problems for which there are still often no suitable answers. This expresses itself in questions of the plan and the market, their position in the international division of labor (with such detailed problems as the appropriate production mix, convertible currency, etc.), and the development of a socialist constitutional state, of a socialist division of labor (executive power) in the state, a socialist political pluralism, etc.

There is one further current serious set of problems: the contradictions of the Stalinist model of socialism, the serious lack of democracy, gave rise to a deep-seated alienation expressing itself in the attitudes toward property and extending to the state power and the Party associated with it. This alienation reached into the nucleus of the Party itself. Here a gap has arisen which in some cases necessitates resorting to economic and political forms of a presocialist and even bourgeois type. This is accompanied by corresponding ideological processes. Therein stands the danger that the necessary reforms of a revolutionary character (taking place within socialism, not against it) might deteriorate into a counterrevolutionary process, as was the case with earlier counterrevolutions.

This entire complicated process has been occurring above all in the GDR under the influence of the West German media, politicians, and parties in concentrated action from Kohl to Brandt—who have been openly and brazenly interfering ideologically, politically, and materially. For example, they worked to forge a united bloc against the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED). In fact, they did this

directly by raising the slogan of ending bloc politics and unity lists, and so on. This is a typical case of bourgeois hypocrisy.

On the whole, one gets the impression that in the European socialist countries recently a kind of dual leadership has been established, one socialist or basically socialist and one antisocialist. Both are struggling for exclusive power. It is in no way certain that socialism will come out the winner of this struggle. In some ways it looks more as if Gorbachev's attempt to break with Stalinism is being transformed into attempts to break with socialism. This would mean that the first worldwide historical effort to establish socialism has foundered and the point now is to secure the conditions for a second attempt, which then perhaps (and this is by no means certain) can take place under more favorable objective conditions and on the basis of richer experiences. (The struggle for peace would then begin to take on increasing importance because one can expect the imperialist powers to fight over the booty; global problems will also be important.) In no case, however, would such an indicated failure prove that socialism is to be abandoned as an idea, as a theory, as the future of society. The world will not live forever under capitalist conditions and the objective laws operating in capitalism itself point not only to a society in which there is socialized production, but to one in which there must be socialized appropriation. The idea for which the best of humanity struggled for two hundred years theoretically and practically, for which countless numbers sacrificed their lives, will not perish as a consequence of the Stalinist perversion of this idea—even though in the past, present, and future we have paid and will be paying a high price for it.

But the question: Who—To Whom? is still an open one. In my opinion, all the socialist states of Europe today find themselves in this dangerous situation of being between the necessary laying out of a path to a new, qualitatively different kind of socialism and the process of counterrevolution. In no way is it already certain that the path to a new future will be successful; in some cases just the opposite may occur. Without the possibility of a fundamental analysis, without taking into account a longer path of development and wider range of countries, it is, however, difficult and perhaps even impermissible to draw such far-reaching conclusions from afar. But that both possibilities exist seems certain to me.

*Eschborn, Federal Republic of Germany*

## Book Reviews

*When Marxists Do Research.* By Pauline Marie Vaillancourt. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1986. 220 pages, cloth \$35.

One must admire the author for having undertaken this “attempt to evaluate Marxist research.” It is an immense field, perhaps too great for one inquiry by a single author, even when the “central focus is on how different Marxist groups carry out social, political and economic inquiry.”

The greatest and undoubted value of the book, as I see it, consists in the aim of the author “to provide non-Marxists with a basic understanding of the various orientations within contemporary Marxism and with some appreciation for the quality and scope of their social research.” Much is done to reach this aim: readers get much information and many valuable insights about the value of Marxism for non-Marxist scientists—provided their eyes are not blinded by prejudices against Marxism.

The author acknowledges in the preface the “sin” that “complicated epistemological and methodological questions are presented in an oversimplified manner.” One cannot escape such “sins,” I suppose, in inquiries like this; simplification and schematization are almost indispensable in bringing order to the material. But the author does not avoid misleading in another way: she is not precise enough in some of her fundamental distinctions and concepts. I can deal here with only some of the questions of this sort that arose while I was reading the book.

The first and crucial question is: what is meant by “Marxist”? In spite of all differences among various groups and individuals, there must be something unifying so that it is reasonable to call them all “Marxists” — otherwise the whole inquiry would lack any proper basis. On this decisive point, however, I could not get rid of significant doubts about the author’s position. “Marxism” for her seems to have no precise philosophical or epistemological content, for “Marxists are deeply split over idealism and materialism and over the theories of knowledge and other epistemological assumptions related to each” (p. 18). To make “identity as Marxists” dependent on “a belief that equality and collective rights are more important than

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personal liberty and individual rights,” or in “the superiority of public ownership” (p. xvi), is obviously too vague as well as not sufficient for distinction. The qualification as “Marxist” also seems not to depend on the self-identification of the scholars in question, as one can see from the names Vaillancourt classifies within her four groups:

(1) *Philosophic* Marxists—who represent “the romantic dimension of Marxism” and are “closely linked to philosophical idealism.” Examples given are Lukacs and Korsch, W. Reich and H. Marcuse, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty (although existentialism is an original philosophical school, and by no means Marxist!). Also included are some Trotskyites, critical theorists like Habermas, and most of the late Frankfurt school (although “critical theory” is the name for the positions of the late Frankfurt school, and the early Habermas belonged to it).

(2) *Materialist* Marxists—the “pragmatic, practical, even anti-idealist, anti-philosophic Marxists”; with them the author associates the Austro-Marxists, the Marxists of the Second International, Plekhanov, Bukharin, and some contemporary scientists in both West and East. Materialists, so she supposes, “exercised authority in the USSR during the 1920s and again under Nikita Khrushchev”; they regain influence with Gorbachev (see p. 12).

(3) *Structuralist* Marxists—such as Althusser, Godelier, and others; here, the author is closest to reality (see p. 13).

(4) *Deductivist* Marxists—“Stalinist in political orientation... characterized by a strong insistence that social analysis must follow logically from what Marx, Engels, and Lenin wrote.” Early deductivists—the Deborinists (as “Hegelians”—why not “philosophics?” one could ask), “important” Soviet deductivists today—Ukrainsev, Rutkevich, Semenov.

As one can see, indeed a very multicolored picture! The choice seems to be (except the third group) rather accidental, and also “pragmatic”—for the “winning group” in all comparisons is the one named “materialists.” I could not shake the vague feeling, while reading, that this group was constructed in such a manner simply in order to “win” at the end (as the mathematician says at the end of a proof: “*quod erat demonstrandum*”).

The “other side” of the comparison, that is the point of view held by Vaillancourt herself, is also named in a generalizing manner—the generally accepted model of research (or inquiry)

(p. 4 and *passim*); although she confesses that “it is not universally recognized as valid” (p. 6). It would be very encouraging if a “commitment to philosophical materialism, to a materialist theory of knowledge, to determinism . . . to general empiricism, and to certain aspects of positivism” (as the author explicates it on p. 8), were generally accepted in non-Marxist social research, as she assumes (p. 15)—but I fear this is not the case.

The comparison between this “generally accepted model” and the four groups of “Marxist inquiry” (epistemological as well as methodological assumptions of research—chap. 2 to 5, and lastly, knowledge claims and policymaking—chap. 6) offers much of interest throughout, although I should like to dispute with the author about many of her theses. In particular, doubts remain as to whether the impreciseness mentioned does not do serious harm to the value of the results.

The choice of literature in the bibliography is to some extent as accidental as the choice of the representatives of the different groups—apparently depending on what is available in English or French translation. Even more, the author makes no distinction between clearly philosophical inquiries and, for instance, concrete sociology. (Almost no economic work is included.) This cannot be without consequences to the relation with, for example, empirical testing, or other items discussed. Here, the heterogeneity of the literature basis has a certain “predetermining” influence on the results of the comparisons.

Lastly, some words about chap. 6, “Knowledge Claims and Policymaking.” Basic for the author’s treatment of the latter field is a “policymaking model” which, I believe, is rather diffuse in a decisive aspect: when the goal of policymaking is defined as to “improve the human condition” (pp. 6, 166) or “to satisfy human needs” (pp. 6, 170). It is very strange, but the terms *classes* or *class struggle* do not even occur in this part of the inquiry. So the topic is discussed quite formally.

The final, summarizing question is, “What can non-Marxists expect to gain from examining Marxist research?” The answer, of course, is that “it depends on which Marxist current is being discussed” (p. 177). As one could see much earlier, the author concludes that “the materialists appear to be the most successful” (p. 176). But my doubts had not been resolved; the author did not convince me that a method “dependent on dialectical and historical materialism”

(as assumed for the deductivists) must be “formal and *a priori*” (p. 179) and hostile to empirical testing, nor that one needs a “pragmatic” attitude to bring out acceptable results, like the materialists in the author’s understanding; and especially, that only the materialists “define Marxism as open and subject to correction” (p. xvii). More precise definitions and a more differentiated sight on the subject of inquiry (a clear distinction between philosophical and concrete-sociological or economic investigation, for example) would have added greatly, I think, to the value of the results of this interesting book.

Gudrun Richter[  
*Academy of Sciences*  
*German Democratic Republic*

*The United States and the Direct Broadcast Satellite: The Politics of International Broadcasting in Space.* By Sara Fletcher Luther. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1988, 230 pages, cloth \$39.95.

This account of the regulatory-political and technological history of satellite communication has chronologies of international broadcast history going back to 1831 and of the International Telegraphic Union (ITU) back to 1865. Highlights in the chronology include the International Radio Treaty of 1912, Woodrow Wilson’s efforts for an international communication system, and Soviet international, multilanguage radio broadcasting, which undermined censorship in the commercial press. The book reprints relevant U.N. legislation, and its bibliography includes literature from the United Nations and developing and socialist nations as well as North America. There is a chapter dedicated to the relation between Marxist social theory and mass communication, in which authors from the socialist nations are sympathetically discussed.

The regulatory history of satellite communication has generally been in the interests of the public, despite corporate efforts to the contrary. The radio and television broadcast spectrum and thus the right to broadcast is controlled by the ITU, a U.N. specialized agency. Multinational conglomerates control only about 10 of the

ITU's 160 votes, hence the positive regulatory history of satellite communication.

The key legislative embodiment protecting the public interest is analyzed in Luther's chapter on international law. ITU Radio Regulations, Article 7, paragraph 428A (adopted in 1971 and ratified by the United States on 14 July 1972), prohibits satellite broadcast to a nation without its consent. In 1982 the U.N. General Assembly embodied the prior restraint provision in a resolution that is to serve as the basis for all future international conventions. Another positive regulation in behalf of the public interest is article VI of the Outer Space Treaty. Adopted by the United States in 1967, it makes states responsible for Direct Satellite Broadcast (DBS) activities carried out under their jurisdiction. Nongovernmental bodies (the commercial media), despite their many efforts, were given no DBS rights, except through their governments. The Outer Space Treaty, like many in the past forty years, builds on the U.N. Charter protection of national independence and sovereignty and its prohibition against intervention in the internal affairs of states.

In addition to international law, there are technological reasons why antidemocratic interests have failed to turn DBS into the international equivalent of North American commercial television. Such would require a new type of VHF set which does not exist and would be expensive to build. The present system of broadcasting to community earth stations for retransmission by cable is cheaper. The advent of the VCR for showing independent programs at home also cuts against DBS. It can be argued that independent programming is cheaper for viewers, who pay a hundred-dollar yearly "tax" for commercial network TV in the increased cost of the products they buy.

Luther comments that even if individual VHF sets were available for reception of commercial satellite transmission, it does not seem likely they could get an audience:

Within the United States, there is continuing commercial interest in the possible utilization of DBS as a domestic enterprise, although its low profitability and high cost, compared with the profitability and cost of existing methods of satellite and terrestrial broadcasting, make it less attractive than it might have seemed when it was new. In addition, the proliferation of cable television has made it more difficult for the establishment networks to deliver

large audiences to advertisers, a fact that has put a damper on new expenditures for DBS and has led the networks to expand into the cable business themselves. (139)

It is probably for both technological and legal reasons that the Voice of America's TV-Marti does not involve DBS, but is broadcast from a helium-filled balloon anchored in Cudjoe Key in Southern Florida.

The book started out as a Ph.D. dissertation and took more than a decade to complete. It records the struggle that occurred throughout the period. Democratic forces were and are concerned at the threat posed by the commercial media. Even public TV, which evolved from the popular land grant college educational tradition, is distorted by commercial pressure.

Luther's study points toward the opportunity which cable television is giving and will give trade unionists and nationality groups to expand their access to and mass participation in television. In spite of corporate domination, a progressive tradition exists in the electronic media. Among the several hundred nonprofit radio stations that broadcast in the 1930s and 1940s were those with programming that reflected the worker's point of view. Radio station WEVD (named for Eugene V. Debs), was owned by the American Workers Guild, which put up capital of \$120,000 to build its 25 kilowatt transmitter. Its programming included regular hours for African-American shows. In 1952 the AFL and CIO had a part in pressuring the Federal Communication Commission to reserve 209 VHF and UHF channels throughout the country for nonprofit TV. The United Automobile Workers was among a number of unions which helped finance the establishment of the Public Broadcasting Service in 1969. Systems like Bell Broadcasting in Detroit, KPRS in Kansas City, and Inner City Broadcasting in New York are owned by and serve the African-American community.

Since 1982 the AFL-CIO's Labor Institute of Public Affairs and its local manifestations such as California Working have been producing and distributing television programs featuring working people, their unions and their issues to public access cable and other network outlets. Regular programs produced include *Labor Beat* in Chicago, *Minnesota Working* in Minneapolis, *People Working for People* in New York, *California Working* in San Francisco, *Washington Works* in Seattle, *Lifestyles of All the Rest of Us* in Los

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Angeles, *Labor's Corner* in Pittsburgh, and *Rhode Island Labor-Vision*

This programming helps recruit new union members, train shop stewards, and raise consciousness concerning health, safety, and women's rights. Shows about such strikes as those by the Pittston miners and the Eastern Airline workers destroy the censorship which the commercial press seeks to impose by its failures in coverage. While ABC- and NBC-TV did not even mention the arrest in August 1989 of Lane Kirkland, head of the AFL-CIO, for exercising his constitutional right to picket the Pittston Coal Company, the United Mine Workers Office of Public Information and Day's Work Production produced a video, *They'll Never Keep Us Down* about the strike.

Currently the AFL-CIO's *Union YES* campaign budgets millions of dollars annually to spread the truth about labor through advertising on the commercial stations. A Gallop Poll in 1988 reported that some seventy million people recollected one series of *Union YES* spots. The AFL-CIO's International Labor Communications Association runs an annual competition for the best film and TV programming produced or commissioned by the association's 750 labor organizations. Most recently the Union Producers and Programmers Network was established to work for an even broader distribution of labor programming. Cable television should make it possible for labor and other popular-interest groups to function relatively inexpensively (\$30,000 for a small black-and-white operation) and go beyond programming to establish channels and networks.

Programming from the socialist nations is increasingly available in the United States. In August 1989 the PSC Corporation of Fairfax, Virginia, signed a five-year agreement with Gosteleradio to translate and market a package of popular Soviet TV programs. The programs will include *Vremya*, the most widely watched program in the world. The Intersputnik Communication System, which for the past twenty years has linked the socialist countries with satellites in geostationary orbit over the Atlantic and Indian Oceans, is listened to by various university departments throughout the United States and is available for wider distribution. Popular European interests and the developing nations have their systems which are also being used in the United States. Twenty nations, including Algeria, China, and Yugoslavia, are in the process of establishing what will be known as Third World Channel.

In the United States about half of the ninety million households

have cable. The affluent suburbs are well served, while the inner cities and rural areas are left out. Those presently without cable services have the most to gain from participation in popular programming. Luther's study helps us to understand why government ownership or subsidization of cable installation in the inner city and rural areas must be obtained as a matter of right. In this way television can be a full constructive element in national and international programs of education, family planning, and the eradication of illiteracy, poverty, exploitation, unemployment, and war.

Charles Brown  
*Detroit, Michigan*

Toby Terrar[  
*Encino, California*

*Marx and Modern Fiction*. By Edward J. Ahearn. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1989, 232 pages, cloth, \$22.00.

Edward J. Ahearn's *Marx and Modern Fiction* continues the development of a practical literary criticism out of classical Marxism that began in the work of Christopher Caudwell in the late 1930s and made its most recent advances in the work of Raymond Williams. Ours is a time in which much criticism and theory is Marxist in some degree; but, as Ahearn says, "many good scholars and teachers who have worked their way through the intricacies of Derrida, Lacan, or Althusser have paid rather little attention to, have read little in, Marx" (p. xii). Ahearn's knowledge of Marx is accurate and extensive, and he applies his Marxism directly to the texts that he studies, without the currently fashionable mediation of twentieth-century continental theorists. As Jack Lindsay observes in his important *Crisis in Marxism*, a major weakness of the continental thinkers is that they often lose themselves in the "theory of theory" and lose touch with "the unity of theory-practice which lies at the root of Marxism" (Lindsay 1981, 8).

The only exception to Ahearn's otherwise unmediated Marxist vision is in his occasional reliance on Luce Irigaray, whose Marxist-feminist

theory Ahearn draws upon for its insights into heterosexuality and homosexuality. Even though he explains that he needs Irigaray's ideas in order to discuss areas of life not specifically analyzed by Marx and Engels, he admits that her views are "controversial" (p. 16). In a book solidly grounded in the Marxist fundamentals that are clearly explicated in the first chapter, Ahearn might well have avoided the excursions into the speculative into which Irigaray takes him.

Ahearn's deviations from his determination to show "the direct usefulness of Marx for criticism of specific works" (p. xi) are, in any event, rare. He does not feel that his book must "master and subjugate all conflicting theory" (as does Fredric Jameson in his admirable *The Political Unconscious*), and his freedom from that burden makes possible his substantial contribution to applied rather than theoretical literary criticism and allows a welcome movement forward after at least a full decade of scholarly wandering in the wilderness of theory. Jameson has already called this book "a very central statement" (dust jacket). One may hope that it is the first of many books that will appear in a revival of classical Marxist criticism.

Ahearn sets out to show that the authors that he has selected for study—Jane Austen, Gustave Flaubert, Henry James, James Joyce, Honore de Balzac, William Faulkner, and Herman Melville—demonstrate "superior insight (a greater or lesser degree of world- historical consciousness) concerning the immense proof of the book's opening assertion that "Karl Marx's depiction of the origin of European capitalism . . ." provides the appropriate historical context for modern Western fiction, with surprisingly precise echoes in the literary works . . . studied" (p. 1). In other words, Ahearn is able to prove that these authors confirm, through their own analysis, the insights into the historical development of capitalism that are offered by Marx.

The seven authors may indeed be classic authors of the bourgeois era, masters of the novel, the literary genre whose development is most closely tied to the rise of the bourgeoisie, but Ahearn's analysis proves that they were bourgeois who were nonetheless, in the

language of Marx, capable, in varying degrees, of “comprehending theoretically the historical movement as a whole” (p. 4). “In no way,” Ahearn asserts, “do [their] works function as ideological justifications of the societal order” (p. 201). The authors offer a conscious critique of bourgeois culture through the events, language, images, and descriptions found in their novels and even, as he argues at the end of the book, through the narrative methods they employ.

The categories under which Ahearn discusses the social insights of the novelists are, of course, provided by Marx: alienation, the division of labor (which, following Marx, Ahearn says “has its historically most fundamental role in the opposition between country and city” [p. 5]), class and revenue, and mode of production, and accompanying Marxist “themes” arising from “analyses and critiques of religion, democratic values, the family, labor, possession, need, objects and the senses, commodities, and money” (p. 12). Ahearn defines these Marxist categories well, if too briefly, in an opening chapter of thirty pages, and then demonstrates, in exhaustive detail, how they serve as tools in the analysis of the novels under study.

As a method for studying classic bourgeois literature, Ahearn’s is one that produces convincing results. It is, moreover, clear that in this book the analysis that is required by this method of study is carried out by the most careful of scholars, one who is patient with the smallest detail. The readings will perhaps seem too close for anyone not simultaneously reading, or teaching, the novels under discussion; but classical Marxist scholarship, which must always offer stronger proofs than are required in scholarship against which there is less academic prejudice, is well served by such thorough compendia of evidence as Ahearn offers.

Critics, both Marxist and non-Marxist, have, for instance, seen how the world of a Jane Austen novel is one saturated with concern about money. But no one has treated this aspect of Austen in such detail as Ahearn, and no one has achieved the level of clarity that his careful use of Marxist categories makes possible. When Ahearn suggests that “irony and ironic literary forms [are] resistances to the oppression of material and historical forces [and] safeguards of inner freedom,” we can see that Jane Austen, whose participation in world-historical consciousness Ahearn proves, was an author for whom irony served just such a purpose. She is, although reporting the values and characteristic activities of the class into which she was born,

also Radical Jane—as the title of one of Ahearn’s chapters names her.]

Ahearn offers readings of the other six novelists that are as stimulating and as well-grounded in the details of the novels as is his analysis of Austen. Perhaps, with Ahearn’s book showing afresh the powerful insights possible through classical Marxist criticism, some of its earlier adherents will be treated with more justice. Robert Sullivan’s recent *Christopher Caudwell* (1987) has shown that Caudwell remains a force to be dealt with in modern criticism, but books like A. L. Morton’s *The English Utopia* (1952) and *The Matter of Britain* (1966) suffer undeserved neglect. Literary works like those studied by Ahearn are, as he says, “every bit as much reproductions, representations, workings up, appropriations of human reality as those of political economy or other social sciences” (p. 24). To understand such reports on the socially created human reality, it is essential that we have the sort of criticism that critics like Caudwell and Morton have written. In their work what Jack Lindsay calls the “unity of theory-practice,” and indeed the relationship of critical work to labor struggle, is not lost. They, with Raymond Williams and some others, are in the mainstream of Marxist criticism—to which Ahearn’s work is a worthy addition.

Victor N. Paananen  
*Department of English*  
*Michigan State University*

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# MEP Publications Style Guide

(January 1990)

The *Chicago Manual of Style* (13th ed., 1982), abbreviated *CMS* herein, is the basic style authority for MEP and should be consulted to answer any questions not specifically covered by the MEP PUBLICATIONS STYLE GUIDE. *Webster's New World Dictionary* (3d col. ed., 1988) is our first-reference desk dictionary.

## I. Spelling and Special Treatment of Words

### A. Terminology

1. Do not use *America* or *American* to refer to the United States. Write out United States when used as a noun; *U.S.* may be used as an adjective.  
But: American Revolution; American Civil War
2. Use *USSR* as noun, *Soviet* as adjective. For other countries, use full name on first use, with abbreviation (if to be used subsequently) following in parentheses: *Federal Republic of Germany (FRG)*.
3. Do not use the *West* and the *East* (or forms of these) to refer to capitalist and noncapitalist countries.
4. Population groups within the United States:  
*African-American* is now the preferred term; when *Black* is used to refer to this national group, it is capitalized  
*Euro-American* may be used; if *white* is used, it is not capitalized (since no single national group is designated, the term is not analogous to a proper noun).  
*Latina/o* is preferred for those of Latin-American background, *Chicana/o* for Mexican-Americans. Do not use Hispanic.
5. Use gender-neutral and gender-inclusive terms and compounds. Do not use the generic *he* or *man*; rather than using forms like *s/he*, recast sentence (retaining pronoun agreement) For example, instead of: *Each author should reread his paper*, write: *Authors should reread their papers*.

### B. Capitalization

1. Capitalize the following:  
Liberal Party (and others, when full proper name is given)

Native American  
Red  
the Left, the Right  
Second World War, World War II  
Third World

2. Do *not* capitalize the following:

cold war  
leftist, right-winger  
white (Euro-American)[

### **C. Possessives**

1. Singular nouns, add apostrophe and an *s*; plural nouns, add apostrophe only (except for a few irregular plurals). This general rule covers proper names as well as common nouns, including most names of any length ending in sibilants

Marx's theories                      Engels's works  
Dickens's novels                      the Joneses' car

2. For exceptions, see *CMS*, pp. 160–62.

### **D. Hyphenation**

1. Prefixes

Most common prefixes are now written solid except with capitalized nouns or adjectives. See *CMS* list of compound words (pp. 176–81) and check a recent standard desk dictionary; *Webster's New World*, for instance, lists several hundred nonhyphenated compounds at non-. Examples:

nonunion, antiwar, midsummer, unstable, proslavery  
*But:* neo-Darwinian

2. Compound modifiers

Most compound modifiers are hyphenated when they come before the noun they modify:

a well-known writer, hand-to-hand combat, soft-coal miner

Some compounds remain open (not hyphenated):

civil rights struggles, cold war policy,  
high school sports, highly developed economy

### **E. Spelling & miscellaneous**

- \**lifestyle*, *worldview*, and *sugarcane* are written solid as single words.
- \**day care* and *work force* are each two words.
- \*Spell *judgment* and *acknowledgment* without the extra e
- \**data* takes a plural verb.
- \**politics* and *dialectics* take singular verbs.
- \*The plural of *apparatus* is *apparatuses*.
- \**practice* is normally preferable to *praxis*.
- \*For emphasis, or for discussing a word as a word, use italics (underlining in typescript) rather than quotation marks. Single quotes should be used only for specialized philosophical terms (see i> 6.53, 6.60–63).

## **II. Numbers**

### **A. Figures or words**

1. If it takes more than two words to write out a number, use figures:  
150 *not* one hundred and fifty
2. Keep numbers compared in the same style.  
5 out of 362 and *not* five out of 362

### **B. Percentages**

1. Percentages and decimal fractions (including academic grades) are set in figures in humanistic as well as scientific copy:  
For these purposes pi will be considered equal to 3.14.  
Grades of 3.8 and 95 are identical.
2. In scientific and statistical copy use the symbol % for a percentage, in humanistic copy, the word *percent*

### **C. Dates**

1. In text, notes, and bibliographies, exact dates should be listed day, month, year (without commas):  
10 July 1986  
The events of August 1945 were decisive.

2. Figures or words may be used for decades:  
in the 1970s or in the seventies

### **III. Punctuation**

#### **A. Periods**

1. Do not use periods in: FBI, CIO, CP, USSR, GDR, FRG
2. Abbreviate *et alii* as *et al.* not *et. al*

#### **B. Commas**

1. Use a comma before the final *and* in a series:  
Smith, Harkins, and Jones

### **IV. Quotations**

\*For handling quotations in the text, see chapter 10 in CMS.

\*Note especially how to handle ellipses (pp. 292\–96). For ellipsis within a sentence, use three spaced periods—that is, leave a space before and after each period. For ellipsis after the end of a sentence, use three spaced periods following a sentence period—that is, four periods, with no space before the first:

After the coup . . . military rule was reinstated.  
racial discrimination and prejudice . . . He was genuinely

\*Do not use ellipsis points at the beginning or end of a quoted passage.

\*Indent and block any quotation longer than eight to ten typed lines (CMS) or quotations with special emphasis.

### **V. Documentation**

#### **A. Author-date system**

This method of giving citations parenthetically in the text is explained in CMS, chapters 15 and 16, esp. pp. 400–405. A brief summary and examples are given below.

1. Form: List the last name of the author(s) and the year of publication in parentheses. Use no punctuation between the name and the date. The page number, if used, follows the date, preceded by a comma. If author's name or

date appears in the text, do not repeat it in the parenthesis. The parenthetical citation is best placed just before a punctuation mark, preferably at the end of a sentence or clause:

This forgery has been attributed to Oswald (Smith 1982, 16).

The parenthesis should be placed immediately after the author's name early in a sentence only if necessary for clarity.

- 2 Following a block quotation, the parenthetical citation should follow the final mark of punctuation of the quotation, with no mark of punctuation after the final parenthesis:

No poem written by a thirty-year-old, surely, has ever so totally rejected so many of the beliefs of the society it was written in. No poem, certainly, has lived to see so many of its heresies so widely accepted before its author turned forty. (Hodgson 1976, 323)

## **B. Bibliography**

Citations in the text must be keyed to a list of all the works cited, titled "Bibliography." This list should be typed double spaced on a page (or pages) following the last page of the text (or endnotes, if any). It may include works not cited specifically in the text. All works should be arranged alphabetically by author; multiple works by one author should be arranged chronologically. If a single author appears also as editor and as first of several coauthors, entries with this name as author appear first, then those with this name as editor, then a coauthor. The examples below indicate the style which citations of various types of publications should follow (see also *CMS*, chap. 16, Style A):

Books:

Green, Gil. *Cuba at 25: The Continuing Revolution*. New York: International Publishers, 1983.

Levernier, James A., and Douglas R. Wilmes, ed. *American Writers Before 1800*. 3 vols. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1983.

\*Supply both place of publication (first city only) and name of publisher as it appears on title page.

Articles:

In books:

Mullings, Leith. "Ethnicity and Stratification in the Urban United States." In *Racism and the Denial of Human Rights: Beyond Ethnicity*, edited by Marvin J. Berlowitz and Ronald S. Edari, 21–38. Minneapolis: MEP Publications, 1984.

In journals:

Navarro, Vicente. "Health, Health Services, and Health Planning in Cuba." *International Journal of Health Services* 2 (Winter 1972): 123–42.

\*For volume numbers of books (as well as journals), use Arabic figures. For journal articles and parts of books, indicate inclusive page numbers as follows: 3–17, 23–25, 100–103, 104–7, 124–28, 1115–20.

\*Abbreviate months in three letters except for May, June, July, Sept.

### **C. Endnotes**

In addition to author-date references, endnotes may be used *sparingly*, i.e., only when further discussion is necessary. If only a phrase is needed, place it in the text in parentheses rather than in an endnote; examples: (see also Smith 1982, 212) or (compare Mullings 1984).

Form: Endnotes must be numbered consecutively and correspond with numbers in the text. Type the list of notes double spaced on a page (or pages) following the last page of the text. References within endnotes should also follow the author-date system with the full reference included in the Bibliography.

### **VI. Citations from the Classics of Marxism**

For the convenience of readers, authors are asked to cite the the Progress Publishers edition of *Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Collected Works* (also issued by International Publishers, New York, and Lawrence & Wishart, London), and the Progress Publishers edition of *V. I. Lenin: Collected Works*.